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To Gary Willis.
And moreover what can be sweeter to our thoughts than the image 
of a true and constant love, which we are assured our friend doth 
bear us? What happiness to have a friend to whom we may safely 
open our heart, and trust him with our most important secrets, 
without apprehension of his conscience, or any doubt of his 
fidelity? What content to have a friend whose discourse sweetens 
our cares? Whose counsels disperse our fears? Whose conver-
sation charms our griefs? Whose circumspection assures our 
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INTRODUCTION
 […] For thou hast been
As one in suff ’ring all, that suffers nothing,
A man that Fortune’s buffets and rewards
Hast ta’en with equal thanks. And blest are those
Whose blood and judgment are so well commeddled
That they are not a pipe for Fortune’s finger
To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
That is not passion’s slave, and I will wear him
In my heart’s core, ay, in my heart of heart,
As I do thee. 
Shakespeare, Hamlet (3.2.66–75)*
Prior to this eulogy on Horatio’s blessed balance of ‘blood and 
judgement’, Hamlet gives his advice to the players, in which he 
conjures the embarrassing image of a bad actor in a wig, to warn 
the actors against ‘tear[ing] a passion to tatters’ (3.2.10) with over-
emphatic gestures and too much shouting. In both art and life, 
then, Hamlet seems to privilege cool judgement over hot passion. 
The description of Horatio as ‘one in suffering all that suffers 
nothing’ suggests a complete detachment from the emotions 
produced by ‘fortune’s buffets and rewards’, a stoical paradigm of 
self-control in the face of the slings and arrows Hamlet has already 
contemplated in the play (3.1.58). A similar privileging of reason 
over passion emerges in a range of early modern treatises on the 
passions. While the apatheia with which Hamlet credits Horatio 
is regularly dismissed as unnaturally blockish and un-Christian1 
much of the advice available to the early modern reader on the 
subject of emotion concerns its restraint and control. The reader 
is either advised against indulging the passions at all, or told 
that their expression should be moderated.2 It is brutish to feel 
nothing – but to feel too much is to reduce oneself to the the level 
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of the unreasoning animal. Whereas today, emotion in Western 
culture is regarded as an individuating force – when exhorted 
to ‘express yourself ’ it is often emotion one is being asked to 
‘express’ – the early modern passions are frequently described 
as that which makes one less of an individual. The passions are 
material forces barely under the control of what really makes 
man human: his sovereign reason. Indeed, the four examples of 
emotion or emotional affect/effect that head up the chapters of 
this book – anger, laughter, love and grief – often appear to the 
early modern philosophical mindset to sit along a continuum at 
the far end of which is madness. Anger is a potentially murderous 
mania; the mad laugh unpredictably and inappropriately; love 
leads to the sickness of ‘love melancholy’; grief is the prime 
producer of melancholic insanity.
Hamlet’s ideal of the perfect actor and his paradigm for the 
perfect, dispassionate friend are not the same. True, in advising 
the Players against ‘anything so o’erdone’ (3.2.21) as gestural 
air-sawing and vocal passion-tearing, he uses the imagery of 
weather in a similar vein to early modern sermons on the restraint 
of the passions in everyday life. For Thomas Playfere in his 
sermon on The Mean in Mourning (1595), crying is compared to 
the weather: too much weeping is like an economically unpro-
ductive, physically destructive storm:
The water when it is quiet, and calm, bringeth in all 
manner of merchandise, but when the sea storms, and 
roars too much, then the very ships do howl and cry. The 
air looking clearly, and cheerfully refresheth all things, 
but weeping too much, that is, raining too much, as in 
Noah’s flood, it drowns the whole world.3
‘In the very torrent, tempest, and, as I may say, the whirlwind of 
your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may 
give it smoothness’, insists Hamlet (3.2.5–8) as he holds forth on the 
actor’s craft. However, Hamlet does suggest that this temperance of 
theatrical expression is somehow to be found in ‘the whirlwind of 
your passion’ rather than that there should be no such whirlwind in 
the theatre, whereas his praise of his friend implies that Horatio has 
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found the state of perfect stoical apatheia, in which misfortune and 
luck are regarded with equally dispassionate equanimity.
Hamlet’s first encounter with the Players after their arrival at 
Elsinore (2.2) seems to sit even less easily with his praise of the 
man who is not a slave to his passions. While Polonius finds the 
First Player’s tears for Hecuba just too much (2.2.499, 520–1), 
Hamlet is delighted with the actor’s theatrical production of 
emotion and takes the tearful delivery of the Trojan battle 
narrative as a rebuke to his own lack of passionate action in 
avenging his father. So it is not that Hamlet thinks that passionate 
expression is only for actors: he takes the actor’s example as one 
he should follow in his own life. Were he able to permit passion 
to overwhelm him as this actor can, birds of prey would be at his 
uncle’s corpse already (2.2.581–2). And should the Player have 
had similar passionate ‘motive and […] cue’ (561) for his speech 
as Hamlet has to support his revenge, far from turning the Player 
into an embarrassing, overacting Herod of a performer,
[…] He would drown the stage with tears
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech,
Make mad the guilty and appall the free,
Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed
The very faculties of eyes and ears.
(562–6)
Here, over-passionate acting would be ‘overdone’ not in the 
sense of bombastic and implausible; it would rather be beyond 
effective, too much to bear, storm-like in a way that seems impos-
sibly impressive in its excess. If the court were filled with men 
like Horatio, there would be no crimes like Claudius’s, governed 
by lust for sex and power. But there would also be no theatre, 
no performance like the player’s to impress Hamlet – and no 
one driven to passionate action in a cause either wrong or right 
in social life. The man who is not passion’s slave does not make 
a very successful dramatic hero; Horatio’s ability to suppress 
rather than to act upon his emotions, to govern himself entirely 
by his reason, would mean no star-cross’d lovers, enraged fathers, 
jealous husbands, furious warriors, jovial and self-indulgent 
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drunks or murdering uncles. In praising the actor’s art, Hamlet 
seems to be suggesting that there are times when people need to 
be as passionate in their expression and action as actors.
This is a book about ‘excessive’ emotion in the theatre in 
which Shakespeare worked, in the plays of Shakespeare and 
his contemporaries, and in the productions of those plays in 
performance today. It inevitably poses questions about what 
emotional excess actually is: how much or what kind of emotional 
expression is too much? What kinds or expressions of emotion 
are considered legitimate in theatrical culture and social life, what 
kinds or expressions of emotion are considered worthy of shame, 
repression and punishment? How does our own expression and 
reception of emotion – in the theatre and, more broadly, in our 
everyday lives – lead us to interpret the work of the early modern 
dramatists? In this book I will be exploring the cultural politics 
of emotion in Shakespeare’s plays – and historicizing the ways in 
which we reproduce and receive them in the theatre. Writers and 
thinkers of the early modern period had all kinds of things to say 
about what we might call the emotions; a significant amount of it 
was negative, as Hamlet suggests in his positive evaluation of the 
reasonable Horatio. Yet people regularly came to the theatre to 
watch people laugh inappropriately, get murderously angry, fall 
madly in love and grieve inconsolably. This book contends that 
the early modern theatre is a place where audiences went to watch 
extremes of emotion and to consider when those extremes became 
excesses. It suggests that because of the social and political signifi-
cance of the passions in early modern drama, and because of the 
ways in which emotion is structured politically in the plays, they 
are a particularly rich site for discussions of how our own society 
conceives of, celebrates and regulates emotion.
EMOTION THEN AND NOW
The early modern period may have valued the expression or 
display of emotion in very different ways from twenty-first-
century Western culture but the differences are not simple to 
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define. A visitor to, say, one of the Royal Shakespeare Company’s 
theatres in the UK today might regard it as just one site of legit-
imate and desired emotional expression. That audience member is 
likely to have been interpellated,4 by films and television dramas, 
by advertising, by the therapeutic community, and in certain 
educational contexts, into what one might call an emotionally 
expressive being, one whose modes of emotional expression 
define the self. He or she may have been told by his or her school-
teachers that while expressing one’s own emotions is valuable, 
the dramatic poetry in which Shakespeare expressed emotion is 
all the more so for its profundity and universality. If the kinds of 
anxieties around influence and mimesis expressed by the Puritan 
anti-theatrical tracts5 have lasted at all over 400 years, they have 
shifted on to other media – films and computer games. Early 
modern drama, particularly that of Shakespeare, is overwhelm-
ingly regarded by today’s English-speaking cultural authorities as 
good for you, partly because it is supposedly so good at depicting 
characters’ emotional expression. A recent scientific and educa-
tional agenda around ‘emotional intelligence’ and ‘emotional 
literacy’ has privileged emotion as part of a rationally regulated, 
functioning society, complicating once again a binary of reason 
and emotion that appears never to have been conceived of as 
simple in the first place. Shakespeare has played a part in this 
agenda, in the classroom and in training for the workplace.6
The theatre of Shakespeare’s London was clearly valued 
by the state’s highest authorities, yet it also held something 
of a precarious legal position.7 If Hamlet’s awe at the First 
Player’s tears for Hecuba are anything to go by, the passions it 
portrayed were an essential part of its draw, despite the anxiety 
around the passions demonstrated by some of the treatises I 
will examine here. Are sermons such as Thomas Playfere’s (see 
p. xiv), which describes too much weeping as destructive nature 
out of control, pointlessly attempting to legislate against the 
emotional outpourings of an essentially passionate culture which 
best expressed itself through its theatre? Were attempts to police 
the emotions through tracts and sermons no more successful 
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than the repeatedly reimposed sumptuary laws of Elizabeth’s 
reign, which uncover a society determined to indulge in sartorial 
excesses as much as an authority eager to rein them in?8 A 
number of recent film and television productions in the UK have 
concerned themselves with the supposedly unbridled passions of 
this period. Popular characterizations of the ‘Tudors and Stuarts’ 
in television drama and documentary have suggested that if our 
own culture is exhorted to greater and greater outpourings of 
emotion, Shakespeare’s contemporaries were even more ready to 
demonstrate the passions (particularly lust and anger, if Michael 
Hurst’s The Tudors is anything to go by).9 A documentary still 
on air at the time of writing, Ian Hislop’s Stiff Upper Lip,10 
has characterized early modern England as a culture of wildly 
demonstrative shows of both anger and affection, in comparison 
to the repressed rigours of Victorian Stoicism that developed 
through the age of empire and in the English Public School (see 
p. 27). In the academy, 2011 has seen the publication of Richard 
Strier’s monograph, The Unrepentant Renaissance; this rigorously 
historicist work demonstrates ways in which affect and emotion 
were highly valued in the dramatic, literary and religious works of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and points to a thriving 
anti-Stoical position in the art and society of the period.11 Here, 
I too am going to assume that the expression of extreme emotion 
was something that people came to the theatre to see and hear – 
to take pleasure in, in fact. But rather than suggesting that it is 
completely mistaken to read anxiety around emotional expression 
in the cultural products of the early modern period, I want to 
argue that the theatre was a place for pushing at the boundaries 
of what society regarded as the legitimate expression of emotion, 
for interrogating and debating those boundaries.
Having begun to make claims for what this book will do in terms 
of early modern scholarship, I should state that one of its central 
purposes is to consider how actors and audiences deal with ideas 
about emotional excess in early modern drama today. Whether 
visitors to the theatre recognized a broadly similar spectrum of 
emotions in what they saw and heard on the early modern stage 
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as they do now, or whether the different historical conditions in 
which the plays were produced and received make it impossible for 
us even to conceive of how early modern audiences may have felt 
in response to the emotions they saw and heard depicted on stage, 
my aim has been to draw the reader into a debate around what 
the theatre can do today with these historical/cultural differences 
and similarities. I am particularly interested in questions of how 
early modern audiences judged or valued the emotions they heard 
and saw performed and whether we judge or value differently. 
The language of the plays, the dramatic and literary traditions 
and conventions upon which they drew, the dramaturgy of the 
plays and the ways in which they were rhetorically structured to 
engage audiences, the architectural structures in which audiences 
were invited to engage with emotion expressed in theatrical 
fictions, the ideas circulating in early modern writings on the 
passions – all these cultural phenomena may be read in terms 
of what it might have been possible to feel in the early modern 
theatre. But if it is possible to make informed speculations about 
what kind of emotional expression was considered laudable or 
shameful, pitiable or risible, enjoyably or horribly excessive, how 
do we put those speculations to work in the theatre today? I hope 
that this book can be part of a dialogue between the theatre and 
the academy about the ways in which we receive and remake the 
cultural artefacts of the past.
EMOTIONAL. EXCESS. SHAKESPEAREAN
Emotional
All of the terms in the main title of this book are politically and 
historically contentious. The first Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED) citation of the adjective ‘emotional’ (as I have used it in 
the title here, to mean ‘Of or relating to the emotions’) is not 
until 1831.12 The OED’s first citation of the word ‘emotion’ to 
mean ‘an agitation of mind, an excited mental state’ is from 1602, 
though the common equivalent term to ‘emotion’ as it is currently 
conceived was ‘passion’ and even to name this as an ‘equivalent’ 
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is to open oneself to the accusation of anachronism. As we will 
see, historians of the emotions have suggested that the shift from 
passion to emotion in common usage over 200 years reflects a shift 
in underlying concept, indeed a shift in somatic, psychological 
and cultural experience. The OED’s 1602 citation does place 
‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in interesting proximity:
1602 T. LODGE tr. Josephus Wks. XV. iv. 388 The king 
entred into a strange passion…and in this emotion or 
rage of jealousie [Fr. en ceste fureur de ialousie] hardly 
contained he himselfe from killing his wife.
This might suggest that a shift is beginning to occur from the 
use of emotion to mean ‘political agitation or unrest’ (first OED 
citation 1562), or ‘movement, disturbance or perturbation’ (first 
OED citation 1594), to its current definition as of ‘any strong 
mental or instinctive feeling, as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, etc., 
deriving esp from one’s circumstances, mood, or relationship 
with others’.13 In 1602, passions are movements, disturbances, 
perturbations of the mind. However, Lodge’s use of the word 
‘emotion’ in this context suggests that the word ‘passion’ has not 
yet accrued the positive and subjectivity-defining connotations 
that the word ‘emotion’ has in many English speaking cultures 
today. Thomas Dixon has pointed to anachronistic pitfalls of 
assuming that terms such as emotion and emotional, passion and 
passionate, feeling, affection and expression mean the same across 
history.14 Neither can we assume that each of these terms has an 
equivalent in every historical period – that we are all feeling and 
expressing the same things across 400 years and simply naming 
them differently.
Here it is worth noting that the field of the history of the 
emotions contains an epistemological tension: broadly, between 
a discipline such as my own, namely Theatre and Performance 
Studies, which is interested in the ways in which language 
and history (arguably) constitute meaning, and the Sciences, 
whose overriding research imperative is to discover things about 
the material world which (arguably) pertain throughout history. 
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These two broad modes of inquiry need not entirely contradict 
one another. It is mainly only in the comic novel now that post-
structuralist Humanities scholars are still be found berating 
scientists for their essentialism.15 However, if a scientist were to 
demonstrate to me, as I have no doubt she could, that no matter 
what a seventeenth-century man’s social class or religious belief 
was, he would still be flooded with adrenalin when fearful, I 
would reply that this material reality is not necessarily material 
to my interest in the cultural phenomena that produce fear, and 
legitimize or punish its expression. I am not so much interested in 
what is physically produced in moments when human beings are 
in the grip of strong passions. Perhaps it is humoral imbalance; 
unsurprisingly, writing in 2013, I do not believe this, though, like 
Michael Schoenfeldt, I often find that the language of Galenic 
medicine ‘yields an [intuitively plausible] account of what it 
feels like to experience certain corporeal phenomena’16. Or it 
could be or hormonal and neurological activity, the science of 
which seems to me to be convincing. But I am more interested in 
which expressions or demonstrations of emotion are considered 
to be reasonable and legitimate in different historical and theat-
rical cultures, and which excessive, disapproved, shameful. I am 
interested in the binaries of reason and excess as they existed in 
the early modern period and as we read them today, and in the 
resultant sets of expressions and repressions, displays and hidings 
of emotion that are staged in the theatre and in everyday life.
 Why use Emotional Excess in this book’s title, then, when the 
early moderns would not have understood the phrase? Why not 
‘Passionate Excess’, for example, to match early modern treatises 
on the ‘passions’, and to fit Hamlet’s line from my subtitle? Aside 
from the issue of what ‘Passionate’ might mean to the reader 
today,17 I want to retain, throughout this book, the sense of 
‘motion’ in ‘emotion’ with which the early moderns would have 
been familiar and to take quite literally and theatrically the early 
idea that when in a heightened emotional state, we are ‘moved’. 
Early modern figurations of the passions, as Thomas Dixon has 
pointed out, were founded upon Aristotelian concepts of rest and 
xxii Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage
motion, taken up by Aquinas in his explication of the ‘irascible’ and 
‘concupiscible’ passions18 and drawn upon by the authors of the 
early modern treatises, such as Wright in his Passions of the Mind in 
General (see pp. 13–14, 113–14). I am interested here in the inter-
relationship of movement and emotion in the production of early 
modern drama today, and how attention to what those things meant 
in the theatre of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
might give us interesting things to do and feel in the theatre today.
The first cited uses of the word emotion, then, before it came 
to be explicitly associated with human feeling, suggest political as 
well as somatic turbulence and movement. Underpinning all the 
examples of theatrical passions explored in this book is a sense in 
which all the passions are propulsive and political. Many of the 
early modern treatises on the passions figure them as turbulent 
movements it is impossible to control. Patience in the face of 
adversity is stasis, passion is movement (although melancholy, as 
we will see, produces a stasis of its own; see pp. 197–8). As such, 
the passions are a potential threat to social stability. Today, as 
the early moderns did, we speak of being ‘moved’ – but imagine 
someone being ‘moved’ by a news story or a fiction and I doubt the 
image conjured contains much actual movement. While ‘moved’ 
and ‘moving’ have become metaphors for a compassionate, often 
sorrowful, feeling ‘towards’ a person or incident, that ‘towards’ 
has lost its sense of direction, whereas ‘moved’ as it is used in the 
early modern drama is much more active: it can contain the same 
sense of compassionate feeling but usually results in someone 
being moved to do something. Burgundy’s letter explaining his 
re-defection to the French in 1 Henry VI reads:
I have, upon especial cause,
Mov’d with compassion of my country’s wrack.
Together with the pitiful complaints
Of such as your oppression feeds upon,
Forsaken your pernicious faction
And join’d with Charles, the rightful King of France.
(4.1.55–60)
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Speaking of his father’s past support of Bolingbroke, Hotspur 
relates that ‘My father, in kind heart and pity moved,/Swore 
him assistance and perform’d it too’ (1 Henry IV, 4.3.64–5). One 
can be moved to compassionate deeds and moved to angry ones, 
and even where there is no obvious move to action as a result of 
inner motion/emotion, being moved is associated with action 
and movement. ‘A woman moved is like a fountain troubled’ 
(5.2.143) says Katherine in her final speech of capitulation to her 
role as perfect wife. While your husband is obliged to move about 
the world for you, she argues, committing ‘his body/To painful 
labour both by sea and land,/To watch the night in storms, the 
day in cold’, the woman is fortunate enough to lie ‘warm at home, 
secure and safe’ (5.2.149–52). Women, at the end of The Taming 
of the Shrew, should stay ‘unmoved’ both mentally and physically 
– and it is difficult to extricate the two in early modern English. 
When Tullus Aufidius sees Caius Martius Coriolanus’ tears in 
the face of his family’s pleas and hears Martius give up the attack 
on Rome, Aufidius responds by telling Martius very simply, ‘I 
was mov’d withal’ (5.3.197). But in performance, Aufidius is 
rarely portrayed as ‘moved’ in the modern sense of empathetic 
tearfulness. His response is ambiguous – and in fact he is moved 
to have Coriolanus killed. Passion is motion/emotion in the early 
modern drama and often leads to passionate action. Emotion is 
thus a political issue for this period, in a way that has been masked 
by Western culture’s current tendency to think of emotion as 
private and ‘personal’. In what follows I consider ways in which 
the production of early modern drama today can re-politicize 
emotion for a modern audience.
My other reason for the use of the term ‘emotional’ in 
this title is connected to the equally contestable term ‘the 
Shakespearean stage’, by which I mean not only the stage of 
Shakespeare’s historical period but the stages which continue to 
produce Shakespeare’s work. This book is an exercise in linking 
theatre and cultural history to the ways in which we perform 
plays from the early modern period today. To make historical 
comparison, one inevitably start with the discourse through 
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which one understands one’s own moment, even as one acknowl-
edges its partial inadequacy to the period studied. Using the 
words ‘emotion’ and ‘emotional’ acknowledges that I am writing 
about what audiences today would think of as having to do with 
‘emotion’. Having argued thus, I do not deny that the term 
‘emotional’ has a problematic – because possibly misleading – 
history in the theatre. It is at the centre of a misunderstanding 
about acting – particularly about acting 400-year-old plays – 
which suggests that acting is all about how characters feel about 
things. But to re-politicize the emotional, to re-inflect it with 
its early modern sense of movement, I am going to start with 
this term, to which audiences in the West today feel they have a 
close relationship and which many assume speaks of something 
universal, transhistorical. I too read something transhistorical 
in this term – its sense of motion, even though that sense is 
lost to everyday usage. As we will see (pp. 193, 270n. 41), for a 
significant group of directors of Shakespeare today, powerful, 
engaging acting is underpinned not by ‘emotion’ in its current 
common sense of what we ‘feel’ about people and circum-
stances, or in the Stanislavskian sense of emotion memory (the 
generation of emotion for a character through remembering one’s 
own emotions) but achieved through action, as Stanislavski also 
argued.19 Stanislavski’s technique of finding objectives for units 
of dramatic text – verbs that suggest what a character is trying 
to do with words – was intended to produce authentic emotion 
in the actor, readable by an audience. Read Stanislavski and his 
proponents and one finds a spiritual rhetoric which valorizes 
emotion and the inner life in ways that suggest a very different 
understanding of human subjectivity from an early modern one.20 
But his method of physical action propels performers towards 
and away from one another, like the concupisciple and irrascible 
passions of classical and early modern thought. Whether one 
moves away or towards, stays or goes, is of both political and 
theatrical importance and my analysis of theatrical emotion here 
is underpinned by this sense of emotion as movement.
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Excess
There is significant disagreement within early modern studies 
about the supposed privileging of reason over passion and affection 
in the period – a debate, in fact, over what kinds of cultural 
anxieties or pleasures existed in relation to ideas of excess and 
the passions. As Richard Strier has cogently put it, the scholars 
he has called the ‘new humoralists’, led by Gail Kern Paster and 
Michael Schoenfeldt, have taken humoral theory to be central to 
an early modern understanding of the body, subjectivity, society 
and the cosmos – and how all of these might be regulated – so 
that for Schoenfeldt in particular, ‘ “the early modern regime 
seems to entail a fear of emotion,” so that the great positive value 
becomes self-control, “the capacity to control rather than to vent 
emotion” ’.21 For Strier, Schoenfeldt overstresses the importance 
of reason and restraint in early modern literary culture, at the 
expense of attention to the evident and not particularly anxious 
pleasure taken in the erotic, the emotional and the culinary in 
Shakespeare, Herbert and Milton. On the one hand, Emotional 
Excess on the Shakespearean Stage could not have been conceived 
without the brilliant excavations and explorations of humours 
theory written by Paster and Schoenfeldt. The very notion 
of emotional excess in early modern drama depends upon an 
understanding, hugely influenced by these theorists, that the 
early moderns conceived of the passions as somatic excess. In 
a range of early modern discourses, humoral imbalance, which 
within normative bounds produced socially acceptable, or at 
least tolerated, emotions, also led to sickness and insanity. The 
passions, then, needed regulating, and while Strier has demon-
strated that many of the early modern period’s most significant 
Christian thinkers saw the passions as not only an inevitable but 
a desirable part of Godly life, the desirability of moderating and 
restraining the passions also emerges again and again in early 
modern writings on them.
However, I am broadly in Strier’s camp when it comes to a 
desire to give pleasure equal weight with anxiety in an exploration 
of plays and performance events that were ultimately produced for 
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people to enjoy. A still pertinent cultural materialist problematic 
relevant to this work was named by Jonathan Dollimore as the 
subversion/containment debate in the 1980s. The two sides of this 
debate were characterized by Dollimore, in the second edition of 
his Radical Tragedy, as British Cultural Materialists, who tended 
to find interrogation and subversion in the cultural products of 
the early modern period, and American New Historicists who 
were more inclined to see such potential subversions as contained 
within the limits permitted by early modern power structures and 
dominant ideologies.22 At one end of the subversion/containment 
spectrum lies theatre as disruptive of social structures, norms and 
hierarchies; at the other, theatre as contained – indeed generated 
and reinforced by – these structures. In this book I engage in 
a different but related debate, one which I think is useful to 
characterize in terms of anxiety and pleasure. This is a book that 
uses discourses and critical tools that are indebted to Cultural 
Materialism, to determine the ways in which emotion was both 
policed and celebrated in the early modern theatre and the ways 
in which we use early modern drama to police and celebrate the 
expression of emotion today. I hope, though, that it also contains 
some challenges to an assumption that underpins much cultural 
materialist analysis of early modern drama and theatre: that the 
products of this theatre were challenging or subversive to early 
modern cultural norms, hierarchies and ideologies insofar as 
they demonstrated, revealed or produced anxieties about them. 
It is productive for a broadly leftist critical project if a dominant 
culture can be demonstrated to be anxious about the structures 
and norms it seeks to account for as natural, universal and stable, 
because then those structures and norms may be argued to 
be culturally constructed, contingent, inherently unstable and 
ultimately challengeable and changeable. The problem with the 
project of focusing predominantly on discovering the cultural 
anxieties that might emerge in the theatre production is that one 
is sometimes in danger of suggesting that early modern audiences 
went to the theatre primarily to be made to feel anxious – or 
perhaps that while, bewildered by a fug of false consciousness, 
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people did in fact go there to be entertained, they inevitably left 
feeling thoroughly anxious and disconcerted.
There is a disjuncture between the notion of cultural anxiety 
and how it might somehow be immanent in cultural products 
and events, and the possible experiences of those who consumed 
or attended them. One issue here, perhaps, is that the study of 
actual audiences in theatres is methodologically challenging; it is 
easier to uncover cultural anxiety in the structures and discourses 
of artefacts and events, and either assume this anxiety was felt in 
their reception, or disregard whether or not it was. If we remind 
ourselves, on the other hand, of the obvious fact that within 
early capitalist culture, plays were written and produced to draw 
audiences to theatres and to give them pleasure, we are obliged, I 
believe, to give as much serious and as much political attention to 
the production of that pleasure as to the anxieties that may have 
emerged ‘in excess’ of it.
The phrase ‘in excess of ’ has been a favourite of cultural 
materialist criticism and it is a useful one. It suggests that 
whatever hegemony is operating through or reflected in culture, 
things can happen, people can behave, words and actions can 
produce meaning beyond what a range of political authorities 
might desire, or even be able to consciously or linguistically 
conceive. In this phrase, excess is politically subversive: the word 
indicates that which dominant culture cannot contain, that which 
goes beyond and challenges monolithic meaning. Queer theory 
has made particularly liberating use of this notion of ideologically 
uncontainable excess of meaning. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes:
That’s one of the things that ‘queer’ can refer to: the 
open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances 
and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when 
the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s 
sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify 
monolithically.23
When people and systems with an interest in the maintenance of 
monolithic meaning are challenged by that which is ‘in excess of ’ that 
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meaning, then of course they may well demonstrate anxiety. Thus I 
am not arguing that anxieties around, say, hegemonic constructions 
of masculinity, figurations of race and alterity, or the regulation of 
slanderous language24 do not exist in the early modern period and 
are not significant objects of study. However, rather than argue that 
early modern culture was predominantly stoical in its attitudes to 
the passions and that the performance of extreme emotion in the 
theatre must therefore have been received anxiously, I am going to 
be working on the assumption that the large number of people who 
attended the theatre in early modern London got pleasure from 
watching and hearing excesses of even distressing passions such as 
anger and grief. In the theatre, characters get too angry, laugh in 
the wrong places, commit crimes and go mad for love, cry for too 
long. They are sometimes condemned for it, simultaneously enjoyed 
for it; their emotional expression disrupts and exceeds authority, 
convention and the acceptable boundaries of sanity and subjectivity. 
The fact that this was and still seems to be immensely enjoyable for 
theatre audiences is partly the subject of this book.
Shakespeare
This book’s examples from recent productions are largely of 
works by Shakespeare, mainly because he is the early modern 
British playwright most produced by the British theatre. The 
book does not compare emotional expression in language across 
the works of early modern playwrights; there is no attempt to 
prove that one early modern author’s work is any more emotionally 
expressive – or excessive – than another’s, though the technology 
that may permit us to do so in very concrete terms is becoming 
more and more sophisticated.25 It evidences Shakespeare’s work 
as containing particularly interesting debates and contradictions 
about emotional excess and the theatre but also makes reference 
to other early modern dramatists.
Given how (relatively) well funded and popular with audiences 
the Royal Shakespeare Company is at the time of writing, given 
that Shakespeare’s Globe manages to fill season after season of 
mainly Shakespeare in its reconstructed Elizabethan theatre, 
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given that the National Theatre regularly gives over one of its 
main houses to a Shakespeare production that regularly sells 
out, the question ‘Why perform Shakespeare’s plays?’ may have 
an obvious answer to many. This answer will include, for some, 
terms such as ‘heritage’, ‘universal relevance’ and ‘the human 
condition’. But there is a tension between the activities and values 
of the theatre and the academy in the UK – and it extends to North 
America I think – when it comes to producing historical drama, a 
tension that arises particularly in the production of the works of 
Shakespeare. The theatre industry in the UK is highly invested 
in Shakespeare as a cultural brand and in continuing to produce 
his work in live performance. If asked about the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean theatre, those involved in the areas of British (or at least 
English) theatrical culture that receive some of the larger public 
subsidies and/or audiences would, I contend, be inclined to 
celebrate the period in which Shakespeare was writing as one of 
cultural and intellectual democracy – a time when theatre had a 
wider social demographic than it does now, a time when complex 
poetic dramas were enjoyed by audiences ranging from appren-
tices who paid a penny to stand in the yard, to the elite spectators 
at the indoor playhouses and at court.26 Closely linked to this 
sense of a democratic period in cultural history is the notion 
of Shakespeare,27 particularly, as a highly – or indeed the most 
– significant writer for his time and, as his co-actor and writer 
Ben Jonson had it, ‘for all time’.28 No matter the efforts within 
the academy at the end of the twentieth century to historicize 
the production and reception of Shakespeare, to demystify the 
cultural and ideological processes by which he became ‘top poet’ 
and generally to debunk bardolatry,29 producers and audiences 
of Shakespeare in the theatre are still quite comfortable with 
assumptions about his universal relevance. While many theatre 
history and performance studies scholars assume that we should 
have a sceptically historicist attitude towards ostensible links 
between plays written 400 years ago and our own attitudes 
and experiences, the theatre industry – at least the part of it 
that produces Shakespeare – assumes we should celebrate these 
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links and that we are almost bound to find them as we work on 
the plays in rehearsal. Theatre companies generally produce 
400-year-old plays because they believe they, and particularly the 
plays of Shakespeare, somehow ‘speak to us’ now – and speak to 
us through common emotional languages, or better express that 
which we are ‘feeling’ now.
Here, I am not aiming to repair the supposedly transparent 
window on to the human condition supposedly encoded in 
Shakespeare’s drama, which was shattered by Cultural Materialism 
in the the 1980s. But neither do I contend that the early modern 
drama simply offers us a series of passionate faux amis, a set of 
emotional expressions which we only imagine we can understand 
but which in fact are born of a set of ignorant and anachro-
nistic hermeneutic assumptions. There are emotions, psychic 
movements towards and away from what might make people 
laugh or cry, in the plays of Shakespeare and his contemporaries 
that we can still understand and may sometimes still experience; 
there are both similarities and differences in how we value and 
legitimate those emotions. What I do want to argue is that by 
understanding the differences pertaining to emotional expression 
and its cultural valuation that exist between Then and Now, we 
might attempt to perform Then in a range of more exciting and 
challenging ways Now.30 So because this is a book not only about 
early modern drama but about its recent theatrical production, I 
also consider here how the work of Shakespeare might interrogate 
and debate values and judgements around emotional expression 
with its twenty-first-century audiences. I argue that because the 
expression of the passions was a more clearly contended issue in 
the early modern period than it is today, in Western cultures that 
consider emotional expression to be generally A Good Thing, 
early modern drama can foreground for ‘us’ what I will call the 
politics of emotional expression. For despite the sense offered to 
us by a range of authorities that emotional expression is mentally 
healthy and key to valued self-actualization, the question of who 




Some of the most significant and exciting recent work in the 
history of early modern emotions has been undertaken by scholars 
who have re-envisioned the early modern mind-set by drawing 
attention to the all-pervading sense of the somatic and its link 
to the physical world in early modern thought. I am thinking 
particularly here of Gail Kern Paster and her work on the somatic 
passions in Humoring the Body, after publication of which no 
writer on emotion in early modern literature should be in danger 
of thinking of early modern human subjects as psychological 
subjects with bodies attached. Paster’s work suggests that the ways 
in which the early moderns conceived of the passions working 
in the body were radically different from today’s psychological 
approaches. She explores the porous nature of the early modern 
body as the period conceived it, and the constant, shifting and 
reciprocal relationships that were assumed to exist between mind 
and body, reason and passion, human and world, human body and 
heavenly bodies. Indeed, her work challenges all of these binaries 
to the point where their very usefulness to describe early modern 
experience – particularly in terms of mind and body – are put in 
doubt. Paster discusses Galenic humoral theory and the ways in 
which the quotidian experience of its workings in the bodies of 
early modern men and women is encoded in cultural products.31
A determination to complicate binaries gives rise to awkward 
questions when considering a period which, while it certainly 
had an extraordinarily holistic understanding of how the universe 
worked, was also, morally and ethically, binarist in the extreme: 
in its understanding of good and evil, order and chaos (political 
and cosmological), male and female,32 and, most significantly 
for this study, mean and excess, reason and passion. As we will 
see in Chapter One, ‘“A Brain that Leads my Use of Anger”: 
Choler and the Politics of Spatial Production’, the reason/passion 
binary is certainly widely circulated in the early modern period 
and posits a reasoning self that seeks continually to control the 
somatic excesses of the passions. In reiterating this binary I may 
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open myself to accusations of a reactionary return to long-since 
debunked thinking. In From Passions to Emotions, Thomas Dixon 
suggests that a range of scholarly works on the history of the 
emotions published since the 1970s have sought to rehabilitate 
the passions from an antagonism with reason which they have 
reinforced and exaggerated to the point of falsifying cultural 
history:
It is not the case that prior to the 1970s no one had 
realized that thinking, willing and feeling were (and 
should be) intertwined with one another. Almost 
everybody had realized this. Too many contemporary 
writers still appeal, nonetheless, to the idea […] that 
either a particular individual, or school of thought, or 
period, or even the entire history of philosophy has been 
characterized by the view that the emotions (or feelings 
or passions) are entirely insidious and are to be subjected 
at all times to almighty reason.33
Dixon is writing primarily about the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, so when I reply that this characterization of the 
‘insidious’ passions that ‘are to be subjected to almighty reason’ 
is exactly how Seneca and many of his early modern antecedents 
wrote about the passions, especially of anger, I am in one sense 
dealing with a period too early to be relevant to his argument. 
Scholars writing about the passions in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries in terms of humoral theory may both agree 
and disagree with Dixon: agree with him, in that in the holistic 
world view that contained the Galenic body cannot not explicitly 
permit the separation of mind and body, reason and passion that 
Descartes theorized in the mid-seventeenth century;34 disagree, 
on the other hand, in that the notion of reason controlling the 
passions and their bodily sources in the humours is absolutely 
conceivable for the early modern mind-set, whether or not it 
is always as desirable as it is for Seneca and his followers, and 
whether or not it is actually ever possible. The human subject, 
then, while beset with the unpredictable workings of his or her 
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passionate body in the world, and always dealing with the somatic 
circulation and imbalances of the humours, has also a duty of 
control of his or her somatic passions. She or he must therefore 
have a sense of an agent, a self, that might endeavour to do the 
controlling. Early modern writings on the emotions, while always 
assuming that the physical and the mental are concomitant and 
co-dependent, also assume a God-given reason that might, where 
appropriate, endeavour to choose to think or behave otherwise – 
in other directions – than in the ways his or her turbulent passions 
are in danger of forcing him or her.35
In Chapter One, I consider Shakespeare’s play Coriolanus as a 
play about anger, its uses and its value. Caius Martius Coriolanus 
is obviously a figure whose anger is put to use by the state in 
time of war; this anger turns out to be useless for the business 
of peacetime governing. It emerges clearly in this play that the 
individual’s control over the movement of his passions is politi-
cally expedient. I explore the play in the light of its source text 
Plutarch’s Lives,36 and Plutarch’s and Seneca’s essays on anger,37 
which figure anger as a terrifying force, in excess of what a 
community, society or state needs its members to do or to be. I 
then consider the ways in which Martius’ anger has played out 
in theatrical (and non-theatrical) space in recent productions. 
Having suggested here that emotion is motion in the early modern 
drama, I argue in Chapter One that Coriolanus is a play in which 
anger moves its central figure across the stage and I explore what 
meanings that might produce for audiences today. Productions 
explored in this chapter are a Coriolanus at Shakespeare’s Globe 
in London, whose lead actor has read Martius’ anger in modern, 
psychological terms. This performance in a theatre that very 
clearly generates meaning spatially produced an exceptionally 
pro-Martius Coriolanus.38 I consider the ways in which anger 
moves Ralph Fiennes’ Martius through the spaces of war and 
peace in his Coriolanus film, in a way that more clearly politicizes 
Martius’ ‘use of anger’.39 I end by suggesting, via two produc-
tions that generate meaning through site (Ivo van Hove’s ‘Roman 
Tragedies’ Coriolanus40 and Mike Pearson and Mike Brookes’ 
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Coriolanus in an RAF aircraft hanger41) that it is possible to 
produce a Coriolanus in space, in ways that foreground a politics 
of anger for a modern audience.
THE EMOTIONAL ETHICS OF BEING AN AUDIENCE: 
LAUGHTER
How is it possible to compare the emotional responses of early 
modern and current audiences? The kinds of ethical consid-
erations that come into play in a study of living subjects make 
discerning possible answers to questions of emotion just as 
problematic for our own period, albeit differently so, as for 
the study of emotions in history. I have recently worked with 
a number of graduate students who have considered audience 
responses in the theatre today and who want to rise to Helen 
Freshwater’s challenge of talking to actual audiences42 rather 
than assuming audience response. Even putting aside questions 
of audience numbers to be surveyed and range of demographic, 
the scholar of theatre audiences faces some daunting challenges 
produced by expectation, obligation and education, which arise 
when an audience member is faced with a lengthy questionnaire, 
or a researcher with a clipboard and a form from the university’s 
ethics committee to sign. These are not challenges I have faced 
here. In studying early modern theatre, we have a paucity of 
accounts of what audience members actually felt about the theatre 
they visited and we are obliged to speculate and extrapolate from 
these, from the ways in which plays and performance events 
appear to have been constructed to elicit audience response, and 
from the historical documents that suggest what it was possible 
to feel and what it was socially acceptable to express in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This is not a book 
about audiences in the early modern period per se but it inevitably 
speculates about them, because it explores the ideas that may 
have been circulating among them and the kinds of responses that 
plays suggest were expected from them. Similarly, it is not about 
audience responses to the recent productions of early modern 
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drama I examine, but the book inevitably references ideas that 
are circulating now about emotion and emotional expression and 
the ways in which productions have been constructed to elicit 
emotional response from audiences today. In Chapter Two, ‘“Do 
You Mock Old Age, You Rogues?”: Excessive Laughter, Cruelty 
and Compassion’ I do have questions to ask about the ethics of 
‘audiencing’ or being an audience43 that cross the early modern 
and the contemporary.
Laughter, of course, is not an emotion but an action, a 
behaviour or an expression of affect. One may be said to ‘feel’ 
anger, love and grief, whereas laughter is something one does – or 
emits. However, it is of particular interest to this study because it 
is, both commonsensically and in the discourses of science, invol-
untary, in excess of will and reason, something that happens as a 
result of emotions. It is in and of itself a somatic excess, a sound 
we usually make in excess of conscious decision. In asking what 
a historical culture finds funny, we are brought into contact with 
both seemingly universal and oddly alien cultural phenomena. 
What one culture finds funny, another will find tasteless, cruel, 
excessive. Yet what one might call the dramaturgical structure 
of laughter may be traced across history and science: laughter at 
the unexpected, laughter at the fall of the proud and pompous, 
laughter at ourselves as a means of social bonding, laughter 
at others as a means of social exclusion. Chapter Two takes as 
its object of study mad characters in the early modern drama, 
examines whether they may have been funny for early modern 
audiences (it seems clear that they were) and whether it may be 
possible to allow them to be so today – or whether that would 
simply be ‘too much’. Notions of madness are central to this 
book, because for early modern medicine, excessive passion was 
madness and was caused by the same humoral imbalances as the 
passions. Mad figures in the early modern drama are excessive 
subjectivities, which push at the boundaries of vocal and gestural 
sense. They are objects, I will suggest, of both comedy and 
compassion, and subjects of their own dramas, into which they 
draw on- and off-stage audience members alike. Their presence 
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and their interaction with audiences produce communities of 
laughter, framing and reframing the kinds of emotional responses 
it is socially acceptable to share publicly. In this chapter I consider 
plays that feature the incarcerated mad and foolish44 – Middleton 
and Rowley’s The Changeling,45 Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi,46 
Dekker and Middleton’s The Honest Whore47 – exploring how 
recent productions of the first two of these plays have dealt with 
the potentially embarrassing – to modern audiences – excesses of 
these figures. I then turn to Malvolio in his makeshift madhouse 
and a new play by Tim Crouch, I Malvolio,48 which is struc-
tured around the framing of its audience as figures of excess and 
excessive laughers.
PLEASURABLE EXCESSES: LOVE
Both the early modern period and our own fell, fall, ‘madly in 
love’. The lover is repeatedly a real and metaphorical madperson 
in the early modern drama49 and today’s modern popular love 
song. The metaphor of love’s madness segues into scientific reality 
for both periods: Burton and Ferrand (see pp. 15, 124–5, 139)50 
write extensively on love melancholy, while recent endocrino-
logical studies of the somatic state of being in love have related 
it to states of insanity.51 Love in both periods is an emotional 
state52 that draws upon the metaphors of past scientific moments, 
metaphors which still seem intuitively to describe the way we feel 
when we are in love, or lose a lover. The metaphor of the heart as 
the seat of emotion is still so common today as to be almost too 
obvious to mention: hearts ache in love and are broken by lovers, 
emotionally intuitive hearts rule rational heads in matters of love, 
even as we understand the heart to be a pump for the circulation 
of the blood.53 In the early seventeenth century, early under-
standings of the workings of the retina had displaced the Galenic 
theory of the eye beam, according to which beams emerge from an 
object being seen and pierce the eye of the beholder. But, as Eric 
Langley has pointed out, for poetry this was still the most potent 
metaphor for describing the way in which love ‘enters’ a lover, and 
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the mutuality of obsessive focus that two lovers experience as the 
eye beams of each pierce the other.54 In the early modern period a 
perfect, selfless love is held out to humankind by God, but human 
love is one of the somatic passions and gives rise to a complex and 
inextricable range of pleasures and anxieties in treatises on the 
passions and in early modern drama.
In Chapter Three, I suggest that the problem with the excesses 
of love in the early modern drama is not primarily love’s associ-
ation with bodily, ungodly lust, even though lust is differentiated 
from love at various points in the drama. Because love for the 
early moderns is one of the somatic passions (see p.  114) it 
partakes of all the potential problems of excess that the other 
passions do. Love’s overpowering nature drives figures in the 
drama to extremes of action and inaction. It undoes the gendered 
subject, rendering men effeminate and turning women into active 
agents in their own dramas. The notion of what we might call 
a romantic love, which is based on sexual attraction but is less 
selfishly driven than ‘mere’ lust, certainly exists in the drama but 
this does not rescue love from the turbulent excesses of somatic 
passion. Love is un-self-ish because it undoes the self. It suggests 
that the undoing of reason, where reason is equated with self-
control, is pleasurable. Whereas for angry Caius Martius, anger 
undoes that which his society finds reasonable and makes him 
most like himself, love in All’s Well that Ends Well and Antony and 
Cleopatra is both unreasonable and de-individuating on the one 
hand and produces agency and action on the other. In Chapter 
Three, I focus on these two plays, in which love and lust drive 
men and women to various kinds of action in excess of themselves 
and their societal roles, without replacing the social self with a 
fantasy of independent selfhood as is indulged by Caius Martius 
Coriolanus. The title of this chapter contains Orsino’s exhortation 
to his musicians to give him excess of the food of love, so that he 
may sicken of it and purge it from himself. All’s Well that Ends 
Well and Antony and Cleopatra seem to proffer a very different 
concept of love from this conventional notion that in love, one 
can always have too much of a good thing. Custom famously 
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cannot stale Cleopatra’s infinite variety because, in this play, it 
is the infinite and impossible variety of the theatre, of which one 
can never have an excess. Taking pleasure in the unpredictable 
emotional worlds of other human beings, always in excess of one’s 
own knowledge, is what love and theatre offer in these two plays.
A POLITICS OF EMOTION: GRIEF
There is a tendency in a range of today’s popular discourses – 
those of the media and popular science, and the everyday language 
that both feeds and reflects them – to suggest that emotions are a 
personal matter, paradoxically both felt in similar psychosomatic 
ways by everyone in a culture or community but at the same time 
uniquely a part of each individual. Theories of the history of 
grief have, as we will see, suggested that the early modern period 
was one in which a shift occurred towards the privileging of the 
personal expression of emotion. It was a time, for example, when 
funeral services began to emphasize the social standing of the 
deceased less and the personal grief of the bereaved more.55 In 
the UK at the time of writing, the government is exhibiting an 
odd mix of the now traditional conservative desire to champion 
the individual and minimize state intervention into the pursuit of 
his or her needs and desires on the one hand, and a new interest 
in how the state might support or even bring about emotional 
states – particularly of happiness (see p.  221). In constructing 
and reflecting a politics of grief, as I contend that Shakespeare’s 
Richard III and Hamlet do, the early modern drama is particularly 
well positioned to open up debates around how emotion may 
be valued and regulated today. The productions upon which I 
focus in this chapter do not suggest to me that the same kinds of 
dominant attitudes to emotion, or the same means of its cultural 
regulation, pertained to the early period as they do today. But 
the question of how much grief was too much, and the points in 
these plays which suggest that refusing to stop remembering the 
dead may have been a subversive act, can, I think, open up parallel 
and related questions for audiences of these dramas, as we enter 
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a period when the government seems to be exercised about how 
happy we are.
The Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC)’s Richard III of 2011 
to 201256 and the National Theatre’s Hamlet of 2010,57 examined 
in this chapter, do not reject the modern notion of emotional 
expression as central to the construction of the self. I have chosen 
them particularly because, in different ways, they draw upon 
traditions of theatrical realism that have individual characters’ 
emotions at their centres. But both productions place individual 
character psychology within political matrixes produced by 
scenography (Hamlet) and conscious theatricality (Richard III), 
and both thus permit a consideration of emotion’s expression 
and its repression, its excesses and its regulation. These produc-
tions foreground grief while going beyond the plausible and 
empathetic performance of that emotion, to explore its politics. 
As productions that seem highly conscious of their own uses of 
space, movement and proxemics, moreover, they are well placed 
to conclude a book that asks the reader to consider the links 
between emotion and motion in early modern drama.
Contemporary Western culture is concerned with the right to 
feel and express emotion; many of us are taught that emotional 
expression defines us, that it is the means by which one might 
‘get in touch with one’s self ’. The triggering of emotion is an 
important means of getting us to self-define through consumer 
choice and community allegiance, a means of producing an illusion 
of individual choice in a world of marketing demographics and 
mass media manipulation. Consider the ways in which emotions 
are both privileged and manipulated in contemporary life, and 
one may be tempted to return to Stoical apatheia, with its almost 
meditative emphasis on letting that pass which does not directly 
relate to the living of a virtuous life. What the theatre might do, 
in staging a period when the question ‘how much emotion is too 
much?’ seemed to be an important cultural and political question, 
is allow us both to take pleasure in the production of extreme 
emotion and consider it at a reasonable – or reasoning – distance.

CHAPTER ONE
‘A BRAIN THAT LEADS MY USE OF ANGER’ : 
CHOLER AND THE POLITICS OF SPATIAL 
PRODUCTION.
petruchio
I tell thee, Kate, ’twas burnt and dried away,
And I expressly am forbid to touch it,
For it engenders choler, planteth anger;
And better ’twere that both of us did fast,
Since, of ourselves, ourselves are choleric,
Than feed it with such over-roasted flesh.
Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew (4.1.158–63)
brutus
Put him to choler straight; he hath been used
Ever to conquer, and to have his worth
Of contradiction. Being once chaf ’d, he cannot
Be rein’d again to temperance; then he speaks
What’s in his heart, and that is there which looks
With us to break his neck.
Shakespeare, Coriolanus (3.3.25–30)
GETTING ANGRY AT WORK
At the time of writing, a Youtube search for the phrase ‘angry at 
work’ brings up a number of bizarre video recordings of people 
losing their tempers in office contexts and violently breaking office 
equipment. The first search result that appears has been online since 
December 2006 and features a man who cannot get his computer to 
link to a remote printer in his open-plan office. After a number of 
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attempts at printing, the man rips his computer monitor from his 
desk and smashes it, screen-downwards, on to a nearby photocopier, 
whose buttons he presses in a frenzied parody of copying whatever 
is on his computer screen. The incident does not appear to have 
been staged. This is a large office, full of other workers sitting at 
their work stations or moving about the space, all of whom stop in 
incredulous fascination or horror at the incident. The suddenness 
and incongruity of this office worker’s anger is, of course, comical; 
that is no doubt why it has been uploaded to Youtube. I also suspect 
that it has remained online and had close to 70,000 viewings to 
date, because it is vicariously pleasurable to see someone so angry 
that he no longer cares about the consequences of his actions, in a 
working environment that one might imagine is highly regulated: 
both overtly, by the corporation that owns the office, and socially, by 
those who have to work in this crowded environment. This man has 
become so frustrated that he no longer cares about the rules and is 
the undoubted hero of the piece as a result.
Daniel M. Gross, author of The Secret History of Emotion: 
From Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’  to Modern Brain Science1 would no 
doubt baulk at my using such an incident to open a chapter about 
excessive anger in early modern drama. For Gross, although
[t]hrowing a temper tantrum or fuming or muttering 
curses under one’s breath might strike us as a lesser 
degree of the same emotion exercised by a vengeful 
tyrant who forces a defiant subject to eat his own son for 
dinner […] it would not strike Aristotle so. We would 
do well to pay close attention to Aristotle and his early 
modern relatives if we hope to see our way beyond the 
current platitudes of emotion.2
Gross goes on to explain that for Aristotle, anger is produced by 
social relationships of inequality, and asserts that, where a king 
is angry, he ‘is angry because his entitlement is threatened, and 
without that extracognative entitlement manifest in the world 
around him, the king would have no angry thoughts at all’.3 
I assume that by ‘the current platitudes of emotion’ Gross is 
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referring to a hazy, post-Freudian, popular cultural notion that 
everyone has emotions to express and that the expression of 
emotion is essential to self-realization, its repression psychically 
damaging. My claim that our Youtube office worker is the hero 
of his broken printer film may be read as one such platitude. It 
is ludicrous, perhaps, even to use the word ‘hero’ in this context. 
The office worker whose society might consider him in need of 
an anger management class has no objective correlative thunder to 
underscore his tantrum, he stands for no principles of Romanitas; 
it is meaningless to compare such an incident with the wrath 
of Lear in the storm or the fury of Caius Martius Coriolanus 
when the Roman soldiers turn back in fear from Corioles. In this 
chapter I am not, precisely, going to compare these things. But 
first I should say that although I agree with Gross that anger, 
both for Aristotle and his ‘early modern relatives’, was ‘consti-
tuted…in relationships of inequality’,4 this does not mean that 
the anger of poor citizens was never considered in early modern 
discourses about anger. Second, I should explain that in this 
chapter I will be examining a range of recent stage versions (and 
one film) of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus and exploring the ways in 
which, in the production of early modern drama, social attitudes 
to extreme and excessive emotion ‘now’ and ‘then’ are always in 
dialogue. The photograph in Figure 1 is from Ivo van Hove’s 
celebrated and much-cited Roman Tragedies version of Coriolanus 
and appears to be an image of Caius Martius ‘losing it’ at work.
This chapter examines Shakespeare’s Coriolanus and the ways in 
which Caius Martius’ excessively choleric disposition, and recent 
social attitudes to and understandings of anger, come together in 
some recent productions of the play, to foreground anger and its 
social meanings across history. I have used Volumnia’s assertion 
that she has ‘a brain that leads [her] use of anger’ in the chapter’s 
title because I am interested in the notion that a potentially 
violent emotion might be used. This idea speaks to a subjectivity 
that we might indeed regard as ‘early modern’: a sense of self to 
be found not solely in the somatic production of the passions on 
the one hand, or in man’s God-given ‘reason’ on the other, but in 
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the nexus between the two, in the way in which reason considers, 
controls, makes use of a passion like anger. The state at peace in 
Coriolanus demands this control, this use of emotion. How is it 
used? How might its uses in the fictional/historical power struc-
tures of early modern drama provoke productive questions for us 
today about the relationship between the individual and power, 
state, society?
HEROIC ANGER
In an interview with Time Out London, Japanese director 
Yukio Ninagawa remarks of Toshiaki Karasawa, the lead actor 
in his production of Coriolanus,5 that ‘He’s a very Stoic actor. 
He manages to contain himself even though he has strong 
passions inside, which gives him a dignity very appropriate for 
Coriolanus.’ 6 The director of this extraordinarily beautiful and 
startlingly athletic production certainly has some supporters 
in linking Caius Martius with Stoicism. “Consider Coriolanus, 
Figure 1: Caius Martius Coriolanus (Gijs Scholten van Aschat) in Coriolanus (The 
Roman Tragedies by Toneelgroep Amsterdam), dir. Ivo van Hove. Courtesy Jan 
Versweyweld/BAM
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the legendary fifth century BC warrior who turns against his 
city for banishing him’, writes Nancy Sherman in her essay 
‘Stoic Meditations and the Shaping of Character. The Case of 
Educating the Military’:
He is portrayed by Shakespeare as the paragon Stoic 
warrior. Physically strong and detached, more at home 
in the battlefields than with his wife and son, his is the 
military man par excellence. Fearless, he sheds few tears.7
An anti-Stoical contemporary of Shakespeare writes of Martius 
as an example of Stoical uncouthness: ‘Coriolanus was by nature 
a Stoic, and his roughness of manners is justly and worthily 
reproved.’ 8 ‘Stoical’ in common parlance has come to mean one 
who can endure pain or hardship without complaining. This 
quality is in line with the Stoic notion of apatheia, and Martius’ 
tendency to belittle his own injuries of course fits this description. 
But his inability to control his anger is in diametric opposition to 
Stoic philosophy on the passions and the play’s narrative turns on 
the fact that the Roman general, unlike Karasawa in Ninagawa’s 
description, cannot ‘contain himself ’. Whereas Seneca argues 
against Aristotle that it is reason, not anger, that should motivate 
‘warlike exploits’,9 Martius’ personal fury at Aufidius, then at 
the Romans who have banished him, certainly seems to motivate 
Martius’ plans of violent action. When it is in Martius’ interests 
to contain his anger and behave ‘mildly’, he is unable to do so. 
When Martius reneges on his promise to lead an attack on Rome, 
his anger when his old enemy calls him ‘traitor’ (5.6.85) and ‘boy’ 
(101) leads to his death at Volscian hands. Seneca regards anger 
as entirely destructive and in opposition to man’s true nature: ‘A 
man is born to help other, wrath for the general ruin of all’.10 The 
ideal, reasoning man will not entertain the passion of anger even 
for a moment. But as far as Martius himself is concerned, Martius 
is his anger: ‘Why did you wish me milder? Would you have me/
False to my nature? Rather say I play/The man I am’. (3.2.14–16). 
Martius hardly conforms to Seneca’s ideal of passionless apatheia: 
he claims barely to feel his war wounds and is impressively 
6 Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage
constant in the face of his friends and family when they beg him 
to save Rome, until he finally capitulates to his mother – but he is 
otherwise the precise opposite of the Senecan ideal, from his first 
rant to the Citizens in 1.1.166–87.11
What Ninagawa and Karasawa offer instead of Caius Martius’ 
all-consuming anti-Stoical choler is a contained dignity appro-
priate to the production’s mise-en-scène. The stage space for this 
Coriolanus was almost entirely taken up with a huge staircase, up 
and down which the Citizens tumbled in terror at Caius Martius’ 
voice and presence, and over which the production’s virtuosic 
fight scenes took place.12 At the top of these stairs stood four 
formidable statues of Heavenly Kings, guardians to Bhuddist 
shrines, which, alarmingly, appeared further down the steps 
later in the production, as if the very upholders of the faith had 
moved into the human world to support Martius. This Samurai 
Martius is all tragic honour, the Citizens all cowering comedy: 
upon Martius’ first entry, they all tumble downstairs. Reviewing 
Ninagawa’s production in the Guardian, Lyn Gardner suggests 
that though this is, in ways she does not explain, an apolitical 
Coriolanus (perhaps she means that, unlike many productions and 
adaptations in the play’s stage history, it doesn’t have an explicit 
political/historical setting) it also contains a critique of violence 
and masculinity:
In this Japanese-language production, Coriolanus is a 
deeply flawed man who is felled not by another’s sword, 
but by a failure of masculinity and an inability to visualise 
a world in which it is not brute strength but humility and 
compromise that are required. Even in death, his empty 
sword hand continues to slice the air. It is like watching 
a clockwork toy soldier run down.13
But I would argue that there was little of brute strength in 
this Martius; or rather, his brutality was filtered through the 
mythology of Samurai honour and the elegant virtuosity of 
the actor’s stage-fighting and acrobatic abilities. The continuing 
slicing of the air by Martius as he dies suggests, certainly, that he 
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believes to the end that Warrior is the only role he can and should 
ever fill – and this is not a role that the political world of the play 
could use or contain. For this audience member, the Warrior 
role was not interrogated in the way that Gardner’s clockwork 
toy soldier image implies. Rather the world of realpolitik was the 
smaller, the more ridiculous, for not being able to contain the 
myth that is Coriolanus. As several reviewers remarked, the first 
thing the audience is confronted with in this production its own 
image, reflected in designer Tsukasa Nakagoshi’s huge mirrors. 
These also reflected the crowds and fight scenes, multiplying 
the figures tumbling and fighting, blurring the perimeters of the 
playing space. The Citizens come from the auditorium and line 
up to look back at us and bow before the performance begins: 
‘Clearly we are supposed to be one with them’, remarks Howard 
Loxton of the British Theatre Guide.14 Perhaps we, as they, were 
too overawed by the virtuoso performance of the Warrior finally 
to be permitted a critique of Martius’ politics.
Would the distance between Shakespeare’s England and the 
Ancient Rome which so fascinated its educated population have 
produced a similarly mythologized Coriolanus in the early seven-
teenth century? My answer is that the social and material reality 
of Caius Martius’ anger may have produced a leaky, ambiguous 
kind of heroism, one that sometimes excites and awes, but also 
invites critique. I am going to suggest here that the politics of 
Coriolanus, the position the audience is invited to take on its 
debates and conflicts, is inflected by the positioning of Caius 
Martius’ anger in social and theatrical space.
CHOLER
First, I want to consider some of the ideas about anger that were 
circulating in early modern England. The early modern under-
standing of the passions as material and somatic is reflected above 
in The Taming of the Shrew, as Petruchio torments his new bride 
by insisting that the meat they were about to eat is burnt and that 
to eat it would exacerbate their ‘choleric’ (4.1.60) tendencies. 
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Burnt meat ‘engenders choler’ and must be avoided by those who 
already have a predominance of choler (or yellow bile) circulating 
in their bodies.15 Petruchio and Kate are ‘of themselves’ already 
choleric (4.1.62) (hot, dry, quick-tempered), so better to fast than 
to make things worse. In this construction, our ‘selves’ comprise: 
what is in and of the body, including the passions, generated as 
they are by humoral predominance and motion; what is external 
to the body and might pass into and through it, like food; and, by 
implication, reason, which Petruchio here suggests should control 
the humorous predominance by choosing not to eat burnt meat.
The joke in this scene, of course, is that there is nothing wrong 
with the meat: Petruchio’s suggestion that the hungry, exhausted 
Kate should fast rather than eat it is part of his ludicrous, albeit 
finally effective, taming game. The idea that ‘being choleric’ is an 
excuse for Petruchio and Kate’s excessive anger is, it seems, to 
be laughed at as much as recognized by an Elizabethan audience. 
Like the notion that the stars control our fate, scorned by Edmund 
in King Lear (1.2.119–33), although many of his audience may 
well have believed it, Petruchio’s idea that the humours control 
‘ourselves’ appears ridiculous here and is elided with his daft 
insistence that the meat is burnt when it is not.
This is not to claim that humoural theory is merely residual 
in Elizabethan thinking by the time Shakespeare wrote The 
Taming of the Shrew. But enjoyment of the play depends upon 
the assumption that Kate particularly, as the Shrew to be Tamed, 
ought not to be so angry, no matter what her physiological 
temperament. Recent productions have had Kate battered, or 
even raped, into submission16 before she speaks her last soliloquy; 
others have played the final speech as a conspiracy between 
Petruchio and Katharina to win the bet on who has the most 
submissive wife; still others have made it clear that Katharina 
has not really been tamed at all.17 But however distasteful we may 
now find the notion of willingly placing our hands beneath our 
husband’s feet (Shrew 5.2.178), Elizabethan audiences may well 
have accepted that Kate’s last speech is indicative of her newly 
learned ability to control herself and her choler. Psycho-physical 
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temperament is one element in a complex matrix of selfhood 
in early modern drama, whereby notions of indulgence and 
restraint, reason and passion, free will and given temperament, 
‘self ’ and society are debated and held in tension. In this comedy, 
the self that is produced by humoral predominance gives way to 
the self that conforms to society’s needs and conventions.
In this chapter I focus primarily on Caius Martius Coriolanus, 
whose choleric predominance cannot ultimately be controlled. 
He is a man whose inability to be ‘rein’d again to temperance’ 
leads to his exile, who momentarily lets himself be persuaded 
from his wrath by his mother and family, but who finally dies in a 
furious temper at the slights of his enemy Aufidius. Anger in this 
play is both one of the defining characteristics of this dramatic 
figure, and an excess, a disease, that Menenius vainly hopes can 
be cured (3.1.296). I am going to assume, then, that Coriolanus is 
a play about anger. I have not made a survey of recent spectators 
or readers of the play but I would imagine that this is not what 
most of them would answer in response to the question ‘What 
is Coriolanus about?’ ‘Politics’, or ‘governance and citizenship’ 
or ‘the exigencies of war and peace’ would, I think, be more 
likely answers. But conceiving Coriolanus as being ‘about anger’ 
does not make it any less ‘about’ the politics of cities in war and 
at peace. True, anger is Martius’ personal problem. When he is 
angry, then he ‘speaks/What’s in his heart’; he is most himself 
and the Tribunes can bring about his downfall. Unlike Lear, who 
becomes less himself when overcome with anger (he goes mad, 
and as Bruce Smith has pointed out, loses both authority and 
masculine identity18), Martius suggests that it is the suppression 
of his anger that would lead to loss of individuated, male identity. 
For Martius, his anger must be expressed in certain situations or 
he will not be ‘the man I am’, whereas peacetime politics requires 
a social construction of selfhood that necessitates the controlled 
use of the passions.
As we have seen in the Introduction to this volume, 
Shakespeare’s plays stage a range of attitudes to the passions and 
to the notions of expressing, extirpating and suppressing them 
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which were circulating during the period, even within the one 
figure of Hamlet. I am going to give some attention here to the 
stoical notion that anger is of itself excessive – in excess of what 
is essential to human nature – and that its feeling and expression 
should be avoided at all costs, not because I consider that this 
how anger is staged in Coriolanus, but because this attitude 
to anger, circulating in classical writings available to the early 
moderns, is so alien to Western popular culture today. Popular 
psychology tells us that it is healthy to express anger within 
circumstances where it cannot permanently hurt anyone; that 
repressed anger will be ‘acted out’ elsewhere if it is not safely 
expressed around the time of its provocation; that violent anger 
expressed in criminal acts are expressions of past trauma; that 
anger should be ‘managed’ rather than extirpated altogether. 
Shakespeare’s source for Coriolanus, North’s Plutarch, on the 
other hand, has much to say about Caius Martius’ anger, none of 
it positive. Plutarch’s essay from the Moralia on anger takes the 
Stoic line that we are better off suppressing it entirely. Indeed, 
the whole point of a treatise on anger for the Ancients, and for the 
early modern writers who translated them and wrote their own 
treatises on the matter, is to discover ‘how [it] may be pacified’,19 
to find remedies for its ‘fatal and tragical effects’, as Nicholas 
Coeffeteau has it.20 Expressing anger in safe and healthy circum-
stances does not appear to be one of these remedies. The very 
title of Plutarch’s essay on the subject, translated by Philomen 
Holland, is ‘Of Meekness, or How a Man Should Refrain Choler’ 
or ‘How to Bridle Anger’.21 Although there are those who, in 
early modern/classical thinking, are naturally choleric, anger is, 
for these treatise writers, at the same time unnatural in that it 
overwhelms reason and distorts even the strongest characteristics 
an individual might possess, such as avarice or ambition. Plutarch 
writes of anger that:
like as that malady according to Hippocrates, is of all 
others, worst and most dangerous, wherein the visage 
of the sick person is most disfigured and made unlikest 
itself; so, I seeing those that were possessed of choler 
 ‘A brain that leads my use of anger’  11
and, (as it were) beside themselves thereby, how their 
face was changed, their colour, their countenance, their 
gate and their voice quite altered, I imagined thereupon 
until my self a certain form and image of this malady, 
as being mightily displeased in my mind, if haply at any 
time I should be seen of my friends, my wife and the 
little girls my daughters, so terrible and so far moved and 
transported beside myself.22
Seneca figures anger as an enemy in battle who (like Caius 
Martius at the gates of Corioles) must not even be allowed to enter 
the mind, but ‘is to be driven from our borders, for when he is 
entered and hath gotten the gates, he taketh no condition with his 
captives’. This is because the mind cannot objectively separate 
itself from the passions and once it has been penetrated by a 
passion as violent as anger, its physical constitution is materially 
and dangerously changed. It becomes anger:
For at that time the mind is not retired neither exteriorly 
examineth she affections, to the intent she suffereth 
them not to have further progress than they should, but 
is changed herself into passion, and therefore can she not 
revoke that profitable and wholesome force [i.e. reason], 
which is already betrayed and weakened.23
Although anger infiltrates and materially changes the mind, 
Seneca separates mind and body in his analysis of anger, suggesting 
that initial provocations to anger are merely somatic and that the 
mind should work to calm itself rather than permitting anger to 
‘overleap reason’:
For if any man suppose that paleness, and trickling down 
of tears, and filthy pollution, or a deep fat sigh, or eyes 
suddenly incensed, or any such like thing, is a token 
of affection, and a sign of the mind, he is deceived, 
neither understandeth he, that these are the agitations 
of the body. […] Wrath […] is a passion; but never is a 
passion without the assent of the mind for it cannot be 
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that without the knowledge of the mind, a man should 
deliberate upon revenge and punishment.24
There is an individual will in this discourse which can work to 
refuse anger entrance to the citidel of the mind/body. Although 
Kate and Pertruchio may be ‘of themselves’ choleric, anger is 
figured in Nicholas Coeffeteau’s treatise as the passion that makes 
one least like oneself – and not only when that ‘self ’ is normally 
virtuous and reasonable: even those of dubious moral standing 
such as the covetous and the ambitious behave unlike themselves 
when angry:
she [choler] sometimes constrains the most covetous 
profusely to cast away their most precious treasure, and to 
make a heap of their wealth, and then to set fire on it; and 
many times also she forceth ambitious men to refuse and 
reject the honours which they had passionately affected 
before their despite: who doth not see that this Passion, 
more than any other, quencheth the light of reason.25
Anger is thus a physical excess and is extraneous, indeed contra-
dictory, to the subjectivities and personal interests of individuals. 
The angry person is in and of himself excessive. Montaigne, 
following Seneca, disagrees with Aristotle that anger has its 
virtuous uses:
Aristotle saith, Choler doth sometimes serve as arms 
unto virtue and valour. It is very likely: notwithstanding 
such as gainsay him answer pleasantly, it is a weapon of a 
new fashion and strange use: for we move other weapons 
but this moveth us: our hand doth not guide it, but it 
directeth our hand; it holdeth us and we hold it not.26
Plutarch, too, denies anger any part in ‘action’ of any ‘wisdom and 
magnanimity’, citing the unworthiness of the adversaries upon 
whom the choleric soul lets his anger fall:
for surely the very actions, motions, gestures, and 
countenance of choleric persons do argue and bewray 
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much baseness and imbecility: which we may perceive 
not only in the brain-sick fits that they fall upon little 
children, and them pluck, twitch and misuse; fly upon 
silly women, and think that they ought to punish their 
horses, hounds and mules.27
For these writers anger is a sickness and a weakness, not a sign of, 
nor an inspiration to, strength.28
It is possible in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
to entertain the notion that the suppression of anger within an 
individual might do him or her harm. Montaigne thinks so, as 
we will see. But I have marshalled these stoical writings on anger 
to suggest that early modern dramatists and their audience are as 
likely to be of the opinion that mankind is better off not feeling 
or expressing anger at all and that Shakespeare inevitably writes 
an interesting tension into the figure of Caius Martius Coriolanus 
when he generates a dramatic figure from a passion that contem-
porary and classical discourses on the subject, including his own 
source, condemned so entirely.
SLIGHT
Negative figurings of anger circulating in the early modern period 
must be read in the light of its conceptualization not only as a 
somatic but as a socially constructed passion. As Gross remarks, 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric defines anger as ‘desire, accompanied by…
distress, for conspicuous retaliation because of a conspicuous 
slight that was directed, without justification, against oneself 
or those near to one’.29 For Aristotle’s society, explains Gross, 
‘[a]nger is a deeply social passion provoked by perceived, unjus-
tified slights, and it presupposes a public stage where social 
status is always insecure’.30 Early modern tracts on the emotions 
propose similarly that anger is a response to publicly experienced 
‘injury’ and that social inequality produces and intensifies the 
social slights that are the cause of anger. Thus Wright, in his 
Passions of the Mind in General, writes:
14 Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage
The injurer’s baseness augmenteth the injury, as a buffet 
given a Prince by a Prince were not so heinous an injury 
as if a base peasant had done it; because as the greatness 
of the prince’s person ought more to be respected of a 
base man than of an equal Prince, so by beating him, his 
contempt is accounted the greater.31
Thirteen years after Wright, Coefetteau writes similarly of the 
intensity of the rage felt and expressed by the slighted ruler in 
his A Table of the Human Passions: ‘[I]f we should yield to a king 
all the honours of the world, and yet to forbear to give him the 
title of a king, this were sufficient to enflame his choler.’32 Here, 
Coeffeteau is not writing of kings with a particular yellow bile 
problem but of all kings. Again, ‘men of authority and command 
[…] if their inferiors fail to yield them the honour which they 
think is due unto them, they cannot endure this injury, but fall 
into rage; which makes them to seek all occasions to punish this 
contempt’.33 ‘Being disdained by the baser sort’ is particularly 
provocative of anger as ‘men of honour cannot endure but with 
much impatiency, to see themselves condemned by the scum of 
the people’.34 However, the notion of socially induced fury may 
be applied, for Coeffeteau, to men of all social statuses: ‘not 
only kings, but every private person is impatient to see himself 
condemned by those which are his inferiors’.35 And even at the 
bottom of the social scale, where there may be no one left to be 
angry with, Coefetteau suggests that the lowliest private citizen 
may nonetheless feel and express anger at his ‘present condition’.36
There is still a sense in Coeffeteau that those of lower social 
status have less of a right to anger than the rich and powerful. He 
advises us that we ‘fly all affairs above our reach’,37 as they will 
make us feel oppressed, and then angry. But the notion that the 
common man should not get angry at his poverty or social position 
does not mean that he does not do so. Seneca, similarly, suggests 
that anyone may become angry at an injury and desire to punish 
the injurer: ‘no man is so humble and base, who cannot hope to 
see justice upon his greatest adversary: we have power enough to 
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hurt’.38 Gross’ example of the tyrant forcing a subject to eat his 
son is the stuff of myth and tragedy; the little man’s temper at his 
neighbour’s slight is not. But for Coeffeteau, the great man in his 
fury may still become the object of scornful laughter: ‘how many 
great personages have we seen expose themselves to be a scorn of 
the world by the excuse of their choler?’ he asks his reader, then 
gives the example of ‘that famous Prince, who wrote letters to a 
Mountain, and who caused a river to be whipped, which had been 
an obstacle to his passion’.39 In Coriolanus, the Citizens’ anger at 
their treatment by the Patricians during the dearth is as much a 
subject of this play as the excessive passion of Coriolanus.
BETTER OUT THAN IN?
Montaigne’s essay On Anger opens with objections to that passion 
typical of his more stoical tendencies.40 Like Seneca, whom 
Montaigne quotes liberally in this essay, and like Coeffeteau, he 
casts anger as the most negative and excessive of the passions. 
‘No passion disturbs the soundness of our judgment as anger 
does’ he writes in his opening critique of parents who chastise 
their children while in the highly visceral throes of anger. ‘You 
can see the fire and rage flashing from their eyes’ he writes, 
drawing on Plutarch to add that ‘according to Hippocrates the 
most dangerous of distempers are those which contort the face’.41
However, as his essay continues, Montaigne is more circum-
spect and permits the realities of social life to intrude upon the 
unyielding ethical stance of his opening passage; he is more 
forgiving of anger and those who experience it than his classical 
muses. He admits that he is not particularly good at controlling 
anger, if provoked to it by something sudden and surprising. Nor 
does he think it healthy to suppress one’s anger if one is constitu-
tionally choleric. In his own ‘On Anger’, he states that ‘the most 
choleric and testy man of France…I ever say, he is the patientest 
man I know to bridle his choler; it moveth him and transporteth 
him with such fury and violence…that he must cruelly enforce 
himself to moderate the same’.42 Rather than praise this paragon 
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for his efforts, Montaigne remarks that ‘As for my part, I know 
no passion I were able to smother with such temper and abide 
with such resolution. I would not set wisdom at so high a rate.’43 
Next, Montaigne writes of ‘Another great man’ who managed 
to keep his passions hidden for sake of displaying a ‘gentle 
correctness’ to the social world. Montaigne is concerned not 
for this man’s position in the social world but for his personal, 
interior welfare:
I told him that indeed it was much…always to show 
himself in a good temper; but that the chiefest points 
consisted in providing inwardly for himself; and that 
in mine opinion, it was no discreet part inwardly to 
fret: which, to maintain that mark and formal outward 
appearance, I fear he did.
‘I would rather make show of my passions’, maintains Montaigne, 
‘than smother them to my cost’.44 Montaigne is not suggesting 
here that everyone’s anger is equally to be valued, or that anger 
per se is to be valued at all. But suppressing one’s anger entirely 
is figured here as the destructive opposite of purgation and the 
somatic is set at odds with the reason that decides whether to 
express or hide it.
In relation to this attitude to anger as ‘better out than in’, 
so seemingly modern and therapeutic, I am interested in a 
line spoken by Volumnia in Coriolanus, which she delivers after 
her confrontation with the Tribunes, when her son has been 
banished. She has been fended off by Brutus and Sicinius with 
the dismissive accusation that, in the excesses of her anger, she 
is mad (Sicinius: Why stay we here to be baited/With one who 
wants her wits? (4.3.43–4)). When the confrontation is over and 
the Tribunes have escaped, Volumnia declares that:
[…] Could I meet ’em
But once a day, it would unclog my heart
Of what lies heavy to’t.
(4.3.46–8)
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She seems to want to meet the sources of her heaviness daily, to 
experience the curative power of stirring up anger. Permitting 
a choleric imbalance, it seems, would ‘unclog’ something more 
painful. Note that this imagined daily confrontation would not 
unclog or expel the anger itself; this she intends to feed on and 
would like to renew repeatedly. But by getting angry, Volumnia 
would presumably drive out the misery of missing her son, or 
the pain at the injustice of his banishment, or whatever we might 
decide ‘lies heavy’ to her heart. Passionate expression is healthful 
to Volumnia, just as the expression of blood is ‘medicinal’ to her 
son (1.5.18).
Of course, such a statement does not necessarily suggest 
that there is a therapeutic discourse of anger common to early 
modern and twenty-first-century Western culture, in opposition 
to Stoical condemnations of anger. Volumnia herself admits in 
her very next speech that this form of ‘therapy’ will ultimately 
destroy her: in answer to Menenius’ invitation to dinner she 
replies with the more often quoted line ‘Anger’s my meat; I sup 
upon myself,/And so shall starve with feeding’ (4.3.50–51). Here 
it is the indulgence of Volumnia’s anger that will eat her insides 
out, as Montaigne would put it, not its suppression. Her desire 
for further contretemps with the Tribunes may have appeared 
comically misplaced to early modern audience members with an 
understanding of anger as the most destructive of the passions: 
anger might well unclog what lies heavy to this mother’s heart 
but replaces it with something much more destructive, as her 
next lines seem to acknowledge. However, the very fact that 
Volumnia considers that her anger may have a restorative or 
curative ‘unclogging’ purpose, and the fact that later, against the 
Stoics, she suggests that she has a ‘brain that leads [her] use of 
anger’, is of significance here. It has led to this chapter’s interest 
in how anger is used in early modern drama, in how it is put to 
use by characters in plays and the cultures invented by them and 
reflected in them. Where writers from Seneca to Wright construe 
it as the most excessive and bestial of the passions, anger in 
Coriolanus seems to have a range of contradictory purposes as it 
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shifts from being a humour, whereby choler and anger are inter-
changeable words and are constituted in yellow bile, to being what 
may now be described as a ‘personality trait’. It is this sense of the 
passions and how one does or does not restrain them as integral to 
the self that also seems to be at play in Montaigne’s essay.
CAIUS MARTIUS’ ANGER AND ITS SOURCES
In order to establish how anger is valued or eschewed as under-
standable or excessive in Coriolanus, I will next turn to Plutarch 
– not only to the direct classical source for the play, Thomas 
North’s translation of the Life of Caius Martius Coriolanus45 but to 
Philomen Holland’s translation of Plutarch’s Moralia, first printed 
in 1601, specifically its essay ‘Of Meekness, or How a Man Should 
Refrain Choler. Or How to Bridle Anger’. Plutarch’s account of 
Martius in his Lives discusses Caius Martius’ choler extensively, 
whereas ‘How to Bridle Anger’ has not been explored as a possible 
influence on Coriolanus,46 surprisingly, given some of the verbal 
echoes to be found in the two texts. In the opening to Plutarch’s 
dialogue, the fictional Sylla compliments his friend on his newly 
achieved mastery over anger and asks him how he has managed it:
when I see how that vehement inclination, and ardent 
motion of yours to anger, whereunto by nature you were 
given, is by the guidance of reason become so mild, so 
gentle, so tractable, it commeth into my mind to say 
thereunto that which I read in Homer:
 Oh what a wondrous change is here
 Much milder are you than you were.47
This opposition of anger to mildness recalls Menenius as the voice 
of reason in Coriolanus, attempting to guide Martius to behave 
‘mildly’ following his unfortunate encounter with the Tribunes 
and the Citizens after the attempt to revoke his consulship 
(3.2.138–45).
Early in the treatise, Plutarch tells the bizarre anecdote of 
Caius Gracchus the orator, ‘a man blunt, rude in behavior, and 
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withal over-earnest and violent in his manner of pleading’, who 
had his servant follow him to the lawcourts and play a ‘mild and 
pleasant note’ on a little pipe:
when his master was a little out of tune…whereby he 
reclaimed and called him back from that loud exclaiming, 
and so taking down that rough and swelling accent of his 
voice…dulced and allayed the choleric passion of the 
orator.48
Plutarch’s Fundanus thinks this is a splendid idea and declares 
that he would happily make use of such a service himself. When 
Shakespeare’s Caius Martius, during the scene in which he 
protests that to behave ‘mildly’ would be to act a part least like 
himself, bitterly (and temporarily) consents to parlay with the 
Citizens in the marketplace, he rages:
Away my disposition, and possess me
Some harlot’s spirit! My throat of war be turn’d,
Which choired with my drum, into a pipe
Small as an eunuch, or the virgin voice
That babies lulls asleep!
(3.2.111–15)
Even closer to this notion, despised by Martius, of turning from 
the noise of war to the sweet sound of the pipe, is Plutarch’s 
example of the Lacedaemonians, who
do allay the choler of their soldiers, when they are 
fighting, with the melodious sound of flutes and pipes; 
whose manner is also before they go to battle, to sacrifice 
unto the Muses, to the end that their reason and right 
wits may remain in them still, and that they may have 
use thereof.49
(125)
Plutarch declares that he despises clichéd saws that provoke man 
to choler and he cites two, one of which suggests the following 
treatment for an enemy:
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Down to the ground with him, spare not his coat,
Spurn him and set thy foot upon his throat.50
(124)
This recalls Volumnia’s vision of Martius beating Aufidius’ ‘head 
below his knee/And tread[ing] upon his neck’ (1.3.47–8) – and 
the reversal of that image at the end of the play: Conspirators draw, 
and kill Martius, who falls; Aufidius stands on him (5.6.129 s.d.). 
The enraged treading upon the enemy that, in Aufidius’ case, 
then gives way to calm and regret (as if Aufidius, in Plutarch’s 
terms in the Anger essay, has returned to himself ) does not appear 
in the Lives: Martius’ life simply ends thus: ‘they all fell upon 
him, and killed him in the market-place, none of the people once 
offering to rescue him’.51
In the echoes of each of the examples from Plutarch here, the 
hero of Coriolanus (and, interestingly given her statement about 
the uses of anger, his mother) seem to scorn Stoicism and its calm 
rationality. Plutarch suggests pipe music as an antidote to choler – 
Martius uses the pipe as a symbol of his emasculation; Menenius 
takes up Plutarch’s favourite opposing term to anger – mildness; 
Martius scornfully promises that he will be mild, then breaks 
that promise; Plutarch cites a couplet about treading upon one’s 
enemy’s neck as an example of exactly the kind of irrational fury 
that should be avoided – Martius’ mother fantasizes about her 
son doing the same to Aufidius and this is finally what happens 
to Martius in defeat. As we have seen, Martius’ determined 
independence has been linked to stoicism (see pp. 4–5), as has his 
calm on saying goodbye to his family when he is banished in 3.3. 
In this scene, argues Robin Headlam Wells, ‘Gone is the raging 
scorn for the feckless plebeians, and in its place is a restrained 
and dignified stoicism’.53 However, even here it is uncertain how 
audiences may have read Martius’ new-found calm; in the Lives, 
Plutarch explains at length that, at this point it was
not that he did patiently bear and temper his evil hap, in 
respect of any reason he had, or by his quiet condition: 
but because he was so carried away with the vehemency 
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of anger, and desire of revenge, that he had no sense 
nor feeling of the hard state he was in […]. For when 
sorrow […] is set on fire, then it is converted into spite 
and malice, and driveth away for that time all faintness 
of heart and natural fear. And this is the cause why the 
choleric man is so altered and mad in his actions, as a 
man set on fire with a burning ague.54
In this account, Martius’ calm is an inward numbness – ‘no 
sense of feeling’ – and an outward appearance of calm produced 
by the choler raging within. Plutarch goes on to describe how 
once Martius had comforted his ‘weeping and shrieking’ wife 
and mother ‘and persuaded them to be content with his chance’, 
he went off to brood at his country residence, ‘turmoiled with 
sundry sorts and kinds of thoughts, such as the fire of his choler 
did stir up’55 and planned his revenge on Rome.
Of course, it could be argued that Shakespeare develops 
and departs from his source and produces a dramatic hero 
truly capable of recovering from moments of ‘raging scorn’ and 
achieving the dignified stoicism which Headlam Wells ascribes 
to him. But I am interested in the early modern possibility of a 
Coriolanus driven primarily by choler, to which Shakespeare was 
obviously exposed in reading Plutarch’s narrative, and I want to 
turn now to questions of what actors and audiences do with such 
a figure and his emotional excesses – if indeed we read them as 
such – today.
MARTIUS’ CHILDHOOD AND THE ENGLISH PUBLIC 
SCHOOL BOY
I am going to examine a production which was intended by its 
lead actor as a psychological excavation of Martius’ choleric 
temperament, although he does not use this early modern 
terminology. In the Shakespeare’s Globe production of 2006, 
Jonathan Cake played Martius as a bombastic yet psychologically 
vulnerable English public school boy, ‘desperate for affection 
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that has been denied him by his mother’.56 This post-Freudian 
reading suggests that anger is the outward sign of an inward, 
unconscious lack or need, first experienced in childhood. The 
production is of particular interest to me, because in Talking to the 
Audience, I argued that the production of dramatic subjectivity in 
the shared lighting of the early modern public playhouse and in 
moments of direct address to the audience – of which there are 
plenty at the new Globe and in Cake’s performance – occludes, 
or at least discourages, this kind of psychological reading.57 Here 
I am going to suggest that Cake’s assumptions about a mother’s 
love and what its lack may have led to might not have been ones 
that an early modern audience would have recognized. I am also 
going to argue that in this production, the use of the relationship 
between the space of the stage and the space of the audience 
reinforced rather than challenged or complicated this reading. In 
Cake’s reading of Caius Martius, as we will see, anger is a result 
of emotional repression.
Although Shakespeare does appear to be asking the audience 
to consider what the results of being brought up by someone like 
Figure 2: Caius Martius Coriolanus ( Jonathan Cake), in Coriolanus dir. Dominic 
Dromgoole, Shakespeare’s Globe 2006 (© Alastair Muir, 4854).
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Volumnia might have been, an early modern audience member 
may have regarded Martius’ uncontrollable anger as stemming 
from the lack of a guiding male hand, rather than expressive of 
a need for more motherly love. Plutarch opens his ‘Life of Caius 
Martius Coriolanus’ by first mentioning the illustrious family 
from whence he came.58 The first time Martius is named, it is 
in relation to his having been ‘orphaned’: he was fatherless and 
therefore not educated or civilized in properly masculine fashion. 
On the one hand, Plutarch tells us that the fact that Caius Martius 
was ‘left an orphan by his father’ and was therefore ‘brought up 
under his mother, a widow’ teaches us something: ‘that orphanage 
bringeth many discommodities to a child, but doth not hinger 
him to become an honest man, and to excel in virtue above the 
common sort’.59 On the other hand, on the second page of North’s 
translation of the ‘Life’, which has the marginal note ‘Choleric 
and impatient’, Plutarch asserts that ‘a rare and excellent wit 
untaught, doth bring forth many good and evil things together’:
For this Marcius’ natural wit and great heart did marvel-
lously stir up his courage to do and attempt notable 
acts. But on the other side for lack of education, he 
was so choleric and impatient, that he would yield to 
no living creature: which made him churlish, uncivil, 
and altogether unfit for any man’s conversation. Yet 
men marvelling much at his constancy, that he was 
never overcome with pleasure, not money, and how he 
would endure easily all manner of pains and travails: 
thereupon they well liked and commended his stoutness 
and temperancy. But for all that, they could not be 
acquainted with him, as one citizen useth to be with 
another in the city: his behaviour was so unpleasant to 
them by reason of a certain insolent and stern manner he 
had, which because it was too lordly was disliked. And to 
say truly, the greatest benefit that learning bringeth unto 
men is this: that it teacheth men that be rude and rough 
of nature, by compass and rule of reason, to be civil and 
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courteous, and to like better the mean state, than the 
higher.60
When Martius is finally refused the consulship by the people in 
Plutarch, he
took it in far worse part than the Senate and was out of 
all patience. For he was a man too full of passion and 
choler, and too much given over to self-will and opinion, 
as one of high mind and great courage, that lacked the 
gravity, and affability, that is gotten with judgement of 
learning and reason, which only is to be looked for in a 
governor of state.61
For Plutarch, then, Martius lacks the reason and sociability 
that a father’s education would have given him. Shakespeare, of 
course, makes more of the mother than Plutarch does: Volumnia 
is far more of a presence in the play than she is in the source and 
Plutarch certainly writes no domestic scene where Martius or his 
son’s child rearing are discussed (1.3). But Plutarch’s patriarchal 
notions of child rearing, which suggest that Martius’ father 
would have been responsible for both the battle training and 
the socialization of his son, offer an alternative to the ultimately 
modern assumption that there is a warm, loving, socializing norm 
of motherhood that Martius lacks in Volumnia. Had he been 
brought up by a father, Plutarch insists he would have been more 
calm, reasonable and socially skilled; lacking this, he is noble on 
the battlefield but impatient and choleric in the city. Shakespeare 
makes nothing of the absent father but instead stages a warmon-
gering mother who expects the reasoning self-control of the 
politician in her son, when she, as in Plutarch, has not taught it 
to him. In the Globe production, Margot Leicester’s Volumnia 
endeavours to teach him the gestures of consensual politics too 
late, hilariously enacting in detailed mime how he must
Go to them, with this bonnet in thy hand,
And thus far having stretched it – here be with them –
Thy knee bussing the stones […]
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  […] waving thy head,
With often thus correcting thy stout heart,
Now humble as the ripest mulberry […]
(3.2.73–9)
His stout heart has never been corrected before and whether an 
early modern audience, knowing their Plutarch or not, considered 
the lack of a father in Martius’ education, it is anachronistic to 
assume that they considered him ‘desperate for affection’ from 
his mother, as Cake suggests. This is not to say, of course, that 
Cake may not read the role as he chooses and stage whatever 
interpretation he thinks a modern audience would be able best to 
understand and enjoy. What interests me here is the way that this 
psychological reading is produced and developed in the theatrical 
and audiences spaces of Shakespeare’s Globe.
Asked about the remarkable physical energy of his perfor-
mance in Coriolanus at Shakespeare’s Globe in 2006, Jonathan 
Cake at first suggests that Martius is warrior ire, explaining that 
whereas in most Shakespearean tragedies, fight scenes come 
towards the end of the play,
The fighting in Coriolanus is at the beginning because it 
defines who he is, it’s the playwright who’s trying to show 
you the character. He starts off by showing Coriolanus at 
a battle because that’s when he is in some way at his 
most articulate as a human being, most expressive, that’s 
where he’s happiest and most free.62
Later in this interview, however, Cake suggests that his first aim 
as an actor in preparing for the play was to make something more 
psychologically layered by way of a character than the ‘thing of 
blood’ his compatriots name him:63
My very strong feeling about the play is that he’s not 
a death machine by any means, in fact he’s about the 
opposite of that. Yes, there is part of him that expresses 
itself through violence, but to me he seems desperate to 
be all the things that he criticizes and affects to despise. 
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He’s a child desperate for affection that has been denied 
him by his mother. He’s desperate for friendship of other 
people.64
Cake does not use the term ‘repressed’ to describe Martius 
(though he acknowledges that he is in psychoanalytic territory, 
asserting that his interpretation ‘would not take a Freudian 
psychotherapist to work […] out’); but for this actor, Caius 
Martius’ choler masks his true desire to be loved. Fascinatingly, 
Guillaume Winter, interviewing Cake, associates this desire with 
the commonplace notion that actors feel the same: ‘You were 
talking about “being liked”’, he says to Cake: ‘Isn’t it what acting 
is all about?’ 65 It is not, it seems, easy to play an unlovable hero, 
so Cake constructed Martius’ sneering contempt for the populace 
as psychological defence born of emotional neglect. He produced 
an English upper class boyishness for Martius that an audience, 
he hoped, could not help but love and forgive:
The child is so stunted and brutalized by his mother 
and by the world he lives in, but at the same time it’s 
incredibly hard to dislike a child, because they’re not in 
possession of a fully-formed mind, they’re all feeling. 
However badly children behave, it’s impossible to write 
them off completely because they’re ruled by their 
feelings.66
Although some felt that Cake’s interpretation reduced the play’s 
gravitas and some found it refreshing, the child, or boy-like 
quality of Cake’s performance was marked almost universally 
in reviews of the production, and associated, with remarkable 
consistency, with the games of cricket and rugby (a link I find in 
my own notes taken after watching the performance for the first 
time). The Daily Mail reviewer even went so far as allocating 
Cake a position on the team: ‘Jonathan Cake, handsome and 
inky-haired, plays Coriolanus as an engaging sort of brick. He 
reminded me of a rugby No 8, thick-skinned and always ready for 
a heave.’67 The term ‘brick’ here, for those not familiar with the 
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early to mid-twentieth-century English upper-class vernacular to 
be found in children’s stories about boarding-schools, suggests 
a likeable and, most importantly, solidly dependable friend. An 
‘engaging sort of brick’ neatly describes the ideal of bluff, 
pragmatic likeability that the British boy’s public school system 
was supposed to produce. It was a product of Victorian economic 
expansion and colonialism. The ruling-class ‘brick’ tolerates 
hardship and uncomplainingly gets the job done. Recognition in 
the form of cups and colonies is heaped upon him but he does not 
demand them: he was always and only doing his job for King/
Queen and Country.68 The stereotype does not proscribe, as 
Cake’s Martius makes very clear, a searing contempt for the lower 
orders if they step out of line. He gives ‘his loyal friends bearhugs’ 
and also claps on the back those willing to fight for him in 1.7, 
forgetting in an instant their reluctance to follow him in Corioles, 
but from his first contemptuous encounter with the Citizens in 
1.1, it is clear that upper-class English privilege brings with it 
the inalienable right to separateness from and disregard for the 
cannon fodder that are the Citizens.
This was a highly engaging Martius. His mastery of irony and 
mimicry made the audience laugh in all the live and recorded 
performances I witnessed and he dominated the Globe stage with 
both his height and his restless shifts in pace: he demonstrated 
physically that he was always ready to move into battle rather 
than stand around receiving accolades. Cake certainly appeared to 
understand Martius as a choleric figure in Act I. It was anger that 
seemed to move him across the stage and on to the walkways built 
out into the yard for this production, to confront the Citizens in 
such a way as to suggest that he is constantly about to put his fists 
up. This portrayal need not have produced an unquestioning bias 
towards Martius; the critique I want to make of the production 
arises not from the fact that Martius could be funny and his energy 
refreshing. To play an English upper-class Martius as completely 
without likeable characteristics is to deny the fact that confident 
humour and mastery of public space which comes with privilege 
can be seductive. But the production blurred the debates around 
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education for leadership that it opened, through its combination 
of a clear set of signifiers of English public school boy and Cake’s 
intention to have his audiences read Martius psychologically and 
sympathetically. It elided the outspokenness of privilege and an 
apolitical psychological authenticity, as we will see.
For Cake, Martius’ choler is a defensive front for his psycho-
logical vulnerability. This vulnerability emerged, as the reviewers 
comment, in the scenes with Volumnia, the mother who sent 
him off to war (for which the rugby-preoccupied reviewers 
were perhaps reading boarding-school) and for whose love 
he appeared to have been been fighting ever since. Margot 
Leicester’s Volumnia was as energetic as her son and his own 
physical energy seemed drained by her presence. She was played 
with a less sinister dignity than is often seen in production and a 
great deal more movement. She sees, in her mind’s eye, Martius 
‘stamp thus, and call thus’ (1.3.33) and this gestural moment 
determined the rest of Leicester’s performance. Much has been 
made of Volumnia’s vicariously living through her son the warrior 
life her gender denies her.69 Here she performed this life unlived 
gesturally and suggested to the end that Volumnia is willing 
consciously to perform rather than only and spontaneously to act 
upon passion, as is her son. The blatant enthusiasm for war and 
wounds conveyed through Margot Leicester’s gestures provoked 
much laughter at the Globe and seemed to produce empathy 
for the son brought up by such a woman. Cake’s energetic fury 
crumbled, as Michael Billington’s review remarks, in the face of 
a mother figure even better able to possess the Globe stage than 
he. Much of the humour in this production arose in moments 
of bathos and the undercutting of bluster and high emotion by 
sudden shifts from grandiose to conversational tones. Nowhere 
was this more apparent as in Martius’ line ‘Mother, I am going 
to the market place’ (3.2.131) when, after much storming about 
the wounds to his integrity which a capitulation to the Citizens 
would force upon him, the angry patrician warrior vocalizes the 
inevitability of his reduction to obedient son. This scene got a 
round of applause in several performances.
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This apparent and audible empathy for the young man so put 
upon by an overbearing mother was at one with the empathy 
produced overall by Cake’s psychological reading of Martius as 
victim of upper-class emotional abuse, the child whose angry 
emotions still rule him because he has been emotionally deprived 
but has not yet quite learned the oppressive lesson of controlling 
his feelings. This is a psychological reading of the history of 
English upper-class child rearing that has resurfaced in novels 
and films during the first decades of the twenty-first century; in 
A. S. Byatt’s The Children’s Book, even the Bohemian Wellwood 
family cannot resist the class-normative practice of sending 
away the oldest son, and the sensitive Tom runs away from the 
boarding-school in which older students have physically and 
sexually abused him, and eventually commits suicide; in The 
King’s Speech, Colin Firth won his Best Actor Oscar for his 
portrayal of King George’s attempts to overcome the stammer 
brought on, the film suggests, by the chronic emotional neglect 
and abuse considered character-building for upper-class children, 
seen (on brief daily display to their parents) and not heard (except 
by nannies whose response to non-normative personalities was 
physical abuse).
When Firth played George VI, the actor was already celebrated 
for his portrayal of the repressed upper-class male; the attempts 
of his Mr Darcy to fight the passion lurking beneath layers 
of patrician etiquette and pride achieved a cult following for 
the BBC’s 1995 Pride and Prejudice.70 The notion that a warm, 
emotionally expressive – or simply vocally expressive, in the 
case of the stammering George VI – human being has been 
repressed or stultified by upper-class child-rearing practices 
may well seem plausible to any audience member for whom the 
nurturing of individual personality, rather than the preparation 
for colonial rule, is the purpose of child rearing. But what these 
readings of upper-class psychology tend to privilege is an interest 
in the individual over an analysis of his class position; one is 
not encouraged to interrogate privilege but to understand that 
the rich have just as hard a time psychologically as the poor 
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have materially. The Evening Standard’s Nicholas de Jongh had 
problems hearing ‘the plummy, frail voice that Cake adopted’ 
for the Globe’s Coriolanus and which de Jongh felt he ‘ought 
to abandon’; but this mix of plumminess and frailty is exactly 
what produces the effect of privileged-yet-vulnerable that made 
this Caius Martius so sympathetic. It is significant that the vocal 
frailty epitomized in George VI’s stammer gained Firth much 
critical approval and an Oscar. A particularly strong and much-
cited scene from The King’s Speech was the moment where Lionel 
Logue, the King’s speech therapist, encouraged him to swear. 
The appeal of this wild and joyous series of ‘blasts’ and ‘buggers’ 
and ‘fuck fuck fucks’ relied upon an audience’s understanding 
that it represented the purging of a lifetime of upper-class 
repression and a more authentic, angry, self-expressive George 
than convention and upbringing had hitherto permitted. Once 
the audience at the Globe had encountered Margot Leicester’s 
Volumnia, who so clearly lived through the fighting machine she 
had created, it was possible to interpret Martius’ anger as self-
expression as well as class contempt. Add this to the portrayal 
of the professional politicians of the piece, the Tribunes, as 
emotionally inauthentic and calculating at a time, as Cake points 
out (pp.  31–2), that much was being made in the UK of the 
untrustworthiness of our own politicians,71 and there emerged a 
clear reading of anger as legitimate self-expression that, I would 
argue, exemplifies a very modern understanding of emotion as 
healthily in excess of society’s oppressive demands.
As I have suggested, this ‘engaging brick’ of a Martius was highly 
energetic. Dynamic change in pace and quality of movement on the 
part of actors is even more crucial to the engagement of audience 
attention in this day-lit theatre than in those that create focus with 
stage lighting. Cake’s shifts of vocal and physical dynamic, particu-
larly when Martius was angry, set him apart from many other figures 
on stage, particularly the Tribunes, who wandered and mused as 
they plotted for their political survival but never entered the yard 
or moved on to the two walkways that had been built out into it, 
the first of the Dromgoole regime’s many incursions into the space 
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of the Groundlings. Cake would plant himself centre stage to make 
formal declamations to the gods or about his enthusiasm for a 
war that would rid Rome of its ‘musty superfluity’ (1.1.225), then 
would precipitate himself towards his enemies – be they political or 
national – with startlingly sudden changes of energy. The requests 
for the ‘voices’ of the people in 2.3 took place in the yard, where 
Martius, as several reviewers noted, would make much of ‘pressing 
the flesh’ of the audience, then wipe his hand disgustedly on the 
gown that was supposed to denote his humility. He happily strode 
out on to the walkways to confront the Citizens and rail against their 
liberties. Benedict Nightingale remarked in The Times that ‘Two 
wooden walkways pass through the theatre’s yard and on to the 
stage, allowing Roman citizens not merely to enter through a crowd 
of groundlings but to be clearly visible as they mingle with them 
and, in effect, become their spokesmen.’72 Cake, certainly, enjoyed 
imagining audience as mob:
when you walk on stage at the Globe you really have a 
mass, you have a mob, you have the populace standing 
in front of you, and they are receiving just as characters in 
the play might. Some of them want to convict Coriolanus, 
some of them want to defend him, most of them are 
probably undecided, just listening. (emphasis added)73
However, I would argue that the audience ‘receive’ Cake’s Martius 
very differently from the fictional Citizens of ancient Rome. In 
several performances, and from what could be seen in recordings 
of others, Martius’ disgust at having to shake hands with ‘us’ 
produced laughter, not an angry identification with the citizens he 
despised. It seemed that what was being enjoyed here was not the 
opportunity to enact participation in ancient Roman democracy, 
but Martius’ comically unbridled willingness to fly in its face, 
because conforming to its conventions felt inauthentic to him. 
Cake was struck how this play appeals to:
the current unhappiness and cynicism in the public today 
about lying politicians, about mendacity and spin… 
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to see a politician standing on stage who cannot help 
but tell the truth, who cannot help but be himself, who 
cannot dissemble, however repugnant one might find his 
view of the world… I was struck when talking to people 
afterwards by how sympathetic and rather thrilling they 
found that ability to be truthful.74
As Cake’s Martius strode about the yard, making the Citizens 
follow him to give their voices, the audience laughed, enjoying 
his outrageous nonconformity – and he appeared to have won the 
audience’s voices too. It was possible to read Martius’ choler, so 
far in excess of what is needed and desirable for a politician in his 
public relations with the Citizens in the play, as an appropriate 
anger at the perceived inauthenticity of politicians in the world 
of the audience.
Empathy for Martius was, then, produced by Cake’s use of 
the Globe’s stage and yard: through the character’s willingness 
to openly express his potentially objectionable but at least, as 
Cake argues, spontaneous and psychologically readable anger; 
through direct address and a physical dynamic that suggests 
there is nowhere on this stage he fears to go or cannot possess; 
and through the actor’s contact with his audience, something 
not permitted to the Tribunes by this production. The Tribunes 
plotted to change the votes of the fictional ‘people’ but never 
came among the paying ones and never addressed the audience 
from the stage either, as Cake’s Martius did repeatedly.75 As Peter 
Holland points out in his essay ‘Coriolanus and the Remains of 
Excess’,76 the Tribunes are repeatedly directed to ‘remain’ in 
the text of Coriolanus; they have the last word, alone together, 
commenting on the action, at the end of four scenes in which 
they appear. In this production, this gave the impression that they 
were removed from the passionate heat of the action. The spatial 
practices of Coriolanus at the Globe produced a particularly 
sympathetic Caius Martius and particularly despicable Tribunes, 
who always seemed too busy plotting to acknowledge us. The 
production foregrounded Martius as man of action, who involves 
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the audience in the action of the play, whose excessive anger is 
generated both by the recognizable signs of upper-class childhood 
trauma and by a natural and authentic fury at the Tribunes, those 
that remained after the excitement of Martius’ angry, humorous, 
authentic presence had departed. While Martius named the 
Citizens as a ‘musty superfluity’ (1.1.225) that can be consumed 
in the war, it was the Tribunes who treated the audience as 
superfluous to their politicking. While Martius likens himself 
to a lonely dragon, Cake’s Martius played for the sympathy of 
the playgoers and Cake believed that he truly wants the love of 
the humanity about which he purports to be so cynical. The 
first time I saw the production, he was so successful in this bid 
for sympathy and theatrical attention that immediately after 
the banishment sequence, in 3.3, the Tribunes were booed, and 
when Martius and Aufidius embraced in 4.4, two young women 
standing behind me let out an ‘Aaaaah!’ of sympathy, as if this 
were a moment of baby-animal-like cuteness.
Caius Martius was recognizable here as a psychologically 
wounded public school boy, whose repressed anger emerged in 
contempt at scheming politicians; his excess of choler was thus 
rendered both sympathetic and understandable. Shakespeare’s 
source in North’s Plutarch source offers a useful alternative to 
the notion of emotional deprivation in Martius’ upbringing: 
it suggests that his choleric pride has not been tempered with 
reason through an education in civic leadership. One might then 
ask the question, then: is Shakespeare’s version of the narrative, 
with its greater role for Martius’ mother, a mid point between 
ancient notions of the somatic passions and the necessity of 
tempering them with reason, and a post-Freudian understanding 
of anger as the affect produced in excess of repressed desire or 
trauma? This would, I think, be too Whiggish an interpretation 
of the play, in which current concerns with issues of child rearing 
and psychology are foreshadowed by Shakespeare. Ralph Fiennes’ 
film of Coriolanus, which he directed and in which he plays the 
lead, suggests to me that audiences today need not necessarily 
be offered a Martius whose choleric subjectivity is produced 
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by past emotional deprivation in order to engage with him as 
a dramatic figure. Although Fiennes was clearly interested in 
possible psychological readings of Martius, his film depicts anger 
as socially produced and as produced in social space.
FIENNES’ CORIOLANUS AND THE SITE-SPECIFIC 
SOLDIER
‘Because of the Place, Because of the Locations.’
Ralph Fiennes’ Coriolanus was filmed in Serbia and Montenegro. 
It attracted wide and prestigious critical attention, with article-
length reviews from Stephen Greenblatt in the New York Review 
of Books77 and Slavov Žižek in the New Statesman.78 Interviewed 
on Serbian television and asked why he had chosen Serbia for his 
Coriolanus, Fiennes replied, ‘Because of the place, because of the 
locations’, then referred to ‘atmosphere’ and architecture. In his 
interview with blogger Andreas Wiseman, he made more explicit 
reference to the architectural history of the country’s cities:
But more importantly than [low shooting costs and 
support from Serbian authorities] is Serbia’s grittiness 
– the bruised battered quality of some of the locations. 
There are great contrasts in Belgrade between weary 
Austro-Hungarian architecture, the old communist style 
and early 20th century neo-classicism.
Wiseman suggests that
That is a large part of what makes Belgrade such a 
perfect location for a contemporary adaptation of this 
play. It is steeped in a very unique history and culture 
but also is representative of the world over. Belgrade 
functions like Shakespeare’s Rome or his Plantagenet 
England. It is rich in a real and difficult history but it 
operates simultaneously as a ‘U-topos’, a ‘no place’, a 
place in which the artist can speculate or suggest.79
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Fiennes, too, thought of his locations as places that ‘could 
be anywhere’.80 At points in the news coverage of food riots 
and warfare, watched by the inhabitants of this modern ‘Place 
calling itself Rome’,81 he uses footage from other places. A vague 
American or Western European familiarity with news footage of 
the former Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s might indeed 
lead to a reductive sense that war is the same ‘the world over’. 
However, Belgrade and its environs, with its sharply juxtaposed, 
visible architectural histories, the news footage of protesters and 
tanks outside the Serbian Parliament for the conflicts between 
Martius and the Tribunes and Citizens in Act 3, the Parliament 
building, inside and out (shooting had to take place at weekends, as 
the location for Martius’ confirmation by the Patricians as Consul 
in 2.2 was Serbia’s Parliament), always reference themselves, in 
productively awkward contrast to the political system depicted 
in the play. They recall Mike Pearson and Cliff McLucas’ theory 
of ‘hosts and ghosts’ in site-specific theatre, whereby the ‘host’ 
site can always be seen through the ‘ghost’-like performers 
that haunt it and in which the relationship between the two is 
always a ‘mis-match’, productive of ‘fracture’.82 Here the ‘ghost’ 
may be more productively considered as the Serbian location 
of this film, haunting Shakespeare production with its history 
of recent political upheaval and violent conflict. There is no 
modern political system that involves patrician approval of parlia-
mentary members, followed by approval by whoever happens to 
be in the marketplace soon afterwards, followed by on-air political 
meetings in which that approval is withdrawn and the parliament-
arian sentenced to death or banishment. In the contrasts and the 
gaps between actual Serbian locations and the action of this play, 
the viewer of this film is asked to consider what is the same ‘the 
world over’ and what is historically and geographically specific.
If the Globe’s 2006 Coriolanus asked its audiences to consider 
the psychological underpinnings of anger, it also produced anger 
as movement in theatre space, as Jonathan Cake appeared to be 
propelled by his impulsive fury across the stage at his opponents 
– the Tribunes, the Citizens of Rome, Aufidius. Cake himself was 
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keen to let the audience see what motivated this movement, where 
in Martius’ past his anger came from and to suggest that it was 
somehow in excess of some true or essential humanity, crushed 
by a lack of parental affection. The site specificity of Fiennes’ 
film does different work with anger and space, and thus asks the 
viewer to consider anger differently: as both socially and psycho-
logically produced by the power structures that can make use of 
it. In his review of the film, Stephen Greenblatt complains that all 
Fiennes is capable of expressing in the central role is contempt. 
For Greenblatt, what Fiennes’ ‘mastery of nausea’ misses is 
Coriolanus’ semantic and thematic link to Cordelia in King Lear: 
both are figures who personify ‘an adherence to a principle so 
extreme and uncompromising that it threatens the whole social 
order and must in effect be eliminated if life is to go on’ but 
‘the viewer of Fiennes’s film would never grasp the affinity’.83 I 
disagree. What I think Greenblatt unintentionally buys into here 
is a critical history of realist acting and of subjectivity as self-
expression, in which self-expression escapes through the fissures 
in the individual’s often unconscious attempts to repress or hide 
it.84 In both histories, Caius Martius is always lacking: he has few 
moments of self-revelation of this kind. I would rather argue that 
what the determined, set expression on Fiennes’ face produces is 
not always contempt; sometimes it seems unreadable – and that 
is the point.
Greenblatt sees a Fiennes who
throws all restraint to the winds in the horrific battle for 
the Volscian town of Corioles, where his crazed, unstop-
pable, virtually single-handed conquest of the citadel 
earns him his honorific sobriquet.85
I, on the other hand, saw a figure moving through streets and 
houses in a bombed-out city, who did not stop, because nobody 
was left able-bodied or armed enough to stop him and who 
was only ‘crazed’ in the way that his single-minded movement 
through conquerable space might seem to we who are not trained 
to it. The contemporary Western civilian imagination, perhaps, 
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can only imagine the soldier as Seneca figures anger – crazed, 
unstoppable. Indeed, Fiennes himself describes the sequence in 
which Martius, inside Corioles, is ambushed by a soldier, fights 
and kills him with his knife, as demonstrating the ‘sort of psycho-
pathic, violent intensity of Coriolanus, [a] kind of extreme rage’.86 
But it is difficult to see what other kind of emotional state one 
might use to portray a killing of this kind and I want to argue that, 
though the film certainly emphasizes Martius’ personal obsession 
with defeating Aufidius, it also suggests that this ‘extreme rage’ 
is hardly in excess of what is needed in warfare. In fact, when 
Martius does confront Aufidius in this sequence, he does not lash 
out at him as he is obliged to do at the soldier who attacks him 
without warning and against whom he must use a knife because 
he is unable to reach his gun. Here both men very deliberately put 
down their guns and prepare for arm-to-arm combat. Excessive 
(to civilians) wrath appears to be a function of warfare; personal 
enmity produces a deadly calm.
The Act 1 battle sequence in this film used supernumeraries 
from the Serbian anti-terrorist squad to perform the Roman 
soldiers and shows ways of passing through spaces of urban 
warfare that are in line with modern military training regarding 
how to give cover and how to enter buildings held by enemies. 
The sequence produces a very different Martius from the hero 
of many a theatre production who takes the city single-handed by 
charging off-stage and comes back covered in blood. This Martius 
moves in the way he has been trained to do, through an urban 
space that has already been blasted into near submission, peopled 
by the already dead and by frightened old people who haven’t 
been able to escape. Fiennes himself was trained in the rules of 
urban warfare by his anti-terrorist squad extras and describes 
what he learned in significantly spatial terms:
Soldiers are lean and fit. They’ve got to have compact 
efficiency in the way they move and operate. The SAJ 
[Specijalna Antiteroristička Jedinica] have been teaching 
me about efficiency of movement, about how to open up 
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angles, the best way to move down corridors, and how 
best to handle weapons – moving the butt of the rifle 
from one shoulder to another, for example. It’s about 
spontaneous efficiency. It’s about drilling.87
Even the movement of the soldier’s rifle fills a space here. This 
efficient movement through space in order to conquer and possess 
it is performed by Fiennes in such a way as to suggest extreme 
tension and alertness; all his unreadable fury is focused on the 
‘spontaneous efficiency’ of killing and staying alive.
This Martius may be read, in accordance with Plutarch, as one 
who is at his disciplined, self-sacrificing best in battle, and at his 
choleric, antisocial worst in political settings.The film makes clear 
that Martius is both a poor producer of social space – he doesn’t 
know how to pass through it unless he is destroying it or leaving 
it. He stops to take some water from an old man who offers him 
a bottle and it seems that he is momentarily bewildered by an act 
that remakes the room both men are in as social space in which 
a host can offer a stranger water.88 He does his most efficient 
soldierly work alone and, once banished, he moves through 
landscapes of wintry wilderness until he reaches ‘Antium’, again 
with controlled, solitary efficiency, stopping to make camp in 
carefully chosen sheltered spots, pacing himself. The relatively 
recent history of the Former Yugoslavia and the location filming 
demands that the viewer asks where we are; it is the solidier, 
Martius, who could be anywhere. He has been trained to move 
through any space, to conquer it and stay alive for as long as 
possible to do so. Soldiers’ slow, methodical movement through 
urban space in this film is punctuated by rapid runs for vantage 
or cover, the sudden breaking down of doors – and, of course, 
gunshot. Sound is produced very explicitly in space in this film; 
gunshot is recorded not solely as shot but as the whole act of using 
a gun – reloading, shot, kickback, bullet cases dropping from guns 
and clinking to the floor, limbs and guns against uniform fabric, 
breath – are all clearly audible. This is the sound of soldiers taking 
up space. Pace Greenblatt, and Fiennes’ own commentary, his 
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work as a soldier does not read as crazed, unstoppable fury – or 
if it does, it is because one is given the impression that this is the 
emotional state needed to carry out the work of a soldier. The 
foregrounding of the materiality of warfare suggests, I would 
argue, that the viewer reads Martius’ furious energy, as he knifes 
his opponent in the empty house in ‘Corioles’, as necessary to the 
enterprise of conquering the city; if we read it as ‘psychopathic’, 
it is war, rather than Coriolanus’ subjectivity, which is the site and 
cause of psychopathy.
When Martius reaches Antium, in the disguise produced by the 
overgrown beard and hair of his long march, he gets the oppor-
tunity to watch leadership as the production of social space as 
opposed to leadership as the conquering of place, or the compro-
mised selfhood of political manoeuvring which Martius has 
rejected in Rome. Martius watches the socially competent Aufidius 
(Gerard Butler) walking through the small town. Everyone seems 
to know the Volscian leader; he shakes a number of hands, pats a 
number of backs, is asked to sit down and drink at a pavement bar. 
This is clearly an alien way of working to Martius, who manages 
to reconfigure Volscian leadership as Leadership Cult, without, 
of course, ever suggesting that he wants admirers. Once accepted 
by Aufidius, Fiennes’ Martius has his head re-shaved and the the 
Volscian youth all do the same, drunkenly taking turns, on the 
eve of battle, to sit in the barber’s chair in which their new leader 
was shaved. Ironically, the Martius who cannot bear to stand or 
sit still and be looked at or talked about, reconfigures Antium as 
the space of the patriarchal monument, in which Martius holds 
court in his iconic barber’s chair and which only his mother 
can invade and fracture. In Rome, he was a reluctant living 
monument or taker-up of ceremonial space:89 after leaving the 
Senate meeting to avoid hearing Cominius’ speech in his praise, 
he finds himself outside in a corridor, a non-place of passing and 
waiting, where a cleaner wheels his trolley past him and they 
exchange puzzled glances. The cleaner has a role that is supposed 
to remain invisible, meaningless; Martius refuses meaning outside 
of military action. But his following in Antium suggests that his 
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meaning in action is overdetermined and mythologized. Aufidius, 
too, is pulled into the cult of Coriolanus by envying it. When 
he asks ‘do they still fly to the Roman?’ (4.7.1) in this film, the 
impression is created that someone whose leadership style was 
highly nuanced socially is now being reduced or essentialized to 
something more Martius-like and monumental.
The film is not without psychological subtext but it is not dwelt 
upon, nor used to make Fiennes more sympathetic. He clearly 
still lives in his mother’s house with his wife and son, and Virgilia 
(Jessica Chastain) is shown clearly pushed out of the relationship 
as Vanessa Redgrave’s Volumnia is permitted to change her son’s 
bandages, the mother’s touch gentle but pragmatic and unabashed 
as Virgilia hovers awkwardly at the door. The wife touches her 
husband much more briefly and awkwardly in the marital bed. 
Redgrave’s performance is clear and simple. She wears military 
uniform for public ceremony and has clearly had to pour her own 
military potential into her son. Young Martius is all innocence 
and potential; he does not demonstrate that that he is particularly 
like or unlike his father as yet. The butterfly-mammocking speech 
is cut (1.3.58–67). An obvious reference to the child Martius 
once was, looking up at his mother for love and approval, occurs 
as he kneels at her feet in their final encounter; but there are 
no sustained attempts to psychologize Martius and his choleric 
temperament. Anger renders him active and articulate in his 
fury at the Citizens; repression of anger renders him awkward 
and stumbling, as he is on the hustings in the marketplace. 
Fascinatingly his red, contorted, spitting visage in the face of his 
trumped-up banishment by a TV talk show that appears to have 
been taken over by the Citizens in 3.3 signifies an inarticulate fury 
that contradicts the articulacy with which Martius speaks ‘what’s 
in’s heart’ in this scene (3.3.29). This Coriolanus is pure anger, 
which is why I argue that Greenblatt is mistaken to see a fixed 
expression as inadequate to the role. Anger renders him active 
and productive – physically in battle and linguistically in confron-
tation. When angry, he appears able to produce performatives 
without thinking: ‘I banish you’ (3.3.123). The ‘calm’ demanded 
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by political life renders him stuttering and awkward, a bad actor, 
as he also acknowledges he is when confronted by his family in 
Antium and is forced to feel other than angry. I read the fixed look 
of contempt marked by Greenblatt as the revulsion Martius feels 
for social interaction, because social interaction always involves 
compromise, whereas killing people does not. We cannot see this 
expression when he is covered with blood after the routing of 
Corioles, not because it is replaced by some self-revealing ecstasy 
or blood-lust revealing Maritius’ inner life, but because the blood 
renders the face unreadable – it is a streaky red painting with 
oddly luminous blue eyes; it represents the action, the fighting, 
that has just occurred, not what Martius feels about it.
Slavov Žižek gets closer to a more productive reading of Fiennes’ 
performance when he argues that Coriolanus is a ‘fighting machine’ 
whose lack of a class allegiance means he can ‘easily put himself 
at the service of the oppressed’.90 If Žižek is suggesting that Caius 
Martius has no class position from the outset of the film, he is 
wrong. Martius is a Patrician and speaks in the interests of the 
Patrician class. The lines of 1.3 in which Martius makes very clear 
his class position are not cut – he storms that the ‘soothing’ of the 
Citizens with democratic representatives has nourished rebellion 
(3.1.69) and that fixed look of nausea is first turned upon the 
Citizens who have come to demand corn at their own price (1.1.10). 
But while Martius can only fight on behalf of the Patricians, he is 
unable to represent them and refuses to be a sign in the semiotic 
system of the Senate. He hates the notion of performing on request 
and he finds standing still to be read disgusting, as evidenced by his 
leaving the Senate before Cominius makes his speech in praise of 
his deeds of war in order to secure his position as senator. It is at 
this point in the film that Martius, standing outside in the corridor, 
encounters the cleaner wheeling his trolley. He has calmly decided 
not to stand and be representative and ends up in a non-place, a 
corridor, meeting the curious glance of one of the disenfranchised. 
Both figures at this point are outside of Rancière’s distribution of 
the sensible.91 Both are therefore, for Žižek, potentially revolutionary 
figures.
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Žižek’s notion of an ideologically undetermined ‘fighting 
machine’ works with the notion of emotion as movement touched 
upon in the Introduction. Martius’ anger at Rome propels him 
from Rome, then back to attack it – and Aufidius and the Volscians 
can make use of it. Once Martius has been banished from Rome 
– and has banished Rome in return – he can put himself in the 
service of anyone or anything. Žižek’s reading is limited, though, 
by the way in which emotion is given social meaning in Roman 
culture. Roman ‘virtus’, maleness and virtue, holds within it, 
semantically, the man who needs nothing but himself in battle 
– who is able, in simple terms, to stand up for himself – and the 
man whose meaning is socially inscribed, whose virtue stands 
for something inherent to Rome. Once he is banished, Fiennes’ 
Martius becomes a free-floating signifier in the wintry no-man’s 
land between this Rome and this Antium. When he reaches the 
latter, the film makes it clear that he neither understands it nor 
signifies within it. Thus while his plan to fight for Aufidius – who 
in this film appears as the guerrilla leader of a less powerful state 
than Rome – fits Žižek’s notion of the potentially revolutionary 
fighting machine, outside of Rome’s distribution of the sensible, 
he cannot stay alive in Antium for long, as here he has ceased to 
mean anything. The things that anger Martius most are words, 
namely the words ‘traitor’, from the Citizens, and ‘traitor’ and 
‘boy’, from Aufidius. The virtuous Roman is the man who stands 
for – and stands up for – his country. The traitor behaves in his 
own self-interest, the boy is a weak dependant who does not yet 
stand for anything. In his fury at these insults, which strip from 
him the things he was willing to stand for, Martius demands 
that the Volscians kill him. In Fiennes’ film, this happens at 
a checkpoint between territories, another non-place. Martius 
may be solitary, a lonely dragon, but his anger means nothing 
without an appropriate social context; he no longer belongs to 
the Romans and now that he has become doubly a non-subject (a 
boy and a traitor) to the Volscians, it is time to die. The conver-
sations and compromises that living in a city (and governing it) 
involve produce a reasoning self which must control the choleric 
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temperament for the long-term good of the city and for the 
enlightened self-interest of the individual. Coriolanus does not 
have self-control except when his choler is channelled in battle; 
he is only able to ‘play the man he is’, an excessively choleric one.
While Dominic Dromgoole’s tenure at the Globe abandoned the 
‘original practices’ productions pioneered under Mark Rylance, 
his production of Coriolanus must have seemed, to the audience 
members who did not have a fine-tuned expertise in Jacobean 
costume, very much a Jacobean one. However, as I have suggested 
here, it suggested particularly twentieth/twenty-first century 
concerns with the inauthenticity of politicians, the need for self-
expression through anger and the inner pain of the repressed 
upper class male. Fiennes’ ‘modern dress’ Coriolanus film, on the 
other hand, much more self-consciously draws parallels between 
the questions Shakespeare’s culture may have been asking about 
the uses of anger and current concerns about the purposes and 
consequences of war. The inclusion of the action inside Corioles 
– not, of course, a scene in the play – demonstrates the training 
Fiennes undertook in military tactics, in which he becomes a ‘thing 
of blood’ (2.2.109), a fighting machine with death in his ‘nervy 
arm’ (2.1.160), the personification of ‘spontaneous efficiency’, 
the winner of the garland for killing the enemy. When Martius 
returns home to his political enemies, it is not permissible to 
render them powerless with the power of his tongue as he did his 
Volscian enemies with his weapon; his refusal to develop a political 
personality to control his choleric temperament finally leads to his 
death. Like the subjects of media stories of post-traumatic stress 
disorder, in the film he seems unable to communicate with his wife. 
Fiennes audio commentary on the film’s DVD release suggested 
that some – mistakenly, in Fiennes’ view – might read the scene 
when she opens a door to find his mother in the intimate act of 
changing those bandages as Oedipal. It rather suggested to me 
that the mother who brought him up to be a warrior, and who will 
not wince at these wounds as she regards them as trophies, is the 
only person off the battlefield who is permitted to approach them. 
The play’s concerns with leadership in war versus leadership in 
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politics, and the channelling of emotion required for both, are 
here paralleled by more recent concerns with appropriate behav-
iours for war and peace and what training for battle might do to 
the masculine psyche.
The distance between the politics of Shakespeare’s Rome and 
any recent political regime that the locations may have recalled, 
and the additional scenes that the film included to explore the 
mentality of a modern soldier, demonstrated a drive to make 
this 400-year-old play about a 2000 year-old culture ‘relevant’ 
to a modern viewer. However, Fiennes’ performance of anger in 
political space foregrounds the political uses of emotion and the 
subjectivity of leadership as I would argue the play does. In the 
light of a tradition of cultural materialist work on early modern 
drama (including my own), which claim that the open, public 
stage of Elizabethan/Jacobean London produces dramatic subjec-
tivity as a public, dialogic act, it is ironic to suggest here that this 
film politicized the cultural production and reception of anger, 
where the performance of Shakespeare’s Globe personalized it. 
This was due partly, perhaps, to the automatic alienation effect 
produced by the film and its placing of 400-year-old language 
in a recent theatre of war. However, I do still consider that it is 
possible to create equally productive dialogues between the ‘then’ 
and the ‘now’ of anger and its meanings in the theatre as well as 
on location in film, and I will conclude this chapter by pointing 
to two recent theatre productions of Coriolanus, both of which 
took a particular interest in the spaces of stage and audience, and 
in siting the production in ultra-contemporary corporate and 
military locations respectively.
CORIOLANUS AND ANGER: SPATIAL SOLUTIONS IN 
THE THEATRE
Getting Angry at Work 2: The Roman Tragedies Coriolanus
In Flemish director Ivo van Hove’s celebrated version of 
Coriolanus (Figure 1), Gijs Scholten van Aschat’s Martius is seen 
getting Angry at Work. The place of work here is not an office 
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like the one pictured on the Youtube clip mentioned above: it 
is plusher and full of places to eat, drink, read, send emails and 
watch Shakespeare, live and on screen. As Christian Billing puts 
it, director and scenographer van Hove and Jan Versweywald
came up with the idea of the corporate convention 
space: a place in which people could sit and watch TV 
in an anonymous environment in which the events of 
the world could unfold around spectators as they were 
having a beer or eating a sandwich.92
However, it read to me as an open-plan work space, one redolent 
of corporate efforts to blur work/life, or work/social life bound-
aries, in not dissimilar ways to the less luxurious open-plan office 
of the Youtube clip. As readers may know from having attended 
or read about this much-toured and much-cited production of 
The Roman Tragedies (Coriolanus, Julius Caesar and Antony and 
Cleopatra, cut to one approximately six-hour performance), 
audience members were invited on to the stage for substantial 
stretches of each performance. While there, they could regard 
the action from close quarters or look at it on one of the screens 
placed about the stage space. They were offered space to read 
newspapers, go online and send emails, or write text for the 
dot-matrix surtitles that rolled out above the stage. The food 
and entertainment offerings recalled what I suspect will be many 
contemporary workers’ experience of wasting time at work.
It was while appearing in a TV debate that this Martius lost 
his temper dramatically and had to be prevented from fighting 
the Tribunes, Brutus and Sicinius. The play’s (easily deflected, 
volatile) Citizens, who speak to the politician in his gown of 
humility and give or take from him their voices in a space of 
exchange, the marketplace, were cut, and the audience as (easily 
distracted, passive) consumers/workers took their place, watching 
‘the action’ on a screen, surfing the internet or wandering about to 
buy food. Appearing on television is, of course, part of the work 
of a modern leader; it is how he appears to the people. His job is 
to appear, as Menenius and Volumnia make clear in Coriolanus, in 
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a way that will please the viewers and convince them that their 
rulers are acting in their best interests. In the Roman Tragedies 
Coriolanus, the violent confrontations of Act 3 took place in 
front of an imagined ‘people’ of television viewers, who would 
have witnessed Martius’ outburst before he was taken off air. It 
also took place before the spectators who had remained in the 
auditorium for this section of the production, and among those 
who had placed themselves around Martius’ place of work, the 
media-obsessed centre of power which he would so much have 
preferred to exchange for the battlefield.
For its British audiences, this outburst of Anger at Work 
no doubt mapped Martius’ inability to behave ‘mildly’ for the 
Citizens neatly on to the critiques of inauthenticity and ‘spin’ 
that have been repeatedly made against politicians in this country 
since the Blair government’s term of office (see n.  72), and 
particularly since the expenses scandal of 2009, soon after the 
breaking of which the Trilogy played at the Barbican, London.93 
It would have been almost impossible to produce a modern-dress 
Coriolanus in 2009 without generating sympathy for a man who 
refuses to do what the politicians told him to. But there was 
also something exciting about the staging of this scene as bad 
behaviour in the workplace. The plush, corporate space, created 
to generate calm isolation for the most part, calm communication 
and cooperation when necessary, a space full of indications that 
work is just like home, had been violated by a passionately angry 
man who did not care if he broke the furniture. His anger was 
readable as both personal pathology and political heroism, both 
excessive because out of control and in excess of the ideological 
structures within which Martius must behave himself.
I witnessed Caius Martius’ outburst from the stage at the 
Barbican. From the auditorium, with its view both of the stage 
and the action taking place on a large screen above it, it may have 
read differently, as an embarrassing and undignified outburst 
by someone unable to control himself when given the responsi-
bility of appearing in front of the world on television. From the 
stage it was an excitingly theatrical expression of anger which 
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suggested that the corporate world could not entirely contain 
political passion and, given that Martius’ politics is violently 
anti-democratic, this may also have been read as a disturbingly 
reactionary moment. Interestingly, however, van Hove’s was also 
the most sympathetic portrayal of the Tribunes I have seen in a 
production of Coriolanus, perhaps partly because we did not get 
to see the unnerving violence that they whip up in the play and 
partly due to the the tangle of media, communication and social 
networking devices and the array of comforts and opportunities 
for consumption displayed before Brutus and Sicinius as they 
stood with the audience and looked at the stage. They had so 
much to attempt to control, so many distractions and conflicting 
interests to play off against one another. ‘Here’s he that would 
take from you all your power’ (3.1.182) warn the Tribunes in the 
play, and on this stage, the layered and ambiguous nature of that 
power made their rhetorical task a seemingly impossible one. 
Their first appearance – in the auditorium rather than on-stage 
– figured the conventional end-on seating area of the Barbican 
Theatre as the space of democracy, while the space of wandering 
and participation became both fragmented and passive. In his 
much-cited ‘Walking in the City’, de Certeau bids us leave behind 
the illusory wholeness of spectatorship, on offer from the top of 
the World Trade Center in New York and descend to the level 
of the walker, the social producer of space.94 Here, the space of 
the spectator became something more critical and interrogatory, 
while the walkers were framed as passive consumers. What the 
shifting set of perspectives offered by this Coriolanus demon-
strated was both the possibility of experiencing anger within a 
political/corporate space as Martius disrupts it, and of watching 
angrily, from the space of the auditorium, at first occupied by the 
Tribunes, but then abandoned by it as they attempt to join the 
mediatized space of political power.95
The Anger of the People: Coriolan/Us
I return, finally, to a site-specific Coriolanus: Coriolan/Us, 
directed by Mike Pearson and Mike Brookes for National Theatre 
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Wales in 2012, in an RAF aircraft hanger near Barry, South 
Wales. My interest in site-specific Shakespeare emerged from 
some experiments with this play in non-theatre spaces with 
Flaneur Productions in Minneapolis (2005 and 2006), which are 
documented elsewhere.96 The promenade Coriolanus on which 
I worked demonstrated that direct address to the audience in 
a non-theatre space did not necessarily produce the dialectical 
and balanced shifts in political sympathy from Caius Martius to 
the Citizens and back again that I had assumed it would. There 
is an assumption underpinning some academic writing on site-
specific work that it is in and of itself more politically progressive 
than theatre which takes place in a theatre with a conventionally 
seated audience sitting quietly (passively?) watching in the dark. 
Pearson’s own work on site-specific practice has suggested this.97 
I had made similar assumptions and failed to predict that a Caius 
Martius that came among his audience to upbraid them as unruly 
Figure 3: Caius Martius Coriolanus (Richard Lynch), First Citizen ( John Rowley), 
Second Citizen (Gerald Tyler) in Coriolan/Us dir. Mike Pearson and Mike Brookes 
for National Theatre Wales, performed at RAF St Athan, 2012 (© Mark Douet/
National Theatre Wales)
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citizens, then later address them as those who might empathize 
with his loathing of said citizens, might prove highly sympathetic. 
Comparable dramaturgical effects in the analysis of the Globe’s 
Coriolanus are explored above.
Coriolan/Us conflated Shakespeare’s and Brecht’s Coriolanus 
texts98 (the National Theatre Wales’ production used a translation 
of Brecht’s Coriolanus for the scenes featuring the Citizens, a cut 
of Shakespeare’s play for the rest of the production); it was clearly 
interested in the perspective of the Citizens. Although the use of 
the Brecht did not evade any of the political problems posed for 
the liberal theatre-goer by Shakespeare’s play (Brecht’s Citizens 
are as easily manipulated by Menenius and by the Tribunes in 
turn as those in the earlier play) their speeches were rendered 
startlingly clear by their modernity compared to the source text. 
What this production permitted was the reading of audience as 
Citizens in a way that did not require them to act as supernumer-
aries. It staged the play as a site of anger across the spectrum of 
social class.
“What is the city but the people?” demands Sicinius at 
one point in Coriolanus – National Theatre Wales makes 
the question the bedrock of this gripping promenade 
production. Here we, the audience, are the people – 
milling, drifting, scattering in alarm as the action plays 
out in our midst.99
It is significant that in Sarah Hemming’s review here, she describes 
the ‘us’ of Coriolan/Us in terms of action. ‘We’ also spent a lot 
of time standing, sitting, watching, listening but I concur with 
Hemming that what the people watching this play do is inextri-
cably part of this production’s mise-en-scene. This is the case even 
though the act of direct address could not attempt to cast them as 
Citizens in this production, because they were divided from the 
action of the play and visually constructed as only ever ‘audience’: 
they were all listening to the actors’ speeches on headsets. The 
Citizens themselves were played by only two actors, John Rowley 
and Gerald Tyler; they crossed the breeze-block divide between 
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Rome and Antium to play the Volscian citizens who kill Martius. 
Occasionally the numerical paucity of this crowd made them 
appear an oddly and naively brave set of revolutionaries setting 
themselves up, somewhat implausibly, against the larger group of 
Patricians who spoke Shakespeare and drove real vehicles across 
the vast aircraft hanger. But having no acted crowd or group of 
Citizens, only a crowd of audience addressed by two plebeians, 
made the casting of ‘us’ as plebeians more effective than in other 
productions where non-actors are addressed as Citizens. This 
was really Coriolan + Us, rather than Coriolanus, plus the play’s 
Citizens, plus some audience members who are, usually, clearly 
just that, however they are addressed.100
Of course, this audience was also there just to watch. The 
only actual moment of ‘participation’ at the performance I 
attended was when we were induced to applaud the conferment 
of Martius’ new surname (1.9.64). But in the shared light of the 
hanger, we were constructed both similarly and differently to 
van Hove’s on-stage spectators. On the one hand, the audience 
was doing nothing in the face of the action, perhaps reminded, 
particularly when watching the two large screens on which one 
could also see the piece, of the comfortably disengaged viewing 
habits of the television audience watching wars in other places. 
Then, in tension with the construction of the audience as passive 
viewer, the audience were also a potential threat in the space: 
they peered into the caravans where the sound technology was 
housed and where the Patricians and Tribunes plotted their 
war and their peace, they crowded around Menenius’ jeep that 
was rocked dangerously by the two Citizens, they milled about 
near meetings they should not have been overhearing and got 
in the way of battles in which they were not going to take part. 
The literal threat that the audience members might obstruct the 
proceedings, go where they were not wanted or trip over some of 
the ever-moving sound and lighting cables and cause a health-
and-safety incident gave them a precarious power. Moreover, 
because each of its members wore headphones, the audience was 
foregrounded as omniscient audience rather than fictional mob 
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– so that when they were addressed patronizingly by Menenius 
or furiously by Martius, the fact of their extra-fictional power to 
hear, move, stay or leave made them, paradoxically, a yet more 
threatening mob.
This was a production that privileged the potentially excessive 
anger of the people and the danger that it might overturn Patrician 
power, over the personal anger of Caius Martius and his mother 
Volumnia, often the emotional centres of this play. Richard Lynch’s 
Martius played angry contempt as effectively as Fiennes but fitted 
even better Žižek’s notion of a fighting machine with no funda-
mental class interest. Ideologically he was, of course, absolutely of 
the Patricians – he is the logical end to their class position – but 
he could have come from anywhere. He was simply Rome’s most 
effective war machine. Martius and Aufidius’ famously homo-erotic 
meeting in Antium was played without relinquishing at any point 
the threat of violence between the two men. There was no sense, 
as in Cake’s performance, that the audience was being asked to 
read some need for love in Martius here. Aufidius’ delight at seeing 
Martius in his camp seemed to stem simply from the use he thought 
he could make of the exiled Roman. Volumnia, too, was de-psychol-
ogized by the production. There was nothing sinisterly smothering 
about Rhian Morgan’s performance; she was, rather, simply a 
strong-willed, highly pragmatic Patrician woman, so confident in 
her class position that she could see no threat to it in revealing the 
manipulations of power and could not understand why Martius 
balked at being manipulative. The relationship between Martius and 
Virgilia was, again, productively difficult to read. She seemed utterly 
numb in his presence. They barely touched throughout the perfor-
mance and the kiss in 5.1 hardly seemed the kind that would elicit 
the description ‘long as my exile, sweet as my revenge’ (5.3.45) so 
that the performance occasionally read startlingly against the grain 
of the text. Perhaps Bethan Witcomb’s performance represented 
an impotent female anger that her husband should be constantly 
risking his life with so little regard for her and for their family; but 
the lack of an ‘emotional’ performance generated a strong sense that 
whatever the wife of a commander felt in this war, whatever the 
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wife of a politician felt in this peace, was irrelevant to the outcomes 
of either.
Described by one reviewer as both vast and claustrophobic, 
the ugly, fume-filled aircraft hanger in which this Coriolanus took 
place was also an actual site of the production of war. St Athan 
is a working RAF base. The production managed to underplay 
the anger of individual characters in this play and to foreground 
the vested interests of every group involved in the politics of war 
and peace. The site framed the audience as a potentially angry 
group of disenfranchised citizens that might run amok and wreck 
the show, or damage the military base. This is, of course, a post-
Marxist reading that Brecht would no doubt have enjoyed and 
whose distinctly unheroic Caius Martius Shakespeare might not 
have recognized. On the other hand, the potential violent force 
of anger is foregrounded here in ways that make sense of early 
modern treatises and their classical sources, all of whom seem so 
terrified of anger’s excesses. I end with this production not only 
because it is the one that, in my experience as a theatre-goer, 
succeeded best in producing a politically radical reading of the 
play, but because it was apparently interested in anger as a political 
force, as that which makes and destroys communities of needs and 
interests, rather than as a means or effect of personal expression. 
In the next chapter I turn not to an emotion as such but to a 
physical effect of emotion – laughter – and consider that, too, as 
a phenomenon that generates and interrogates social groups and 
their interests in early modern drama and its production.
The conclusion I draw here concerns early modern drama 
and site-specific theatre. In a culture that tends to read anger as 
a matter of personal mental health, it is important, I think, to 
develop performance conventions that permit the performance 
of other discursive possibilities around excessive emotion. The 
psychological agency of Cake’s Martius suggests that he Just Can’t 
Help his Anger – even in the face of Volumnia’s cold suggestion 
that we can use our brain to control anger when it is politically 
expedient. This sense of character emerging at a point where 
humoral predominance and social needs are in conflict certainly 
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emerges in the play. But in the Globe’s production, emotion is 
privileged where in the play it is of ambivalent personal and social 
value. In the play there are others who will not control their anger 
because it is not in their interests to do so: the people. The two 
broadly site-specific productions I have mentioned above demon-
strate ways in which anger pushes at social-spatial boundaries 
and ways in which socio-political groups, as well as individuals, 
might be theatrically configured as angry, in excess of forces 
endeavouring to contain them. The meanings generated by the 
juxtaposition of 400-year-old text and ‘modern’ site do potentially 
great work in foregrounding how anger might be staged as both 
used by and in excess of the cultures that approve or disapprove, 
legitimate or warn against it.
CHAPTER TWO
‘DO YOU MOCK OLD AGE, YOU ROGUES?’ 
EXCESSIVE LAUGHTER, CRUELTY AND 
COMPASSION
iago
Now will I question Cassio of Bianca
A housewife that by selling her desires
Buys herself bread and clothes: it is a creature
That dotes on Cassio; as ’tis the strumpet’s plague
To beguile many and be beguiled by one:
He, when he hears of her, cannot refrain
From the excess of laughter.
Shakespeare, Othello (4.1.94–100)
Laughter reveals us as a social mammal, stripping away 
our veneer of culture and language, challenging the 
shaky hypothesis that we are rational creatures in full 
conscious control of our behaviour.
(Robert R. Provine, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation)1
first madman
Do you look for the wind in the heavens? Ha, ha, ha, ha! 
No, no, look there, look there, look there! The wind is 
always at that door. Hark how it blows, poof, poof, poof !
all
Ha, ha, ha!
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first madman
Do you laugh at God’s creatures? Do you mock old age, 
you rogues? Is this grey beard and head counterfeit, that 
you cry, ‘Ha, ha, ha?’
Dekker and Middleton, 1 The Honest Whore, 
(5.2.196–202)
WHAT’S FUNNY? THE HERMENEUTIC PROBLEM 
OF LAUGHTER
During November 2011, I ran two workshops as part of Forum 
Shakespeare in Rio de Janeiro. This is a programme of events 
curated by People’s Palace Projects, an arts organization based at 
Queen Mary, University of London, which creates and brokers 
international arts partnerships and produces arts for social justice 
projects.2 One workshop was a half day at the University of Rio 
de Janeiro, with a group of highly able undergraduate students 
particularly attuned to the possibilities of applying physical 
theatre practices to early modern drama production. The other 
was a day with an equally talented and less privileged group from 
the Universidade da Quebradas, whose students were drawn 
from the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.3 Some of these students had 
achieved extraordinary success against odds that many British 
drama students would find hard to imagine. What was impressive 
about both groups was their willingness to commit, intellec-
tually, emotionally and physically, to working in a one-off class 
with a stranger on a  400-year-old play in translation. What was 
strikingly different about the two groups was their attitudes to 
the comic. The work concerned, as much of my practical work 
with students does, the relationship between performer and 
audience in Shakespeare,4 and focused specifically on the gestural 
vocabularies suggested by Shakespeare’s theatre. We worked on 
Ophelia’s account of Hamlet’s entry to her closet. We worked on 
Angelo’s ultimatum to Isabella in 2.4 of Measure for Measure. The 
Quebradas group were markedly more comfortable with allowing 
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their work on these scenes to be funny, while the University of Rio 
de Janeiro group suggested that working with direct address on 
a scene gave rise to the danger of ‘turning it into a comedy’. The 
Rio group produced exceptionally visually creative work on these 
difficult texts (the translations used archaic language to produce 
a sense of a poetry of the past) which inclined either towards the 
confrontational, painful and more naturalistic, or towards the 
broadly gestural and comical. The Quebradas group seemed more 
comfortable with moves between the comical and the serious. 
This group were not unnerved by the notion that Shakespeare 
could be funny where his subject matter – madness and sexual 
exploitation – seemed most serious; they shifted between comic 
and serious modes with great ease, both as actors and audience.
There is a problem of culture and hermeneutics here, compa-
rable to the one that has made Robert Darnton’s The Great 
Cat Massacre such a popular work of cultural history. Darnton 
gives an account of an eighteenth-century worker’s protest that 
involved the theatricalized killing of all the cats in their neigh-
bourhood and explores the cultural differences that might make 
an act that a modern French person might deem distasteful and 
cruel hilariously funny to a eighteenth-century one.5 It will not 
always be possible to excavate the reasons why a historical culture 
might find something acceptable to laugh at and something 
else excessive, tasteless or cruel – and because laughter is such 
a visceral and seemingly universal physical effect of emotion, 
it is tempting to assume that if audiences consistently laugh 
at particular moments in a historical drama today, they have 
‘discovered’ what was funny about it to its original audiences. 
Both my Brazilian example and Darnton’s massacred cats suggest 
that socio-economic as well as national and historical differences 
pertain to questions of what is funny and what is not, what it is 
considered legitimate to laugh at and what might make one stifle 
one’s laughter. I have already called the students who were more 
reluctant to make a ‘difficult’ moment in Shakespeare funny 
‘more privileged’ than those with seemingly less anxiety around 
generic propriety, and in a short article in an online edition of the 
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Guardian newspaper I tentatively suggested that those who have 
experienced violence and corruption might be better equipped to 
understand the dramaturgical structures of a play like Measure for 
Measure than those with relatively ‘easy’ lives.6 I say ‘tentatively’, 
because as one of the relatively privileged, I am conscious both 
that this suggestion might be a patronizing generalization, and 
of the potential for misreading the laughter of another culture, 
even when its members are alive to explain it. In this chapter, 
nevertheless, I consider exactly the issue of what was funny to a 
culture whose members I am unable to question except through 
textual traces – and hope to produce a more nuanced argument 
than one which suggests that a more violent culture laughs at 
subjects that its more sheltered descendants might consider 
cruel.7 I am going to suggest that while twenty-first-century and 
early modern cultures have not, of course, found all of the same 
things legitimate objects of humour, or all of the same things 
excessive, it is possible today to read the dramaturgy of humour 
in early modern drama in ways that challenge generic boundaries 
and simple binaries of humour and seriousness, compassion and 
cruelty across 400 years.
This chapter explores dramatic moments which suggest that 
some kinds of laughter are excessive, or cruel. The chapter’s 
exemplary objects of laughter are mostly theatrical mad figures: 
characters who go mad as a result of trauma experienced as part 
of a dramatic plot, like Shakespeare’s Ophelia, characters kept in 
madhouses, from Jacobean tragedies, and a figure who is incar-
cerated as mad as a joke or a punishment: Malvolio in Twelfth 
Night. I am going to suggest that where a twenty-first-century 
audience may find laughing at such figures in excess of the 
boundaries of human compassion and good taste, an early modern 
audience may have laughed freely. But far from suggesting 
that the early modern period is therefore merely an example of 
benighted social attitudes long since abandoned, I will argue that 
laughter in the early modern theatre is ambivalent and multi-
directional rather than simply excessive and cruel. Laughter in 
the first plays I explore here is often, rather, in excess of simply 
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explicable power relations between the laugher and the laughed 
at. As Albrecht Classen points out in his introduction to Laughter 
in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times, ‘Those who laugh 
either join a community or invite others to create one because 
laughter excludes and includes, it attacks and belittles but it also 
evokes sympathy and understanding.’8 Some of the plays we are 
going to examine here shift remarkably swiftly from one kind of 
laughter to another. 
In what follows, I am going to cite some scientific studies of 
laughter. Some of these studies are interested in laughter as a reflex, 
something involuntary that the laugher cannot help. According to 
Robert Provine, laughter is ‘spontaneous and relatively uncen-
sored, thus showing our true feelings’.9 Of course our ‘true feelings’ 
about what is funny are, as the Great Cat Massacre example above 
suggests, socially determined – thus whereas scientists may find 
that laughter is invariably produced by, say, non-serious incon-
gruities (see p.  65) and, indeed, are supported by early modern 
treatises on laughter, different societies and periods may find these 
non-serious incongruities in different places. What I have found 
useful about the universalizing tendency of scientific studies of 
laughter has been their concern with possible social bonding 
purposes of laughter in evolutionary history: Classen’s laughter 
‘for sympathy and understanding’. Where the Humanities scholar 
might stereotype science – particularly evolutionary psychology 
as it is recounted in popular science – as tending to naturalize 
conservative continuities (above all in its explications of gender 
roles10), the studies I cite here interestingly suggest that laughter 
has developed for reasons connected with altruism and sociability 
rather than aggression and exclusivity.
THE ANTI-COMICAL PREJUDICE
In the speech from Othello that opens this chaper, Iago declares 
that Cassio, when he hears of Bianca, ‘cannot refrain’ not from 
an excess of laughter but from ‘the excess of laughter’. Thus 
to Iago, it seems, laughter is in and of itself an excess. Perhaps 
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anything that does not further his desire to bring about Othello’s 
tragedy is simply in excess of what is meaningful to this villain. 
Perhaps the companionable reflex of laughter – even when it is 
spiteful – is irrelevant to this figure with no companions. Or, in 
accordance with Provine’s description of laughter, laughter is 
an uncontrollable reflex and Iago is always entirely in control of 
himself, Othello, and the plot of the play. To imagine Iago getting 
any closer to laughter than a contemptuous sneer at a man such 
as Cassio, would be to imagine Iago losing control. That such 
a figure considers laughter excessive is, of course, in laughter’s 
defence. As we will see, there are anxieties around the ethics 
of laughter circulating in early modern writings – particularly 
around whether laughter tends to the derisive and the cruel – 
which Iago’s implied dismissal of it might contest. If this cruel 
and monomaniacal villain calls laughter excessive, he might 
encourage his audiences to consider its social advantages. The 
‘mad’ characters I examine here are always potentially excessive 
figures, their language a tumble of repetitive excesses which fails 
to keep within the boundaries of grammar and sense, paying no 
attention to sumptuary etiquette, wild haired and hatless with 
their stockings down-gyved. They are of particular interest here 
because to laugh at them may be considered inappropriate, even 
cruel – in excess of the social regulation of emotional expression 
both in the early modern period and today. But if it is villains 
like Iago who call laughter an excess, we should also consider its 
positive effects.
Philip Sidney’s familiar theory of laughter from the Apology for 
Poetry is that laughter, particularly in the theatre, is potentially a 
cruel kind of pleasure: ‘naughty play-makers and stage-keepers 
have justly made [it] odious’.11 It is to be differentiated from 
delight, albeit that there may be artistic depictions that provoke 
both. ‘[O]ur comedians think there is no delight without laughter’, 
declares Sidney, whereas in fact we delight ‘in things that have a 
conveniency to ourselves or to the general nature’ and ‘laughter 
almost ever comest of things most disproportionate to ourselves 
and nature’. We are delighted at beauty and laugh at deformity; 
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we delight in ‘good chances’ and laugh at ‘mischances’.12 Sidney 
argues that it is the responsibility of the play-maker to be sure 
that his final intention is educational delight, rather than mere 
laughter, and declares:
the great fault even in that point of laughter, and 
forbidden plainly by Aristotle, is that they stir laughter 
in sinful things, which are rather execrable than ridic-
ulous; or in miserable, which are rather to be pitied than 
scorned. For what is it to make folks gape at a wretched 
beggar, or a beggarly clown; or, against the law of hospi-
tality, to jest at strangers, because they speak not English 
so well as we do? What do we learn?13
Significantly, Sidney ends his discourse on the comic by admitting 
he has ‘lavished too many words on this play matter’ and explains 
that this is because, although he counts plays among the ‘excelling 
parts of Poesy’ and drama the most common poetic form in 
England, ‘none can be more pitifully abused’. The theatre play 
has the potential, ‘like an unmannerly daughter showing a bad 
education’, to cause ‘her mother Poesy’s honesty to be called into 
question’.14 Theatre appears to be the place where laughter causes 
Sidney the most anxiety. He links it with unruly female sexuality 
in this image of Poesy illegitimately mothering the theatre.
Less nervous about laughter than Sidney is Laurent Joubert’s 
well-known Treatise on Laughter, first published in French in 
1579, which repeatedly suggests that it is simply not natural (and 
his work largely discourses on laughter as a natural phenomenon) 
to laugh at what ought to be pitied: ‘What we see that is ugly, 
deformed, improper, indecent, unfitting and indecorous excites 
laughter in us, provided we are not moved to compassion.’15 His 
examples are accompanied by provisos which demonstrate that it 
is only light and inconsequential mishaps and improprieties that 
move us to laughter. If its subject is likely to be seriously pained or 
humiliated without desert, we simply will not laugh at an incident. 
Joubert’s study is of laughter in ‘real life’; Sidney has the poetic 
and dramatic arts as the object of his Apology and it is significant 
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that the latter’s attitude to laughter is more censorious. There is a 
danger for Sidney, which Joubert never touches upon, that poetry 
will induce its audiences to laugh at that which should be pitied; 
Joubert simply trusts that where something is pitiable, we will not 
laugh. Take Joubert’s example of the unseemly exposure of body 
parts that should properly be covered in public:
It is equally unfitting to show one’s arse, and when there 
is no harm forcing us to sympathize, we are unable to 
contain our laughter. But if another suddenly puts a 
red-hot iron to him, laughter gives way to compassion 
unless the harm done seems light, and small, for that 
reinforces the laughter, seeing that he is properly 
punished for his foolishness and unpleasant foul deed.16
The bare arse makes the viewer laugh; a violent punishment 
will not – although a light punishment, well deserved, will. But 
in the context of poetry and stage plays, laughter at something 
that should be serious because pitiable is something more of a 
risk. Sidney is of course right to suggest that fictional violence, 
deception or impropriety are a great deal more likely to be laughed 
at than the same in social life: fiction is, in one simple sense, 
always inconsequential. However, I also want to suggest that it 
is in moments of morally dubious, improprietous and excessive 
laughter that spectators are asked to examine the community 
of laughers to which they belong, in a range of ambiguous and 
challenging ways. The theatre is not reality, despite Puritan 
fears that it might produce real emotions and have unwished-
for consequences. But it has a social and material reality more 
complex than that railed against in the anti-theatrical tracts of the 
early modern period,17 a reality produced when human subjects 
gather to watch actors pretending to be other human subjects 
and as audiences are asked to witness, react to, enjoy and accept 
the fictions produced by actors in spaces built for playing. The 
audience really laughs, and here I consider moments when an 
audience is indeed invited to laugh at the supposedly pitiful and 
wretched. I am going to suggest that the relationship between 
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laugher and laughed-at is a more complex one in the shared 
light of the Elizabethan and Jacobean playhouse than Sidney’s 
examples and concerns suggest. ‘What do we learn?’ asks Sidney 
from the scornful, bullying, inhospitable forms of laughter he 
describes. I will argue that we may learn much about laughing, 
community and communities of laughter.
In answer to Sidney’s question, author of Shakespeare and 
Laughter Indira Ghose might answer: we learn, or rather we 
are able to convince ourselves, that we are superior to those at 
whom we laugh. In her chapter on ‘Early Modern Laughter’ 
she develops the concept of the community of laughers whose 
comic object is always outside of that community.18 Ghose’s 
theory may be read with Sidney’s in its suggestion that there is 
always something ethically dubious about laughing. Her study 
certainly informs this chapter; however, I want to challenge the 
assumption (which Ghose herself complicates elsewhere19) that 
communities of laughers are always created at the expense of 
another – the outsider or Other whose existence confirms what 
it is to be an insider, part of a dominant group of subjects whose 
membership of the group becomes what it means to be a subject. 
Cuckold jokes, for example, are supposedly always at the expense 
of some other group of men likely to be cuckolded and create a 
sense of superiority among those laughing at them: ‘[t]hus jokes 
about cuckoldry, rather than serving as a hydraulic safety valve 
for anxieties, can paradoxically serve to create a sense of male 
bonding’.20 Ghose ends her discourse on this type of joke by 
asserting that ‘Cuckolds are always other people’.21 However, the 
example she uses – the Duke’s men’s hunting song in As You Like 
It (4.2.10–19) – suggests that something more complex is going 
on than the kind of excluding behaviour involved in laughing at 
cuckolded outsiders. The ‘horn’ of which the men sing in their 
pastoral exile is, at one level, the hunting horn and the song 
suggests that the men are reclaiming it from its denigrated status 
as cuckold symbol for the manly pursuit of hunting: it is ‘the lusty 
horn’, the instrument that calls the hunt, not ‘a thing to laugh to 
scorn’, the sign of cuckoldry. But of course, by singing of the horn,
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It was a crest ere thou wast born.
Thy father’s father wore it,
And thy father bore it.
(4.2.15–17)
the overworked joke about cuckoldry and possible illegitimacy 
contained in the symbol is ever present, even as it is denied. In the 
shared lighting conditions of the early modern playhouse, songs 
are always extra-diagetic even when they are part of the fiction: 
the Duke’s men decide to sing a hunting song at this point in the 
fiction; they also sing a song, do a turn, for the audience. In this 
case, the audience is being told not to laugh at the horn, even as 
they are being taunted as bastards, their fathers as cuckolds. If, 
on stage, there is a mix of singing to the audience and singing 
with each other, this is group bonding of a particularly inter-
esting and shifting kind. One may argue that everyone onstage 
and in the playhouse is being asked to laugh at themselves, in a 
homo-sociality that is so confident it does not even need to point 
to a group of outsiders as the object of laughter. It is your father, 
everyone’s father, who bore the horn – and, should anyone be 
offended, we’re really only singing about hunting.22 A theory of 
laughter communities that posits the necessity of an ‘other’ to 
laugh at fails to take into account the subtle pleasures of self-
deprecation, which, one might argue, have been a part of English 
culture for over 400 years. But what I am particularly interested 
in arguing is that communities of laughter in early modern drama 
are so sharply shifting, so bewilderingly constitutive of one 
community then another, that an audience cannot always know 
how they are being interpellated: as laughers or as the laughed at.
LAUGHTER, COMMUNITY, COHESION
Interestingly, a number of recent biological and psychological 
studies make no Sidnean distinction between laughter and 
delight, nor suggest that laughter is necessarily socially excluding. 
As I suggested above (p. 58), the Humanities may tend to regard 
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science as overly concerned with evolutionary psychological 
readings of phenomena which fit an ultimately conservative model 
of survival of the fittest, so it is interesting to read Jaak Panksepp’s 
2000 study of the ‘neural and psychoevolutionary underpinnings 
of joy’, in which he elides laughter, joy and delight. Drawing upon 
research that has discovered ‘laughter’ as a result of tickling in 
primates and even laboratory rats, he suggests that ‘A study of the 
underlying brain systems in other mammals may eventually help 
clarify the ancestral antecedents of joy within the human brain’ 
and discusses the ‘delighted attentions’ indicated by laughter in 
infants at ‘joyful tickling and peek-a-boo games of absence and 
presence’.23 Far from assuming that all laughter has its basis in the 
production of social bonds by way of the exclusion of the Other, 
Panksepp remarks that ‘It is a common but not an empirically 
firmly established view that the maturing human taste for humor 
is based, in some foundational way, on the existence of infantile 
joy and laughter’.24 Panksepp assumes that laughter indicates joy 
and if laughing in infants begins, as he asserts, at two or three 
months, it is a pre-social phenomenon that develops socially and 
for social purposes as the child matures, rather than a purely 
social, community-building, Other-excluding one.
In Panksepp and Burgdorf ’s study of rats, the kind of chirping 
response to tickling that Panksepp equates to human laughter 
‘predicts playfulness […]: animals that chirp most during tickling 
also solicit play the most’.25 Unlike Joubert in the late sixteenth 
century, who dismisses tickling as ‘an imitation and copy of real 
laughter’26 and considers ‘true’ laughter to be a God-given form 
of release from only human woes and hardships,27 modern science 
here considers tickling-induced laughter as a physical reflex 
of just the same kind as laughter at a joke or other intellectual 
stimulus.28 For Panksepp, play is a social activity, even in rats, 
and what interests him seems to be the equation of the physical 
capacity for laughter-like chirping with this social activity. Giggly 
rats are the most social in Panksepp’s article and in his joint study 
with Burdorf: rats who make the giggling sound solicit play the 
most. Those with a tendency to laugh are of a social, sanguine 
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disposition in Joubert, for whom laughter ‘indicates a good 
nature and purity of blood’29; the humoral type with the greatest 
tendency to laughter, ‘sanguine people’, are, moreover, ‘naturally 
gentle, gracious, pitiful, merciful, humane, courteous, liberal, 
polite, affable, easygoing, accommodating, hardy, amiable, friendly 
and cheerful’,30 all social virtues. The most interesting adjective in 
this copious list is ‘pitiful’, given Sidney’s concerns that laughter 
is often at those who should elicit our pity but at whom we cruelly 
laugh instead. For both this twenty-first-century scientist and 
this sixteenth-century theorist, who are considering the science 
and culture of laughter rather than dealing with anxieties about 
the theatre, laughter indicates playfulness, sociability and, by 
extension in human beings, empathy.
One remarkable consistency across 400 years of laughter 
analysis is the shared conclusion that unthreatening incongruity 
provokes laughter. In Matthew Gervais and David Sloan Wilson’s 
summative article on ‘The Evolutionary Functions of Laughter’,
what emerges from the [recent scientific] literature 
is something of a consensus that incongruity and 
unexpectedness underlie almost all instances of formal 
laughter-evoking humor. This is insofar as the perceived 
inconsistency between one’s current and past experi-
ences involves both a non-serious or playful frame and 
an alternate type of intelligibility, that is, a meaningful 
interpretation of some stimulus or event that is different 
from that which was initially assumed.31
Similarly, for Joubert, causes of laughter must be non-serious 
and conducive to a spirit of playfulness, or we will be moved to 
pity and cease to laugh. His examples of the humorous, too, are 
largely of the sudden and unexpected: a quick wit is funnier than 
an obviously laboured one;32 the sudden and unintended glimpse 
of ‘shameful’ body parts ‘such as seeing them through an open 
seam of the breeches’ is funnier than their deliberate exposure.33
The undermining and exposure of credulity is a particularly 
strong source of laughter for Joubert. In an example that provokes 
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one of his voluminous lists of adjectives, he describes as hilarious 
an incident wherein
we are promised the sight of a beautiful young woman, 
and just as we are aroused, we are shown a wrinkled 
old lady with one eye, a runny nose, a thick and kinky 
beard and underslung buttocks, dirty, smelly, drooling, 
toothless, flat-nosed, bandy-legged, humpy, bumpy, 
stinking, twisted, filthy, knotty, full of lice, and more 
deformed than ugliness itself. Here there is something 
truly to laugh at, seeing ourselves made fun of in this 
way.34
Having one’s own credulous hopes and expectations suddenly 
and surprisingly just as they are at their height seems to fit 
Gervais and Wilson’s notion of ‘non-serious social incongruity’ 
very well.
Why summative articles such as Panksepp’s and Gervais and 
Wilson’s interest me is that one can read them with Joubert to 
challenge conceptions of laughter that emerge from Ghose’s 
study and, as we will see, Carol Neely’s work on theatrical depic-
tions of the incarcerated mad: that laughter tends to connote 
and produce power and social exclusion. For Sidney, we laugh, 
particularly in the theatre, at those we should rather pity – the 
weak, the grotesque; for Ghose, laughter is always ‘at’ the 
other; for Neely, whose ground-breaking scholarship on madness 
in early modern drama seeks to recuperate the early modern 
Bedlam from its reputation as a cruel and voyeuristic theatre,35 
laughter and pity at the mad are, as we will see, diametri-
cally opposed responses, albeit they sometimes appear on stage 
together. Panksepp, on the other hand, remarks that in mammals, 
‘laughter is most certainly infectious and may transmit moods of 
positive social solidarity, thereby promoting cooperative forms of 
social engagement’. For this kind of positive affect to take place, 
there need be no other to laugh at.36 Similarly, ‘non-serious social 
incongruity’ can include laughter at the self as well as at the other, 
just as the butt of Joubert’s humour in describing the old woman 
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in his example appears to be those who were expecting a young 
one, rather than the old woman herself. One would hope that 
laughing at her perceived deformities within her hearing would 
count as an injury provocative of pity, and that Joubert would not 
consider it funny. However, there is a social hierarchy associated 
with laughter in Joubert’s treatise: he suggests that one’s social 
inferiors are less worthy of pity as they have no right to avenge 
themselves. Jokes based on deception or imposture in Joubert will 
amuse as long as one is ‘careful about the place, the time and the 
persons’:
The deception we acknowledge as being laughable is 
lighter, and such that it cannot be ill interpreted, done 
among friends and companions, or inferiors, who cannot 
really be upset or ask vengeance. This is why one must 
choose the persons.’37
Perhaps Joubert considers his putative old lady one of these 
socially inferior non-subjects and it cannot be denied that laughter 
at the mistake in the hypothetical example may serve to create a 
community of the young, male and not-ugly, confident enough in 
their social standing to laugh at themselves. Panksepp does touch 
upon what he calls the ‘dark side to laughter’ in a way that Sidney 
may have understood, referring to ‘the derisive laughter that 
arises from feelings of social scorn’,38 just as Ghose suggests that 
‘Within a group laughter may promote group solidarity, which 
may then be used to exhibit disdain toward others and to ostracize 
those outside the group’.39 But Panksepp also points to situations 
in which ‘too much laughter’, far from producing and legitmizing 
cultural norms, ‘can become a social problem’; fascinatingly, he 
cites Joubert’s 1579 treatise himself, particularly its discussion of 
laughter and incontinence. Panksepp remarks that ‘eliminative 
urges’ accompanying laughter have been treated with the same 
kinds of agents that treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
in children: ‘we may wish to inquire,’ suggests Panksepp, ‘what 
such pharmacological agents do to children’s sense of humour’.40 
The treatment of perceived excesses of activity in children may 
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also repress their playful delight. What these twenty-first-century 
studies share with Joubert is the strong sense that laughter 
may have positive as well as divisive social purposes41 – and the 
example of treatment of excessive laughter here suggests that it 
may also be something of a subversive force.
LAUGHING AT THE MAD
In the opening passage of his chapter on ‘Laughter and Narrative’ 
in early modern comedy, Jeremy Lopez asserts that ‘While the 
events of Elizabethan and Jacobean comedy, the outcome of its 
scenes and plots, are frequently unpredictable, the behavior of 
comic characters usually is not.’ In these plays, ‘the overt and 
widespread reliance on stock, conventional, typical characters’ 
and their predictable behaviour ‘provides an order and a system 
of rules that act as a kind of balance to the disorderly, even 
lawless manner in which the comic narrative develops’.42 Thus 
it is comic plots that amuse because they play to the desire for 
the unpredictable and incongruous. Certain comic characters 
may be funny because they allow other characters and paying 
audience alike to bond in the cheery or spiteful safety that they 
are of the inside group of laughers, not part of one of the outsider 
categories of cuckolds, foreigners or ugly old women. Comic 
characters according to Lopez’ description react predictably to 
the unpredictable. Malvolio is so ‘full of self-love’ (1.5.87–8) that 
he is bound to fall for Maria’s letter plot; the comic incongruity 
that makes us laugh lies in the gap between his self-perception 
and the rest of the social world’s perception of him. It is particu-
larly amusing, then, when unpredictable things happen to those 
who like to find the world predictable, who seek to regulate and 
repress its unpredictabilities and who accept, legitimate and work 
to produce its social hierarchies. It is funny to see someone fall in 
the mud, writes Joubert, and ‘the more indecorous the fall, the 
greater the laughter. I call it indecorous when it is not orderly 
or expected: for the surprise has much to do with it.’43 It is even 
funnier if they are of high social status and pompous with it. 
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Lopez’ theory of comic character holds good here, as one who did 
not exhibit a predictable set of behaviours connected with over-
inflated pride would not be so funny when falling. The fact that 
Joubert finds anyone falling in the mire fairly amusing (anyone, 
that is, who does not horribly injure themselves so doing and thus 
provoke our pity) suggests that all human beings are comical in 
the pompous surety of the stability of the world and their control 
of its physical properties.
The comic stage figures I am going to discuss next, though, 
are by their very nature unpredictable; indeed, they are often 
predictable only in their unpredictability. These are the ‘mad’, 
who appear on the early modern stage as figures of comedy and of 
pity, and significantly as both. I am going to use them to trouble 
Lopez’s theory of predictable characters in comedy, which I think 
suggests a particular kind of power relationship between the 
laughter and the laughed at, in which the audience is located in 
the comfortable position of knowing insider. The unpredictability 
of the mad figures examined here complicates laughter’s social 
and theatrical meaning.
Mad figures in early modern drama are, as Carol Neely 
suggests in her brilliant study of gendered madness in the period, 
gesturally and linguistically excessive. Their language is charac-
terized by quotation, fragmentation and repetition44 – repetition 
often reflective of obsession with the trauma that has driven them 
to madness. In Dekker and Middleton’s 1 The Honest Whore, the 
mad figures in the (Italian) Bethlem monastery, of which more 
later, have been bereaved of lovers, lost all their goods at sea, or 
gone insane with jealousy; the troop of performing madmen in 
The Duchess of Malfi obsess about sex, cuckoldry and their past 
professions. Ophelia, of course, sings and speaks fragments of 
her father’s death and, perhaps, her own sexual betrayal. Edgar in 
King Lear invents a madman whose past dealings with a sexually 
corrupt court haunt him – though his ‘Tom o’Bedlam’ is also 
a construct of, and perhaps a comment on, residual notions 
of madness as demonic possession.45 Were any of these mad 
figures funny? And if they were, were they, then, paradigmatic 
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of Sidney’s doubts about laughter in the theatre, examples of the 
way in which theatre provokes us to laugh at that which Joubert 
assures us we never do? Mad figures in the theatre may have 
invited laughter at their excesses. But when those excesses have 
been produced by past trauma, Joubert explains that compassion 
overrides amusement:
if a man who became frenzied or maniacal says and does 
some strange things, we cannot keep from laughing 
until we think about the great loss of his senses and 
understanding he has suffered. Then we experience 
compassion because of the misery, and more still if this 
misfortune does not come through his own fault.46
Ophelia’s first entrance in Hamlet 4.5 may be read in the light of 
Joubert’s analysis. The mad Ophelia is carefully introduced by the 
conversation between Gertrude and the Gentleman thus:
queen
I will not speak with her
gentleman
  She is importunate,
Indeed distract. Her mood will needs be pitied.
(4.5.1–2)
The audience, as well as the Queen, are prepared for a ‘distract’ 
figure and warned that pity is the appropriate response to her. 
The rest of the dialogue before her entrance concerns how 
her speech may be read by ‘ill-breeding minds’ (4.5.15) who 
‘botch the words up to fit their own thoughts’ (4.5.10). The 
fear is clearly that Ophelia’s fragmented discourses will expose 
the court in some way – and this introduction to her madness 
prepares the audience, too, to read her carefully. Interestingly, 
though, it is not until her second entrance in the scene, this time 
into the presence of her devastated brother, that anyone offers 
a compassionate commentary on her state, or appears clearly 
to be emotionally affected by it. Once she has entered for the 
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first time, Claudius and Gertrude are reduced to splutterings 
of ‘How now, Ophelia?’, ‘Nay but Ophelia’, ‘Pretty Ophelia’ 
(4.5.22, 34, 56), suggesting embarrassment and social tension 
around her behaviour as much as compassion. Ophelia’s sudden 
and fragmentary shifts of subject – particularly the young men 
who will do it if they come to it (4.5.60), inappropriate to the 
sane Ophelia’s gendered innocence as perceived by her brother 
and father – might be as funny as ‘Poor Tom’s’ leaping out at the 
Fool shouting fragments of Catholic superstition, or the comic 
non sequiturs of Malfi’s mad professionals, were we not aware, to 
cite Joubert again, of Ophelia’s great loss. What I want to suggest 
here is that in Ophelia’s first mad sequence, the audience may 
be permitted momentarily to forget the death of Polonius and 
rather to laugh at the King and Queen’s desperate attempts to 
contain the madwoman. She is, after all, according to the Q1 stage 
direction, frequently used by modern editors, a incongruous, 
potentially comical, performing mad figure: her hair may suggest 
crazed female distress47 but she is also playing a lute (Hamlet Q1 
13.14 s.d.). It is only at her second entrance that we are offered 
a clear commentary on her state (Claudius explains her madness 
as ‘the poison of deep grief ’ (4.5.75) at her father’s death and 
Hamlet’s departure but only when she has left the stage). This 
is offered by Laertes, who makes clear that this particular kind 
of incongruity – ‘is’t possible a young maid’s wits/Should be as 
mortal as an old man’s life?’ (101) – just is not funny. In Joubert’s 
treatise, the move from laughter to compassion in the face of 
the mad has a clear chronology. In the the theatre, laughter and 
compassion uneasily share the stage.
CRUEL AND KIND
As Indira Ghose’s work on exclusive and excluding laughter 
communities might suggest, underpinning Sidney’s anxiety 
around the laughter induced by stage comedies is an idea that 
troubles the scientific studies I have cited above, with their confi-
dence in laughter as a positive social bonding mechanism, and 
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Joubert’s notion that real pain is not risible. This is the idea that 
some laughter is cruel: laughing at those in pain, laughing at those 
who cannot help their appearance or behaviour. The wretched 
beggar or beggarly clown, the stranger who cannot speak English 
are Sidney’s examples.48 Read the words ‘cruel’ and ‘cruelty’ in 
early modern writings and there seems to be a broad continuity of 
meaning across 400 years. ‘Cruel’ then, as now, refers to inexpli-
cably unkind people and actions, and suggests an inhuman lack 
of empathy and a pleasure in unkindness on the perpetrator’s 
part. In early modern writing, cruelty is equated with a lack of 
humanity quite explicitly; to be cruel is to be less, or sometimes 
more, than human – and thus not to feel compassion for human-
ity’s trials. Death, war, fate and the law can all be cruel49 – they 
are abstractions, without pity or compassion. Cruelty is un-kind-
ness, where ‘kind’ means like, kin and kin-like: it is the opposite 
kind of act or attitude to that which builds social bonds. Thus, 
when Hamlet says, ‘I must be cruel only to be kind’ (3.4.176), his 
line suggests that Gertrude – and the audience – will wonder at 
his lack of humane compassion for his distressed mother and that 
he needs to explain his seeming perversity. Two scenes earlier, as 
he plans this visit to his mother’s closet, he has suggested that 
cruelty and naturalness are not opposed – ‘Let me be cruel, not 
unnatural’ (3.2.397) – and the double use of the word in relation 
to his mother seems to protest too much. The traitor Scroop is 
addressed by Henry V as a ‘cruel,/Ingrateful, savage and inhuman 
creature!’ (Henry V, 2.2.95); once rendered inhuman, he can be 
killed. The clown Launce in The Two Gentlemen of Verona is 
dismayed at his dog’s dog-like cruel-heartedness, complaining:
I think Crab, my dog, be the sourest-natured dog that 
lives: my mother weeping, my father wailing, my sister 
crying, our maid howling, our cat wringing her hands, 
and all our house in a great perplexity, yet did not this 
cruel-hearted cur shed one tear: he is a stone, a very 
pebble stone, and has no more pity in him than a dog.
(2.3.5–11)
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Crab has shown no compassion for the human emotion that even 
the cat is demonstrating at Launce’s departure from his family, 
and the impossible image of the cat ‘wringing her hands’ draws 
attention to the very humanity of the emotions for which the dog 
has no compassion, a humanity that is absurdly foregrounded 
again and again in the speech that follows, as Launce tries to tell 
the story of his parting, using his shoes, staff, hat and the dog 
to represent the human protagonists. The idea of cats, dogs and 
inanimate objects expressing human emotion is as essential to the 
comedy as Launce’s confusion as to what should represent whom.
Despite seeming historical continuities, the cultural industries 
that are in the business of recalling and reproducing the past 
have a range of contradictory attitudes to that past’s perceived 
humanity or cruelty. The dramatic and medical treatments of 
mental illness that emerged from the early modern period give 
rise to very different iconographies of pastness 400  years later. 
The early modern period produced some of the most valued 
cultural artefacts studied in the Humanities today (plays, in 
particular) but its authorities also perpetuated judicial cruelties 
around which a whole other heritage industry has been built. 
While supremely articulate women – witty Beatrices and stalwart 
Isabellas – are to be found at Shakespeare’s Globe, walk fifiteen 
minutes through South London to the Clink prison museum and 
a very different cultural reality of scolds’ bridles and chastity 
belts is on display. Broadly speaking, those elements of ‘our’ 
past which ‘we’ wish to legitimate and universalize (the works 
of Shakespeare, for example) tend to be reproduced as ‘kind’, in 
both the senses of ‘compassionate’ and ‘like-us’. A production of 
The Merchant of Venice – the Shakespeare’s Globe production of 
1998 comes to mind – tends to be roundly slammed by the critics 
if it seems to be inviting the audience to laugh at Shylock. While 
Shylock is cruel in his insistence on having his pound of flesh, he 
must also be seen, in modern productions, to be sorely provoked 
by a cruelly prejudiced Venetian gentile society, or the production 
will risk being dismissed as inhumane and anti-Semitic, contami-
nating Shakespeare’s currency as universally human.
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If Shakespeare’s Globe, as its website proclaims, offers the 
theatre-goer and tourist ‘Not just theatre but the capital at its 
very best’,50 other south London attractions relish the display of 
London Down the Ages at its violent worst. The Clink museum 
is dedicated to the prison of that name, first built on this site in 
1144. Here, according to the museum’s website, ‘Visitors will 
experience a hands on educational experience allowing them to 
handle original artefacts, including torture devices’; the website 
goes on to contextualize itself geographically, culturally and 
historically thus: ‘This area housed much of London’s enter-
tainment establishments including four theatres, bull-baiting, 
bear-baiting, inns and many other darker entertainments’, the last 
of which remain unnamed but which I assume to include prosti-
tution, which, unlike torture, is considered too dark to name for 
a website that offers an educational experience for all the family. I 
am unsure as to whether the list is intended to provoke surprise at 
the closeness of the seats of culture to what modern visitors would 
regard as crueler entertainments, or whether theatre is deliber-
ately being contaminated by the connection – but the website’s 
education page merrily declares:
Whether you’re looking for a fun visit to torture each 
other and learn of the truly horrible history or a visit 
filled with educational fun and learning, our tour team 
are able to offer it all and tailor to your own specific 
needs.51
A few hundred yards further east still, the London Dungeon 
attraction offers a range of theme-park rides around the cruelties 
and dangers of London’s past, including a Torture Chamber 
exhibit where
London’s torturer always finds a way to get you talking, 
whether with the hook, the castrator, the jaw breaker, or 
the creeping agony of the rack. Maybe he’ll loosen your 
tongue the hard way, with the tongue-tearer!52
The excesses of the past in these two attractions are comically 
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cruel and unthinkably distant from us. Where the Shakespeare 
trade seeks to teach us what is transhistorically human, the 
aesthetic of the Dungeon’s website in particular, and its entrance 
on Tooley Street, seems to invite laughter at the ludicrous 
inhumanities of the past.
Another room in the London Dungeon is, at the time of 
writing, dedicated to ‘Bedlam’ and is advertised in similar spirit:
Face the inmates of one of London’s first asylums: 
infamous for driving the slightly eccentric to the depths 
of insanity! Quick, they’re waking up. Move along before 
you cause bedlam!53
The very inclusion of the Bethlem Hospital in the Dungeon 
experience suggests that it was, like the torture chambers, a cruel 
prison, that barbarically failed to recognize the true mental state 
of its inmates and whose tortures drove them mad. Interestingly, 
the Dungeon website both perpetuates and baulks at the historical 
stereotype of the visitor who comes to Bedlam to be entertained: 
we are being invited to do exactly that but at the same time are 
jokily warned to run off before the madmen wake up. Little 
wonder that scholars may feel the need to recuperate the early 
modern period for a degree of humane good intention when the 
past is depicted in such cartoon-like images of barbarity.54 In the 
following examination of dramatic scenes in madhouses and a 
scene set at a makeshift madhouse, where Malvolio is incarcerated 
in Twelfth Night, I argue that the inclusion of mad figures in 
the early modern drama for their comic value offers us a more 
nuanced way into a debate around cruel laughter versus compas-
sionate seriousness in the early modern period than the one that I 
have laid out so starkly here as taking place in the cultural/tourist 
spots of South London.
LET’S ALL GO AND SEE THE MADFOLK
Did early seventeenth-century Londoners go to visit the inmates 
of the Bethlem Hospital for entertainment? The London 
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Dungeon exhibit draws on an assumption that they did, and 
a range of cultural and theatrical histories have assumed so 
too; Carol Neely’s study of Distracted Subjects: Madness and 
Gender in Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture challenges this 
assumption.55 She suggests that historical evidence for these visits 
before the Restoration is scant, based on five dramas in which 
incarcerated madpeople perform for audiences,56 and a much-
paraphrased reference to the Percy children visiting London in 
1610, where they saw their father in the tower and were taken on a 
number of London outings, including ‘The Show of Bethlehem’. 
This is the only existing reference, outside of a dramatic text, 
to a visit to the hospital supposedly for entertainment before 
1632, and Neely argues that it is is unlikely to have referred to 
a visit to the hospital at all: the children more probably visited 
a Christmas entertainment – a show about Bethlehem.57 Neely, 
following Andrews, points out that visits to Bethlem may have 
occurred for a range of purposes, including charitable donation 
and moral instruction.58 Her argument is supported by the Duke 
in The Honest Whore Part I, who plans to arrive at the madhouse 
‘as if we came to see the lunatics’ (5.1.110) but in order to make 
this pretence convincing tells his comrades that they must meet 
with ‘some space of time/Being spent between the arrival each 
of other’ (108–9) – suggesting that they must not be perceived as 
the mass audience of a theatrical spectacle if they are going to be 
allowed in.
The notion that previously held assumptions about visiting 
Bedlam for a laugh are anachronistic is key to Neely’s recuper-
ation of the hospital as an institution with a genuine charitable and 
therapeutic purpose.59 The hospital was hopelessly underfunded 
and certainly resorted to cures that might be considered cruel and 
certainly ineffective today; but, argues Neely, ‘Visiting seemed 
to have begun (or increased) gradually in the middle decades 
of the seventeenth century. It accelerates in the Restoration.’60 
How, then, to explain the earlier plays that cite this as a practice? 
Neely suggests that there are too few of them to form the 
basis of plausible evidence for it: there are only four plays that 
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stage performing madmen in ‘houses of confinement’ plus an 
additional work, the Duchess of Malfi, in which madmen are 
brought to the Duchess’ prison to perform for her before she is 
put to death. The scenes that there are, argues Neely, are better 
explained by the theatre’s desire for metatheatrical innovation, 
vogue for satire (the madmen, as she points out, are often mad 
professionals, common objects of popular satire) and the need 
for the playing companies to deflect audience attention from the 
potentially socially disruptive or subversive in their plays’ main 
plots, than in terms of a reflection of common cultural practice.61 
For Neely, the later habit of going to see the madfolk may have 
been life imitating art.62
Neely is right to suggest that fictional visits to madhouses 
in plays do not equate to a common practice of voyeuristic and 
insensitive visits to madhouses for entertainment in social life. 
But I want to challenge an implication that I think lies beneath 
her recuperation of early modern Bethlem: that compassion 
and entertainment are somehow opposed or contradictory and 
that laughter must be justified or denied if we are not to dismiss 
early modern attitudes to the mentally ill as cruel and benighted. 
‘The hospital does not confine mad-persons cruelly or indis-
criminate; but stage madhouses make spectacles of them as the 
hospital is imagined to do’, argues Neely on her opening page.63 
I want to argue that this notion of ‘spectacle’, with its connota-
tions of voyeurism, imagines the Victorian freak show rather 
than early modern theatre. Neely points to the moments when 
on-stage audiences laugh together at the mad and suggests that 
‘these communal responses protect audiences from individual 
engagement with particular madpersons’.64 But on the early 
modern stage, just such an individual encounter is very possible 
should a mad figure turn to address an individual in the audience, 
and at such a point there is the potential for communal laughter 
which, far from protecting said individual, renders the confronted 
audience member the object of that laughter. In revisiting the 
dramatic treatment of mad figures on the early modern stage here, 
I want to suggest that, whether or not real early modern gallants 
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regularly or ever payed visits to Bedlam for entertainment, theatre 
audiences may have laughed at fictional mad figures in ways 
that produced complex and ambivalent relationships between 
madness and sanity and between fiction and culture. I am going 
to deal first with early seventeenth-century plays that feature 
incarcerated mad figures and consider some of the ways in which 
they have been treated in recent productions; I will then shift 
to a recent performance of Malvolio’s wrongful incarceration in 
Twelfth Night which deals explicitly with whether an audience’s 
laughter at this figure is in excess of compassion and good taste, 
and consider a recently staged reworking of the fate of that 
character by writer and performer Tim Crouch.
THE DUCHESS OF MALFI
An on-stage, fictional audience for comedy inevitably gives rise 
to judgements about laughter, as the paying audience watch the 
fictional one laugh at what the former may or may not find funny. 
Fictional mad people are shown to the fictional sane in the three 
Figure 4: The Duchess of Malfi (Miranda Henderson) in Ten Thousand Several 
Doors dir. Jane Collins, Prodigal Theatre at the Nightingale Theatre (Brighton, 
2006 © Matthew Andrews)
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dramas I am going to consider next: twice in formal shows for 
which the mad performers have rehearsed; once in theatrical 
revelations, where a madhouse keeper demonstrates his trauma-
tized charges to visitors. The on-stage audience in The Duchess 
of Malfi is the least conventional of the three: she is presented 
with madmen from a local asylum as entertainment – or torture – 
before she is put to death by her brother for marrying against his 
will. The Duchess of Malfi’s mad clearly serve a satirical purpose 
for the paying audience: a doctor, a priest, a lawyer and an apoth-
ecary, each speaks the language of his profession, distorted by 
obsession and distraction; each profession is figured as a butt of 
humour. The scene draws not only on the comedy which, Joubert 
writes, is inherent in ‘a man who became frenzied or maniacal’ 
saying and doing ‘strange things’ (see p.  70) but on the stock 
comic trope of the proud man fallen. It is not each madman’s 
fault, per se, that he has been incarcerated in the madhouse close 
to the Duchess’ prison – but his former authority reduces the 
likelihood that an audience should feel pity for him, just as status 
and pomposity of Joubert’s faller in the mire diminishes the pity 
offered him by his hypothetical bystanders.
First, the Malfi madmen perform their song, whose lyrics 
are primarily concerned with what a dreadful, harrowing and 
bestial song it is. The dismal kind of music arranged by Robert 
Johnson is disturbing and complex. As Leah Marcus points out 
in her Appendix to the Arden Early Modern Drama edition of the 
play, it ‘makes daring use of chromatics to indicate madness’ and 
‘invite[s] the singer to repeatedly imitate the sound of a wolf ’s 
howl’.65 Presumably, though, the song must be well performed in 
order to be entertaining for the paying audience, especially one at 
the Blackfriars used to complex interact music, albeit supposedly 
a ‘deadly dogged howl’ designed to ‘corrosive […] [our] hearts’ 
(4.2.61, 67). Through singing it, the performing madmen both 
demonstrate their complex humanity and comment on their 
animal-like state of distraction – ‘Sounding as from the theat’ning 
throat/Of beasts and fatal fowl’ (4.2.62–3). The song’s self-refer-
entiality confers on the madmen, I am suggesting, some of the 
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agency and sentience of the actors who are in control of the song 
for their audience. Next comes the madmen’s rambling satirical 
dialogue, during which they appear to be speaking to one another 
rather than performing for the Duchess, obsessing about past 
sexual betrayals and making grandiose, delusional claims. They 
may, of course, address any of their predictably unpredictable, 
obsessive ramblings to an audience member, some of whom, at the 
Blackfriars,66 may have been sitting on the stage with the Duchess 
herself: this may have been both disconcerting and provocative 
of laughter at another spectator’s expense. Is it really possible, 
though, that anything but the most hesitant nervous laughter 
could be generated by this display, given that the only on-stage 
audience which the paying one has to laugh with comprises 
the imprisoned Duchess, convinced from the beginning of the 
scene that she will die in this prison (4.2.11–14), and her waiting 
woman Cariola, neither of whom give any indication of finding 
the show funny? 
The Duchess has just been subjected to two other grotesque 
theatrical shows, one performed by her brother Duke Ferdinand 
himself with his dead-man’s hand prop (4.1.44 s.d.), the other 
shown with the intention that she take theatre for reality: 
waxworks of her dead children are revealed from behind a curtain 
(4.1.55 s.d). The madmen surely cannot serve simply as comic 
relief within the Duchess’ tragedy, as the audience’s pleasure in 
the satire and the theatrical mad behaviour and laughter must 
be filtered through the on-stage audience of the imprisoned 
Duchess. Matthew Steggle has suggested that Nicholas Brooke’s 
notion of Horrid Laughter in Jacobean Tragedy, which had gone 
relatively unchallenged since its publication in 1979,67 has made 
anachronistic assumptions about the ubiquity of laughter by 
early modern audiences at tragedies. Steggle suggests that our 
main sources of evidence for such laughter are scenes clearly 
separated from the main plot, or theatrical mistakes and bad 
performances.68 But in a sense, these madfolk are both: their 
theatrical turn is a performance in its own right, for the paying 
audience, as well as one rehearsed for the Duchess. Brooke 
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himself is unsure as to whether the ‘funny and obscene’ ‘antics’ 
of these madmen69 would have generated comedy – ‘the hideous 
tension of the scene may or may not permit actual laughter’70 
and it seems that recent production in the UK has been nervous 
about finding out.
The last major London production of the Duchess of Malfi at 
the time of writing (Old Vic, 2012)71 cut the madmen’s sequence 
altogether – though this was ostensibly due to the need to shorten 
the running time of the production. The National Theatre’s last 
production (2003), set in a 1940s mafia-dominated Italy, had Janet 
McTeer as the Duchess, strapped into a chair and injected with 
what the subsequent lighting and sound show suggested were 
hallucinogenic drugs. Although the ‘madmen’ seemed to appear 
in the risers upstage (used later to seat actors after the deaths of 
their characters), they were there, as Kim Solga describes them, 
to act out ‘choice bits of the movie she was forced to watch: a 
series of video projections on the back upstage wall chronicling 
the destruction of her happy family’. I am convinced by Solga’s 
reading of this scene: ‘perhaps […] we had all been momentarily 
transported into her altered brain’.72 The RSC’s last production 
at the time of writing (2000–1) had the madmen incarcerated in a 
tall glass structure centre-stage, which, as the production opened, 
contained the partying court; then, for the madmen’s scene, 
a rocking, muttering, white-nightwear-clad, pseudo-Victorian 
nightmare of an asylum.73 At the National the madmen’s words 
were cut altogether, at the RSC they were partially inaudible: this 
was a distressing scene of enforced incarceration and brutalized 
insanity, rather than the play’s satire on the fallen professional 
classes.
A complex and engaging way around the fact that the madmen’s 
satire is hard to grasp for a modern audience (distracted non 
sequiturs can be less than amusing for those who are finding 
400-year-old satirical references difficult in the first place) was 
devised by Jane Collins, Peter Farley and Prodigal Theatre for their 
production in and around the Nightingale Theatre and Grand 
Central Bar in Brighton (2006).74 This promenade production’s 
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audience followed The Duchess of Malfi through dressing-rooms 
and kitchens, into the theatre space, down into the pub itself, 
and up to an upstairs window, out of which the Duchess and her 
children could be seen kissing Antonio goodbye and disappearing 
into Brighton station in her attempt to escape her brothers’ wrath. 
The equivalent of the madmen’s sequence took place in one of 
the pub’s bars, where the Duchess sat slumped before a little 
stage while her brothers put on a ghastly, misogynistic stand-up 
comedy routine for her and our benefit, complete with a ventrilo-
quist’s dummy dressed like the Duchess. This was a disconcerting 
experience for this audience member, not least because the bar 
was still open to drinkers who had not paid to see the Duchess of 
Malfi and who may have been wondering if this was really what 
the comedy’s little audience considered proper Saturday night 
entertainment. Perhaps, while laughing at the mad is intolerable 
to modern sensitivities, laughing at misogynistic jokes is just 
uncomfortable enough. Thus Prodigal Theatre produced a Malfi 
prison scene highly adequate to the play – it both entertained and 
appalled, provoked pity for the Duchess and laughter in spite 
of that pity. Even where the comedy was genuinely amusing – it 
was well performed and could also be enjoyed as a parody of 
1970s sexist stand-up – enjoyment was rendered awkward by 
the presence of the slumped and exhausted Duchess. I am not 
suggesting that there is a direct analogy between the kind of 
humour used by Ferdinand’s entertainers in Brighton’s Grand 
Central Bar and the satire of the madmen, but it produced a 
partially amused, partially awkward self-consciousness among 
the audience which never permitted us to forget that our laughter 
might be in danger of breaking social codes. We had to consider 
what it was acceptable to laugh at. It also gave the performers an 
agency which the helplessly incarcerated madfolk at the RSC in 
the late 1990s could not possibly have, a point I will return to 
in considering one of the mad figures in Dekker’s 1 The Honest 
Whore.
 ‘Do you mock old age, you rogues?’  83
THE CHANGELING
The mad of The Changeling’s madhouse plot are confined both 
in Alibius’ madhouse and off-stage (until they perform their 
wedding dance in the modern productions discussed here). They 
are heard and not seen, shouting their obsessions (which are 
mostly with food but seem sexually inflected75) to the horror of 
Tony the natural fool – in fact the disguised Antonio, would-be 
lover of the madhouse keeper’s wife, Isabella. The early modern 
period distinguished between madmen and natural fools similarly 
to the ways in which the mentally ill and the intellectually disabled 
are categorized today.76 Alibius’ house contains both, unlike the 
historical Bethlem, which only accepted those suffering from 
mental illnesses deemed curable.77 
When the bogus fool Tony arrives at the madhouse with his 
accomplice Pedro, who pretends to be a relative paying for his 
simple cousin’s confinement, he is treated as a child, to be tested 
and put into a ‘form’, in the hopes that his intellectual capacities 
may be improved, and though Alibius claims that ‘I do profess the 
cure of either sort’ (1.2.49) (i.e. both fools and madmen), it does 
not seem that there is much hope of curing Tony. Like Lear’s fool, 
who calls his master ‘Nuncle’ and is threatened with the whip for 
pushing at the boundaries of his ‘licence’, Antonio’s Tony is an 
infantilized figure, and there is much joking on the part of Alibius’ 
assistant Lollio that if they are lucky he may improve to the point 
of gaining employment as a law-enforcer – a satire on the mental 
capacities of beadles and justices (1.2.124–31). Unusually at this 
point in the stage history of disguise, and unlike Shakespeare’s 
pretended mad figures Hamlet and Edgar, who plan or put on 
their antic dispositions in the presence of the audience, Antonio 
makes his very first entrance in The Changeling disguised as Tony: 
there is no indication in the text that the audience should know 
that he is only acting the natural fool. It is clear, from the moment 
of his entrance, that he is to be recognized as someone with a 
mental disability: ‘Save you, sir’, says Pedro, bringing Antonio 
on-stage, ‘my business speaks itself;/This sight takes off the 
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labour of my tongue’, to which Alibius replies ‘Ay, ay, sir,/’Tis 
plain enough you mean him for my patient’ (1.2.82–5). It is not 
possible to know whether the Antonio actor would have made the 
audience laugh as he made his disability ‘plain enough’, or even 
whether it would have been so ‘plain’ that the audience would 
have suspected from the outset that this was someone disguised as 
a fool. The early printed stage direction is Enter Pedro and Antonio 
like an idiot (1.2.78 s.d.) but it is not possible to tell whether or 
not this ‘likeness’ would have been penetrable to the audience, 
as most on-stage disguises in the early modern theatre were,78 
or whether an audience would have seen a genuinely bewildered 
figure, fearing being left behind by his ‘cousin’, and felt a degree 
of sympathy with him. My suggestion is that both were possible.
The disguised Antonio supports the gestural language of 
natural folly with a vocal range that includes laughter and 
which, though it is socially inappropriate, is indication to Lollio, 
following Aristotle, that he is human:
lollio
Tony, Tony, ’tis enough, and a very good name for a fool. 
What’s your name, Tony?
antonio
He, he, he; well, I thank you, cousin, he, he, he.
lollio
Good boy, hold up your head. He can laugh; I perceive by 
that he is no beast.
(1.2.95–9)
The natural fool is treated as a child, whereas the madmen, heard 
off-stage, are disfunctional, sexualized, vocally violent adults. 
‘Tony’ is afraid that they will bite him (1.2.202). When Alibius 
and Lollio are discussing the show their inmates must perform for 
Beatrice Joanna’s wedding, it is the madmen that are both men’s 
first concern:
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lollio
I mistrust the madmen most; the fools will do well enough: 
I have taken pains with them.
alibius
Tush, they cannot miss; the more absurdity,
The more commends it, so no rough behaviours
Affright the ladies O they are nice things, thou know’st.
(4.3.51–5)
Lollio is worried that the madmen are not as safely under his 
control as the fools; Alibius is more confident but, while he clearly 
considers that the madmen will be successfully hilarious in their 
theatrical mistakes (the more absurdity, the more commends it), 
he is also concerned that they may be too rough and frighten ‘the 
ladies’. Where, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the mechanicals’ 
fears of affrighting their female spectators are clearly ridiculous, 
The Changeling’s paying audience have heard the madmen and 
may be less certain of how they should react to this show. The 
mad in this play clearly teeter between the comic and the fright-
ening – and between the comic and the pitiful. When Alibius’ 
wife Isabella is shown her other would-be lover, Fransiscus, who 
has chosen a madman disguise in contrast to Antonio’s fool, she 
reacts to his delusional observations and typical non sequiturs with:
Alack, alack, ’tis too full of pity
To be laugh’d at! How fell he mad? Canst thou tell?
(3.2.42–3)
As Joubert instructs (see p.  70), she looks to find pity in the 
trauma that may have brought the madman to this state. Both the 
drama and the treatise suggest that it is sometimes more ‘pitiful’ 
to rein in one’s laughter at the mad figure – but this assumes, of 
course, that s/he is also potentially funny.
As Joost Daalder points out, the critical history of The 
Changeling has been one of theatrical pragmatics versus thematic 
coherence: some have read the madhouse subplot as Rowley’s 
entertaining comedy turn, essentially extraneous to the plot, 
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while others have argued that it is a disturbing reflection on the 
main plot, whose supposedly sane characters are truly crazed 
with love and violent lust.79 The latter interpretation is certainly 
the one favoured by reviewers of the Cheek by Jowl production 
of 2006, who praised the doubling of roles between the two plots 
– though several critics saw the link between main plot and mad 
plot as forged by the production rather than by Middleton and 
Rowley themselves:
The perennial problem lies in reconciling this grim 
tragedy with the comic subplot in which a madhouse 
keeper’s wife is assailed by counterfeit lunatics. But 
Donnellan solves this at a stroke by turning the actors in 
the main story into the asylum inmates.80
Nothing can make the mad scenes funny, but Donnellan 
comes as near as anyone could to make them seem one 
with the main action: he doubles roles between the two 
plots and in one fine frenzy gets all the characters to join 
hands for a desperate lunatic jig. It looks like a dance of 
death.81
Significantly, both Billington and Clapp here regard the mad 
plot as a problem to be overcome – as irritatingly in excess of the 
tragedy proper – and Billington is pleased that the production’s 
dramaturgy has ‘reconciled’ what he sees as the play’s generic 
fragmentation, while Clapp is presumably assuming that what 
was once funny about the mad scenes is lost to current audiences 
and again wants them integrated into a more satisfying whole, 
with no fragmentary, mad excesses. One online reviewer is more 
overt about the unease with which a modern audience supposedly 
greets the mad scenes and about the assumed disjuncture between 
comedy and cruelty over 400 years: for David Benedict, writing 
for Variety.com, the play has
one big minus: the subplot about feigned madness in 
a madhouse. A merciless parade of lunatics may have 
gone over well when it was first performed in 1624, but 
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antics with antic dispositions sit uneasily with modern 
audiences.82
Here, to play mad without a worthily literary theme – the madness 
of love and lust – through which to read the madmen is to make 
of them a ‘merciless parade’; the binary of benighted voyeurism 
in 1624 and enlightened analysis in 2006 is clear. John Peter in 
The Times, on the other hand, suggests that the madhouse plot 
is both a deliberate part of the play’s thematic design and may be 
intentionally comical, albeit disconcertingly so: ‘it’s both a parody 
of the main plot and a grotesque variation on it’.83 To imagine 
Middleton and Rowley discussing the thematic relevance of the 
latter’s subplot to the former’s narrative is to precipitate them 
into a twentieth-century literary critical seminar, and although 
they may well have considered the lust and violence of De Flores 
and Beatrice Joanna’s narrative as a form of madness, what this 
reading of the play, via this production, does is to rescue it from 
the perceived vulgar and cruel excesses of its theatrical origins.
Whether the rendering of a grotesque coherence, in production, 
between the two plots is deliberate or fortuitous is not so much 
my concern as whether the violent excesses of one plot permit 
audience laughter at the mad excesses of the other. Billington 
and Clapp suggest they should not and even Peter suggests that 
any comedy in this production is grotesque parody rather than 
hilarious relief – but these critics are reviewing the ‘dark’ Cheek by 
Jowl production, which is full of recognizable tropes of hypocrisy 
and repression, and the theatrical iconography of psychoanalytic 
seriousness. Peter describes it as the play Strindberg would have 
written if he ‘had been a Jacobean’;84 Clapp asserts that it ‘is 
one of the first plays to show the unconscious running rampant. 
[…] For this drama of the unconscious, everything is turned 
inside out’;85 Billington calls Olivia Williams’ Beatrice Joanna 
an ‘unstable heroine’, then a ‘frenzied neurotic’, and points out 
that ‘Alsemero, who she weds, keeps a well-stocked library of 
sex manuals’.86 For Peter, director Declan Donnellan ‘reveals the 
play’s power by ignoring its baroque flamboyance’87 but there 
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is certainly a theatrical-baroque sensibility in the production’s 
references to dimly lit Catholic churches – red chairs are made 
into prayer stands, as Billington remarks, for the Alicante church 
in which Beatrice meets Alsemero and her wedding is staged 
at the beginning of the second half, complete with a repeated 
and monotonously sinister chant of ‘Ave Maria Virgine’. This 
production offers madfolk as compulsively twitching figures 
played by the main cast, their dance one of desperation. Both the 
scenography and the depiction of the mad suggest that if there is 
any laughter to be had here, it should be, in the words of Brooke’s 
seminal work on the Jacobean Tragedy, ‘horrid’ (see p. 80).
Despite its modern costuming and the ostensible intimacy of 
the reduced capacity Barbican auditorium, central to its design, 
this production had its audiences peering into the dark at a ghastly 
historical ‘other’, a vision of another era’s (Jacobean? Freudian?) 
instability and insatiability. The most recent UK production of 
the play at the time of writing, directed by Joe Hill-Gibbons for 
the Young Vic,88 was a much more brightly lit affair, even more 
blatantly ‘modern’, with its score of contemporary popular music 
(including the wonderfully sick-humorous choice of Béyonce’s 
‘Single Ladies’ for the wedding dance, providing a grim reference 
to the finger with a ‘ring on it’89 that features so nastily in the play) 
and its sex scenes featuring strong-smelling strawberry trifle (the 
bed trick encounter between Alsemero and Diaphanta was staged 
in this production and, as dramaturg Zoe Svendsen remarks, 
this was not food as a metaphor for sex, but a staging of food-sex 
itself90). Where Cheek by Jowl’s production was read by the 
reviewers as taking place in the dark unconscious of the Jacobean 
psyche, this production took place, very consciously, in the Young 
Vic studio and later its main house, in the lit presence of the paying 
audience, some of whom were seated on the stage, and whom 
were addressed directly, particularly unnervingly by De Flores 
as he commented in soliloquy and ‘aside’ on his passion for and 
progress with Beatrice Joanna. For Cheek by Jowl’s production 
at the Barbican the audience was, I suggest, distanced from a 
world of historical, foreign, Catholic excess; at the Young Vic the 
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performers appeared determined to implicate the audience in the 
excesses of soundscape, death and strawberry trifle.
As in Cheek by Jowl’s production, the mad plot was doubled 
with the main plot and came together in the dance of the fools 
and madmen, to the pop song which horribly recalled what 
had recently happened to Alonzo’s finger. The dance included 
a parody of a traditional wedding party – speeches, eating, 
toasting, chatting were all choreographed into the dance, as was 
sex between De Flores and Beatrice Johanna, her foamy modern 
white wedding dress flying over her head as he forced her on to 
her wedding banqueting table. As in Cheek by Jowl 2006, the 
wedding dance brought mad and main plot together and the 
performers were one and the same – but instead of a dance full 
of recognizable tropes of the disturbed and theatrically maniacal, 
this was a slickly paced dance of a performance, of the kind 
teenagers may have learned from a Béyonce video. It was as if 
Alibius and Lollio had laughed about what fun it would be to 
get the madfolk to do a popular ‘R’n’B’ routine, one which the 
rich young crowd at the wedding also happened to know. The 
movements were only rendered macabre and desperate by the 
audience’s knowledge of the plot and the fact that De Flores’ rape 
of Beatrice is choreographed into them, with Beatrice returning 
to the dance proper immediately afterwards. This dance was 
not ‘dark’ – it was lively, tightly choreographed, brightly lit and 
hugely enjoyable – but disturbing nevertheless. It suggested that 
the wedding ceremony was but an empty social form, and that 
because all love in excess of its meaningless conventions is illegit-
imate here, love must inevitably turn to violence and chaos in the 
society that imposes weddings upon daughters. It suggested that 
the audience’s enjoyment of this play might be in excess of their 
moral sensibilities and, sure enough, one is invited to both laugh 
and squirm as strawberry jelly turns from a food fetish to the guts 
spilling from the murdered characters of the last scene: not dark 
humour but sick humour.
Reviewers offered similar comments to those made about the 
2006 production, concerning the thematic coherence of mad and 
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main plots. Billington makes a direct comparison: ‘I was won 
over by a production that, like Declan Donnellan’s 2006 version, 
suggests madness is the play’s real theme’91 and writes that ‘It 
seems natural that the actors in the main story should reappear in 
the truncated sub-plot, in which a madhouse doctor’s wife fends 
off her own suitors’. Charles Spenser in the Telegraph says of the 
subplot:
It’s poor stuff in comparison with the main play, but in 
this production, with the suitor feigning the symptoms 
of cerebral palsy, mangling his language and writhing in 
his wheelchair sporting a grotesque pink plastic safety 
helmet, it certainly taps into the sick heart of a play about 
madness and desire.92
Antonio’s disguise as the natural fool tapped into the humour of 
the playground (the imitation of cerebral palsy recalls children’s 
cruel mimicking of the same) and the grown man is both infanti-
lized and brutalized by the pink safety helmet he has been given, 
and protected by it, as he is repeatedly rapped over the head 
with Lollio’s truncheon. The moment at which Antonio reveals 
himself to Isabella as a suitor gave a retrospective permission 
to have laughed at his ‘Tony’ act: we were only laughing at this 
ludicrous imitation of the disabled, not at the disabled themselves.
‘This may not be the purest of Jacobean revivals but, in 
an uninterrupted 110 minutes, it captures perfectly the play’s 
atmosphere of mad excess’, writes Billington at the end of his 
review.93 But if one does choose to take, for a moment, the purity 
of a production’s Jacobean-ness as a measure of its success, this 
production’s mix of galleried seating and a number of stage-
sitters, its direct address to the audience and close proximity of 
actor and audience, and the music/dance interlude that works 
as both slick entertainment and commentary on the narrative, 
make this more of a ‘Jacobean’ revival as Cheek by Jowl’s psycho-
analytic one. The implication of seating ‘the audience on all four 
sides of the action in either boxed-off galleries at ground level or 
looking down from the high balcony’, argues Paul Taylor in the 
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Independent, is that ‘we are like prurient visitors to Bedlam’,94 
taking up once more the assumption that all gazing at the mad 
was, and is, ‘prurient’, in excess of humanity and good taste. But 
I suggest that the audience for this Changeling are not offered 
the safety of the ‘prurient’ gaze – if such a gaze existed at the 
time this play was written. This audience rather is constructed 
as a group of playgoers at the early modern playhouse; they are 
not simply permitted to gaze at the mad and the helpless but are 
addressed by figures with agency in the violent action to which 
they are witness. As we will see, in the an earlier play featuring a 
madhouse plot, The Honest Whore Part 1, actual mad figures in 
the early modern drama – rather than characters pretending to be 
mad or characters whose passions verge on insanity – can be given 
a comparable theatrical agency.
THE HONEST WHORE
Part 1 of this two-part drama95 contains a substantial Bethlem 
Monastery sequence (this particular Bethlem is situated outside 
Milan), in which the much put-upon Candido, a linen draper, 
is incarcerated by his wife, who pretends he is mad and has him 
committed to the asylum in order to provoke him to an anger 
that he frustrates her by refusing to vent. The asylum is visited 
in turn by two young lovers who hide there: to get married and 
escape the disapproving father of the bride. When this father, the 
Duke of Milan, discovers their plot, he and his followers arrive 
at the madhouse, intent on stopping the marriage. This is the 
exchange between the Duke and his followers, in which a visit to 
the madmen is posited, quite literally, as a pastime:
duke
Castruchio, art thou sure this wedding feast
Is not til afternoon?
castruchio
So ’tis given out, my lord.
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duke
Nay, nay, ‘tis like. Thieves must observe their hours;
Lovers watch minutes like astronomers.
How shall the interim hours by us be spent?
fluello
Let’s all go and see the madmen.
all
Mass, content.
(1 Honest Whore, 5.2.100–6)
This unhesitating chorus of enthusiasm for the idea suggests to 
me, pace Neely, that watching the mad may have been considered 
a fun thing to do, though the aforementioned passage in which the 
Duke insists that the party does not arrive in a crowd suggests that 
treating the mad as theatre may have been considered suspiciously 
indelicate.96 When faced with their first madman, the visitors’ 
reaction is one of pity and compassion:
duke
How fell he from himself?
anselmo
[the friar who runs this Bethlem Monastery] By loss at sea.
I’ll stand aside: question him you alone,
For if he spy me, he’ll not speak a word
Unless he’s thoroughly vex’d.97
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Once this traumatized merchant gets into his stride, however, 
and begins to spout the fragmentary memories, repetitions and 
imagined encounters that typify mad discourse in the drama, 
presumably while getting more and more tangled up in his net, 
the party clearly begins to find him entertaining:
1st madman
[…] Stay, stay, stay, stay, stay – where’s the wind, where’s 
the wind, where’s the wind, where’s the wind? Out, you 
gulls, you goose-caps, you gudgeon-eaters! Do you look 
for the wind in the heavens? Ha, ha, ha, ha! No, no! Look 
there, look there, look there! The wind is always at that 




The madman behaves as if the gallants are part of the scene of 
his trauma, directing them where to look for the ever-present 
wind that has wrecked his ships. At first, this audience behave as 
a community of laughers, external to the scene; but the madman 
insistently draws them in, first by confronting their laughter and 
denying that his plight is mere theatre, then by disrupting the 
social hierarchy of the occasion. His response at being laughed 
at is to upbraid the gallants for their lack of respect for an elder: 
‘Do you laugh at God’s creatures?’ he demands. ‘Do you mock 
old age, you rogues? Is this grey beard and head counterfeit, that 
you cry, “Ha, ha, ha?”’ (5.1.201–3). Having thus ticked off these 
young puppies and accused them of laughing as if at a play, where 
his beard might be counterfeit, and thus, of course, implicating 
the paying audience in the disrespectful laughter, he takes on 
the epithet of father his on-stage audience has given him and, 
moreover, the authority of the father figure, as he turns abruptly 
to the gallant Pioratto and asks, ‘Sirrah, art not thou my eldest 
son?’ (203). Falling in with the joke Pioratto agrees that he is, to 
which the madman retorts that indeed he is not, as he looks quite 
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different. It is to the Duke the madman turns next, addressing 
him with the demeaning ‘Sirrah’ (207), minutely examining – and 
then insulting – the state of his hands, to the amusement of the 
gallants.
Having brought the gallants into close physical proximity to 
him and implicated them in his comical insults at their lord’s 
expense, the madman calls upon the Duke to ‘Kneel down, thou 
varlet, and ask thy father blessing’ (215). And once the whole party 
is clustered around him, he is back in the scene of the shipwreck, 
with his audience as his fellow sailors, and then as his enemy:
If you love your lives, look to yourselves. See, see, see, 
see, the Turks’ galleys are fighting with my ships! Bounce 
goes the guns! ‘Oooh!’ cry the men. Romble romble go the 
waters. Alas! There! ’Tis sunk, ’tis sunk! I am undone, I 
am undone! You are the damn’d pirates have undone me! 
You are, by th’ Lord, you are, you are, stop ’em, you are!
(221–6)
Within one short sequence, the madman’s audience can pity, 
laugh at and interact with him. The madman is, at one moment, 
seemingly helplessly entrapped in his net, a theatrical spectacle, 
while the next moment he has the power to pull his spectators 
into a comic dialogue with him, the jokes of which are very much 
at the spectators’ expense, and then into the narrative space of 
his trauma. The madman forms and reforms communities of 
laughers; particularly interesting here is the way in which he 
remakes social hierarchy by getting the Duke to kneel to him 
and the gallants to laugh at the Duke. His unpredictability is 
disarming – to a group which has already been literally disarmed 
at the door of the madhouse, where the very reason given for 




But, gentlemen, I must disarm you then.
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There are of mad men, as there are of tame,
All humour’d not alike: we have here some,
So apish and fantastic, play with a feather,
And tho ’twould grieve a soul to see God’s image
So blemish’d and defac’d, yet do they act
Such antic and such pretty lunacies,
That spite of sorrow they will make you smile;
Others again we have like hungry lions,
Fierce as wild bulls, untamable as flies,
And these have oftentimes from strangers’ sides
Snatch’d rapiers suddenly and done much harm,
Whom if you’ll see, you must be weaponless.
(5.2.153–66)
In this prologue to the Bethlem scene, the mad are no more 
subsumable into one humour – or stereotype – than the sane. 
Anselmo suggests that watching them will conflate pity and 
smiling. The speech neatly reverses Joubert’s analysis who writes 
that ‘we cannot keep from laughing’ at the madman ‘until we 
think about the great loss of his senses and understanding he has 
suffered. Then we experience compassion because of the misery, 
and more still if this misfortune does not come through his 
own fault’.98 For Joubert, we laugh at the madman’s predictable 
behaviour until we remember his suffering; in Anselmo’s speech, 
compassion is the assumed state when first confronting the 
mad, smiling the inevitable reaction to the theatricality of the 
madmen’s ‘antic and…pretty lunacies’. The scene suggests that 
it was thinkable for the early moderns to find a madman amusing 
and simultaneously to empathize with him – indeed, to have a 
complex and shifting relationship with him as a human subject.
The reciprocity between performer and audience demon-
strated here is also a condition of the early modern playhouse and 
it is worth reconsidering here the indoor playing conditions in 
which early modern dramas featuring the incarcerated mad were 
produced. Dekker and Webster’s Northward Ho was performed 
at Paul’s by Paul’s Children; Fletcher’s The Pilgrim at court 
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and then at the Blackfriars by the King’s Men; Middleton and 
Rowley’s The Changeling at the Cockpit by Lady Elizabeth’s Men. 
Two plays featuring the incarcerated mad, including The Honest 
Whore, were played in outdoor, public amphitheatres; never-
theless, The Duchess of Malfi was in the King’s Men’s repertoire 
when they owned the Blackfriars (and Webster’s irritation at the 
way in which his tragedies were received by the commoner crowd 
out of doors is clear from his preface to The White Devil 99), while 
The Honest Whore itself, first performed at the Fortune by the 
Prince’s Company in 1604, was one of only two plays of Dekker’s 
to be revived for indoor showing – by Queen Henrietta’s Men at 
the Cockpit around 1635.100
The good-humoured confrontation and flattery by teasing, 
used by Shakespeare when he jokes about noisy groundlings and 
mad Englishmen in Hamlet, is in particularly strong evidence in 
plays written with the private playhouses in mind, sites of enter-
tainment where the rich and fashionable have their behavioural 
and sartorial habits dramatized and satirized. Sarah Dustagheer 
has argued persuasively that speeches such as Jonson’s prologue 
to The Devil is an Ass, in which the playwright complains of 
stage-sitters restricting the playing space to the size of a ‘cheese 
trencher’ (Prologue, 8) and tells players to move out of their 
sight lines when they have finished speaking,101 shows the artist 
reclaiming the stage space from recalcitrant playgoers rather 
than deliberately drawing attention to them in order to please 
them.102 I have no doubt that there is some genuine exasperation 
at play on Jonson’s part here, just as there may have been in 
Shakespeare’s advice to those clowns inclined to show off to those 
less interested than they should be in necessary questions of the 
play. What interests me here, though, is what Tiffany Stern103 and 
Ralph Cohen104 have noted as an indoor playhouse tendency to 
include audiences quite explicitly within the theatrical form and 
fictional content of the theatre event. Nova Myhill, in her study 
of ‘Spectators as Spectacle in the Caroline Private Theatres’ 
argues that inductions featuring gallant stage-sitters suggest ‘that 
the experience of playgoing is as subject to judgment as the plays 
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themselves’ by this elite audience of self-appointed critics.105 
What we have in The Honest Whore’s madhouse sequence is an 
audience for the madmen made up of the kinds of gallants who 
may have sat on the stage at the play’s 1635 revival, attentive and 
empathetic one moment, raucous and disrespectful the next, 
always inclined to find jokes at the expense of another in their 
party hilarious. Myhill concludes that the on-stage audience 
staged by (and mingled with the real on-stage audience in) the 
Inductions written by Jonson and Brome ‘ultimately expands the 
frame of the play to include the entire theater, placing the theater 
audience on display in the terms of the playwright rather than 
the reverse’.106 The fact that in its original incarnation this play 
probably played at the Globe suggests that the scene’s shifts from 
laughing at the mad to laughing at those who laugh at them was of 
comic value anywhere. Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider 
the ways in which proximity to the stage and the particular 
audience demographic of the private playhouse might conspire 
here to turn a self-constituting – and perhaps self-satisfied – 
in-group of laughers into a group laughing at themselves along 
with a distinct ‘other’, the madman.
MALVOLIO
The mad figures we have considered thus far stage a fascinating 
uncertainty around permissible and excessive laughter and about 
what kinds of behaviour and laughter are in excess of what is 
properly human. I want now to consider the implications of 
this argument about shifting sympathies and comic excess for 
a Shakespearean text, Twelfth Night, via a recent play about 
Malvolio. Of course, Shakespeare did not write a madhouse scene 
as such: Twelfth Night’s scene of incarceration is one of false 
imprisonment in a makeshift madhouse. It is of particular interest 
here in the light of a historical interest, in theatre production, in 
stripping the scene of its comedy.
The image shown in Figure 5 is of Malvolio incarcerated 
as a madman by his gulls. It advertises not a production of 
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Twelfth Night but a staged court case, Malvolio’s Revenge, in 
which Olivia appeals against the millions of dollars’ worth of 
damages Malvolio has won in a successful suit against the ‘False 
imprisonment, violation of constitutional rights, and…inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress’ inflicted upon him by Sir 
Toby et al.107 This courtroom drama could stand as a parody of 
what Becky Kemper argues is an anachronistic interpretation of 
Malvolio’s incarceration as an extremely cruel abuse: the showing 
of Malvolio through a prison grate became a scenic convention 
from the 1850s.108 In her article subtitled ‘Reclaiming the Humor 
in Malvolio’s Downfall’, Kemper follows C. L. Barber’s warning 
against rendering Malvolio too pitiable,109 and argues that the 
sight of Malvolio tortured and broken is a theatrical anachronism 
that ‘can so sour the final moments of the play that they ultimately 
rob the audience of a satisfying conclusion’.110 She also suggests 
that in comparison to the historical cultures of punishment 
and treatment of the mentally ill in Elizabethan and Jacobean 
England, Malvolio is let off very lightly: merely deprived of light 
Figure 5: Malvolio (Ted van Griethuysen) in Twelfth Night (Shakespeare Theatre 
Company, 2008), used to accompany a review of Malvolio’s Revenge (Shakespeare 
Theatre Company Mock Trial, Sidney Harman Hall, Washington, DC, 2009) 
(by kind permission of Shakespeare Theatre Company © Carol Rosegg)
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and visited by a comedy priest, as opposed, say, to having his 
leg chained to the floor and being beaten with brambles, the fate 
suffered by the wife treated as mad, as a punishment for scolding, 
in Barnaby Riche’s ‘Two Brethren and Their Wives’, a possible 
source text for Twelfth Night.111
Kemper lists the following examples of modern productions 
in which the incarceration scene is staged as ‘nothing short of 
torture’:
Henry Irving’s 1884 production put the steward in ‘a 
dungeon worthy of fidelio’. Jacques Copeau in 1914 
preferred the image of Malvolio’s desperate fingers 
clawing at a grate. Bell Shakespeare company in 1995 
had Malvolio stuffed in a portable dumpster that Feste 
beat with a baseball bat. In 2005, Dian Denley of 
the Globe Center Australia paraded a black-hooded 
Malvolio onstage, echoing Iraq’s Abu Ghraib Prison.112
She points, as have other scholars, to the folio stage direction 
for the scene ‘Malvolio, within’, reminding us that the audience 
never actually see Malvolio during this scene, and to the fact that, 
though Sir Toby suggests binding him, this humiliation would 
not have been staged in the early modern playhouse. As David 
Carnegie has also marked, the convention of a visible Malvolio in 
his makeshift madhouse emerged on the mid-Victorian pictorial 
stage.113 For Gayle Gaskill, ‘the shadow of this representational 
staging still falls over the dark house scene’ and she adds Bill 
Alexander’s RSC production of 1987 (Malvolio: Anthony Sher) 
and Trevor Nunn’s 1996 film (Malvolio: Nigel Hawthorne) to 
Kemper’s list of pitiable Malvolios, pointing in particular to 
how the conventions of film close up invite an emphasis on the 
‘psychology of humiliation’ in the play.114
The Malvolio’s Revenge mock trial was produced by the 
Shakespeare Theatre Company of Washington, DC, but its 
lawyers were real. Malvolio’s lawyer was former US Solicitor 
General Paul Clement, who made a passing joke about his 
defence of Guantanamo imprisonments without trial during 
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the performance.115 The linking of Malvolio’s treatment to a 
particularly raw and current form of inhumanity could not have 
been clearer. In the productions listed by Kemper, the audience 
is asked to recognize that the joke against Malvolio has finally 
transgressed the boundary between comedy and cruelty and that 
they should stop laughing at him and empathize. If this treatment 
of the ‘mad’ Malvolio is indeed an anachronism, it is one that 
Malvolio’s Revenge clearly enjoys enormously and which the 
performance tradition instigated by Irving asks its audiences to 
take very seriously.
How does the fate of Malvolio relate to the ambivalent theat-
rical treatments of the incarcerated mad figures discussed above? 
The wrongly incarcerated Malvolio is a stage mad figure in 
more ways than one. Like The Duchess of Malfi madmen after 
him, he is a member of the upstart professional classes whom 
the audience love to hate (interestingly, of course, The Duchess 
of Malfi is a play about an aristocratic woman who actually does 
marry her Steward116). Malvolio has imagined serving the lust of 
his mistress’ heart as Edgar, in King Lear, imagines that his Poor 
Tom has done. And if Kemper and the scholars she cites are right 
and the audience never see him once he is incarcerated, Malvolio 
is like the mad figures in The Changeling subplot, who shout their 
mad fragments from off-stage and are attended to and upbraided 
by an on-stage carer. The joke of the sane man wrongly incar-
cerated, who cannot prove his sanity because everything he does 
and says seems to confirm his madness, is repeated in the fate of 
Candido, in The Honest Whore, imprisoned in the madhouse as 
part of his wife’s plan to provoke a manly anger from this impos-
sibly calm and cheerful husband, and in Fletcher’s The Pilgrim 
(1621),117 where the saintly Alina’s furious father Alphonso is 
reconciled to his daughter’s marriage as in The Honest Whore 
and is also cured of his excessive anger. In The Pilgrim, as in The 
Honest Whore, a father is made to reconsider his authoritarian 
demands when his daughter’s marriage for love is approved by 
a higher authority. Alphonso’s daughter Alinda’s clever serving 
lady Juletta convinces the Master of a madhouse that the King 
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wants Alphonso incarcerated. At first, the tyrant-father’s fury at 
not being able to find his runaway daughter, then at being taken 
for a madman, confirms to the Master of the house that the angry 
gentleman does indeed deserve his incarceration – but Alphonso’s 
anger subsides as he actually begins to doubt himself:
master
Ye are dog-mad: you perceive it not,




Aye, whips, and sore whips, and ye were a Lord sir, if ye be 
stubborn here.
alphonso
Whips? What am I grown?
[…]
I do not perceive I am so; but if you think it –
Nor I’ll be hanged if it be so.
Irons brought in
master
Do you see this sir?
Down with that devil in ye.
alphonso
Indeed I am angry
But I’ll contain myself: O I could burst now,
And tear myself, but these rogues will torment me:
Mad in my old days? Make mine own afflictions?
(4.1.19)
Through being taken as mad, Alphonso learns to ‘contain’ the 
anger that has been the scourge of his daughter and an object of 
ridicule for the audience throughout the play. I include this passage 
here because it demonstrates a very different dramaturgical and 
102 Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage
thematic purpose for a false incarceration from that in Twelfth 
Night, wherein Malvolio’s equally comic flaw of pride reduces 
him to the plight of a madman but is far from redeemed by the 
last scene. Malvolio will never see that he has ‘ma[de] [his] own 
afflictions’ and swears revenge on the on- and off-stage commu-
nities of laughers that have made him their object. One may 
assume that audiences of 1602 and 1621 respectively are intended 
to laugh at both of these self-deluded figures – but the ‘satisfying 
conclusion’, to recall Kemper, that The Pilgrim offers is that the 
deluded are brought to self-containment. All Malvolio seems to 
be brought to is anger at the fact that he has been duped and an 
understanding that we have all laughed at him.
Much late twentieth-century criticism of Twelfth Night has 
been determined to offer audiences and readers a ‘dark’ ending 
to-Twelfth Night, and has read Malvolio’s last line as a serious 
disruption to the play’s celebratory ending.118 In this reading, 
the audience is told that it has been enjoying itself too much and 
is made to face the cruel community of excessive laughers it has 
become. But this can only work if Malvolio has been seriously 
abused in his makeshift madhouse. If the audience has not seen 
him, if Sir Topaz has been enjoyably ridiculous and the audience 
has only been provoked to the mildest of pity for Malvolio, or 
indeed simply enjoyed the incarceration scene for its ludicrous 
and unnecessary theatricals – Malvolio continues to be risible 
when he, determinedly unredeemed to the end, offers revenge as 
an ending to this play instead of comedy.
My reading places the play at the conservative end of the 
subversion/containment debate recalled in the Introduction to 
this volume (p.  xxvi). I argue that we cannot assume an early 
modern audience would have considered Malvolio’s treatment 
excessive at all and I suggest that what Twelfth Night does is 
generate communities of laughers at Malvolio’s expense.119 He 
is a ludicrous social climber with ideas above his station and it is 
for this that he his punished; in laughing at him, the audience is 
constructed as a community that understands it is ludicrous for 
the ‘Lady of the Strachy’ to marry ‘the yeoman of the wardrobe’ 
 ‘Do you mock old age, you rogues?’  103
(2.5.37–8). The fact that Sir Toby Belch recognizes that the whole 
joke has gone too far (4.2.64–70) suggests that he recognizes the 
trouble that the joke will cause for him rather than, necessarily, 
its cruelty. Thus Twelfth Night may be read as a comedy of social 
othering that is certainly unkind to the social climber but suggests 
that ostracization and contempt are exactly what he deserves. The 
play un-kinds Malvolio, makes it clear he is not one of us. It is 
impossible to know what an early modern audience may have felt 
when Malvolio declares he will be revenged on the whole pack of 
them. I am suggesting here that it may not have felt implicated in 
some dreadful psychological torture, or particularly sorry for the 
fallen proud man at all.
I, MALVOLIO
I, Malvolio is a play by Tim Crouch that rereads Twelfth Night 
in terms of laughter and its excesses. It tells the story of the play 
from Malvolio’s perspective and its audience is presented, from 
the play’s opening moments, with Malvolio as both a victim of 
Figure 6: Malvolio (Tim Crouch) in I Malvolio, Unicorn Theatre, 2011 (© Bruce 
Atherton and Jana Chiellino)
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early modern shame punishments and the inmate of an imagined 
asylum from a dark and unspecified past. The piece is one in 
a series written and performed by Crouch, in which he retells 
four Shakespeare plays from the perspectives of what he calls 
minor characters (A Midsummer Night’s Dream is narrated by 
Peaseblossom, The Tempest by Caliban, Macbeth by Banquo). In an 
online interview, Crouch asserts that he is giving these characters 
a voice that Shakespeare does not permit them, suggesting that 
he is in some way subverting or undoing the power politics of the 
plays in question.120 The production is of particular interest here 
because throughout the hour-long monologue, all addressed to 
the audience, Malvolio/Crouch repeatedly makes the audience 
laugh, something that is predicted in the stage directions of the 
published text of I, Malvolio. He then repeatedly comfronts them 
with accusatory questions and upbraids them for their laughter:
I am locked away in hideous darkness. Without light, 
without toilette.
He shows the audience his behind. The audience laughs.
Find that funny still? Is that the kind of thing you find 
funny?
Oh such fun, you think. A sport royal, I warrant.
You bullies. You big bullies.121
This Malvolio is a figure disgusted by the excesses both of his world 
and the one he is addressing, which he assumes to be one and the 
same – excesses that include Belch’s drinking and carousing, Viola’s 
cross-dressing (which he dismisses as completely inexplicable, the 
actions of a mad woman), and all the indulgences the audience 
members may like to partake of: he aggressively suggests that they 
all enjoy dropping litter, spitting, drinking, smoking, laughing at 
those who are different to themselves, and, most repulsively to 
him it seems, going to the theatre, a place, he insists, where people 
might enjoy watching a man like Malvolio hang himself.122 He also 
repeatedly claims not to be mad.
Malvolio is dressed for most of the performance as just the 
kind of victim of abuse to which Kemper and Neely might object 
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in their revisions of the end of Twelfth Night and the historical 
treatment of inmates of Bedlam respectively. He wears filthy, 
in parts bloody, off-white ‘combinations’, full of holes which 
suggest that someone has poked at him with something sharp, or 
burnt him with cigarettes. The garment has a split in the behind 
through which it may be seen, when he first bends over, that he 
has soiled himself – presumably out of fear at some unspeakable 
treatment or because he has not been given anywhere to relieve 
himself in his prison. Large toy flies are attached to him. On 
his back is a sign which reads ‘Turkey Cock’ and underneath it 
another reading ‘Kick Me’. His head wear seems to represent 
something between said turkey and the familiar horns of the 
cuckold; beneath his chin is a red turkey’s wattle on an elastic 
strap. It is clear that he has been subjected to some charivari-
like display, shown to the world as an object of contempt.123 His 
costume speaks a history of the social pariah, from the receiver of 
the theatricalized medieval shame punishment, still part of legis-
lative practice in Shakespeare’s lifetime,124 through the Victorian 
asylum inmate to the modern day, homeless victim of abuse.
Despite – or perhaps because of – the grim visuals, Malvolio’s 
audience is constructed and reconstructed as a group that enjoy 
laughing at him, even as they are upbraided for doing so. My 
own experience as an audience member was of laughing openly at 
Malvolio’s pompous accusations that we were all part of a cruel, 
decadent and chaotic society conspiring to incarcerate one of its 
only decent members, abruptly followed by genuine moments of 
pity for this figure, and moments of repulsion – not so much at 
his vilely soiled attire but at his desperate love for Olivia, of which 
more later.
This Malvolio figure contains two comic stooges: the proud 
man fallen and the social misfit. Crouch performs the play in 
two versions, one for its originally intended audience of 11+ 
and one for adults (the main differences being the strength of 
the swearing the piece contains and the amount of exposure 
offered by the character’s underwear, with some improvised 
differences that change from performance to performance). The 
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intended audience of young people is encoded in both versions: 
in Crouch’s opening encounter with them, he accuses them of 
litter dropping. He has screwed up and abandoned Maria’s forged 
letter, which he has been reading and rereading as the audience 
enter, and then fires his accusatory questions at them:
I’ll just drop this here, shall I? Is that what you’d do? 
In the absence of a bin. This thing here. Yes? Just leave 
it here. Dump it here. Let it rest and blow about. Let 
someone else pick it up, shall I? Someone else, shall I?
Is that what you’d do, is it? That the kind of thing you’d 
get up to? The kind of thing you’d like? Is it?125
The questions develop into a rant against the litter droppers 
and spitters of this world, those who would reduce an ordered 
society to filth and chaos. Whether the audience largely comprise 
members who are younger than this Malvolio or not, he treats 
them as an authoritarian’s nightmare of the younger generation, 
which in an adult audience generates giggly rebellion. He insists 
that by the end of the evening he will have been revenged on the 
whole pack of us and suggests that this is what the audience is: 
a pack, a cruel community of laughers in whose interest it is to 
‘other’ its weaker members, laugh at his misfortune. Malvolio’s 
monologue shifts at one point to a diatribe against the theatre:
The theatre. Where we can drink and smoke and fornicate 
and squeal with delight and give access to our baser 
feelings and care not a jot for any decent human sensi-
bility. Look. Look. LOOK. Look at yourselves. LOOK 
AT YOURSELVES. With a ghastly rictus of amorality 
frozen on your ugly faces. This is how you look. Like 
this. And this. You are all as bad as each other. All of you. 
ALL. ALL.126
He admits to having Puritan tendencies – he wants the theatres 
closed – and suggests that we are all ghastly voyeurs who would 
happily kick ‘the funny man’ until he bleeds, or watch him hang 
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himself: he sets up a noose, gets one spectator to hold the rope 
while another readies herself to pull away his chair, then tells us 
he is not going to give us the sensationalist satisfaction of seeing 
him die. When I attended the production, he asked a man in the 
front row what his name was and offered a comic construction of 
what might happen when ‘Andrew’ went home after the perfor-
mance – ‘You’re home early Andrew! – Oh yes, it finished early 
– he hanged himself.’
A critique of audience passivity has been central to Crouch’s 
recent work127 but I want to suggest here that if his intention is 
to make us reconsider our tendencies to bully and exclude in 
our acts of comic spectatorship, or to shake us from our roles in 
wider culture as passive onlookers to violence against difference, 
this is not quite the way in which this performance works upon 
the mainly adult audience with whom I watched the piece and 
for which it was not originally written. For this audience, the 
moments when Crouch very obviously appears to want to bring 
us up short in our laughter, and to consider whether we really 
would happily kick a man when he is down, produced what I 
read as the silence of mild embarrassment at being preached to, 
rather than a genuine reappraisal of cultures of spectatorship. 
I refer particularly to when Malvolio suggested that as a pack 
of laughers, we would laugh at anyone who is different from 
ourselves. The performance was, I would argue, more successful 
in implicating its audiences when it let them laugh and laugh again 
at a range of comic objects, from the primitively scatalogical (we 
laughed at the sudden appearance of Malvolio’s arse, as Joubert 
suggests we should) to the pitiful (some laughed at Malvolio’s 
story of failed love and humiliation, even at his repeated assertion 
that his imagined requited love had brought him the only happy 
moments of his life, though others let out an ‘Aah!’ of sympathy), 
to the pompous (we laughed, like Toby Belch, at Malvolio’s 
condemnation of the excesses of social life and are cast as the 
carnivalesque bringers-down of the social order). The audience 
at the production I attended, then, both laughed and pitied as 
Joubert suggests we do – and laughed at the piteous, as Sidney 
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(and Crouch’s Malvolio) fears that theatrical comedy encourages 
us to do.
Crouch’s nuanced portrayal of the awkward, pompous social 
misfit recalls a transhistorical archetype stretching from Malvolio 
himself, to Jane Austen’s Mr Collins, to BBC TV’s Basil Fawlty 
at his most snobbish: he is the socially inept social climber who 
desires the obvious signifiers of social success but misreads more 
nuanced social semiotics – most importantly, those that indicate 
how he himself is being read. Malvolio begins this play in the full 
realization that he has been made a laughing-stock, then proceeds 
to demonstrate how and why. He accuses his audience of caring 
little for his upright, ordered social view of the world, casting 
them as teenage rebels even when the majority are adults; he 
accosts them in an embarrassing leopard-print thong, in the kind 
of awkward burst of sexual enthusiasm that we assume must have 
revolted Olivia. ‘A kind of innocence irradiates Malvolio’s joy’ 
at finding Maria’s letter, argues Robert H. Bell of Shakespeare’s 
figure: ‘What loser has not dreamed that the last will be first? 
Let him without foolish fantasies cast the first stone.’128 But what 
Crouch’s piece suggests is that it is easy to forget any kinship with 
Malvolio in our own joy at being ‘big bullies’. Malvolio has been 
punished for being a poor reader – of Maria’s trick letter and of 
social semiotics;129 he who cannot read the signs is, to all intents 
and purposes, what Malvolio insists he is not: mad – and risible. 
Crouch’s Malvolio, like Iago in my opening quotation, considers 
laughter an excess in and of itself – part of a society of Belch-like 
decadence, material excesses, and sensation-seeking behaviours 
in excess of decency, propriety and kindness. What Crouch’s 
production succeeds in doing, I suggest, is to offer its audience 
space in which to watch themselves laugh from within a range 
of laughter communities. Crouch suggests by implication that 
Twelfth Night may just have let us laugh at him.
What implications does Crouch’s performance have for produc-
tions of Twelfth Night? For Crouch, in the end, it can have none, 
because as he suggests, it is giving Malvolio a voice that in the 
play he does not have. In one sense it offers exactly the reading of 
 ‘Do you mock old age, you rogues?’  109
Malvolio’s plight that Kemper objects to. It suggests that, far from 
being a subtle interplay of performer and audience, spectator and 
object of spectacle that is contained within the madhouse scenes I 
have explored here, Twelfth Night is a play that allows us to laugh 
in self-satisfied superiority at the social climber. The mad figure 
on the early modern stage is an object of laughter, a generator of 
laughter, a laugher. Whether the wrongly incarcerated Malvolio 
may be seen in his improvised madhouse or not, it is clear that he 
cannot, as The Honest Whore’s madman can, look back and laugh 
at those who are looking at him and laughing. He is in darkness, 
in a separate space from his on-stage tormentors and his paying 
spectators. Considering the possibility of laughing at the mad in 
the early modern drama – so very far in excess of compassion 
and good taste for our reviewers of The Changeling – has recon-
firmed my sense that performing early modern drama now has the 
potential to locate the audience in an oddly disturbing reciprocal 
relationship with traditionally and stereotypically constructed 
‘others’. It may also, as Crouch is suggesting Twelfth Night does, 
reconfirm such boundaries and stereotypes. Twelfth Night may 
have a more satisfying dramaturgical structure for a modern 
reviewer than the Jacobean dramas featuring the incarcerated 
mad: one cannot imagine a theatre company being praised for 
forcing a Shakespeare comedy into literary acceptability, as we 
have seen in the reviews of the 2006 Changeling. But modern 
production’s need to show that its audiences have been guilty in 
laughing at Malvolio, that we have demonstrated ‘the excess of 
laughter’ and become a cruel pack, worthy of the abused man’s 
revenge, suggests that the laughter it generates may be relatively 
contained and comfortable. The Honest Whore’s madman gets to 
ask his laughing on- and off-stage audience, ‘Do you mock old 
age, you rogues?’ (5.2.201–2), rather like Crouch’s Malvolio as he 
asks us, ‘You enjoy that sort of thing, do you? Makes you laugh, 
does it?’ Twelfth Night’s Malvolio only gets to storm off-stage, 
swearing that he will take an impossible revenge.
It is logical that a comedy should punish an anti-comical figure 
like Malvolio, who, like Iago, might decry ‘the excess of laughter’. 
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But his ultimate punishment, our laughter, regulates the discon-
certing shifts in spectatorial power that laughing at and with the 
mad offers in the other plays I have considered here. Stephen G. 
Breyer, the ‘real’ judge at the Shakespeare Theatre Company’s 
mock appeal against Malvolio’s damages, finally decided in favour 
of Olivia: “‘No liability,’ he said. ‘And the reason is: I don’t like 
Malvolio’.130 The raucous, laughable, shifting excesses of the mad 
characters considered here may not permit such a simple and 
self-contained judgement.
CHAPTER THREE
‘GIVE ME EXCESS OF IT’ : LOVE, VIRTUE AND 
EXCESSIVE PLEASURE IN ALL’S WELL THAT 
ENDS WELL AND ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA
enobarbus
[…] Octavia is of a holy, cold and still conversation.
menas
Who would not have his wife so?
enobarbus
Not he that himself is not so; which is Mark Antony.
Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra (2.6.122–6)
When Menas suggests that every man wants his wife holy, cold 
and still of conversation, Enobarbus demurs, figuring Antony, 
and by implication Cleopatra, as worldly, hot and shifting in 
comparison to Caesar’s obedient and self-sacrificing sister. The 
ideal of womanhood in a range of early modern writings is the 
one Menas attributes to Octavia – but Enobarbus knows that such 
an ideal would not suit Antony. In Antony and Cleopatra, and in 
All’s Well that Ends Well, love between sexual partners is framed as 
an excessive passion: one which is both socially problematic and 
theatrically pleasurable and which undoes gendered conventions 
of constancy, balance and restraint. As we will see, some critical 
accounts of love in Shakespeare have endeavoured to separate love 
from lust, framing lust as a violent and troublesome passion, love 
as a heightened spiritual state beyond the somatic. While there is 
no doubt that ‘mere’ lust often figures in early modern drama as 
violently excessive and excessively selfish, I am going to argue that 
love, too, has its anxiety- and pleasure-producing excesses. Love, 
in the plays under discussion here, is always in danger of undoing 
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a version of subjectivity in which virtuous reason controls the 
boundless excesses of the early modern mind/body. Superficially, 
Helena and Cleopatra are on opposite ends of the spectrum of 
early modern archetypes of love and of female virtue. Compare 
their effects on their respective beloveds: Shakespeare’s Cleopatra 
is the ‘triple-turn’d whore’ of legend (4.12.13) and the partner 
in Antony’s double adultery; she is twice the cause of his defeat 
in battle and her play-death leads to his actual demise. Helena 
sleeps only with her rightful husband; her own false death, on 
a pretended holy pilgrimage, serves to bring Bertram to a right 
understanding of her value as a wife. Helena is good for Bertram, 
where Cleopatra is ultimately very bad for Antony. Cleopatra’s 
love, the more notoriously excessive, ends in death and is matched 
in excess and in death by Antony’s. Excessive love for Helena is 
something never clearly experienced by Bertram; indeed, by the 
end of the play, her own excessive and, some might argue, selfish 
passion, could be said to have cured him of youthful excesses, 
just as her medical knowledge cures the King of France’s fistula. 
However, Helena’s love is, as we will see, figured as excessive 
in a number of ways that make a comparison with Cleopatra’s 
productive. The plays offer the excesses of love as primary 
sources of theatrical pleasure, while hedging the passion about 
with moral provisos and punishments. They explore and celebrate 
the excesses of love in ways that trouble some of the categories of 
reason and passion that are at work in the early modern period – 
and bring them, so to speak, into play. Both of these women act 
according to a love which exceeds the boundaries of ideology and 
reason.
LOVE AS A PASSION
First, I want to turn to the question of whether love may 
usefully be considered as an emotion at all. David Schalkwyk 
suggests that it is a reductive mistake to describe it as one of the 
embodied, humoral passions of classical or early modern thought 
– or to categorize it as a set of neurological and endocrinological 
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phenomena and responses, as Schalkwyk suggests modern 
science has recently attempted to do. He argues that love is not 
an emotion per se but ‘a form of behaviour over time’, involving 
a range of emotions, and suggests that humoral concepts of love 
are figured as both anachronistic and excessive in Shakespeare. 
Of Orsino and his conception of a humoral Love, whose excesses 
must be purged and which women are typologically incapable of 
feeling (Twelfth Night 1.1.1–3, 2.4.94–104), Schalkwyk writes:
Embodiment of and spokesman for humoral theory, 
Illyria’s duke is the sign of the excessive, the anachro-
nistic, at a remove from reality. Almost every critic of the 
play has observed that Orsino’s love is a fantasy. Humoral 
theory helps us to give a greater degree of precision to 
the endlessly repeated undergraduate cliché that Orsino 
is not in love, but rather in love with love itself. He is 
in love with himself as the paradigmatic embodiment 
of humoral psychology, and the dialogic nature of the 
play presents other characters who embody and enact a 
different concept of love.1
According to Schalkwyk’s nuanced and convincing argument, 
love as a gendered, somatic passion, with all the problems of 
excess the passions generate, is an anachronistic notion which 
Twelfth Night supersedes. He cites early modern treatises on 
the passions, pointing particularly to way in which Thomas 
Wright’s ‘whole register and style’ in The Passions of the Mind 
‘changes abruptly’ when he turns to the subject of love.2 ‘These 
dry discourses of affections, without any cordial affection, have 
long detained & not a little distasted me’, writes Wright of the 
other passions he has been exploring: cordial affection seems to 
be of a different order. Nevertheless, Wright’s appeal to God, 
‘the soul, and life of all true love’,3 at the opening of his chapter 
on the subject suggests that love makes him just as nervous as the 
other passions. ‘Now that I come out towards the borders of love’, 
writes Wright, in a passage cited by Schalkwyk,
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give me leave, O loving God, to vent out and evaporate 
the effects of the heart, and see if I can incense my soul 
to love thee entirely…and that all those motives which 
stir up mine affections to love thee, may be means to 
inflame all their hearts, which read this treatise penned 
by me.4
When Wright ‘come[s] to the borders of love’, that most 
all-consuming of passions, he must ask God to help him turn 
all of it on to God himself. For Wright is not about to discourse 
primarily on the love of God but on human love. The very inflam-
matory madness that Schalkwyk argues is ‘divine’5 is one of 
Nicholas Coeffeteau’s list of passions – ‘pity, fear, bashfulness, or 
shame, love, hatred, desires, Choler and the rest’, and Coeffeteau 
defines all of them as phenomena ‘which are accompanied with 
some notable defect’.6 Their disease-like, troublesome, excessive 
quality is what make passions passions – and love is one of them. 
Human love can be benevolent, a selfless compulsion to ‘will good 
to some one, not for our own private interest’,7 and Coeffeteau 
defines it separately from desire – which is always for that which 
is absent. He writes of love as selfless friendship, in the beautiful 
passage I have used in the dedication to this book. However, he 
still clearly feels that human love needs policing by reason, just as 
do the other passions:
Human Love is a Passion which should follow the 
motions of reason, and which being guided by the light 
of the soul should only embrace the true good, to make 
it perfect: for containing himself within these bounds, it 
should no more be a violent & furious passion, which fills 
the world daily with so many miseries by her exorbitant 
and strange disorders.8
Love should follow the motions of reason…it should not be a 
violent and furious passion. But Coeffeteau’s very statement 
of what love should not be in this passage suggests that love 
does often stray into the realms of the exorbitant, strange and 
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disordered. The construction of love as passion and disease 
emerges even more clearly in Ferrand’s Erotomania, a treatise on 
love melancholy, which, having asserted that their are two broad 
kinds of love, ‘the one divine, the other common and vulgar’,9 
calls upon the ancients to support his argument that love is yet 
another of the unreasonable passions:
love being a mixt disease, both of the body and the 
mind; I shall furnish my self with precepts out of 
Plato, and with medicines from Aesculapius, in the cure 
of Love Melancholy, being such as I have gathered 
out of Hippocrates, the Prince of Physitians: Intending 
to handle Love no otherwise, then as it is a passion, 
or violent perturbation of the Mind, Dishonest, and 
Refractory to Reason.10
Love, for Coeffeteau, contains something substantially different 
from the other passions, something divine: but human love can 
still be listed as a passion or affection, as it clearly is for Ferrand 
– and thereby may be figured, in its excessiveness, as a disease.11
SHAKESPEARE AND LOVE, SHAKESPEARE AND SEX
As Paul A. Kottman points out in his study of Romeo and Juliet, 
recent scholarship has figured early modern dramatic love in 
terms of its social limits, so that the paradigmatic historicist inter-
pretation of that play is of a ‘dialectical tension between the lovers’ 
desires and the demands of society’.12 Love in the early modern 
drama is perhaps embarrassingly excessive in these terms, as the 
plays are full of lovers who appear ready to let their love exceed 
society’s demands. Other recent studies have taken seriously the 
notion of a love – particularly in Shakespeare – that transcends 
social demands and boundaries and seem keen to separate love 
from sex, in ways that might lead one of Kottman’s historical 
materialists to accuse them of a naive moral idealism. Stanley 
Wells concludes his chapter on ‘Sex and Poetry in Shakespeare’s 
Time’ in his book Shakespeare, Sex and Love thus:
116 Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage
So perhaps we can say that Shakespeare succeeds in 
writing verse which […] can certainly appeal to a homoe-
rotic readership but which transcends the boundaries 
of subdivisions of human experience to encapsulate the 
very essence of human love. As we might have expected 
of him.13
This essence of love, Wells suggests, goes beyond the ‘light-
hearted eroticism’ or ‘voyeuristic pleasure’ of some of the other 
poets he is examining, ‘to a profound expression of a ‘hallowed’ 
love that […] knows no limits’.14 For Wells here, the ‘very essence’ 
of human love is something quite other than the muddy somatic 
appetites that both blur and subdivide human subjectivity for the 
early moderns. In its ‘essence’, love transcends the debates around 
the interests and ideologies, which are inherent in its construction 
for a scholar such as Dympna Callaghan, cited by Kottman.15 It is 
startling to consider the fact that Wells’ and Callaghan’s analyses 
of Romeo and Juliet were written within fifteen years of one 
another. For Wells Shakespeare’s sonnets express a ‘profound’ 
love that is not merely erotic or visual: it is ‘hallowed’, spiritual. 
Wells reads Romeo and Juliet as somehow less universal than the 
Sonnets, because more explicitly heteronormative – but again in 
Wells’ concluding paragraphs, Shakespeare’s work is about a love 
that transcends the physical:
In the end the play becomes an elegy for wedded love, a 
condition in which sex, while it is important, is subsumed 
in celebration of a spiritual as well as a physical unity.16
Wells ends a number of his chapters by assuring the reader in 
some way that it is something other, or more profound, than 
sex that Shakespeare is writing about when he writes of love – 
and ends the chapter on ‘Sexual Desire’ with the assertion that 
‘Rape is the ultimate consequence of lust, the very opposite 
of love. Yet the physical act is identical.’17 This he restates in 
his conclusion, where he suggests that Shakespeare ‘knew the 
dangers of of mistaking animal desire for higher passion’. But, 
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happily, Shakespeare ‘knew too that sex is an essential component 
even of the higher forms of human love, that it can lead to a 
sublime realization of the self in a near-mystical union of person-
alities, such as he figures forth in his poem “The Phoenix and the 
Turtle” ’.18 The attempt to redeem lust from what is supposedly 
its ‘ultimate consequence’, rape, reinforces manichean binaries 
of sex and love, physical and spiritual. Although other critics are 
not often as explicit about their privileging of the spiritual, the 
notion of a selfish, desiring, physical lust that is superficial and 
fleeting and could be for any sex object, and a love that is more 
lasting, ‘profound’, individuated and ultimately virtuous is an 
undertone for a number of recent writings about Shakespeare and 
love. ‘Love and lust are generally polar opposites in Shakespeare,’ 
argues Maurice Charney, ‘and lust is associated with villains.’ 
This is a continuing theme in the Sonnets, Charney goes on to 
argue, and in Venus and Adonis. In his drama, Charney asserts, ‘All 
of Shakespeare’s villains are lustful because they believe only in 
the natural order’ and he cites Lear’s Edmund: ‘Thou nature are 
my goddess’ (1.2.1).19 Thus ‘nature’ is figured by both Edmund 
and Charney as base and animalistic – excessive in its lack of 
restraint. But the early modern theatre cannot figure love as either 
pure, villainous, bodily lust or as sublime spiritual union, uncon-
taminated with the somatic. Human love is a ‘passion’, and as we 
have repeatedly seen here the passions are inescapably natural 
and somatic.
Of particular interest here is David Scott Kastan’s article ‘All’s 
Well that Ends Well and the Limits of Comedy’ in which he points 
out that whatever early modern defenders of the theatre may say 
about the moral benefit of reading or watching comedy (it exposes 
vice and folly – Sidney; it offers light relief to the busy mind, 
making the worker more productive after the recreation it provides 
– Heywood20), the happy endings of stage comedies belie these 
attempts to render them moral reflections of the ‘real world’:
This willingness to gratify human desires in the face 
of the evidence of human experience discomforts those 
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who demand moral utility from art. Bacon complains 
that ‘the Stage is more beholding to Love than the Life 
of Man’.21
Yet, later in the article, it seems that Kastan too demands moral 
utility from art, where he suggests that in the ‘problem comedies’, 
the audience is emphatically reminded that life is not comedy, 
through Shakespeare’s deliberate over-contrivance of the happy 
ending:
In the problem comedies the contrivance is the 
characters’ own and is throughout too self-regarding, 
too un-responsive to the needs and desires of others, 
to permit our delight. We are forced to recognize that 
comic triumph is not innocent, that event usually will 
not yield to desire without some other desire yielding to 
event; that is, we are forced to contest the claim that ‘all’s 
well that ends well.’
If love is selfish, we cannot delight in it, and for Kastan, Helena’s 
love in All’s Well is only too selfish:
though Helena finally does earn Bertram’s love, she 
succeeds through a tenacity too nearly predatory to be 
completely attractive or satisfying.22
Kastan goes on to demonstrate repeatedly that the comic 
resolution to the play is pointedly inadequate to the plot and 
suggests that the psychological integrity of the figures in All’s 
Well cannot be compelled to yield to comic form, just as Bertram 
cannot be compelled to love. What I am going to argue here is that 
a love which is in excess of self can be therefore condemned as 
selfish in Kastan’s terms, because it overwhelms the consideration 
of both self and other. Both attractive and potentially satisfying, 
it is also problematically amoral – both for Shakespeare’s culture 
and our own, albeit in differently inflected ways.
I am not going to argue, in opposition to Wells and Charney, 
that Shakespeare and his contemporaries do not differentiate in 
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any way between love and lust. When Bertram swears to Diana 
‘I love thee/By love’s own sweet constraint, and will forever/
Do thee rights of service’ (4.2.15–17), an early modern audience 
would no doubt have been more likely to trust Diana’s cynicism 
– ‘Ay, so you serve us/Til we serve you’ (4.2.17–18) – than 
Bertram’s oaths. Once Bertram is tricked into believing he has 
had sex with Diana, he leaves her and is ready publicly to dismiss 
her as a whore. His declaration in the last scene of the play that 
he will love Helena ‘ever, ever dearly’ (5.3.315) is clearly of a 
different order. Despite Juliet’s comic references to male lust 
(‘What satisfaction can thou have tonight?’ (2.2.126)), Romeo and 
Juliet makes it clear that Romeo’s ‘bent of love be honourable,/
[His] purpose marriage’ (2.2.143–4), thus differentiating it from 
the lust that a Bertram feels for a Diana (or, perhaps, that Romeo 
felt for Rosaline). In the two plays explored here, love is certainly 
more than ‘mere’ sexual desire and is certainly more complex and 
sympathetic than the villainous lust experienced by an Edmund 
or an Iago. But this does not ultimately mean that it is without its 
dangers and abilities to disrupt.
ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS WELL
Love in All’s Well can be something of a problem, and I am 
going to argue here that this is because its excesses push at the 
boundaries of gendered propriety for its central female figure, 
rather than because of any essential qualities or faults that 
render the play more generally a ‘problem play’. The pseudo-
genre of the ‘Problem Play’ has been contested in scholarly 
discourse, since Boas labelled All’s Well, Measure, Troilus and 
Hamlet thus in 1896,23 borrowing from the term used to describe 
the social problems staged by Ibsen and Shaw, and since W. W. 
Lawrence reduced the ‘problem’ to the three comedies in 1930.24 
Even as it emerged, the usefulness of the term to categorize a 
range of generically slippery and/or morally challenging plays 
by Shakespeare was being interrogated: ‘It has been perpetually 
redefined’ by writers after Boas, asserts Peter Ure in 1961.25 Ure’s 
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introductory solution to the vagueness of the term is to take on 
the vagueness of another scholar and
borrow the warning that Dr Tillyard placed in the 
forefront of his book on the subject: ‘I use the term 
vaguely and equivocally […] as a matter of convenience…
to achieve the necessary elasticity and inclusiveness.’26
However, in the paragraph following the one cited by Ure, 
Tillyard used the term in fairly inelastic fashion, to praise Hamlet 
and Troilus and Cressida as ‘problem plays because they deal with 
and display interesting problems’ (which perhaps sums up the 
ways in which scholarship now regards all the plays categorized 
thus), while asserting that All’s Well and Measure are problem 
plays ‘because they are problems’.27 Boas tells his late Victorian 
readers that ‘All these dramas introduce us into highly artificial 
societies, whose civilization is ripe unto rottenness’ and that 
‘Amidst such media abnormal conditions of brain and emotion 
are generated,’28 and Tillyard takes up the theme of the problem 
play as cognitive abnormality when he asks his reader to ‘consider 
the connotations of the parallel term “problem child”’. ‘There are 
at least two kinds of problem child’ asserts Tillyard, the first being 
‘the genuinely abnormal child, whom no efforts will ever bring 
back to normality’. All’s Well and Measure are ‘like [this] first […]: 
there is something radically schizophrenic about them’ (10).
Society as artificial and rotten; abnormal conditions of the 
brain and emotion; if Boas describes their content accurately, 
then these plays are packed with the problems that most fascinate 
the late twentieth- early twenty-first-century cultural materialist 
critic or historian of the emotions, rather than being ‘problems’ 
in themselves. As the pseudo-genre’s critical history progresses, 
the problems posed by these plays increasingly demonstrate, for 
literary scholars, Shakespeare’s daring experimental bent. Even 
the ‘problem’ of genre marked by Boas and Lawrence had been 
recuperated by 1974, when Anne Barton stood up for generic 
instability, describing the ‘clash between those opposing elements 
of fairy tale and realism, of romance motivation and psychological 
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probability’ as a disturbing but deliberate part of All’s Well’s 
design, rather than as a problem of muddled genre. All’s Well and 
Measure for Measure raise ‘doubts as to the validity of comedy as 
an image of truth’, she argues in her introduction to the Riverside 
Shakespeare’s All’s Well.29 It complicates genre and this is not a 
problem. It is significant that two years ago at the time of writing, 
G. Beiner called his monograph exploring All’s Well, Measure and 
Troilus Generic Tension as Exploratory Mode and suggests that while 
each play has a ‘vital relationship with the normative genre’ the 
plays are part of a European dramatic ‘poetics of generic tension’.30
However, if the problem child has become the child genius for 
the academy, newspaper reviewers of the Shakespeare’s Globe 
production in 201131 still conformed to the notion that the 
seeming generic and psychological contradictions of this play 
still make it unwieldy and unpopular – and some conflate the 
complex history of the ‘problem play’ in criticism with a simpler 
notion that these are just faulty comedies. Whereas a scholar 
such as Bloom may now assume that for ‘Modern readers (sic) 
[…] The marriage of Helena and Bertram is a punishment, 
not a happy ending, and it is a complex authorial challenge to 
readers demanding a complex critical response’,32 newspaper 
critics certainly see the play’s resolution as problematic in the 
theatre, chiefly because of the problem that is Bertram. Tillyard’s 
notion of the play as ‘problem child’, irredeemably ‘abnormal’, 
and the idea that Bertram is at the centre of this problem,33 still 
emerges in journalistic criticism of the play. For Charles Spenser, 
self-consciously blunt in the Daily Telegraph, All’s well is ‘usually 
classed among Shakespeare’s so called “problem plays”, the 
main problem in my view being that it’s not much cop’.34 It is 
‘a knotty problem play’ for Paul Taylor,35 ‘one of Shakespeare’s 
most beguiling but least-loved plays’ for Michael Billington36 and 
‘one of Shakespeare’s most charmless comedies […] made up 
of improbable liaisons, arbitrary decisions, brutal exposures and 
mechanical resolutions’ for Susannah Clapp.37
Having given the stock warning about problem plays, many 
reviewers of the Globe production praised it warmly for its 
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interpretation of Bertram, who appeared to have ‘feelings’ for 
Helena from the outset, which he was unable to express until he 
believed that he has lost her in death. Sam Crane looked longing 
and bewildered in the presence of Ellie Piercy’s Helena, as the 
former left for France and even after he had rejected her before 
the French court. The extracts below demonstrate that if Bertram 
can be made sympathetic, the ‘problem’ is solved:
The problem with the play is always Bertram, who seems 
a snobbish rotter on rejecting marriage to Helena on the 
grounds that she is ‘a poor physician’s daughter’. Sam 
Crane plausibly plays him as a callow youth heavily influ-
enced by the laddish military ethos and half in love with 
the woman he spurns: even when, after their imposed 
union, he tells Helena to ‘haste to horse’ he gives her a 
long, lingering look filled with quiescent desire.38
Most productions (of this very rarely staged piece) 
present a Bertram who is noxious in his selfishness. 
Not here. Sam Crane gives us a hero who is sunk in 
a self-hating depression and who, although he knows 
that Helena could be the answer to his prayers, can’t 
overcome the rooted self-dislike that would allow him to 
woo her.39
Bertram can come over as a cad, but Crane makes him 
immature and conflicted, trying on poses for size. He 
clearly nurses unarticulated feelings for Helena, which 
renders him more appealing and makes sense of her 
pursuit of him.40
The implication is that, for an audience today, Bertram demon-
strates an unappealing, snobbish self-centredness in his rejection 
of Helena, and her ‘pursuit of him’ – and the love that drives it 
– therefore makes no ‘sense’. The Globe production reinvented 
Bertram, so that his change of heart at the end of the play was 
prefigured from his first stage encounter with Helena, and their 
final reunion produced a self-authenticating, mentally healthy 
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and therefore ‘truer’ Bertram, who had always loved Helena but 
was just too far ‘sunk in a self-hating depression’ or too ‘immature 
and conflicted’ to admit it to himself. If the play, to return to 
Tillyard, is mentally ill – ‘there is something radically schizo-
phrenic about [it]’ (see p. 120) – this production sites that illness 
in Bertram and cures him.
The Financial Times review suggests that love is difficult for 
a theatre audience to accept when its object is unsympathetic: a 
plausible heroine could not love a ‘cad’, so her pursuit of such 
a Bertram is implausible. However, this assumption emerges 
from a moral framework concerning love and its meanings that 
this play does not necessarily fit. In fact, it makes perfect sense 
for Helena to love a ‘cad’; as early as medieval stories of love 
such as Boccaccio’s that were circulating in translation in early 
modern England (and which, of course, Shakespeare used as his 
sources), love is sudden, manifests itself suddenly and physically 
and is physically overwhelming. Afflicted with love, one may be 
expected to use one’s god-given reason to combat it – but this is 
exceptionally difficult. Here is Boccaccio’s Amorous Fiammetta, 
in Bartholomew Young’s English translation of 1587, describing 
the moment when she falls in love with the young man she sees 
at a religious festival, a ‘cad’ indeed, who eventually proves her 
downfall. I quote it at length as it brings us back, via so many 
examples, to the somatic nature of the passions in writings still 
circulating in the early modern period:
a shining light issuing from out his clear eyes, and 
running by a most subtle and fine beam, did meet and 
hit directly against mine, which contending to pass 
further by what secret way (I know not) suddenly went 
penetrating to my very heart, which fearing their violent 
entrance, and calling to it all her exterior forces, left 
me altogether pale and cold. But their abode was not 
so long there, but the greatest fear was past, and then 
were they welcomed with a hot and burning passion: 
whereupon the foresaid forces returning to their 
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places again, brought with them a certain heat, which 
driving all paleness quite away, painted my face like the 
vermillion Rose, and made me burn as hot as fire: And 
yet beholding from whence all this did proceed, I could 
not but breathe out a sorrowful sigh. And from that hour 
forward, my thoughts were occupied in nothing else, but 
meditating of his brave personage, and apparent virtues, 
and especially in imagining how to please him.41
Although Fiammetta’s description bypasses the liver, which 
André du Laurens later asserts is an essential part of the somatic 
process of setting ‘concupiscience on fire’,42 love is figured, as 
in Du Laurens’ discourse, as a material force, capable of physi-
cally piercing the body of the one in love when she looks at the 
lover. The description of the ‘most subtle and fine beam’ which 
Fiammetta’s lover emits accords with Galen’s theory of vision, 
whereby beams physically emerge from the object of vision and 
pierce the eyes of she who looks. By 1621, Burton is still asserting, 
in the ‘Love Melancholy’ chapters of the Anatomy, that ‘the most 
familiar and usual cause of love is that which comes by sight, 
which conveys those admirable rays of beauty and pleasing graces 
to the heart’. The eyes
as two sluices let in the influences of that divine, powerful, 
soul-ravishing, and captivating beauty, which, as one 
saith, “is sharper than any dart or needle, wounds deeper 
into the heart; and opens a gap through our eyes to that 
lovely wound, which pierceth the soul itself ” (Ecclus. 
18.) Through it love is kindled like a fire.43
By 1604, Johannes Kepler’s Optics, which produces something 
closer to modern science’s understanding of vision, had been 
translated into English. Kepler suggests that vision occurs 
‘through a picture of the visible things on the white, concave 
surface of the retina’.44 For Kepler, the labour of looking is done 
by the looker; in Galen, that which is seen sends forth its beams 
for the looker to receive. Beauty, post-Kepler, is indeed in the 
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eye of the beholder. It is interesting, then, that Burton writes of 
love at first sight in terms of extramissive vision. Eric Langley 
points out a ‘slippage either side of the century, where old and 
new conceptions of vision compete, coexist or become confused’ 
and that ‘One such slippage, where the theory remains in circu-
lation, can be observed in poetry’s treatment of the eye’.45 Indeed, 
Langley remarks that to his knowledge there is
not a single poem from the erotic narrative tradition that 
fails to utilize the ‘transpiercing eye[beams]’ tradition of 
extramissive theory; it would appear that not one poet in 
this tradition can resist the ‘furious dart[s]’ of eyebeams, 
and that [n]o armour might be found that could defend 
[their lovers from the] ‘Transpearcing rayes of Christall 
poynted eyes.’46
One might argue that it can hardly be illuminating to compare 
sudden passion, this love at first piercing, with Helena’s, which 
has grown with her, through her lifelong close proximity to 
Bertram – or indeed to cite Fiammetta, when Shakespeare uses 
another Boccaccio source for his play, the story of Giletta of 
Narbonne, translated in William Painter’s Palace of Pleasure.47 
What I want to point to here is the materiality of the process of 
falling in love as it is described here and the reference at the end 
of the Fiammetta passage to the beloved’s ‘apparent virtues’. If 
a more recent definition of ‘apparent’ is accidentally assumed 
here, then the passage may be read as a knowing satire on the 
superficiality of a sudden love. But the use of the word to mean 
‘only seeming, appearing to be one thing while possibly being 
another’ does not occur until 1846.48 ‘Apparent’ here, from the 
French ‘appearing’ (the original spelling is ‘apparant’), means 
visually evident, all too clear. And the appearance of the lover can 
never remain superficial, on the surface – it enters Fiammetta 
very literally, turning her cold then hot, forcing an audible 
expression of love from her: the excess of love’s heat must be 
literally expressed in a sigh. Although Helena, we are repeatedly 
reassured, is a figure of moral rectitude not to be compared with 
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the likes of Fiammetta, Helena’s love, too, is figured as both 
visually constructed and excessive.
In the first scene of All’s Well, Helena describes her unrequited 
love for Betram, whom she is about to lose sight of altogether 
when he leaves for Paris, as excessive at every turn. Love oblit-
erates her. She is ‘undone’ without Bertram. She must ‘die for 
love’ like the hind who loves the lion. She understands that her 
‘fancy’ is ‘idolatrous’, suggesting in this word (coming as it does 
immediately after her description of her repeatedly drawing him 
in her heart) that she is in love with an image. Like the idola-
trous Catholic, she must ‘sanctify his relics’ (1.1.99), a choice 
of imagery that both recalls and undoes the notion of love as a 
spiritual good. Later, when she confesses her love to Bertram’s 
mother, the Countess of Rousillon, the boundless excess of her 
love and its idolatry are again her subjects:
Yet in this captious and inteemible sieve
I still pour in the waters of my love
And lack not to lose still. Thus, Indian-like,
Religious in mine error, I adore
The sun that looks upon his worshipper
But knows of him no more.
(1.3.199–204)
Helena’s agency shifts fascinatingly in her description of her love. 
In her first soliloquy, she complains that her ‘imagination carries 
no favour in it but Bertram’s’ and she describes the process of 
looking at him as one of drawing, deliberately inscribing him on 
to the ‘table’ of her heart. Where Fiammetta suggests repeatedly 
that there was nothing ‘she’, her moral, willing self, could do 
about her physical, material fall (her fall in love, and from virtue), 
Helena’s first soliloquy is full of self-blame. The metaphor of 
drawing Bertram in her heart suggests conscious deliberation. 
Then, in the above speech, the notion of the idolatrous gaze 
suggests a helpless ignorance. Helena is like an ‘Indian’ who 
believes naively that the sun takes notice of him – but she is 
simultaneously knowing and sophisticated in her ability to analyse 
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herself thus. Helena tells the audience, and later the Countess, 
that she just can’t help herself and yet blames herself for not being 
able to apply reason to the idolatrous excesses of love.
Helena’s passion for Bertram is hedged about with repeated yet 
ambiguous figurings of her virtue. In the first scene of the play, 
inherited ‘dispositions’, education and Helena’s own efforts give 
the Countess great ‘hopes’ of her turning out well (1.1.39–44), 
though she is also rebuked in this same scene for excessive 
mourning of her father (‘Moderate lamentation is the right of 
the dead;/ Excessive grief the enemy to the living’ (54–5) Lafeu 
opines, unoriginally). Excessive show of feeling is in danger of 
looking showy, and although most editors point out that ‘affect’ 
in the Countess’ warning (‘no more, lest it be rather thought 
you affect a sorrow than to have it’, 51–2) does not have the 
same connotations of affectation or hypocrisy as it does later in 
the seventeenth century (1661 is the OED’s first citation of this 
meaning), the idea of showing more sadness than one actually 
feels surely prefigures the later definition, especially as Helena 
defends herself with the assertion that she does affect (show) a 
sorrow but ‘I have it too’ (53). In fact this excess of sorrow, as the 
audience soon discovers, is for Bertram because he is leaving for 
the French court, and not for her departed father.
The discussion of given and attained qualities continues in 
the Countess’ advice to Bertram. Whereas Helena’s given gifts 
are her ‘dispositions’, to which she adds by responding well 
to a good education, Bertram’s are his father’s ‘shape’ and his 
‘blood’ – though when the Countess exhorts that his ‘blood and 
virtue/Contend for empire in thee’ (61–2) she is also making the 
unintended prediction that his heated young blood will, for the 
greater part of the play, win over his virtue; and concern with 
what is due to his ‘blood’, in the aristocratic sense, is what leads 
to his blindness regarding Helena’s virtues when he rejects her 
later in the play.
The play opens, then, with a variety of exhortations to a pair 
of young people to be good, virtuous and moderate – to control 
themselves, in fact. The remainder of the Countess’ speech to her 
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son is a Polonius-like call to moderation and balance in friendship 
and conduct. Helena is introduced to the audience as both an 
inherent and self-made good girl – while she weeps embarrass-
ingly all over the stage. For Kathryn Schwarz, ‘Helena becomes 
[in the collective critical memory] a type of the disorderly woman, 
her conservative course of action knocked out of bounds by 
an excess of desire’49 and, indeed, the Countess’ assurances of 
her virtue are also knocked out of bounds, in the very scene in 
which the audience is offered them. When Bertram has taken his 
leave and the advice-giving adults have exited, Helena gives the 
soliloquy which acknowledges that she is not the dutiful daughter 
she seems. The speech recalls Hamlet’s following the exit of his 
father’s ghost, and is the diametric opposite to Hamlet’s promises. 
Hamlet vows to remember his father; Helena has ‘forgot’ hers. 
Hamlet promises to obliterate from the ‘tables’ of his memory 
everything he has learned through his childhood, ‘all trivial fond 
records,/All saws of books, all pressures past/That youth and 
observation copied there’ (1.5.99–101) and to replace them with 
his father’s memory and vengeance. Helena confesses that she has 
only Bertram copied in her ‘heart’s table’ (1.1.94).
Helena’s declaration of her love for Bertram is framed drama-
turgically with warnings about excess, echoing the anxieties 
around the excesses of young female love that hover in the intro-
ductory passages of the source text, where Boccaccio/Painter’s 
Gilletta of Narbonne ‘fervently fell in love with Beltramo, more 
than was meet for a maiden of her age’.50 Having been marked by 
the Countess and Lafew as a virtuous young woman in danger 
of mourning excessively, she confesses to her excessive love 
for Bertram; we then meet Parolles, the epitome of louche and 
disreputable excess, sometimes compared, albeit as a less likeable, 
or less self-aware, version, to Falstaff51 – a liar, fool and coward 
(1.1.101–2) whose language is all sexual innuendo and whose ‘soul 
[…] is in his clothes’ (2.5.44).
After two of the play’s older generation – the Countess and 
Lafew – have set up a supposedly clear moral framework whereby 
its young people may be judged, Helena’s conversation with 
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Parolles is highly morally ambivalent. It begins with her odd 
comment that his bad qualities suit him very well when virtue 
does not seem so very appealing: ‘when virtue’s steely bones/
Look bleak i’th’cold wind’ (1.1.104–5). Her sententia that ‘full 
oft we see/Cold wisdom waiting on superfluous folly’ (1.1.105–6) 
seems to favour neither side of the wisdom/folly binary and 
virtue’s cold steeliness does not seem nearly as attractive as the 
lively, fallacious arguments about virginity that Parolles throws at 
Helena in response to her oddly sudden question about protecting 
her virginity:
You have some stain of soldier in you; let me ask you 
a question. Man is enemy to virginity; how may we 
barricado it against him?
(1.1.112–14)
In introducing the subject of how virginity may be protected, 
she prefigures the dangers to body and reputation to which she 
is about to expose herself on the journey she is planning by the 
end of the scene – and having set Parolles off on his predictable 
ramble about how keeping one’s virginity is unnatural, she soon 
departs from her theme of keeping it, to that of ‘los[ing] it to her 
own liking’ (150–1).
Helena’s discourse on virginity ensues, with its notori-
ously cut-off line, the missing part of which Ewan Fernie 
has fascinatingly ignored in his entry on the speech to the 
‘BloggingShakespeare’ website. Where most editors gloss the 
speech by explaining that Helena is referring to the court when 
she speaks of a place where Bertram will find everything from a 
‘mother, a mistress, and a friend’ to ‘his faith, his sweet disaster’ 
(1.1.167, 173), Fernie assumes that it is her virginity where they 
are to be found. In imagining herself completely given over 
to Bertram’s love, she becomes a place of infinite variety and 
capacity. I find this reading – and the tone which Fernie is able 
to adopt when Blogging rather than writing for academic peer 
review – compelling, despite his somewhat perverse determi-
nation to ignore most editors’ insistence on missing text: ‘For 
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though we might very well assume that becoming HIS would be 
to become a lesser thing,’ writes Fernie of Helena,
that’s probably not how it appears to any impassioned 
inamorata, and maybe we should listen to experience a 
bit. So, imagine BEING—
 His humble ambition, proud humility,
 His jarring-concord, and his discord-dulcet,
 His faith, his sweet disaster!
Is there not an Ariel-like mobility, beauty and freedom in 
such a varied and textured life? … It’s greatly to Helena’s 
credit that she, unlike Troilus, can go BEYOND the 
fear of losing distinction in her joys. And we’re very 
far from any kind of school-girl (or boy) sentimentality 
here. Consider that ecstatic ASCENT toward ‘his sweet 
disaster’! Self-gifting doesn’t end in saccharine union, 
but more of an amoral, Dionysian delight.
Doesn’t it make you SHIVER?52
Even if one insists on the missing line that would link Helena’s 
virginity and the court to which Bertram is travelling, it is difficult 
to deny that Helena is imagining being the things she envisions 
Bertram will find at court, or at least links herself somehow with 
them. What I find particularly productive here is the way in 
which, read like this, the speech produces what Fernie calls an 
‘amoral, Donysian delight’, one which suggests a self-fulfilment 
to the point of the obliteration of self and a love in excess of social 
convention. Such a conceptualization of Helena’s excessive love 
permits both the seeming selfishness of Helena’s demand that 
Bertram become her husband whatever he thinks of her – and the 
seeming self-sacrifice of the quest she undertakes.
Of course, there is no uncontainable, self-undoing love in 
Bertram for Helena. In promising to love her ‘ever ever dearly’ 
(5.3.315) once he fully understands what she has done to win him, 
it seems that he is learning love, as opposed to desire for social 
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status or lust for the physically attractive. But his conversion is 
sudden and he never describes the nature of how that might ‘feel’ 
to him, as Helena repeatedly does. Over the course of All’s Well, 
Bertram must learn to be less like Parolles, to settle down and 
marry a virtuous maid. While he learns that love is more than 
‘just’ lust or a means to social betterment, his love is contained 
by social convention where Helena’s reads repeatedly as in excess 
of it. The pleasure to be taken by the audience in the figure of 
Helena is that she is in love with a ‘cad’ (see p. 122); this love is 
comically excessive and illogical, involves visually driven lust as 
well as a sometimes selfless love (indeed, to separate these is to 
figure them falsely). It both empowers Helena to describe herself 
and to behave with an agency in excess of that which would 
have been permitted to any of her potential female audience 
members when the play was first produced – and it undoes her, 
to use her term, entirely. Love in All’s Well – and in Antony and 
Cleopatra, as we will see – is paradoxically both self-undoing and 
self-intensifying.
The reviews of the Globe’s All’s Well quoted above suggest 
that in order for this play to be satisfying to its audiences, the 
union of the central figures must be a companionate marriage of 
individuals who understand – and have fallen in love with – each 
other’s positive personal qualities. I argue that it is only a modern 
audience who leaves the theatre wondering how Helena will get 
along in marriage with a snobbish lecher who has both rejected 
her and dismissed the other woman he has declared love for as a 
‘common gamester to the camp’ (5.3.188). I am not suggesting 
that an early modern audience would not have sympathized 
with Helena as Bertram disparages her social status and physical 
attractions, or that it would not have condemned his treatment of 
Diana. But the early modern Bertram is an embodiment of the 
excesses of youth, his energies are directed, quite conventionally, 
towards fighting, novelty and lust, so I suggest that his sudden 
shift to maturity and an appreciation of Helena’s virtues at the 
end of the play would not have been too sudden to palates in 
1603. The revelations of the last scene literally change Bertram, 
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even when he has just dismissed Diana as a whore because he 
considers her beneath him. His change may be implausible for an 
audience who believes in fixed personality but quite reasonable 
for a culture for whom selfhood is always a struggle between 
reason and the passions. Suggesting that Bertram really loves 
Helena all along, as the Globe’s 2011 production did, serves to 
underplay the passionate irrationality of Helena’s love which is 
essential to the play’s theatrical pleasure.
Helena’s love represents a different kind of excess from that of 
Bertram’s youthful ‘blood’: an excessive love that can only thrive 
fictionally, theatrically. While Bertram’s journey to the French 
court and then into battle may plausibly have happened to a 
wealthy young man in early modern Europe, a real young woman 
would have been hopelessly vulnerable and compromised had she 
undertaken the risky journey Helena does. In order to undertake 
it in the play, she must be protected by an idealized virtue that 
an off-stage counterpart would have been unable to safeguard. 
Moreover, and more importantly for my argument here, Helena 
is in fact a more excessively passionate figure than Bertram and 
her passion must be contained throughout the play by repeated 
assurances that she is virtuous (All’s Well contains the most 
frequent combined use of the words ‘virtue’ and ‘virtuous’ of the 
Shakespearean canon, with Measure for Measure coming a close 
second). Her passion is a source of comic, theatrical pleasure 
for the audience and though it is presented in one sense as the 
moral opposite of Bertram’s lust for Diana, it is just as irrational 
and excessive. For David Scott Kastan (see p. 117), Helena’s 
love is too selfish to be pleasurable and her contrivance of a 
happy ending suggests that Shakespeare’s ‘problem play’ is thus 
problematizing comedy’s happy endings generally. But I want to 
turn now to a production – or adaptation – of All’s Well, which 
de-problematizes the play and permits a celebration of Helena’s 
excessive love.
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SUNIL SHANBAG/ARPANA THEATRE’S ALL’S WELL THAT 
ENDS WELL
Arpana Theatre’s All’s Well is an adaptation in Gujarati, Maro 
Piyu Gayo Rangoon, produced in 2012 for the theatre’s ‘Globe to 
Globe’ season of Shakespeare’s plays in 37 languages. It prompted 
the disconcerted final comment by reviewer Andrew Dickson that 
‘In this most problematic of comedies, you’re left wondering: 
what’s the problem?’53 A number of commentators have written 
about the questions around theatre and interculturalism provoked 
by this festival, and the ways in which a range of the productions 
negotiated the cultural imperialist histories of Shakespeare in 
their countries through their versions of Shakespeare.54 Arpana’s 
production, set in India circa 1900, was particularly interesting in 
this regard. When Bharatram (Bertram) falls for Alkini (Diana) 
in this version, she is in a precarious economic position as part of 
an opium-trading family because the British have just banned her 
business, making her easy prey to a young man who offers to buy 
up her surplus stock in exchange for her chastity. Peter Kirwan 
comments that the bedtrick plot ‘was figured as two women’s 
near-desperate attempts to assert self-determination under the 
oppressive conditions of class hierarchy and imperial rule’.55 
However, he also argues that this political history was ultimately 
‘an undertone to what was, fundamentally, a joyful comedy’ and 
the production is an important case study for this chapter, because 
its celebratory tone convincingly counters the history of critical 
problematization of this play, a problematization so universal and 
determined that a critic who denies the ‘darkness’ and difficulty 
of All’s Well opens herself up to the accusation of misreading – at 
least by theatre critics, as we have seen.
 Using the nineteenth-century popular theatrical form of 
Bhangwadi, this production was revelatory in its ability to tell 
this story in such a way as to render almost meaningless the 
anxieties around consistency of genre and subjectivity that have 
labelled All’s Well a ‘problem play’. It is not that this production 
transformed its source text into something comically comfortable 
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or painless, though Bhangwadi is described in the Globe to 
Globe publicity as a popular, perhaps escapist form that mixed 
music, dance and acting and ‘originally catered for an audience of 
daily wage labourers in the 19th century’.56 But the play’s setting 
made sense of Bharatram (Chirag Vora)’s desire to leave his home 
and family and grow up. The social conventions governing the 
behaviour of the young male in this society meant that Bharatram 
did not question its class boundaries and more obvious rewards, 
and failed to see what might make him more lastingly happy. 
Bharatram was just as snobbish as any recent British Bertram, 
just as dismissive of Heli/Helena (Mansi Parekh) when he 
expressed his dismay at being married off to her. But he was a 
plausible product of his national and historical culture, and the 
actor’s portrayal of his excitement and enthusiasm at leaving 
the conventions of home and childhood for what seemed to him 
like adult freedoms in Mumbai made him a more sympathetic 
Bertram than others I have seen; there was no need here to make 
him secretly in love with Helena from the start in order for him 
to be a flawed but not entirely dislikeable figure.
In this version of the play, Bharatram puts himself not into the 
service of a king but of his uncle Gokuldas (Utkarsh Mazumdar), 
a rich merchant. He is excited to go to and try for a fortune in 
Mumbai – then with Parolles’ (here Parbat, played by Satchit 
Puranik) encouragement, escapes from his marriage to Heli to 
Rangoon, rather than to any neighbouring wars. Audience members 
of British origin may have assumed that his distaste for Helena/Heli 
is entirely caste-based – but Vora also gave the strong impression 
that Heli is part of a youth Bharatram wants to leave behind in a 
search for excitement, independence and the opportunity to cash 
in on the burgeoning wealth of the early twentieth-century city. He 
patronizes her as he might a little sister, telling her excitedly of the 
trip he is to make; his ignorance of her love, pitifully obvious to the 
audience, is comical but plausible.
Andrew Dickson’s generally positive review of this All’s Well 
in the Guardian called the performances ‘broad brush’ (see 
p. 137), suggesting that his expectations of subtlety in the acting 
 ‘Give me excess of it’  135
of this ‘problem play’ were not quite met. But in the source text, 
there is nothing subtle about Helena’s love for Bertram as she 
describes it in soliloquy. It is powerful, overwhelming, irrational 
and manifests itself gloriously in the facial expressions of Mansi 
Parekh’s Heli, who is ever-ready to share her passion with the 
audience in speech and song. She is an intensely sympathetic 
figure because she is in love, and in a culture whose elders arrange 
marriages for its youth, the fact that the patriarch she has cured 
arranged her a marriage to the man she loves was as delightful to 
her as Bharatram’s refusal of her was short-sighted and immature, 
despite the fact that the suddenness of the announcement made 
his dismay understandable. The Globe audience’s audible delight 
at Heli’s entrance in traditional Hindu wedding gear seemed a 
conventional response to a bride’s entrance, enabled by the fact 
that at this point in the play we were clearly being asked to love 
Heli and were positioned as keen for her to obtain her heart’s 
desire.
In an interview with Andrew Dickson before the Globe perfor-
mances, director Sunil Shanbag says of potential responses to 
Bharatram:
I’m generalising, but the Gujarati audience is a fairly 
conservative one […] I think they’re going to feel that 
he is a victim, because he got pushed into this marriage. 
But hopefully they’ll respond to her strength also: she’s 
decided this is the man she loves, and she goes after it. 
Everything is going to be ambivalent.57
After the production’s run, Shanbag commented that a strong 
Heli was well received by audiences both at the Globe and for the 
production’s run in Mumbai and cities in Gujarat. Shanbag noted 
that the response to the wedding scene in India was similar to 
that at the Globe – ‘the same response at every show’, an ‘audible 
gasp when she emerges in her bridal finery…partly because it is a 
beautiful dress changed into in quick time’ but also, he suggested, 
because audiences ‘feel Heli is being justly rewarded’ with a 
magnificent wedding to the man she loves. The director goes on to 
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explain the positive reception of Heli in terms of women audience 
members enjoying a woman’s resourcefulness: ‘it is the woman in 
an average Gujarati home who chooses which play the family will 
see, so Gujarati theatre friends who saw our previews said that 
our strong Heli would in fact work well for us’; but also in terms 
of more recognizably traditional expectations around gender and 
marriage:
I think the perception is that Bharatram is responsible 
for his own situation by being blind to what seem obvious 
advantages in a relationship with Heli. Kunti, his mother, 
is worried Bharatram will marry either an ‘educated city 
girl’ or an English ‘memsahib’, and she extols the virtues 
of a traditional Indian wife. This is familiar to Gujaratis 
who have a tradition of migration – indeed the Gujarati 
audience at the Globe probably found this very close to 
their own experience!58
So Heli is both extolled by Kunti as a traditional Indian wife and 
leaves the safety of her home to find her husband and win him 
with a bed trick. The cultural context maps beautifully on to 
the source text’s emphasis upon Helena’s feminine virtue which 
frames the daring and exposing nature of the quest for Bertram.
Bhangwadi is a theatre form dependent upon interaction with 
the audience and this production clearly drew on this in creating 
a Helena/Heli on to whom an audience could project their own 
versions of romance. Her style of performance may recall, for 
European theatre-goers, the Lecoq or Gaulier-trained physical 
theatre performer who, in the mode of the clown, shares his or her 
figure’s most delightfully painful emotions with the audience and 
renders him/herself empathetically vulnerable in their presence. 
Embarrassment played ‘out’ in this way is hilarious, ridiculous 
and also highly sympathetic; it is, I would argue, at the heart of 
Helena’s first soliloquy when she admits to the audience that, 
hopeless though it is, she loves Bertram. The tearful exasperation 
of Heli, as Bharatram gleefully tells her of his forthcoming 
journey to Mumbai, is revealed to the audience even as Bharatram 
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is blind to it and the conspiracy of emotion into which we are 
invited to enter with her is seductive.
Heli also sings her love, as is conventional in the Bhangwhadi 
musical theatre form, another empathy-producing convention for 
the lover figure. The songs and Mansi Parekh’s highly engaging, 
emotive acting, albeit ‘broad brush’ by standards of theatrical 
realism, worked to produce empathetic reaction in the audience, 
in a way that may have recalled for its English-speaking audiences 
the production of affect in Western musical theatre. Although 
scenographically, linguistically and economically, this All’s Well – 
performed on the open stage at the Globe, using close translation 
of Shakespeare’s language – could not have been more different 
from a West End or Broadway ‘show’, a comparison is productive 
with what Millie Taylor calls the ‘voluptuous excess and self 
awareness’ of the musical, which, argues Taylor, ‘allows audiences 
to access the transcendental pleasures of emotional attachment, 
intelligent interpretation [and] nostalgic recreation’.59 Journalist, 
playwright, director and performer Sohailia Kapur writes of 
the essential difference between the Western musical ‘where 
there is a distinction between spoken dialogue and song’ and 
the tradition of musical theatre that has developed from Indian 
folk theatre, ‘where there is no difference between songs and 
dialogues’. Fascinatingly, she cites Shanbag’s work in musical 
theatre as bringing together rural and urban traditions, ‘in a 
uniquely urban-Indian idiom, distinct from both the western 
musical as well as Indian folk styles’. Despite arguing for the 
independence of work like Shanbag’s from either tradition, Kapur 
cites Swanand Kirkire, where he asserts that ‘Musicals are pure 
entertainment and have the power of bringing common people to 
the theatre’, suggesting a commonality between the forms. ‘But 
one has to do something meaningful’, continues Shanbag, and, 
writes Kapur, he ‘continues adapting and writing new musicals 
in his unique urban-rural genre’.60 Shanbag’s All’s Well offers 
emotional attachment (particularly to Heli), intelligent inter-
pretation (of All’s Well) and ‘nostalgic recreation’ (of the young, 
rural woman in love, the perfect wife for Bharatram as far as his 
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mother is concerned) and permits this ‘problem play’ its elements 
of ‘pure entertainment’ while still offering the audiences the 
pleasures of interpretation and interrogation of gender and social 
class. The pain, then, of Bharatram’s rejection of Heli when it is 
announced that he is to marry her is produced in the audience by 
the fact that once she has ‘won’ him, she believes the play already 
to have reached its conventional happy ending, its musical theatre 
closure. In this version, she is not on-stage when Bharatram 
expresses his distaste for the match, so when she enters in her 
wedding dress she is all glowing expectation, while the audience 
knows the rejection that is to come. What Heli has done by the 
end of the play is convinced Bharatram of her intelligence and 
resourcefulness – and she produces a satisfying closure that the 
audience have already had held out to them in the wedding scene.
What this production marks are the play’s questions of gender, 
virtue and love’s excesses, rather than anachronistic psychological 
problems around the plausibility of Helena’s love for a man who 
initially insults her. Although Heli’s love is only marginally in 
excess of her class/caste,61 her actions are most certainly in excess 
of her cultural position as a young woman. Her love is comically, 
though poignantly, passionate. This version of All’s Well is a 
complex yet thoroughly comic version that both relies on an 
audience recognizing certain cultural conventions unquestion-
ingly – such as the notion that marriage is always positive for a 
play’s heroine. The mix of genre and narrative convention that 
has been the play’s ‘problem’ in its critical history is rendered 
unproblematic by the Bhangwadi form, which is in excess of the 
play’s political realism – its setting under British colonial rule 
and the opium trade. In the source text, Bertram is a ‘realistic’ 
gendered archetype; Helena’s daring in taking off on her travels 
is less anchored in social reality – she is a figure from a folk-tale 
rather than a recognizable type from early modern English – or 
early nineteenth-century Indian – social life.62 This production 
makes it clear that in coming together with Heli, Bharatram too 
can step out of the social constructs that make him, and marry 
outside of his class/caste. Although Kunti can rest safe in the 
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knowledge that he has married a ‘traditional’ Indian wife rather 
than a city girl or an English woman, Heli is a figure who publicly 
sings the excesses of her love, cures kings and demands a young 
man in marriage because she is in love with him.
I have suggested in the opening to this chapter that the excesses 
of love – and not only of lust – are a problem for early modern 
culture and theatre. Coeffeteau and Ferrand figure love as a 
disruptive disease like the other passions (see p. 115); Helena’s 
love for Bertram in All’s Well has to be repeatedly hedged about 
with reassurances of her virtue. However, All’s Well that Ends 
Well demonstrates that in the theatre, love’s excess can figure 
as the primary source of the audience’s theatrical pleasure and 
exceed gendered conventions of virtue. In Arpana’s production, 
the swiftness of Bharatram’s ‘conversion’ to loving Heli matters 
little; in fact, his downcast appearance when her supposed death 
is announced suggests that he is beginning to miss and to value 
the home he had been trying to escape. What appears to engage 
the audience is the fact that Heli’s overwhelming passion for him, 
sung, danced and spoken, the source of our theatrical pleasure, 
wins him in the end.
ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA
All’s Well’s Helena is a woman of modest means and excessive 
passion. She is resourceful in her quest for Bertram’s love. 
Cleopatra, as she appears in Plutarch and Shakespeare, is a 
figure of sexual and material excess: she is the serial lover of 
the leaders of the known world, the riches rolled out to Caesar 
from a carpet.63 She legendarily seduces Antony using her almost 
infinite resources; unlike Helena, she is a figure whose material 
means match her passions. A number of notorious film depictions 
of Cleopatra have endeavoured to match Plutarch/Enobarbus’ 
description of the Egyptian queen on the Cydnus:64 they are 
‘spectaculars’, whose budgets recall the glorious excesses of the 
barge.65 The history of Cleopatra in modern performance is one of 
awe and disapproval at both material and emotional excess. ‘The 
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‘Cleopatra look’, writes Suzanne Osmond, ‘embraces the kitsch 
spectacle of excessive opulence associated with the stereotypical 
Orientalist image of Ancient Egypt’.66 Here is an extract from 
Laurie N. Ede’s account of the making of Caesar and Cleopatra, 
the 1946 film of George Bernard Shaw’s play. I am interested in 
the binary of prodigious excess and reasonableness that plays out 
in the first two sentences:
Caesar and Cleopatra was produced by the famously 
prodigious Gabriel Pascal. […] Pascal promised to bring 
in the star-filled Caesar and Cleopatra for a reasonable 
£430,000 on a 16-week schedule. The film ultimately 
cost £1.3 m, took 15 months to film and still ranks as 
one of the most costly failures of British film industry. 
Some of the problems weren’t Pascal’s fault; he faced 
constant delays wrought by air-raids, shortages of men 
and materials and the availability of the stars Claude 
Rains and Vivien Leigh. But Caesar and Cleopatra was 
undoubtedly a profligate film.67
Ede goes on to describe the ‘prodigious’ producer’s ‘multi-
talentitis’: how he packed the production company with star 
practitioners who had no sense of a contained role in the 
film-making process, leading to massively inflated fees and the 
excessive proliferation of design sketches for the film. Shaw’s 
narrative depicts a sexually innocent, pre-Cydnus Cleopatra, who 
remembers Antony as ‘A beautiful young man, with strong round 
arms [who] came over the desert’ and restored her father to power 
when she was 12.68 For Ede, this was nevertheless a Cleopatra’s 
barge of a film (only of course the Plutarch/Shakespeare barge 
was a fabulous success rather than a costly failure).
The Victoria and Albert Museum’s account of Oliver Messel’s 
design work on Caesar and Cleopatra offers a completely different 
narrative of this film’s production: it describes an artistic process 
steeped in the ‘make do and mend ethos of wartime Britain’. Due 
to rationing and the unavailability of materials,
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Many of the props required [for Caesar and Cleopatra] 
had to be created using what was freely available. 
Authentic-looking antique Egyptian jewelry was created 
from thin wire, plastic, cellophane and bits of glass. Gold 
plates and ornaments were made from a combination of 
gilded leather and papier-mâché. Many of the costumes 
were contrived from Indian saris, obtained from some 
of the large department stores in London which where 
still functioning. Costume-making workshops were also 
badly understaffed due to the essential dressmaking 
workforce having left London due to bombing or on war 
service.69
These different accounts of the making of a Cleopatra film – 
cautionary tale of film industry extravagance in Ede’s account, 
story of resourceful theatricality in the V and A’s – are my way in 
to an exploration of the moral ambivalence that besets that most 
excessive of figures, Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, in production. 
I particularly enjoy the contrast between these two accounts, 
because it recalls both Cleopatra’s excessiveness and her resource-
fulness, a binary that pertains to Helena too. Cleopatra fascinates 
(yet again) not only because of the ways in which she uses her 
fabulous wealth but because she is both an embodiment of 
passion’s excess, fainting and sighing for love of Antony, and 
the consummate performer of her love, absolutely in control, 
completely resourceful.
Recent receptions of Cleopatra’s theatrical passion have been 
inflected, I argue here, by cultural attitudes to her excesses of 
consumption. Displays of feeling and displays of wealth are 
conflated and judged together. Today, Enobarbus’ description 
of Cleopatra’s barge (the barge itself does not, of course, feature 
physically on the Shakespearean stage) almost inevitably recalls 
the Hollywood versions – or even the Las Vegas construction: the 
floating lounge bar Cleopatra’s Barge is situated in the Caesar’s 
Palace hotel and casino. Unsurprisingly perhaps, a number of 
late twentieth-/early twenty-first-century productions have 
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endeavoured to interrogate the notion of a perpetually self-
displaying Cleopatra, and simultaneously to reassure audiences 
that the theatre is far from a reiteration of her – and Hollywood’s 
– conspicuous consumption. I want to suggest that the theatri-
cality of Cleopatra’s passion for Antony is potentially central to 
the pleasure produced by the play but that recent production has 
demonstrated a Roman tendency to balk at its excess. Central to 
my argument is a production that seems to deny that, for much 
of the play, Cleopatra is necessarily in love with Antony at all (see 
pp. 147–8). This is Janet Suzman’s production for Chichester 
Festival Theatre,70 which was driven by Suzman’s consciousness 
of reading from a woman’s perspective. The director’s programme 
note to the production argues that Cleopatra’s relationship with 
Antony may be largely politically expedient, until she realizes 
his worth upon his death (see p. 148). I cite the production as an 
example of a modern anxiety around the play’s multiple misogynies 
– particularly the shifting but ultimately transhistorical desire for 
and distrust of women on display – and of excessive display and the 
spectacular more generally. This anxiety ironically reiterates some 
of the constructions of women it seeks to resist. In explaining away 
Cleopatra’s emotional excess and positing her as a figure entirely in 
control of her passions, Kim Cattrall’s performance of Cleopatra 
reinscribes the figure in a familiar reality of inevitably manipulative 
women in difficult man-made circumstances and, I argue, denies 
the play its pleasurable and interrogatory excesses.
Antony and Cleopatra places love in precisely the contradictory 
position in which it, and the passions more generally, appear in 
early modern philosophical treatises: though they cause violence, 
sickness and distress, life would be bland and humans ‘brutish’ 
without them (see Southwell, p. 169). Act 1 scene 5 begins with 
Cleopatra’s call for mandragora ‘That I might sleep out this 
great gap of time/My Antony is away’ (1.5.5–6). Here a life 
without the ‘fierce affections’ she has for Antony is not even 
worth staying conscious for and the notion of a life without affec-
tions is considered explicitly in her conversation with Mardian 
the eunuch. He, as he explains, does in fact have them: it is he 
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who uses the term ‘fierce affections’ (1.5.18) and thinks about 
‘what Venus did with Mars’ (19), though he cannot put his 
thoughts into practice. Cleopatra assumes that he is currently 
better off than her, as his ‘freer thoughts’ are ‘unseminar’d’ 
and therefore ‘May not fly forth of Egypt’ (1.5.12–13); thus he 
will presumably not be in a sick state of longing for someone 
who is elsewhere, as she is. Here is a connection between the 
psychological and the somatic alien to modern concepts of the 
body: that thoughts may be said to have semen. Of course, take 
this literally and Cleopatra’s thoughts must be ‘unseminar’d’ 
too, as she is female. It is significant that in the same moment 
that Cleopatra languishes for love, love is figured as male in 
its liveliness, movement and boundlessness. It is both a poison 
which she feeds herself and seems to grow more languorous 
while contemplating – yet the object of her love, Antony himself, 
when a messenger arrives from him, is a ‘medicine’ who guilds 
the messenger with his ‘tinct’ (1.5.38–9). Desire – love unful-
filled – is a sickness, which a communication from the loved one 
cures. Thoughts of love are both productive of extreme languor 
and figured as lively, life-giving semen. In the scene that follows, 
as Pompey discusses the state of the wars with the pirate Menas, 
fulfilled desire is described as just as inductive of languor as 
longing for the absent lover: Menas imagines Antony ‘tie[d] up’ 
with lust for Cleopatra in a ‘field of feasts’ (2.1.23) in which the 
food is both ‘cloyless’ (25) – never sickening – and yet brings on a 
‘Lethe’d dulness’ (27). Antony is ‘ne’er lust-wearied’ but it is lust 
that Pompey hopes will weary Antony and slacken his desire to 
fight. In 1.5, Cleopatra both wants to sleep through her longing 
and indulge it; she thinks the eunuch is better off without the 
capacity for freer thought to fly off to a lover, yet by the end of 
the scene she is speaking of the salad days in which she loved 
Caesar as ‘green in judgement, cold in blood’ (1.5.77): before she 
met Antony she was neither mature in judgment nor sexuality. 
This pressures fascinatingly the early modern commonplace that 
youth is hot-blooded but lacks reason; here, as Cleopatra gains 
maturity and judgement, she also gains heat.
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Among all these contradictory figurings of liveliness and 
sleepiness, excitement and dullness, it is clear that love, like 
Coriolanus’ anger, is always potentially in excess of all control 
and use value. This emerges in 2.2, before the meeting between 
Caesar and Antony, where Lepidus urges Enobarbus to keep his 
master calm during the potentially tense encounter. ‘Tis not a 
time for private stomaching’, argues Lepidus, who clearly thinks 
that one’s passions should be put in the control of one’s wider 
interests and duties. The exchange continues:
enobarbus
  Every time
Serves for the matter that is then born in’t.
lepidus
But small to greater matters must give way.
enobarbus
Not if the small come first.
lepidus
  Your speech is passion:
But pray you, sir, stir no embers up.
(2.2.9–13)
For Lepidus, there are ‘small’ and ‘greater’ matters, the small 
being the personal, the ‘greater’ being to do with power politics: 
there is a time for passion and this is not it. Enobarbus seems to 
have a better idea than his interlocutor what kind of play this is.
PERSONAL AUTHENTICITY AND MATERIAL PLAINNESS
During the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, Antony 
and Cleopatra in British production became plainer. Partly, no 
doubt, to avoid orientalist cliché, fewer attempts were made to 
produce spectacular displays of Egyptian opulence, and differences 
between Rome and Egypt were increasingly made with simple 
choices of lighting, costume and large props. Even where the play 
has continued to be a vehicle for high/costly British production 
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values – in the main houses at the RSC or at the National Theatre 
– these scenographic depictions have consciously historicized 
the work of theatrical reconstruction that must be done (and was 
done by Shakespeare) to produce this play, rather than offering 
the audience an unproblematically seductive and gorgeous ‘East’. 
Alison Chitty’s set for the National’s 1987 production starring 
Judi Dench and Anthony Hopkins71 was, for one reviewer, ‘[A] 
cunning all-purpose design of brick-red walls’ which served to 
‘bind the two worlds of this rich epic together’.72 Here it is the 
‘epic’ that is rich, while the set is cunningly resourceful. It was a 
design that offered broken walls and single columns, synecdochic 
fragments of an ancient world; costumes recalled the Jacobean 
clothing of the play’s origins as well as golden glints of a ‘rich’ 
ancient world. Reviewer Steve Grant had presumably become 
used to the notion that the Egyptian scenes of the play need not 
be depicted with overly sumptuous pseudo-Eastern exoticism, 
since five years earlier he had written of Adrian Noble’s studio 
production at the RSC’s Other Place:73 ‘I didn’t find the play 
too confined in its present, rather bare, two tiered setting, while 
throughout Noble’s fairly hectically-paced production there are 
enough atmospheric hints at world power in the making to cover 
up for lack of scenic changes.’74 And in 1978, Peter Brook and Sally 
Jacobs’ continuous staging of the play, which centred on simple 
screens, large stools and cushions, and plain and striped North 
African-inflected costumes,75 is described by Richard Proudfoot 
as ‘a healthy reaction against surviving mid-Victorian assump-
tions about staging and costuming Shakespeare’.76 Proudfoot may 
be referring to the antiquarian re-creations of the Victorian stage, 
multiple scene changes or the additions of music and spectacular 
ballets: the rejection of any or all of these clearly signals for 
Proudfoot something both ‘modern’ and closer to Shakespeare 
in late twentieth-century theatre.77 The signs of plain resource-
fulness – present even in big-budget, big-design productions 
such as the National’s of 1987 – continue into the twenty-first 
century as we will see, and map on to a need for Cleopatra to be 
more than a set of displays and seductive manipulations.
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Not long into the opening scene of the RSC’s 2006 production 
of Antony and Cleopatra, once the Roman messengers whom 
Antony dismisses too lightly have left, Harriet Walter as Cleopatra 
pulls off her iconic bobbed wig (‘The spuriously inaccurate visual 
‘code’ of jet black bobbed hair’ as Suzanne Osmond describes 
it78) with something of a sigh of relief. She reveals her own hair 
in an untidy, boyish crop. It is an amusing moment, in which 
the Egyptian queen suggests that she is weary of all the iconic 
self-display involved in being Cleopatra: at this point in her life, 
‘wrinkled deep in time’ (1.5.30), she would rather take a rest from 
her notorious identity79 and just be herself. The moment recalls 
the masquerading strategies discussed by Osmond in her essay on 
representations of Cleopatra, the strategies of sex and power used 
by the ‘femme fatale’, whose ‘shape shifting and putting on and 
taking off of costumes disguises and therefore infers a deception, 
a disguising of some true identity’.80 This Cleopatra takes off 
her disguise to reveal ‘herself ’ – and this warm, sympathetic 
but anachronistic move both reflects current popular notions of 
authenticity and selfhood beneath social construction and works 
against Shakespeare’s construction of Cleopatra as a performer 
and producer of excessive pleasure. Just as men never tire of 
Cleopatra (2.2.246–8), being Cleopatra, in all her notorious 
excess, is something of which, I would argue, Cleopatra never 
tires herself. What the RSC moment suggests, via the synec-
dochic wig, is that Cleopatra’s self-presentation is in excess of a 
more authentic self, a less dressed-up, less publicly recognizable 
one. Thus the figures Antony and Cleopatra display on the world 
stage are different from the selves the pair are permitted to be 
domestically – despite the fact that what they do when they are 
alone, according to Cleopatra, is continue to dress up (2.5.18–23). 
Production can fail to realize the playful theatricality and powerful 
self-objectification of Cleopatra because of a need to redeem the 
play and the figure from a history of conspicuous consumption, 
misogyny and essentially racist exoticization – a need to purge the 
play, its displays and its relationships of its perceived excesses.
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THE UNREADABLE DISPLAYS OF CLEOPATRA: 
CHICHESTER 2012
Chemistry
I am generally somewhat suspicious of reviewers who complain 
of there being no ‘chemistry’ between lovers in stage plays. 
My experience of productions which are thus put down has 
often been that there has been something else to engage with 
– that ‘chemistry’ has not been the point of the production, or 
at least not the most interesting one – and I suspect that what 
reviewers often mean is that their own chemicals have not been 
stirred by the performers in question. However, when Lyn 
Gardner wrote of Kim Cattrall and Michael Pennington in the 
Chichester production of Janet Suzman’s Antony and Cleopatra81 
that ‘Despite some manufactured playfulness between the lovers 
at the beginning, there is an absence of chemistry between them, 
no sense that sex genuinely threatens the cold-hearted ambitions 
of Octavius Caesar […] and Rome’,82 she made an important 
point. There is a politics of passion in this play around which 
Suzman decided not to centre her production. Love and sex in 
Antony and Cleopatra do threaten Roman ideology and ambition 
but here they seemed absent.
As a number of reviewers remarked of both this production 
and its first incarnation at the Liverpool Playhouse in 201083 
(with Cattrall as Cleopatra but Jeffery Kissoon as Antony), it was 
clearly a deliberate decision to suggest that Cleopatra’s choice of 
Antony may have been a purely politically expedient one – and 
not only in their first encounter at Tarsus, where the barge display 
is written as a seduction by Plutarch and Shakespeare, planned 
by Cleopatra before the couple have met. ‘Does Cleopatra love 
Antony or does she love the fact that he is one of the three most 
powerful men in the Roman empire?’ asks Claire Brennan of the 
Liverpool production.84 For Paul Taylor, watching at Chichester, 
‘The production is keen to convey an intelligent heroine, who 
never really loses sight of her own political agenda through 
passion. She has enough nous to wince at the errors perpetrated 
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by her bungling lover.’85 The reviewers have clearly understood 
the questions that Suzman wanted to pose to her audience. In an 
interview before the Liverpool production she argued that she has 
found within the play a
far more interesting drama than the old love-story 
warhorse. I’m more fascinated by Cleopatra as a political 
animal trying to survive in a savage world than in a tragic 
love affair. Is she in thrall to Antony? I find that not to 
be so.86
In her programme note to her 2012 production at Chichester 
Festival Theatre, Suzman writes:
The play seemed to me to be enigmatic – magnificent but 
enigmatic; just how much does she love him? That he was 
thoroughly enthralled by Egypt’s queen is expressed in 
detail and in depth in the play, and [he] fatally misjudges 
his tumultuous world because of it. Her passion for him 
is more veiled and often hyperbolic, after all she has a 
country and heirs to consider, but crystallizes thrillingly 
into very great and true poetry the moment he expires. 
How painfully true to life; so often we only realize what 
we have lost when it’s gone. She marries him with a full 
heart at the end: ‘Husband I come!’ she cries and is soon 
to join him where the ghosts gaze.87
In thrall and enthralled. The common usages are each slightly 
different but Suzman suggests in her use of both terms that to 
be in love is to be passion’s slave in a way that disempowers and 
belittles. She clearly does not want the answer to the question 
‘just how much does she love him?’ to be particularly hyperbolic. 
Antony is ‘enthralled’ but Cleopatra is not ‘in thrall’. Throughout 
the production, then, Cleopatra’s political pragmatism was very 
much in evidence. In 1.3, her sickness and fainting were comically 
manipulative and very clearly used to get Antony to stay – until it 
is clear that there was nothing she could do to prevent his going 
and she dropped into the less emotive sincerity of ‘you and I must 
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part’ (1.3.99). But this Cleopatra was clearly no clichéd archetype 
of femininity whose only intelligence lies in her ability to manip-
ulate sexually. Suzman cites Adrian Goldsworthy’s Antony and 
Cleopatra and Stacy Schiff ’s Cleopatra, A Life as a source for her 
reading of the character – and thereby conflates Shakespeare’s 
version with a historical figure in need of feminist recuperation. 
Goldsworthy’s account of Antony and Cleopatra’s first meeting 
centres on political pragmatism: ‘She needed to win over the 
man who could confirm or depose her, so it is reasonable to 
believe that she deliberately set out to seduce him and that from 
early on he wanted her as a lover.’88 Schiff ’s project is to rewrite 
Cleopatra’s history for a popular readership, reclaiming ‘That 
Egyptian Woman’s’ story from sexist propaganda that began with 
the Romans. Like the Romans, writes Schiff,
We remember her […] for the wrong reasons. [In fact 
she was a] capable, clear-eyed sovereign, she knew how to 
build a fleet, suppress an insurrection, control a currency, 
alleviate a famine. […] She nonetheless survives as a 
wanton temptress, not the last time a genuinely powerful 
woman has been transmuted into a shamelessly seductive 
one.89
To emphasize this point that Cleopatra ‘has a country […] to 
consider’, Cattrall was to be found at a table signing official 
documents handed to her by all-purpose official Alexas and 
wearing heavy reading glasses, a comic contrast to the floating 
white Egyptian/Eastern signifiers of the rest of her costume. 
After Antony’s first defeat of the play, at Actium, Cattrall’s 
Cleopatra wept her devastation at the outcome of the misjudged 
sea battle. But her delivery of the question to Enobarbus – ‘Is 
Antony or we in fault for this?’ (3.13.2) – was spoken in a tone 
of practical curiosity: she seemed to be wondering what to do 
next if it emerged that she had involved herself with a leader of 
poor judgement. After Antony’s second defeat in this production, 
it seemed more likely than not that Cleopatra had, as Antony 
suspects, instructed her forces to abandon Antony for Caesar 
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when the battle seemed to be going the latter’s way. She agreed 
readily to Thidias/Caesar’s suggestion that she had been forced 
to be Antony’s lover and a blank contempt descended upon her 
at Antony’s treatment of the messenger. Her next reconciliation 
with him, particularly the announcement that it is her birthday, 
was brought about by a cartoon-like performance of ‘feminine 
wiles’. At the mention of the birthday, Antony offered a comic 
‘oops’ to the audience, like a man from a sitcom who has forgotten 
the wife’s anniversary; this provoked a laugh – rather at Antony 
than with him, I sensed. Pennington’s Antony was an old, highly 
manipulable man who loses his temper easily but can be lulled 
back to compliance by a seductive word or gesture from his much 
younger lover. Cattrall signalled clearly what Suzman suggests in 
her programme note – that Antony is ‘a necessary male consort’ 
for Cleopatra, ‘sixteen years her senior, whom she sets out to 
seduce as she struggled to strengthen her hold on the throne’.
Suzman was pleased to find in Goldsworthy and Schiff ’s work 
on the ‘real’ Cleopatra ‘that the fabled love affair was so much 
more subject to the savage exigencies of the time than the received 
impression of an equal balance of the passions, which still casts a 
filmic glow over the peerless pair’. Suzman also remarks that, as a 
woman director, she is ‘inevitably less interested in the sex-bomb 
iconography for Cleopatra’. Her reading of the figure as one fully 
aware of the power of display – the opening of the production 
has her rising through a trapdoor in her white robe and gold 
jewelry, lifting her arms ceremoniously above her head – and for 
whom almost every action is a matter of political expediency, also 
chimes with L.T. Fitz’s critique of ‘Sexist Attitudes in Antony 
and Cleopatra Criticism’, written in 1977, a few years after 
Suzman herself played the role for the RSC90 and the production 
was recorded for television (1974).91 Fitz, too, emphasizes that 
Cleopatra is a political leader: ‘Being queen of Egypt gives 
Cleopatra the opportunity for splendour, to which she is not 
averse; but it is also (let it not be forgotten) her career.’92
Cattrall’s less than overt performance of lust in this production 
may also have been an attempt to confound any conflation here 
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of Shakespeare’s middle-aged ‘sex bomb’ and the one played 
by Cattrall in HBO’s Sex and the City. But a combination of a 
69-year-old Antony (according to most readily available biogra-
phies, this makes Pennington 13 years older than Cattrall but his 
performance made the gap appear larger), whom we may have 
been hard pressed to imagine either going into battle or having 
very much by way of gaudy nights with his more physically lively 
consort, and a clear foregrounding of Cleopatra’s political needs 
over the sexual in this production, resulted in the replacement 
of one old set of stereotypes with another. The ‘impression of an 
equal balance of the passions’ (which Suzman associates in her 
programme note with film versions of this love story) – the version 
of the play in which two infinitely powerful, equally irresponsible 
and roughly equally middle-aged figures give up control of the 
known world, then their own lives, because they cannot extricate 
political world from passionate life – is replaced by the story of 
a middle-aged leader who knows she is powerfully attractive to a 
now rather vulnerable and elderly one and uses him – plausibly 
and understandably given the male-dominated political systems 
within which she has to operate – to her own ends. ‘Catrall’s [sic] 
relationship with her women seems warmer than her relationship 
with her lover, with whom you feel she is more likely to share 
a cup of cocoa than a passionate kiss’93 suggests Gardner; for 
Paul Taylor, who also makes the Chemistry point, Pennington’s 
Antony ‘seems less like a faded romantic idol than an incipiently 
senile embarrassment’ and Taylor makes it clear not that he is 
sneering at the actor’s age but that it is ‘the interpretation and not 
this still-vigorous actor that is at fault here’.94
The problem here, for this audience member and the cited 
reviewers, with Suzman’s challenge to the assumption of an equal 
passion between Antony and Cleopatra is that once one has under-
stood that Antony is a vulnerable fool and Cleopatra a manipulative 
politician, it is difficult not to disengage from the pair entirely. The 
‘poetry’ of the play to which Suzman refers in the programme, 
which she seems to suggest permits ‘Love’ to ‘conquer all’ in the 
end, is not the poetry of verbal echo, the linguistic construction of 
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the ‘mutual pair’ (1.1.38) which a close reader like Ernest Schanzer 
found in the play.95 In this production, Pompey (Oliver Hoare), 
in his tearful account of the death of his father when he confronts 
Antony and Caesar in 2.6, and Caesar (Martin Hutson), in his 
distress at Antony’s betrayal of Octavia, performed more ‘love’ than 
Antony and Cleopatra; Ruth Everett’s Octavia falls to the floor in 
weeping distress when she finally accepts that Antony is not sitting 
faithfully at home in Athens and Caesar holds her desperately in 
his arms, calling her his ‘dear’st sister!’ (3.6.100) in such a way as to 
suggest love between family members is more genuine and altru-
istic than the self-serving, self-centred love of lovers. Suzman – and 
indeed Cattrall – clearly want to locate a powerful political agency in 
Cleopatra, rather than leave her once again with the limited sexual 
agency granted to the icon of female beauty and sexual manipula-
tiveness across thousands of years, beginning with Roman histories 
of Cleopatra and recycled in early modern figurings of inconstant 
woman. In deciding not to play it for love, the productions misses 
love’s subversive excesses, as Gardner’s review suggests.
Avoiding Misogyny
The history of Cleopatra is part of a historical narrative of 
feminine excess that these modern productions are keen to 
eschew. In early modern misogynistic discourse, woman equals 
excess and men are in turn exasperated by and prey to her 
somatic and sexual excesses: woman’s changeability, her lack 
of reasoning self-governance, her slavery to the passions and 
her excessive desire for self-display. The nature of woman in 
early modern writings is notoriously difficult to pin down – 
appropriately enough given her supposed wayward changeability. 
There is an inherent contradiction between the humoral and 
the social construction of the female. On the one hand, she is 
colder and damper than man, her temperament tending to the 
phlegmatic; on the other, she is supposedly dangerously lustful 
and remarkably quick to anger, which should indicate a hot – so 
choleric or sanguine – temperament: inherently unreasonable, 
woman does not have her passions under control. This was 
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clearly a problem for early modern physiology. Gail Kern Paster 
quotes royal physician Helkiah Crooke, where he concludes in 
his Microcosmographia ‘that…men are hotter than women…as 
well in regard of the Naturall Temper, as that which is acquired 
by diet and the course of life’ and concludes that herein lies 
the predominant understanding of female temperament and 
humorality in the early modern period as cold, spongy, less vital 
and less clearly individuated than male.96 But Crooke’s conclusion 
is to an argument that he clearly sees as unresolved for many, 
and which he elucidates over five huge folio pages,97 even where 
he has concluded it. The physicians and philosophers against 
which he argues have asserted that women are not only quicker to 
anger and more lascivious than men but, more positively, ‘all the 
Faculties, Vital, Natural and Animal are in women more perfect in 
men’ and so ‘who will deny but they are also hotter than men?’,98 
heat generating the vitality of all the faculties. Crooke goes on 
to demolish these arguments with a fury for which he finally 
feels the need to apologize, excusing himself in terms of the heat 
generated by manly scientific dispute. It is a fascinating discourse 
that demonstrates the biological construction of the female as the 
negative other to the male, which Paster has brilliantly analysed. 
The point I want to make here is that in deciding that women are 
phlegmatic types – slow, fearful, accepting of their fate – early 
modern humoral theory seems to invent the woman it would like 
to see, rather than the woman it fears – and then must reinvent 
her quickness to anger, wantonness and petulance in the light of 
her supposedly colder temperament.99 By 1641, characteristics 
that supposedly exist in women which may appear to be contra-
dictory but which are explained away humorally by Crooke are 
parodied by Royalist satirist Thomas Jordan as whore and saintly 
wife, the latter so stable in temperament as to seem comically 
naive.100 In Crooke’s biology, woman is the cold, faulty opposite 
of man. In Antony and Cleopatra she is his dangerously hot equal.
Thus, despite her supposedly steady, Octavia-like phlegmatism, 
the trope of woman as inconstant and faithless occurs repeatedly 
in a wide range of early modern dramas, treatises and ballads. That 
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they are inconstant is Swetnam’s first complaint against women 
in the epistle to the Araignment, where he laments his contact, 
as a traveller, with ‘the heinous evils of unconstant women’.101 
Intrinsic to the sin of inconstancy are the evils of changeable 
mood, excessive lust, love of ‘bravery’ or fine dress (which is of 
course used to tempt men) and excessive anger – which women, 
in an account such as Dekker’s The Bachelor’s Banquet ‘Pleasantly 
discoursing the variable humors of women, their quickness of 
wits, and unsearchable deceits’, turn upon their husbands when 
they don’t get the clothes they want.102 Cleopatra’s excessive, 
theatrical self-decoration, then, is both just like a woman – and 
also very much unlike the women who appear in early modern 
discourses seducing men into marriage then nagging them for 
clothes, or seducing men into sex and getting clothes for payment, 
if only for the simple reason that Cleopatra has all the riches of 
the East with which to provide for herself.
As Steven Mullaney points out, in early modern writing,
Misogyny presents an interpretive embarrassment of 
riches: it is everywhere, unabashed in its articulation and 
so overdetermined in its cultural roots that individual 
instances sometimes seem emotionally underdeter-
mined, rote and uninflected expressions of what would 
go without saying if it weren’t said so often.103
But the ubiquitous stereotype of the inconstant woman is also the 
emotional centre of this play and pushes at the bounds of misogy-
nistic thinking and at the simplicity of the stereotype. Inconstancy 
is central to the very plot structure of the play and is figured in 
Antony as well as Cleopatra, as he shifts from his declaration 
that ‘there’s beggary in love that can be reckon’d’ (1.1.15) to his 
reckoning that it would be politically expedient to marry Caesar’s 
sister. Octavius Caesar combines both the notion that women are 
naturally inconstant with the idea that women sometimes need to 
be so, when he assures Thidias that ‘Women are not/In their best 
fortunes strong, but want will perjure/The ne’er-touch’d vestal’ 
(3.12.29–31); it is clearly possible that an early modern audience 
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would have assumed that Cleopatra acts in accordance with her 
wayward, shifting temperament and subjection to the passions, 
as she flirts with the first man who comes to her – Thidias – when 
it looks as though Antony’s fortunes are finally waning. The trite 
expression of ‘what would go without saying’ about women in 
the early modern period is certainly said often enough in the play. 
But change and changeability – to replace ‘inconstancy’ with less 
pejorative terms – are also both central to the pleasures produced 
by Cleopatra for Antony (her ‘infinite variety’ (246) and theatrical 
shifts of temper) – and to the theatrical pleasure produced by this 
play. Changeability, that unfathomable fault of women in misog-
ynist discourse, and in much Cleopatra criticism from Coleridge 
onward,104 is not the subject of mere eye-rolling exasperation on the 
part of men (though Enobarbus’ commonsensical utterances on the 
matter demonstrate such exasperation (see p. 156)) but the site of 
the play’s emotional intensity. In Suzman’s production, Cleopatra’s 
changeability is given a clear material and psychological motivation 
that clears her somewhat of 400-year-old charges against women 
now distasteful to many modern audience members.
PASSION AND THEATRICALITY
In the second scene of the play, Antony finally hears the message 
from Rome that, in the world’s opinion, he is losing that world 
while he languishes with Cleopatra. He also hears that his 
wife Fulvia is dead. Fulvia, it seems, conforms to the ‘famili-
arity breeds contempt’ cliché that Cleopatra belies. In her now 
permanent absence, Antony mourns his wife – ‘She’s good, being 
gone’ (1.2.131). Cleopatra appears to understand how absence 
works in this regard and repeatedly creates a theatrical desire 
and suspense in the play by absenting herself. She has done so 
as Antony enters in 1.2; she repeatedly faints – or pretends to; 
she fatally absents herself in Act 4 of the play, leading Antony 
to kill himself for love and loss of her. This production of desire 
by absence is central to Cleopatra’s theatricality and to discuss it 
will require a definition of theatricality that strips the term of its 
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connotations of inauthenticity. Cleopatra’s ‘celerity in dying’, as 
Enobarbus jokes about it, makes her ‘cunning past men’s thought’ 
(1.2.150) according to Antony, when he is trying to break off from 
her enchantments. But Enobarbus protests against the notion that 
Cleopatra contrives or puts on the excess of her passions:
Alack, sir, no; her passions are made of nothing but 
the finest part of pure love. We cannot call her winds 
and waters sighs and tears; they are greater storms and 
tempests than almanacs can report. This cannot be 
cunning in her. If it be, she makes a shower of rain as 
well as Jove.
(1.2.151–6)
Her expressions of love are so materially excessive that they must 
be real; they go beyond the physical expression of Fiammetta’s 
sighs (see p. 124): her material expressions of love are more like 
the weather. Enobarbus’ tone reads as both jocular and awed – 
and his barge speech will also demonstrate that he is very capable 
of awe when it comes to Cleopatra. He seems at once ironic in 
his defence of the authenticity of her passions and genuinely 
impressed by her acting.105 Recall Hamlet’s soliloquy after he 
has listened to the Player’s speech and the real tears that the 
good actor is able to bring to his eyes, ‘for nothing! For Hecuba!’ 
(2.2.557–8). Cleopatra is able to ‘die’ at will; Enobarbus has seen 
her ‘die twenty/times upon far poorer moment’ (1.2.146–7) than 
Antony’s leaving. The great actor can make ‘a shower of rain as 
well as Jove’ and, like Cleopatra, the actor is both a creator and a 
feeler of passion. In the very next scene, 1.3, Cleopatra demon-
strates this celerity in dying, or at least fainting.
Enobarbus’ seeming belief in Cleopatra’s excessive passions 
rather contrasts with his sentiments in his exchange with Menas 
in Act 2. Here, the pair, who have previously fought each other, 
indulge in a little misogynistic joking about women’s falsehood:
menas
All men’s faces are true, whatsome’er their hands are.
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enobarbus
But there is never a fair woman has a true face.
menas
No slander. They steal hearts.
(2.6.99–101)
Menas suggests, as he shakes Enobarbus’ hand, that he will be 
able to read his former combatant’s face no matter what his hands 
do by seeming way of friendship, and Enobarbus replies with a 
remark that will bond them against a common enemy, the ever-
faithless female. However, this is just the kind of conventional 
homosocial exchange that occurs in an all-male environment 
such as the parley with Pompey, and it highlights the male-
constructed nature of this version of the female. In the rest of 
the play, Enobarbus is unable to reduce Cleopatra to an archetype 
of female ‘untruth’ in this way – she constructs herself in such a 
way as to ‘beggar[…] all description’ (2.2.208). There is no doubt 
that Antony and Cleopatra does reiterate some stock misogynies 
and mystifications around notions of woman’s changeability and 
her concomitant seductive power. But it also stages changeability, 
passion and the changeability of passion in such a way as to 
render anxieties around them secondary to their theatrical appeal.
Of course, the binary of Roman duty and Egyptian excess 
could not be more clearly set up in the first scene of Antony 
and Cleopatra; the contrast has become a critical commonplace 
and a scenographic cliché. Philo describes Antony as having 
been pulled from his military responsibilities in Egypt and the 
general ‘oe’r flows the measure’ in his ‘dotage’ on Cleopatra; his 
legimate, masculine, somatic excess – his armour-busting heart 
– has become feminized in love: ‘the bellows and the fan to cool 
a gypsy’s lust’ (1.1.9–10). The gendered and racially determined 
metaphors of excess could not be clearer. However, when we meet 
the couple, it is Antony who speaks of finding out new heaven and 
new earth rather than set a boundary to their love. Where Antony 
is determined to figure the space of the couple’s love as the whole 
world, Cleopatra insists that in fact it is circumscribed by the 
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realities of Antony’s loyalties to Caesar and his ties to Fulvia. 
Cleopatra ventriloquizes Antony’s obligations to Caesar with her 
‘‘Do this, or this;/Take in that kingdom, and enfranchise that;/
Perform ‘t, or else we damn thee’ (1.1.23–5). The more expansive 
Antony’s language becomes, the more determined she seems to 
pull him back to the mundane realities of doing this or that, and 
of the messages that ‘grate him’ (19). Of course, the actor playing 
Cleopatra may decide that her provocative determination that 
he should attend to the messengers aims at exactly the opposite 
effect and that Antony knows exactly what is required of him 
when Cleopatra disingenuously suggests he pay more attention to 
Rome than to herself. But it is significant that it is Antony here 
who persistently figures that love as boundless and himself as only 
himself as he is ‘stirred by Cleopatra’ (44), where Cleopatra’s first 
lines are concerned with the social contracts that are also part of 
Antony. The opening images of the constant, dutiful, soldierly 
general being turned to an immeasurably excessive dotage by 
this ‘gipsy’ are challenged from this first scene. In his article on 
the ways in which Roman needs and desires are projected on 
to the figure of Cleopatra, Jonathan Gil Harris argues that the 
very gendered notion of steadfast, reasoning male and changing, 
passionate woman is produced by Antony himself in his charac-
terization of Cleopatra and serves to erase his own changeability:
The impression of [Cleopatra’s] ‘variety’ is in part created 
by the panoply of subject-positions she is accorded by the 
alternately desiring and disgusted Antony: ‘enchanting 
queen’ (1.2.125); ‘my chuck’ (4.4.2); ‘my nightingale’ 
(4.8.18); ‘Triple-turn’d whore,’ ‘grave charm,’ ‘right 
gipsy’ (4.12.13, 25, 28). Cleopatra’s ‘variety’ provides the 
specular image – is, in many respects, the very effect – 
of Antony’s own. His displacement onto her of his own 
vacillations exemplifies.106
In support of Harris’ argument, it is also Antony who figures 
Cleopatra as the theatrical, pleasure-loving queen, suggesting that 
it is she who has instigated the game of wandering the streets to 
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note the quality of the people: ‘last night you did desire it’ (1.1.56), 
he insists. In North’s Plutarch, as I have noted elsewhere107, this 
is rather Antony’s regular escapade than Cleopatra’s, although 
she occasionally accompanies him: Plutarch’s Antony disguises 
himself to go among the people and Cleopatra joins him dressed 
as a chambermaid. In Plutarch, Antony, it is suggested, deliber-
ately shows one side of himself to Egypt, one to Rome and this 
changeability is figured as theatrical and praised as a fine trait by 
the theatrical Egyptians:
And sometime also, when he would go up and down the 
city disguised like a slave in the night, and would peer 
into poor men’s windows and their shops, and scold 
and brawl with them within the house: Cleopatra would 
be also in a chambermaid’s array, and amble up and 
down the streets with him, so that oftentimes Antonius 
bare away both mocks and blows. Now, though most 
men misliked this manner, yet the Alexandrians were 
commonly glad of this jollity, and liked it well, saying 
very gallantly and wisely, that Antonius shewed them 
a comical face, to wit, a merry countenance: and the 
Romans a tragical face, to say, a grim look.108
In Shakespeare’s play, Antony shifts theatricality onto Cleopatra:
Fie, wrangling queen,
Whom everything becomes – to chide, to laugh,
To weep; whose every passion fully strives
To make itself, in thee, fair and admired!
No messenger but thine, and all alone
Tonight we’ll wander through the streets and note
The qualities of people. Come, my queen!
Last night you did desire it. [to the Messenger] Speak not to us.
(1.1.49–56)
However, I do not want to argue here that Cleopatra’s theatricality 
in Shakespeare’s play is a Roman invention but rather suggest that 
the expression of the passions in this play is linked to the intense 
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pleasures of theatricality as much as the cultural anxieties the 
term also produces in the period.
On one level, the first four lines of Antony’s speech above 
simply look like an overblown way of saying ‘you look great 
when you’re angry’. But Antony is also figuring Cleopatra here 
as an actor-like figure. Her every passion, says Antony, strives 
to make itself fair and admired in her: the compliment at once 
suggests that she exhibits all the passions admirably and that 
the passions are all competing to be admired through her. The 
great actor does look great when he’s angry: all the passions are 
admired when he produces them. The speech also suggests that 
there is no humoral predominance in Cleopatra; she has every-
thing, whereas the people they are about to watch in the streets 
have particular, and one assumes interestingly limited, qualities. 
Later, as we have seen, Enobarbus praises – albeit in equivocally 
jocular style – Cleopatra’s ‘sighs and tears’; here I suggest that 
Antony uncouples the idea of rapidly shifting passions from some 
ultimately misogynistic notion of women’s changeability and 
instead associates them with the pleasure his paying audience is 
taking from emotional expression in the theatre.
In return, Cleopatra describes Antony as someone who, again 
like the great actor, is well able to control his passions, is able to 
put them to use. As she receives his gift of a pearl in 1.5 he is 
carrying out his duties in a fashion neither sad nor merry, as the 
messenger reports, and here Cleopatra both privileges the figure 
of he who is not passion’s slave and simultaneously maintains that 
violent passions become the great man:
O well divided disposition! […]
He was not sad, for he would shine on those
That make their looks by his; he was not merry,
Which seem’d to tell them his remembrance lay
In Egypt with his joy; but between both.
O heavenly mingle! Be’st thou sad or merry,
The violence of either thee becomes
As does it no man else.
(1.5.56–64)
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The ability to control the passions for the sake of one’s work and 
duty is praised in the first part of the speech but in the second, 
Cleopatra is returning Antony’s compliment of 1.1, in which all the 
passions strive to be admired within her. Antony, like Cleopatra, 
is actor-like in the way he is both able to put the passions to what 
use he will, controlling them where necessary, and in the way that 
they ‘become’ him. Being sad or merry is still nevertheless a matter 
of ‘violence’. It is not the well-controlled, reasonable Christian 
expression of emotion that is being extolled here.
Arranging the weddings of actors, throwing up in the Senate,109 
getting beaten up in the streets, Antony in Plutarch can be both 
a great warrior and a figure of fun, a merry lover of comical 
theatricals and a serious Roman leader. In Antony and Cleopatra, 
Shakespeare takes up Plutarch’s suggestion that it is only the 
Romans who believe that the ‘comical face’110 of Antony is not truly 
Antony – and the Antony of the play colludes in this construction 
of himself when it suits him, as when he assures Caesar he only 
neglected his duties in their wars ‘when poison’d hours had 
bound me up/From mine own knowledge’ (2.2.96–7). In this 
regard, he matches Cleopatra in her self-interested flirtation with 
Thidias and her suggestion that her relationship with Antony was 
enforced; Antony denies Cleopatra (and indeed marries someone 
else) when it is expedient.
What Antony does not have, either in Plutarch or Shakespeare, 
interested though he is in theatrical spectacle and play-acting 
in the former, is Cleopatra’s ability to make theatrical spectacle 
of her own person. In Enobarbus’ description, closely based 
on Plutarch of course, he is left all alone in the marketplace 
as everyone – as even the air would if it could – rushes to see 
Cleopatra on her barge. In Plutarch he is well known for dressing 
down rather than up for an occasion, although it is hinted that this 
may well have been part of a performance of authenticity that won 
him the approval of the man in the street:
For when he would openly shew himself abroad before 
many people he would always wear his cassock girt down 
low upon his hips, with a great sword hanging by his side 
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and upon that, some ill-favoured cloak. Furthermore, 
things that seem intolerable in other men, as to boast 
commonly, to jest with one or other, to drink like a good 
fellow with everybody, to sit with the soldiers when 
they dine, and to eat and drink with them soldier like: 
it is incredible what wonderful love it won him amongst 
them.111
Antony finally makes a poor, even comical performance of his 
own tragedy, in his botched suicide. Cleopatra takes time to get 
dressed for hers, chooses a means of death that leaves little trace 
upon the spectacle of her dead body and though she fantastizes 
that in dying she goes to join her ‘husband’ Antony, her decision 
to die seems as explicitly motivated by a determination not to be 
co-opted into a theatrical shame punishment devised by Caesar.
The figure of the actor is not an unambiguously positive one 
in the play. Cleopatra herself equates it with insincerity when 
she sarcastically interrupts the departing Antony’s ‘Most sweet 
queen’ with ‘Nay, pray you seek no colour for your going,/But bid 
farewell and go’ (1.3.32–4); there is no need for him to decorate 
his departure with theatrical artistry or ‘colour’. When she has 
had the news of Fulvia’s death and is berating Antony for his 
lack of tears, she bitterly tells Antony to weep for his dead wife 
and pretend the tears are for her, Cleopatra: ‘Good now, play 
one scene/Of excellent dissembling, and let it look/Like perfect 
honour’ (1.3.79–81). The following exchange enrages Antony as 
Cleopatra continues to interrupt him as if commenting on his 
acting:
antony
  You’ll heat my blood. No more.
cleopatra
You can do better yet; but this is meetly.
antony
Now, by my sword –
 ‘Give me excess of it’  163
cleopatra
  And target. Still he mends;
But this is not the best. Look, prithee, Charmian,
How this Herculean Roman does become
The carriage of his chafe.
(81–6)
Despite the awed respect with which Antony’s divine sponsor, 
Hercules, is treated elsewhere in the play, when the Roman 
soldiers of 4.3 believe they hear him leaving the general, to ironize 
Antony as ‘Herculean’ is a particularly sharp theatrical joke here: 
‘I could play Ercles rarely’ (1.2.26) is the claim made by the 
notorious overactor Bottom and here Cleopatra teases Antony 
for his theatrical bombast. Later, however, when she is missing 
him, she pays him that similar compliment to the one Antony 
pays her in 1.1: the violence of his passion becomes no man else 
(1.5.62). And in 1.3, when Antony threatens to walk off-stage after 
the teasing exchange above, she shifts to a mode of speech that 
appears, by contrast to the overblown theatricality of which she 
accuses Antony, utterly sincere:
Courteous lord, one word:
Sir, you and I must part, but that’s not it;
Sir, you and I have loved, but there’s not it;
That you know well. Something it is I would –
Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony,
And I am all forgotten!
(1.3.88–93)
Cleopatra shifts from acting out a faint in anticipation of Antony’s 
news, teasing him for acting himself and goading him to act better, 
to the fragile vulnerability of these lost lines, where forgetting 
what she wanted to say recalls the actor in the moment of ‘drying’. 
‘When good will is showed’, says Cleopatra later, when joking 
with the eunuch Mardian about his willingness to play billiards 
with her, ‘though’t come too short,/The actor may plead pardon’ 
(2.5.8–9). Here Cleopatra comes too short and fails to express 
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herself in words, and appears all the more pleasingly sincere as 
a result.
This scene ends with Cleopatra speaking of her ‘becomings’, 
which, she says, kill her when they do not ‘eye well’ to her one 
audience member, Antony (1.3.98–9). Then she finally retrieves 
her performance skills and ‘becomes’ the formally deferential 
Lady wishing goodbye to her Lord:
[…] Your honour calls you hence;
Therefore be deaf to my unpitied folly,
And all the gods go with you! Upon your sword
Sit laurel victory, and smooth success
Be strew’d before your feet!
(1.3.99–103)
Mark Rylance playing Cleopatra at Shakespeare’s Globe in 
1999112 accompanied these lines with a deep curtsey. A Cleopatra 
otherwise inclined to move rapidly about the stage self-consciously 
performing herself, with Charmian and Iras attempting to place 
cushions in just the place where their mistress might sit, Rylance 
now became formal and still, heightening still further the triple 
performance of the woman, the boy (here man) player and 
queen that constitutes this figure. However, this did not make 
Cleopatra’s farewell lines appear insincere. Like the good actor 
in Hamlet, Cleopatra delights with her performances and appears 
truly to feel what she performs.
LOVE, THEATRICALITY, AUTHORITY
Antony and Cleopatra ends with Cleopatra wrestling the role of 
stage-manager in the Cleopatra show from Caesar. Although his 
planned leading of Cleopatra ‘in triumph’ (5.2.108) is to be a 
parade of prisoners of war rather than a judicial punishment, the 
parade that Cleopatra imagines she is escaping from by taking 
her own life entails a charivari-like entertainment, notoriously 
complete with the squeaking player who will ‘boy [her] greatness/
I’th’posture of a whore’ (5.2.219–20). It recalls the theatrical 
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shame-punishments still residual in English legal culture and 
meted out particularly frequently on those deceitful, faithless, 
changeable women who had transgressed sexually.113 The wrong-
doers in these punishments are displayed by the law as the law 
has labelled them – as ‘strumpets’ stripped half naked or dressed 
in symbolic clothing with signs about their necks. Escaping 
such punishment, when Cleopatra displays herself in death she 
displays herself. It is essential to Cleopatra’s self-construction as 
a self-authoring, theatrical figure of excess that her last perfor-
mance is not stage-managed by Caesar. Caesar, despite often 
being played as a repressed, puritanical introvert by modern 
actors (no doubt because of his love of the old, puddle-drinking 
Antony (1.4.62–4) and his reluctance to get drunk with his 
friends on Pompey’s boat (2.7.100–102)), is very much aware of 
the power of theatricality. This is confirmed not only by his plan 
to display Cleopatra to the world as his prisoner but by his shock 
at his sister’s return to him as a ‘market maid to Rome’ (3.6.52) 
rather than accompanied by a suitably extravagant parade which 
might top the exhibition Antony and Cleopatra have just made 
of themselves and their children ‘in the common show place’ 
(3.6.12), much to Caesar’s fury. Trees should have bent with the 
weight of men waiting to watch Octavia pass by, and ‘expectation 
fainted,/Longing for what it had not’, because Octavia is Caesar’s 
sister (3.6.47–9). Caesar figures public display as productive of 
desire here. Like Cleopatra, he understands the erotic economy 
of these events; unlike Cleopatra, his understanding of them 
does not go beyond their use value. Cleopatra’s self-display is so 
excessive in its theatricality and so inextricably bound up with 
the ‘winds and waters’ of her passions that it is inevitable that 
she would refuse to be displayed in the way Caesar intends. Her 
person ‘beggars all description’ within the discourses of early 
modern misogyny because the excessive, shifting, uncontrolled 
passions of the female do, in fact, appear to be in her control, as 
they are in the control of the actor in Hamlet who ‘really’ cries for 
Hecuba. According to this reading, Cleopatra’s tragedy is that she 
can only maintain this excessive, self-performing agency in death. 
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She is a self-constructed theatrical being who defies misogynist 
discourses around women and ‘bravery’, whereby women dress 
up and use make-up in order to deceive men into loving them 
(and providing them with more bravery).114 The description-
beggaring excess of Cleopatra and her barge display reflects the 
enormity of her passionate theatrical range – or her range of 
theatrical passions.
Through 1.2 and 1.3, Cleopatra stages a range of early modern 
anxieties about women – that they are cunning, changeable, 
deceptive, lustful, that they think and behave in excess of male 
reason – and suggests that the multiple performances of this 
particular woman should be the focus of its theatrical pleasure. 
The play links this female changeability to acting and the active 
skill of changeability which the good actor must possess – and 
which the audience has clearly come to the theatre to enjoy. 
Woman’s changeability is bound up in early modern misogynistic 
discourse with the excess of her passions, her inability to control 
them, her lack of reason – ultimately her lack of humanity. But 
the actor’s changeability permits him to play any human; a good 
actor’s ‘becomings’ are never tired of, they always ‘eye well’. 
That Cleopatra is all changing passion produces her as one of 
those excessive femininities about which the misogynists such 
as Swetnam complain. But her changeable emotions figure her 
as an actor who is the ultimate controller of the passions – the 
actor can bring them on and off at will and produce real, material 
effects of passion in that ‘sweating labour’ (1.3.93). Cleopatra is 
a bewildering and ‘enchanting’ admixture of excess and control.
Helena opens All’s Well pretending she is crying for her dead 
father where she is in fact crying over the departure of Bertram; 
she makes a speech in which she upbraids herself for the 
hopeless naivety of a love she cannot help. In a familiar comedic 
convention, she shows to the audience what she cannot tell the 
other characters – then she exposes her love with nearly disas-
trous consequences. Cleopatra, on the other hand, constantly 
and openly displays herself; this is not the same as ‘pretending’ 
anything – at least not to the audience. Even when sometimes 
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she may be read as ‘only acting’ to manipulate Antony, the 
fact that she acknowledges her ‘becomings’ complicates misogy-
nistic discourses around the manipulative female. Just as, for 
Enobarbus, she displays what a great queen she is through her 
barge pageant, she continually demonstrates to us how passionate 
she is for Antony, in the way that Hamlet’s Player shows he can 
‘really’ be passionate. Of course, Cleopatra is in love with Antony 
where Hecuba is ‘nothing’ to the Player. But the deliberate 
and conscious sense of self-display is comparable. Fascinatingly, 
because so paradoxically, Cleopatra is the ultimate willing agent, 
because she is so like an actor.
In both All’s Well that Ends Well and Antony and Cleopatra, 
audiences are invited to take pleasure in the excesses of love. 
Love in both plays is certainly more than lust but it is not divided 
from it as Charney has suggested. It is troubling because it 
leaves one a slave to passion – but also because it seems to offer a 
powerful agency to the two female figures I have discussed here. 
For the early modern period, love compromises male reason, 
female virtue, and the work of fighting and leadership; it blurs 
gender boundaries – sending Helena out to work in her dead 
father’s trade and Antony to the bedroom dressed in Cleopatra’s 
attire when he should be fighting. In our own period it blurs the 
boundaries of sincerity and authenticity which British and North 
American societies like to police, particularly because of the ways 
in which Cleopatra’s passion is figured as theatrical. It is impos-
sible to tell when Cleopatra is acting – and when she is acting it 
does not mean she is not sincere. I am not denying that misogynist 
anxieties around female excess are not part of the language and 
dramaturgy of these plays – but I am arguing that Helena, Antony 
and Cleopatra are in excess of them. The expression of unrea-
sonable love in All’s Well and Antony and Cleopatra produces 
theatrical pleasure and this challenges constructions of emotional 
excess as shamefully feminine. Perhaps Shakespeare does not 
write another Taming of the Shrew because excess of passion is 
more entertaining than its taming.
CHAPTER FOUR
‘STOP YOUR SOBBING’ : 
GRIEF, MELANCHOLY AND MODERATION
cressida
Why tell you me of moderation?
The grief is fine, full, perfect, that I taste,
And violenteth in a sense as strong
As that which causeth it: how can I moderate it?
If I could temporize with my affection,
Or brew it to a weak and colder palate,
The like allayment could I give my grief.
My love admits no qualifying dross;
No more my grief, in such a precious loss.
Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida (4.4.2–10)
Some skillful limner help me, if not so,
Some sad tragedian to express my woe:
But (oh) he’s gone, that could the best, both limn
And act my grief; and ‘tis for only this for him –
That I invoke this strange assistance to’t,
And in the point call himself to do it;
For none but Tully Tully’s praise can tell,
And as he could, no man could act so well
This point of sorrow, for him none can draw
So truly to the life this map of woe;
This grief ’s true picture which his loss has bred,
He’s gone and with him what a world are dead.
Anonymous, Elegy on the death of Richard Burbage
When Cressida replies furiously to Pandarus’ plea that she ‘be 
moderate’ (2.2.1) after hearing that she must part from Troilus, 
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she insists that she tastes her grief. Read her speech alongside 
Richard II’s insistence that he, too, tastes grief and one might 
assume that Cressida’s declaration is part of a discourse of somatic 
passion quite unremarkable in the early modern period. Richard’s 
tasting of grief is, after all, one of the feelings and experiences he 
lists as common to all men. The deposed King uses it to insist, 
albeit with a bitter irony, that he is a man as other men are:
richard
For you have but mistook me all this while:
I live with bread like you, feel want,
Taste grief, need friends: subjected thus,
How can you say to me, I am a king?
(3.1.174–7)
Grief here is such a palpably physical passion and such an ordinary 
part of the human condition that it seems logical to describe it 
as being apprehended in the mouth, like daily bread. Cressida, 
however, brings a culinary precision to her tasting of grief. It is 
as if she is being asked by her uncle to water down that which 
tastes properly strong, and even in the extremity of her grief she 
is able to speak of its fullness and perfection, how its strength is 
appropriate to its cause – her love for Troilus. This seems a fitting 
description for grief in the theatre, where the audience has come 
to see grief finely, fully and perfectly depicted on-stage. Whereas 
early modern religious and philosophical thought stresses the 
proper place of moderate grief – Jesus wept, after all, and it 
would be inhuman not to respond feelingly to life’s tragedies 
– moderation of grief was nevertheless a crucial Christian and 
politically correct undertaking in the early modern period: Robert 
Southwell declares that ‘not to feel sorrow in sorrowful chances, 
is to want sense, so not to bear it with moderation, is to want 
understanding, the one brutish, the other effeminate’.1 Mourning 
must be undertaken within a cosmological context which makes 
our human griefs both insignificant and part of a god-given 
state of things, in the face of which we must acknowledge our 
helplessness. For example, a national loss as cataclysmic as that 
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of Elizabeth I must be seen through the proper joy of the next 
succession: the first of Mavericke Radford’s Three Treatises on 
the succession, The Mourning Weed, The Morning’s Joy and The 
King’s Rejoicing, advises that
according to the sundry turnings and movings of these 
higher spheres (having all one primum movens, God the 
whole monarch of heaven and earth), all other inferior 
Spheres, are moved, turned about or changed. [H]ence 
cometh alterations in kingdoms; hence cometh changes 
of Kings and Princes.2
A sermon such as Thomas Playfere’s The Mean in Mourning 
(much copied, according to his rather irritable dedicatory epistle), 
lists the times that Christ said to his followers ‘weep not’, and, 
as we have seen (p. xiv), compares excess of weeping to the 
destructive excesses that he figures as both part of and as against 
nature. Jesus was
Forbidding thereby immoderate weeping, which is 
condemned, in nature; in reason; in religion. In nature, 
the earth when it rejoiceth, as in the summer time then 
it is covered with corn, but when it hath too forlorn, & 
sorrowful a countenance, as in the winter time, then it 
is fruitless, and barren. The water when it is quiet, and 
calm, bringeth in all manner of merchandise, but when 
the sea storms, and roars too much, then the very ships 
do howl and cry. The air looking clearly, and cheerfully 
refresheth all things, but weeping too much, that is, 
raining too much, as in Noah’s flood, it drowns the whole 
world.3
G. I. Pigman marked a cultural shift from an intolerance of grief 
at the death of loved ones and advice against its indulgence in the 
slightest degree, to the acceptance of this passion in moderation, 
over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.4 However, even in 
this more grief-tolerant period, grief is linked with madness via 
the somatic continuum of melancholy, or black bile, so that in 
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early modern discourse it is always in danger of overwhelming 
both body and reason. As we will see, whether the melancholic 
state is considered to be primarily physical and dispositional, 
or whether physical disease is thought to be brought about by 
emotional perturbation, it is assumed that when it comes to 
sorrow, there is a reasoning self that should endeavour to prevent 
grief from becoming immoderate and which is always in danger 
of being obliterated by melancholy.
Nevertheless, Cressida’s immoderate weeping is fine, full and 
perfect: to her, it tastes just as it should. Of course she is, notori-
ously, soon to be unfaithful to Troilus, so that it may occur here, 
to audience members or readers who know her story, that she will 
be well able to ‘moderate’ both her love and grief before very long. 
But her insistence here on a perfect reflection of love and grief, of 
cause and effect, of grief as taste, does not seem to me to contain 
an ironic reference to her future conduct, or if it does, as Linda 
Charnes might suspect after her study of Cressida’s Notorious 
Identity,5 the irony is dramatic and may be understood by the 
audience at the same time as they witness an in-the-moment 
utterance of perfect sincerity from Cressida. The use of the taste 
metaphor here rather suggests that grief over loss is somehow a 
pain to be enjoyed – and in this chapter I am going to argue that 
the early modern theatre depends on depictions of extremes of 
grief and sorrow for the production of theatrical pleasure, despite 
a number of characters recommending moderation and timeliness 
in the expression of grief and condemning its supposed excesses, 
just as a sermon might. Grief that is fine, full and perfect in the 
theatre can be excitingly immoderate.
In the plays examined here, moral and political tensions 
arise in moments where excesses of grief and sorrow subvert or 
obstruct cultural norms, power structures and dramatic plot. 
In this chapter, I argue that grief and sorrow have a potentially 
interrogatory, even subversive politics,6 which, in the theatre, can 
be explored, staged, produced in excess of what is legitimated, 
valued or permitted by society and culture more generally. In 
what follows, I suggest ways in which the theatre both reinforces 
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and pushes at these limits, as it deals in the limitless need to 
produce audience pleasure. I consider the Henry VI plays and 
Richard III in terms of the valuations of personal grief and 
political grievance they contain, and Hamlet in terms of the ways 
in which the personal and the political are conflated and compli-
cated in connection with grief. 
I acknowledge that an audience watching a production of one 
of these plays today may feel little of the subversive power of grief, 
given the different ways in which that emotion is valorized in 
modern Western society. A theatre-goer in the English-speaking 
world today is a great deal less likely than an early modern one to 
attend a sermon that exhorts him or her to emotional moderation 
in mourning, the Sunday after seeing a play that seems to depend 
for its success on the passionate expression of grief. Here, I am 
going to explore two examples of how current concerns around 
emotional expression might be mapped on to the political drama-
turgy of the passions in early modern drama – and thus open up 
a politics of the emotions to a modern audience. The examples 
are of recent British productions, produced by the two largest 
publicly funded theatre companies in the UK, the RSC and the 
National Theatre: one of Richard III and one of Hamlet.7 Each 
of these modern dress productions stages grief as a disruptive 
political force: disruptive because, as Cressida suggests, it both 
seems impossible to moderate – it is in excess of the controlling 
agency of reason – and because there are characters in plays who 
seem determined to indulge it, no matter how culturally and 
politically expedient it might be for them to stop their sobbing.8 
The narratives of both Richard III and Hamlet are structured 
around personal grief in political culture; they dramatize the 
politics and the policing of emotion. This makes them particu-
larly good plays for commenting on later historical moments 
where politics takes an active interest in how we feel. I emphasize 
that this is different from saying that grief is somehow the same 
for all time and that a particularly powerful dramatization of it is 
therefore ‘universal’. I would rather suggest that Richard III and 
Hamlet have structures which generate emotions in tension with 
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their political contexts and may thus be made to reflect upon the 
politics of emotion in the audience’s historical moment. Although 
attitudes to how much grief and sorrow it is considered proper, or 
legitimate, or healthy to express in public or private have clearly 
changed since the turn of the sixteenth century, these plays 
invite current audiences to consider the ways in which their own 
cultures and societies ask them to express and display, or control 
and repress, grief and sorrow.
GRIEF AND GRIEVANCE
It is difficult to ascertain how long might have been considered 
too long to mourn in early modern England, at least as evidenced 
in drama. In aristocratic society, as Sarah Tarlow has demon-
strated in her study of Ritual, Belief and the Dead in Early 
Modern Britain and Ireland, the proper expression of grief and 
the timing of mourning lay in moderation, with an ‘increasingly 
sentimental attachment to the dead [growing] stronger and more 
acceptable over the course of the eighteenth century’.9 Tarlow 
gives the example of Frances Stuart who stayed in mourning for 
fifteen years – from the death of her husband to her own – and 
writes that while, by the late eighteenth century, this would have 
been regarded as evidence of laudably romantic sensibility, in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, the Duchess’ mourning 
‘was regarded as excessive by many of her peers who questioned 
its authenticity and appropriateness’.10 Claire Gittings quotes 
a contemporary of Stuart’s remarking that ‘[His] loss she takes 
so impatiently and with so much show of passion that many odd 
and idle tales are daily reported or invented of her’.11 Over-long 
or over-passionate mourning was considered irreligious because 
it represented a railing against God’s purpose and a lack of faith 
in redemption. In a search for accessible popular advice for the 
bereaved today, it would be unusual, to say the least, to receive 
a warning that overly passionate displays of grief might be 
considered insincere by one’s peers – mere ‘bravery’ (5.2.79), as 
Hamlet describes Laertes’ show of mourning for Ophelia. A large 
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number of bereaved families in the UK hold Christian funerals 
for their loved ones even if the deceased was not a believer, or even 
if the mourners themselves are not – but a congregation would no 
doubt be surprised and offended if the celebrant suggested that 
overly long demonstrations of grief might offend God. A modern 
audience may therefore be inclined to dismiss as tactless or cruel 
the admonishments of Claudius and Gertrude in Hamlet that 
Hamlet is mourning for too long, or of the Countess, in All’s Well, 
when she suggests that with all her public weeping, Helena might 
be showing more than she feels. In fact the stock saws of Gertrude 
and Lafew, that ‘all that lives must die’ (Hamlet, 1.2.72) and that 
‘excessive grief is an enemy to the living’ (All’s Well, 1.1.55), are 
commonsensical wisdoms of the period, which anyone may have 
recognized as healthful advice and proper religious duty 400 years 
ago. Claudius is all the more wicked for hypocritically giving 
sober, religious council about a death that he has violently caused 
but this would not necessarily have undermined his advice about 
moderation in mourning itself.
Lucinda M. Becker points out in her study of Death and the 
Early Modern Englishwoman that it is important not entirely to 
conflate the public rituals of mourning with internalized feelings 
of grief here:
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘grief ’ in this 
period as mental pain, distress or suffering; its associ-
ation with loss by death has strengthened only in more 
recent times. […] Grief can […] be seen as a private 
affliction, not necessarily expressed to others, whilst 
mourning is an externalized activity that reflects grief 
and loss.12
But when the Countess suggests that Helena may be thought 
‘rather to affect a sorrow rather than to have it’ (All’s Well, 1.1.51–2) 
if she continues to weep so copiously in public, she demonstrates 
the close early modern relationship between feelings of sorrow 
and loss and their public display in mourning. Some modern 
editors point out that ‘affect’ here does not yet necessarily have 
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the connotation of affectation, so that Helena is not suspected of 
‘hypocritically pretending a grief that she has never felt…but that 
she will be suspected of making an outward show of grief in excess 
of that which she now (after a lapse of time) feels’. (See p. 127)13 
However, she instantly replies in her own self-defence, in words 
which suggest that she feels a pejorative connotation of ‘affect’ 
here: ‘I do affect a sorrow indeed, but I have it too’ (1.1.53).14 
Hamlet finds himself in a similar position when asked why his grief 
for his father ‘seems so particular’ (1.2.75) when he knows full well 
that ‘all that lives must die’ (72). Helena insists that her outward 
expression of grief accurately reflects ‘that within’ (Hamlet 1.2.85); 
Hamlet suggests that ‘that within’ is beyond expression. Gertrude 
is not asking Hamlet to cast off only his ‘nighted colour’ (1.6.68) – 
his mourning dress – but to cease, ‘with veiled lids’ to ‘seek for [his] 
noble father in the dust’ (70–71). She is essentially telling him not 
only to take off the trappings and suits of official mourning but to 
stop looking – and thus being – so sad, as what this look of sadness 
suggests is that he could reverse and contradict the natural way of 
things and find his father down in the direction of his downcast 
eyes. For Claudius and Gertrude, feeling and display, grief and 
mourning are to all purposes as one, whereas Hamlet denies that 
his outward expressions of sorrow – be they sartorial (his inky 
cloak, 77) or somatic (his sighs of sorrow and his tears, 79, 80) – 
necessarily reflect what he feels at all. Hamlet’s claim to have ‘that 
within which passes show’ (85) has been regarded as paradigmatic 
of a proto-modern psychological interiority.15 The rest of the play, 
however, is concerned, as we will see, with the expression of grief, 
in its multiplicity of senses, and melancholy, with all its yet more 
complex early modern nuances, and how these emerge in the social 
world as outward show and political action. Hamlet begins the 
play by asserting that he feels more than he could ever express but 
struggles throughout it with the fact that his grief only produces 
meaning when it is externalized: interpreted or expressed.
In addition to Becker’s warning about historical definitions 
of grief here, it is worth pointing to a historical sense closer to 
our ‘grievance’. The OED offers as its first definition of grief 
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‘Hardship, suffering; a kind or cause of these’ but gives this 
sense a date of 1722. Its second definition, first cited in 1584, 
is as ‘Hurt, harm, mischief inflicted or suffered; molestation, 
trouble, offence’. Third, from 1573, comes ‘feeling of offense; 
displeasure, anger’. Shakespeare’s use of the word suggests that 
he certainly associates grief with sorrow in loss; indeed, it is 
used by Shakespeare in hendiadys with the words sorrow and 
woe.16 The tearful Henry VI of the trilogy, of whom more later, 
uses it alongside woe and in association with tears for loss, and 
the word grief is certainly associated with mourning among the 
mourning women of Richard III. Richard, in 3 Henry VI, who, 
in claiming that hot fury at his father’s killing has dried up all his 
tears, suggests that weeping would be the conventional reaction 
to grief at such a loss. The sense of grief as offence or grievance 
still echoes in Shakespeare’s early plays, however. Somerset 
surely speaks more in anger than in sorrow when he speaks thus 
of Humphrey of Gloucester, whom he later conspires to murder:
Cousin of Buckingham, though Humphrey’s pride
And greatness of his place be grief to us,
Yet let us watch the haughty Cardinal:
His insolence is more intolerable
Than all the princes in the land beside:
(2 Henry VI 1.1.170–4)
The noun in the plural, even more, suggests wrongs or offences 
to be avenged rather than sorrows at loss. The Archbishop of 
York in 2 Henry IV conflates the term ‘griefs’ with ‘offences’ and 
complains that
When we are wrong’d, and would unfold our griefs,
We are denied access unto his [the King’s] person,
Even by those men that most have done us wrong.
(4.1.77–9)
Indeed, Hamlet deliberately reads the plural noun as referring to 
political grievance when he replies to Rosencrantz’ query about 
his ‘cause of distemper’:
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rosencrantz
Good my lord, what is your cause of distemper? you do 
surely bar the door upon your own liberty if you deny 
your griefs to your friend.
hamlet
Sir, I lack advancement.
(3.2.339–42)
For the rest of the play, the word is used solely in association 
with bereavement. But this double or shifting sense of grief as 
offence, and grief as sorrow at loss, is significant in a consid-
eration of the religious obligation to moderate grief in the early 
modern period: to show too much grief upon the death of a loved 
one might suggest that one has a grievance – and given that only 
God can take away life, immoderate grief might indicate that 
one’s grief/grievance is against Him. Although grief, woe, sorrow 
and tears are often used in association or even indeterminably in 
Shakespeare, the fact that grief can also connote distress at an 
offence makes it a more appropriate term for Cressida to use than 
sorrow at her imminent loss of Troilus in our quotation above. 
She is both intensely unhappy at the parting and furious at its 
injustice. Its connotation of political grievance is also partially 
what gives grief its dangerous political edge, as we will see.
SOMETIMES ‘TIS GOOD TO BE MISERABLE IN MISERY: 
GRIEF IN THE THEATRE
In the anonymous elegy on the death of Richard Burbage (perhaps 
better known in Collier’s fraudulent version of it, complete with 
citings of the tragic actor’s Shakespearean roles),17 the anonymous 
author’s opening conceit is to ask for someone to help him to 
‘limn and act’ his grief over the death of the great actor; he then 
declares that the only man to ‘express’ such a grief is the dead 
actor himself. The poet calls for help from an artist who can 
express woe visually or vocally – the limner (a copyist painter), 
or an actor like Burbage himself. Grief here needs depicting in 
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ways that are beyond the power of this elegist’s written word 
or, it is perhaps suggested, any of the mourner’s powers of 
expression. No one but Burbage could ‘draw/ So truly to the life 
this map of woe’: the elegist’s woe as expressed in his poem is a 
two-dimensional map which Burbage himself could turn into a 
more lifelike depiction. If we are to ask, then, the purpose and 
value of grief as it is depicted on-stage, this elegist might answer 
that a great actor can help us memorialize our greatest griefs and 
woes. He limns, or paints them by acting them – and without 
his acting, we are left with the elegist’s flat map – not nearly as 
satisfactorily close to what we might want to express if we could. 
Grief becomes fuller, finer, more perfect when heightened and 
aestheticized by the actor.
Burbage, then, expressed grief in such a way as to suggest to 
his audiences that their own griefs were being expressed – but 
not merely in the purgative sense of the word ‘express’. Like the 
moderate grief that Cressida scorns, the elegist’s expression of his 
very own grief will never be as properly powerful as the version 
of it he imagines an actor producing. The catharsis-as-purgation 
model of the theatrical expression of emotion makes acting the 
political safety valve of the theatre: it permits empathetic – 
perhaps kinesthetic – feeling on the part of the audience in relation 
to actor and action – and thus expresses emotion in the material 
sense, and disperses it for the better safety and governance of 
society. Wherever one stands on the long historical-critical debate 
on what Aristotle meant by Catharsis in the Poetics,18 this was 
certainly a meaning current in early modern England.19 Leon 
Golden usefully cites Milton’s preface to Sampson Agonistes, 
demonstrating that as late as 1671, the purgation theory of 
catharsis is closely linked to somatic notions of the same:
Tragedy is … said by Aristotle to be of power, by 
raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of 
those and such-like passions…. Nor is Nature wanting 
in her own effects to make good his assertion; for so in 
physic things of melan-cholic hue and quality are used 
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against melan-choly, sour against sour, salt to remove 
salt humours.20
Theatrical expression of emotion, however, in the model I develop 
here, remains excessive rather than purgative, in that in its outward 
show of inner movement or turmoil, it releases the passions from 
the boundaries of the body, or the flat map of the elegist, and into 
the world, to be caught, enjoyed, continued rather than purged, 
by others. This may seem contrary to the advice to the players 
given by Hamlet; Tobias Doring suggests that in describing the 
stage as a mirror, which offers ‘“virtue her own feature” or “scorn 
her own image” [Hamlet] does not encourage the contagious 
effects of real passion’.21 Even for Doring, though, ‘these aesthetic 
principles do not remain unquestioned’ and he goes on to remind 
us that though Hamlet scorns the contagious laughter of clowns 
in the advice to the players, he mourns the loss of one of them as 
he hold Yorick’s skull.22 Later in this chapter I will turn again to 
Hamlet, to suggest that it contains a political dramaturgy of grief 
that sits in tension with common Christian and Classical saws 
about grief ’s moderation.23
Just as contemporary defences of the early modern theatre 
suggested that one might learn from the instances of folly or 
disaster viewed on-stage, as Stephen Pender’s important article 
‘Rhetoric, Grief and the Imagination in Early Modern England’ 
suggests, instances and examples of disasters and bereavements 
are suggested as a cure for grief in the classical writings translated 
into English by and during this period.24 There are scores of these 
to be found in Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, for example, all 
supposedly there to help the reader find moderation in grief:
‘twas Germanicus’ advice of old, that we should not 
dwell too long upon our passions, to be desperately 
sad, immoderate grievers, to let them tyrannise, there’s 
indolentiæ, ars, a medium to be kept: we do not (saith 
Austin) forbid men to grieve, but to grieve overmuch.25
Burton insists that instances of terrible sorrow helps us to 
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palliate our own – to express it in the purgative sense. Similarly, 
Cicero’s Five Questions, translated into English in 1561, advises 
that examples of past griefs ‘not only provides knowledge about 
humanity but also shows that what others have endured and 
do endure is endurable’.26 However, as Pender also suggests, 
being encouraged to imagine the griefs of others may also 
exacerbate grief. Burton’s extraordinary lists of descriptions of 
those suffering from melancholy as caused by grief give as many, 
if not more examples of immoderate grief, as examples of those 
who have controlled it, or of those who have grieved moderately, 
from which his readers might take courage. We may read in 
Burton a fortifying example of Tully (Cicero), who
was much grieved for his daughter Tulliola’s death at 
first, until such time that he had confirmed his mind 
with some philosophical precepts, ‘then he began to 
triumph over fortune and grief, and for her reception 
into heaven to be much more joyed than before he was 
troubled for her loss.’ If a heathen man could so fortify 
himself from philosophy, what shall a Christian from 
divinity? Why dost thou so macerate thyself? Tis an 
inevitable chance, the first statute in Magna Charta, an 
everlasting Act of Parliament, all must die.27
But by the time we have got to this point in The Anatomy, we have 
already been taken through incident upon incident of inconsolable 
sorrow from classical times and Judaeo-Christian example. These 
are inevitably more lively, one might say more theatrical, than the 
worthy examples of self-government which Burton offers – the one 
above, fascinatingly, finally shored up not only by the invocation of 
God’s law but by medieval legislation. Burton colourfully presents 
to the reader’s imagination the roaring and tearing of hair of the 
woman mad with grief, the black cloud that descended upon 
Achilles after the death of Patroclus, the running on swords’ points 
and jumping into graves that are the manifestations of immod-
erate grief.28 These descriptions involve physical action and lively 
metaphor, where their admirable moderate counterparts can, for the 
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most part, only be denoted in terms, as with Cicero above, of what 
the grief-stricken have stopped doing. If the reader enjoys Burton 
for the stories, he engages imagination, opinion, judgement, and, 
as Justius Lipsius suggests, ‘opinion’, or false judgement, amplifies 
affections ‘and lifteth them up as it were upon a stage to be seen’. 
‘The stage’ here, Pinder continues,
is the imagination. The ‘wonderful effects and power’ 
of the imagination, Robert Burton confirms, consist in 
‘keeping the species of objects so long, mistaking, ampli-
fying the by continual & strong meditation, until it at 
length it produceth in some parties real effects, causeth 
this [melancholy] and many other maladies.’29
In Lipsius it is assumed that the reader will instantly understand 
how problematic the imagination, with is opinions and false 
judgements, is, if it is compared to the stage with its infectious 
heightening of ‘affections’.
I have listed the particular incidents above from Burton’s many, 
because they are incidents and characters that also appear in the 
plays of Shakespeare. His work appeals to its audience using the 
very spectacle of Ophelia entering with her hair down; of Achilles 
avenging Patroclus; of Brutus and Antony committing suicide on 
their sword’s points; of Hamlet witnessing Laertes attempting to 
jump into Ophelia’s grave, and insisting that his, Hamlet’s, grief 
for her is greater than that of the the dead woman’s brother. Such 
images are of the kind that made the theatre a place of uncon-
tained imagination and griefs dangerously indulged by imitation. 
In a sense, then, I argue throughout this book that Plato, Polonius 
and the anti-theatricalists were right: the early modern theatre 
was a dangerous place of bodied-forth imaginings and imaginary 
bodies, where audiences might hear and watch actors pretending 
to feel and thus remember what it was to feel themselves, feel 
again, feel more. Even in a book such as Burton’s one may argue 
that examples of terrible grief accrue an entertainment value 
beyond their intended purpose of curative example.
This may not be considered a problem in the theatre today. 
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While a common perception may be that the British are inclined 
to express grief in quieter ways than a range of other cultures, the 
value of emotional expression may be said to be unproblematically 
high in the twenty-first century. A present-day theatre-goer, even 
if she is a practising Christian, is unlikely to feel anxiety at the 
tension between calls to moderation preached to her on Sundays 
and her interpellation as an impassioned being in the theatre. The 
cultural and educational value ascribed to Shakespeare today may 
lead her, rather, to consider the emotions depicted on-stage as 
valuable because paradigmatically ‘human’, heightened in such a 
way as to teach her something about ‘the human condition’. While 
the scare quotes in the last sentence suggest that I am cynical 
about such a universalist perspective, I do not want to argue that 
this putative theatre-goer is only imagining a connection between 
her own griefs and those expressed in an early modern drama. 
The expression of grief in Western culture is policed in a variety 
of often contradictory ways, some of which may have been unrec-
ognizable to the early moderns, others of which may have been 
quite familiar. The notion of emotionally cathartic (in the sense 
of purgative) grief (what we might casually call ‘having a good 
cry’) would not have been foreign to the early moderns. Even 
the Stoic Seneca admitted that there are traumas and losses to 
which we cannot help reacting by crying and, as we have seen in 
the subheading to this section, Burton quotes him thus: ‘I know 
not how (saith Seneca) but sometimes ‘tis good to be miserable 
in misery: & for the most part all grief evacuates itself by tears.’30
Conversely, the early modern concept that prolonged, ‘immod-
erate’ expression of sadness may lead not to emotional release but 
may be indicative of mental illness is not entirely strange to us 
either, though early modern figurations of the the excess of black 
bile in the body, which both indicates and causes sorrow and 
which overwhelms the griever, are of course foreign to modern 
science, as are, for many, the Christian and Classical notions 
that one is morally responsible for the moderation of one’s own 
grief. The idea that ‘overmuch sorrow’ (see p. 201) could lead to 
– or actually is – mental illness resonates across the seventeenth 
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century, and is echoed by Freud in the opening to his much-cited 
essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’; the essay explores what Freud 
considers to be the complex psychological differences between 
circumstantial grief and mental illness, and he does so first in 
temporal terms, recalling the instances I cite here of early modern 
people and dramatic characters being warned against mourning 
for too long:
it never occurs to us to consider mourning as a patho-
logical condition and present it to the doctor for 
treatment, despite the fact it produces severe deviations 
from normal behaviour. We rely on it being overcome 
after a certain period of time, and consider interfering 
with it being pointless, or even damaging.31
Ordinary mourning and pathological melancholia may be provoked 
by the same cause – loss. But the latter simply will not stop. 
Here, the difference between the cultural valuation of sorrow in 
the early modern period and the early twentieth century is a 
matter of timing: during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
common sense suggests that mourning can – even should – last 
a very long time without the griever being considered mentally 
ill or insincere. In 1917, Freud can already assume that everyone 
understands him when he asserts that we ‘consider interfering 
with [mourning] being pointless, or even damaging’ until after 
‘a certain period of time’. Read any easily accessible advice on 
coping with loss today and one will be advised that while one’s 
peers may tactlessly expect one to ‘get over’ the loss of a loved 
one in a matter of months, this is unrealistic and one should give 
oneself time to grieve.32
Ultimately, however, though one might compare the acceptable 
time limits placed on grief in both periods of history, the moral, 
religious and philosophical imperatives to moderate one’s grief in 
cultural life – exhortations not to be passion’s slave – that emerge 
in the sermons and treatises of the early modern period simply 
do not, I would argue, pressure the contemporary theatre-goer. 
The rest of this chapter, then, is divided into two different but 
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related kinds of endeavours: the exploration of grief and its value 
as it emerges differently in the early modern drama; and examples 
of the ways in which two contemporary productions – one of 
Richard III and one of Hamlet – have staged what I will call the 
political dramaturgy of grief, in ways that are accessible to the 
theatre-goer today.
GRIEF AND ACTION: HENRY VI AND RICHARD III
In Shakespeare’s earliest historical dramas, the Henry VI plays, 
weeping is repeatedly figured as an obstruction to action, particu-
larly to revenge. In the second play, Henry VI calls his own 
tears for his imprisoned uncle Gloucester ‘unhelpful’, comparing 
himself to a cow bereft of her slaughtered calf, who
  [...] runs lowing up and down,
Looking the way her harmless young one went,
And can do nought but wail her darling’s loss;
Even so myself bewails good Gloucester’s case
With sad unhelpful tears, and with dimm’d eyes
Look after him, and cannot do him good;
(2 Henry VI, 3.1.214–19)
When Suffolk hypocritically laments Humphrey of Gloucester, 
having conspired to murder him, Queen Margaret makes an 
ironic statement on the unproductive nature of tears, where she 
insists that she does not blame Suffolk for crying and suggests she 
herself would cry if it could do any good; again, the audience will 
be well aware of the hypocrisy of the speech given Margaret’s own 
collusion in the murder:
queen
Why do you rate my Lord of Suffolk thus?
Although the duke was enemy to him,
Yet he most Christian-like laments his death.
And for myself, foe as he was to me,
Might liquid tears, or heart-offending groans,
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Or blood-consuming sighs recall his life,
I would be blind with weeping, sick with groans,
Look pale as primrose with blood-drinking sighs,
And all to have the noble duke alive.
(3.2.56–64)
In both cases grief disables, rendering the avenging agent a 
somatic mess of tears, sighs and pallor. If the self is an active agent 
in the world, grief makes one less oneself – less of an avenger 
with a purpose, more a mass of unfocused, reactive affect. The 
griever in Henry’s speech is figured as a cow. The grieving body 
in Margaret’s speech is consumed and made drunk by grief, and 
her assertion that she would let this happen would it save ‘the 
noble duke’ only serves to emphasize the fact that crying won’t 
save anyone. Grief is anathema to the kind of action that redeems 
oneself from the self-obliteration of slight.
Later in the play, after the assassination of Suffolk, Margaret 
admits, as Macduff does when he hears of his wife and children’s 
slaughter, that the loss of a loved one by violent means makes it 
impossible to avoid tears:
queen
Oft have I heard that grief softens the mind
And makes it fearful and degenerate;
Think therefore on revenge and cease to weep.
But who can cease to weep and look on this?
Here may his head lie on my throbbing breast;
But where’s the body that I should embrace?
(4.4.1–6)
She cradles Suffolk’s head, and it is her throbbing breast, rather 
than the mind that might reason out a revenge, which controls 
her actions. Margaret’s rhetorical question addressed to the 
audience produces a moment that in common parlance today 
might be called more ‘human’ than Margaret’s other comments 
on crying and one cannot but imagine that her early audiences, 
too, would have responded ‘who indeed?’ and felt, like Macduff, 
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that Margaret must also ‘feel it as a [hu]man’ (Macbeth 4.3.221). 
As we have seen, a complete lack of grief in the face of terrible 
troubles is a sign of an inhuman and un-Christian hardness for 
the early moderns. For Patricia Phillippy in Women, Death and 
Literature in Post-Reformation England, Shakespeare’s Richard III, 
with his Machiavellian performances of mourning, and his decla-
ration that his ‘manly eyes did scorn a humble tear’ at the deaths of 
young Rutland and his own father (Richard III, 1.2.168), demon-
strates that a failure to mourn properly is as culturally problematic 
as excessive mourning. As we have seen, the ideal mean for grief 
is summed up in Phillippy’s citation of Robert Southwell, who 
declares that to feel nothing at ‘sorrowful chances’ demonstrates a 
brutish lack of human understanding, whereas to fail to bear them 
with moderation is ‘effeminate’ (see p. 169). To mourn too little is 
to place oneself outside of the bounds of what it is to be human; to 
mourn too much is to place oneself outside of masculine subjec-
tivity and an active agency in the world.
By the end of the third part of Henry VI, Margaret has hardened 
the mind that Suffolk’s death had softened with grief and returns to 
the stock assertion that weeping simply delays revenge:
queen
Great lords, wise men ne’er sit and wail their loss,
But cheerly seek how to redress their harms.
[…]
We will not from the helm to sit and weep,
But keep our course, though the rough wind say no,
From shelves and rocks that threaten us with wrack.
[…]
Why, courage then! what cannot be avoided
’Twere childish weakness to lament or fear.
(5.4.1–2, 21–3, 38–9)
The sailing metaphor is particularly significant here in contrast to 
Henry’s cow image: the grieving cow runs, directionless, up and 
down with dimm’d eyes; the unweeping sailors keep a straight 
course through shelves and rocks. By this point in the Henry VI 
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narrative, Margaret has become a ‘woman of stone’ to borrow 
from Lear’s accusation in the face of what he sees as insufficient 
howling for Cordelia’s death (King Lear, 5.3.255). In positing 
grief against action, these are plays that hold in tension two 
versions of what it is to be human that emerge again in Hamlet.
Richard of Gloucester, when his father the Duke of York is 
killed, demonstrates precisely the opposite somatic workings to 
the griever drowned in tears: he claims his body is too hot with 
avenging fury, either to weep or to speak:
richard
I cannot weep, for all my body’s moisture
Scarce serves to quench my furnace-burning heart;
Nor can my tongue unload my heart’s great burden;
For self-same wind that I should speak withal
Is kindling coals that fires all my breast,
And burns me up with flames that tears would quench.
To weep is to make less the depth of grief:
Tears then for babes; blows and revenge for me.
Richard, I bear thy name; I’ll venge thy death,
Or die renowned by attempting it.
(2.1.79–88)
The declaration that ‘to weep is to make less the depth of grief ’ 
posits Richard’s subjectivity in his name, inherited from his 
father: his heroic, aristocratic, adult male selfhood lies in family 
honour and reputation. Tears are for babies; to be fully mature 
is to revenge gross slights. His suggestion that to speak any 
more than he does of his heart’s great burden would be similarly 
degrading to this sense of hot, male selfhood.
It is notable that the figures in the early history plays who favour 
vengeance over weeping are the most violent and villainous, 
fury-like in their vengeance (Margaret) or devil-like in their 
murderous plotting (Richard). Henry’s cow-like grief, on the 
other hand, may be sympathetic but it figures him as a weak-
minded and ineffectual monarch. Relentlessly directional pursuit 
of vengeance is hardly being held up as an ideal in these plays. But 
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grief is most certainly unproductive. The tension is staged from 
the very first scene of 1 Henry VI, in which Exeter demands to 
know why everyone is wearing the black of mourning for Henry 
V, when they should be ‘mourn[ing] in blood’ (1.1.17) and recov-
ering his lands in France. At his funeral, Henry V is figured as 
an impossible, mythological figure of perfect manhood, both 
virtuous and wrathful (1.1.8–16) but ‘Too famous to live long’ 
(1.1.6). The living characters in the play are either virtuous or 
wrathful, grieving or acting.
Gender underpins the binaries of active revenge and inactive 
grief, where women are socially barred from violent action 
(Margaret and Joan La Pucelle are figured as both monstrous and 
sexually excessive in their violent, active womanhood). Beatrice in 
Much Ado About Nothing makes explicit the socially constructed 
expectation that women grieve while men get angry, when she 
is seen weeping for her cousin Hero, wrongly disgraced for 
unchastity at her wedding. Beatrice asks that Benedick avenge 
the young woman’s wronged reputation as it is a ‘man’s office’ 
(4.1.265), bursts into prolonged and furious invective at the 
effeminate court ‘princes and counties’ (313) whose manhood is 
‘only turned into tongue’ (318) when he refuses, and rants that, 
were she a man, she would ‘eat [Claudio’s] heart in the market 
place’ (304–5). The violence and the rhythm of her language 
recalls Laertes’ cry that to revenge himself upon his father’s killer 
he would ‘cut his throat i’th’church’ (4.7.126). But Beatrice is not 
a man, and her fury subsides in the declaration that if she cannot 
‘be a man with wishing, [she] will die a woman with grieving’ 
(4.1.420–1). The Duchess of Gloucester in Richard II, too, 
angrily and actively demands that a man – this time her brother-
in-law – avenge the death of a loved one, her husband. When he 
will not act for her, she declares that she is going home to die of 
grief (1.2.65–74). Again, grief echoes with grievance, a grievance 
a woman is not permitted to address. In Richard III, however, 
wherein it may seem to the modern actress that all the women 
in the play get to do is mourn, mourning becomes action. I am 
referring here not, of course, to the first instance of mourning in 
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the play, that of Anne, who appears to be entirely acted upon by 
Richard: she begins 1.3 by following the corpse of her father-in-
law who Richard killed and ends the scene engaged to be married 
to him. I refer rather to the turning point in Richard’s fortunes, 
when he is met by the Senecan trio of mourning women in 4.4,33 
who intercept him, as he puts it, in his ‘expedition’ against his 
mustering enemies (4.4.136). Grief here turns not to impotent 
tears but to the linguistically performative as the women shift 
from the helpless language of mourning, which turns the women 
against one another in what amounts to a mourning competition, 
to the language of the curse, which Elizabeth explicitly asks 
Margaret to teach her (116–17). Whereas Gaunt’s exhortation to 
the Duchess of Gloucester to ask God for vengeance where she 
cannot take it herself leads to her declaration that she will die of 
grief, Margaret in Richard III now speaks of woe as performative:
elizabeth
My words are dull: O quicken them with thine.
margaret
Thy woes will make them sharp and pierce like mine.
(124–5)
If Elizabeth mourns in excess of her causes of grief, deliberately 
imagining that her ‘babes were sweeter than they were,/And 
he that slew them fouler than he is’ (120–1), Margaret advises 
that her ‘woes’ will become effectual, piercing (125). Elizabeth 
suggests that even if this cannot be the case, they will at least be 
therapeutic: ‘Let them have scope: though what they do impart/
Help not all, yet do they ease the heart’ (130–1). But the Duchess 
of York, Richard’s mother, is more of Margaret’s optimism as to 
the effectivity of the linguistic expression of grief, replying,
If so, then be not tongue-tied; go with me
And in the breath of bitter words let’s smother
My damned son, that thy two sweet sons smother’d.
(132–3)
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Words of grief turn bitter; women’s metaphors for words turn 
from those of wind and air (126–30) to a breath which smothers: 
words are figured as literally taking revenge. And sure enough, 
as many of Richard’s audiences across history will know when 
they hear the Duchess’s ‘most grievous curse’ (188) on Richard, 
it works. Bloody Richard is, as the Duchess curses, and bloody is 
his end (195); the ghosts he has created do indeed haunt him and 
‘whisper the spirit of [his] enemies’ (193).
The sequence that follows this one, in which Richard persuades 
the mourning Elizabeth to permit his marriage to her daughter, 
looks set to prove the mirror sequence to his wooing of Anne. 
In their Senecan group of female mourners the women block 
Richard’s path and almost silence him; once Elizabeth is left 
alone, however, she falls prey, as Anne does, to his Machiavellian 
machinations in a more theatrical realist vein. But rather than 
next taking the stage alone to crow at his success, as he does in 
1.3, Richard begins what might be a similar speech – ‘Relenting 
fool, and shallow, changing woman!’ (431) – to be interrupted 
by messenger after messenger announcing the armies mustering 
against him. This is the turning point in Richard’s fortunes, 
whereat his hot, tearless realism gives way to the metaphysics of 
the grief he has caused. Having been blocked in his determined 
journey to a firmer power base by the mourning women, having 
failed to block the sounds of their mourning with the sounds 
of war, Richard’s tragedy begins its downward trajectory as the 
women’s curses, Senecan tragic inevitability and Christian provi-
dence in the holy Richmond unite to defeat Richard.
A number of scholars have plausibly argued that the cultural 
losses and anxieties inscribed in the staging/writing of this scene’s 
mourning, cursing women render them repeatedly in excess 
of religious and political hegemony. Their grief is subversive, 
both within the play and within the Protestant culture of late 
seventeenth-century England. I have found arguments about 
the memorialization of purgatory in this play convincing.34 But 
the staging of residual Catholic practice is only part of a wider 
sense in which grief subverts by leaking back into political life 
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in Richard III. Grief stops action in the Henry VI plays; here 
it stops Richard in his progression to power, and the play’s 
mourning women can work through production to demonstrate 
the dramaturgy of grief and political power, even where audiences 
have no knowledge of the residual systems of mourning for the 
dead that may be being grieved for in the early modern period.
‘WHO INTERCEPTS ME IN MY EXPEDITION?’: 
RICHARD III (SWAN THEATRE 2012)
Roxana Silbert’s Richard III at the Swan in 201235 was played by 
Jonjo O’Neill. This actor had previously played the Machiavellian 
Edmund in Rupert Goold’s King Lear (Liverpool Everyman and 
Young Vic),36 with horribly good-humoured direct address to 
what seemed like a delighted audience, and opposite a hopelessly 
innocent Gloucester and Edgar. There is no such contrast of 
foolish goodness and clever evil in Richard III, as it is peopled 
almost entirely by power-mongering members of the play’s two 
Figure 7: Richard III ( Jonjo O’Neill) in Richard III dir. Roxana Silbert, Royal 
Shakespeare Company, 2012 (© Geraint Lewis)
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central royal factions, many of whom appear entirely aware of 
Richard’s machinations but do nothing about them, out of fear, 
or hope of self-advancement, or both.37 The most ludicrous 
example of this is in 3.4, the scene in which Richard suddenly 
declares that Hastings must be executed because he has conspired 
with Mistress Shaw to wither Richard’s arm, which the court 
must all surely know has been thus deformed since his birth 
(3.4.59–79).38 The power of this play for audience members today, 
who are not necessarily particularly invested in the politics of a 
fifteenth-century civil war and its implications for a sixteenth-
century monarchy, lies in the relationship between Richard and 
his audience: however much one might disapprove of the political 
murder of spouses and relatives, a Richard with deft comic 
timing, confiding to the auditorium what he is doing in the face 
of so little resistance from the other characters on-stage, can 
prove irresistibly funny, and give Richmond an uphill struggle 
in convincing us not to be somewhat disappointed when right 
triumphs and the new king removes Richard from the action. 
This may be a transhistorical effect of the dramaturgy of 
this play, especially given the theatre history of the entertaining 
‘Vice’ figure, whose lineage Richard acknowledges (3.1.82–3). 
What the play presumably relied upon in its first productions 
was the audience’s ready-made bias for Richmond as founder 
of their own Queen’s dynasty; like the Vice, Richard must have 
been able to seduce the audience into his grim comedy without 
any real danger of changing the average late Tudor theatre-goer’s 
allegiance to Richmond’s offspring.39 As Silbert and her company 
found, though, Richard’s blatant stage-management of power also 
offers a challenge to the play’s women, whose formally structured 
speeches of mourning may seem both lengthy and excluding 
in comparison to Richard’s swift wit and direct address. One 
element of this play – Richard, with his inheritance from the vice 
and the stage Machiavel – translates easily into comic traditions 
with which modern audiences are still familiar, while the formal-
ities of Senecan tragedy from whence Shakespeare developed 
the carefully structured speeches of the mourning women are 
 ‘Stop your sobbing’  193
now perhaps less accessible and their proportional length in the 
drama40 may seem excessive. It would have been easy, remarked 
Silbert when cutting the play for production, to have lost huge 
swathes of the women’s speeches without losing any of the bare 
bones of the plot. She was keen not to do this, however, and to give 
the women the proportional presence they have in an uncut text.
Silbert’s production is particularly pertinent for an exami-
nation of early modern theatrical grief in current production, 
given her ease with permitting modern actorly interest in 
character psychology and back-story into the rehearsal room, 
alongside a commitment to the staging of action over feeling (it 
is not, Silbert insists, how a character feels, and how that might 
be expressed through the language of the play, that is staged in an 
early modern drama but what a character does with the language, 
and to whom: language in Silbert’s rehearsal room is usually 
performative, though she also acknowledges the limits of the 
Stanislavskian method of ‘actioning’).41 Alongside an essentially 
performative analysis of the text and an openness to psycho-
logical discussion, Silbert has embraced the notion of a direct 
relationship between performer and audience, particularly for 
her productions in the intimacy of the RSC’s Swan Theatre, 
and has an interest in the dramaturgical histories encoded in a 
play of this period. As a visitor to rehearsal, offering background 
material to the production in the last of these areas, it seemed 
strangely contradictory that I should speak to the actors about, 
say, the theatricality of Vice figure and Richard’s consciousness 
(impossible in the realist theatre) that he is (pre-)determined to 
be a villain (1.1.30), and then that such a talk should be followed 
up by a psychologist’s visit to rehearsals, in which the emotional 
damage done to a child rejected by its mother was discussed. But 
these different forms of knowledge were all ways into the play for 
this company and generated a range of theatrical effects which, far 
from ironing out its dramaturgy of sharp contrasts, reconfigured 
the politics of the women’s grief in ways that potentially accessed 
that grief ’s subversiveness for an audience unaware of its original 
religious and political meanings.
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While the mourning, cursing women of 4.4 in no way sobbed 
their way through their lines in this production, their physical 
actions were juxtaposed with the formal poetry of the speeches 
and the additional formality of the accoutrements of modern 
mourning – formal dress and wreathes put up against the walls 
of the ‘tower’ in mourning for the princes – to produce an effect 
of emotional reality that in turn foregrounded Richard’s easy, 
natural way with the audience as theatrical convention. When 
Siobhan Redmond as Elizabeth lay on the floor of the Swan’s 
thrust stage, catatonic with grief, she looked awkwardly untheat-
rical, her body refusing the angry grace of the lines she spoke. The 
Duchess of York and Margaret ‘rest’ on the ground in the scene as 
it is written (4.4.29, 34 – it is modern editors who interpret these 
internal stage directions as [sitting]), and as there is nothing for 
them to rest on but ‘England’s lawful earth’ (4.4.29), this effect 
of awkwardness, one might argue, is already partially encoded in 
the play. But Silbert’s eclectic rehearsal process, metatheatrical 
in ways appropriate to the play’s history for some scenes, as we 
will see, but typically post-Stanislavskian in its initial table work 
and its permission for actors to find character journeys through 
the play, permitted theatrical styles and staging conventions to 
inhabit the play simultaneously and in contrast, in such as way as 
to reopen emotional expression as a site of political contest.
O’Neill’s performance as Richard was of a witty playground bully 
who it is difficult not to find hilarious despite the all too evident 
effect his cruelty has on others – particularly when the others are 
not particularly likeable themselves. He recalled a previous Richard, 
Paul Hunter’s, in an English Shakespeare Company production of 
1998,42 in which the whole cast were dressed as children; after his 
ascent to the throne and the interval, Richard was revealed from 
within the folds of a bouncy castle as it inflated before the audience. 
Both productions emphasized the amorally playful relationship 
between Richard and an audience for whom he evidently cared 
no more than for the characters he was plotting to kill. Hence his 
seductiveness: the audience, it is implied, should count themselves 
favoured to be in on the plot and lucky to be outside of it. Richard’s 
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rise to power was played by O’Neill with all the impermeable high 
theatrical status bestowed upon him by the humour of direct address 
to the audience; he shared with the auditorium his contempt for 
those who know he is a murdering con-man but who will not step 
out of line to stop him. It was one of the most consciously theatrical 
Richard IIIs I have seen, playing very fully on Richard’s metathe-
atrical awareness of his theatre-history status as vice and stage 
Machiavel, particularly in his orchestration of the noise and bluster 
for the benefit of the Lord Mayor in 3.5 (which of course comes 
directly after Buckingham’s assurances that he will be well able to 
‘counterfeit the deep tragedian’ with Richard (3.5.5.)), and 3.7, in 
which he poses as reluctant king between two churchmen. As the 
farce of 3.5 commenced, Richard shouted ‘action’, and the lighting 
state changed to a firey red. The scene then featured a comical 
feigned battle, in which Ratcliffe’s arm emerged from an opening 
upstage centre in the plain frons, holding three swords for Richard 
to clash against, as if Ratcliffe had been instructed to enact a whole 
army. The head of Hastings which is then presented to the Lord 
Mayor was not a stock theatrical head in a bag but an impressive 
likeness of the actor playing him (John Stahl). The realistic prop 
made for a ghastly theatre of comic cruelty but barely gave Ratcliffe 
time to prepare for his next role as churchman in 3.7. In this 
production, Richard has no real monks to accompany his staged 
praying, and so dresses up two of his men instead.43 There was 
much comical running about and getting ready glimpsed through 
the frons, topped by Ratcliffe attempting to enter too soon, being 
told ‘not yet!’ and being stuffed back through the window where 
he and his other player friar were to pose with bible and rosary. 
Richard, then, constructed his rise to power metatheatrically, in 
the shared space of actor and audience; he was both visible stage 
manager and stand-up comedian, a theatrical figure who produces 
an effect of hyper-reality because he can so clearly occupy the ‘real’ 
world of the present as well as that of the fiction.
However, Roxana Silbert also discussed psychological back-
story with this company and her staging of Richard’s death was 
redolent of both the villain’s personal and mythological past. At 
196 Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage
the end of the last scene, after a vigorous full-cast sword fight 
complete with dangerously authentic-looking clanging broad 
swords, Richmond killed Richard with two strokes of his sword, 
finishing him off by breaking his neck. The pair wrestled each 
other to the ground, until Richmond had Richard lying in his lap, 
the latter’s head in an arm lock. It took some time for Richard to 
die there. He opened his mouth in a strangled choke, goggle-eyed, 
appearing like the baby his mother wishes she had strangled in 
the womb (4.4.137–8), choked to death with an umbilical chord. 
To work back from Richard’s demise to that turning point of his 
fortunes, the 4.4 confrontation with the mourning women, their 
mourning turns him from a metatheatrical orchestrator of power 
and audience engagement into a vulnerable psychological being 
who is unsure about whether he can love himself, because, it 
has been openly declared, he was hated from the moment of his 
birth.44 
As I have said, Silbert’s actresses made no attempt to emote 
their way through the lines of 4.4. Elizabeth describes words 
as ‘Windy attorneys to their clients’ woes,/Airy succeeders of 
intestate joys,/Poor breathing orators of miseries’ (4.4.127–9) 
but there is none of the excess of gasp and breath that one might 
usually associate with the performance of sorrow. The women 
rather played a physical excess of sorrow – lying on the floor 
to mourn at the beginning of 4.4 – while vocally underplaying 
the lines that speak of extreme grief: ‘O who has any cause to 
mourn but we?’ (34). As they bar Richard’s way in this scene, the 
women’s competitive grieving and talk of the performative power 
of excessive grief gives way to Richard’s mother’s description of 
his birth; she promises to be ‘mind and gentle in [her] words’ 
(161) and Sandra Duncan’s tone was, when compared to the 
content of her speech. What this performance permitted was a 
certain alienation from the women’s grief and the possibility for 
the audience to watch its effects rather than empathize kinestheti-
cally with the breath and tears grief might usually be expected to 
produce. Grief became productive, finally, of Richard’s downfall, 
rather than of winds, sighs and tears that prevent action in the 
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Henriad. When Richard calls for the sounds of war to blot out 
the sounds of grieving – more stage-management of plot and 
power – he suddenly seems ludicrous in his theatricality, while the 
women’s grief reads as fine, full, perfect – in excess of Richard’s 
politics, rather than excessively performed.
HAMLET
In the Henriad, grief is excessive in that it prohibits action: it 
is impossible to channel it into action unless it changes in its 
physical nature and becomes anger. In Richard III, the excess 
of the women’s grief becomes active. What happens to grief in 
Hamlet, the play so famously marked by inaction? It is not that 
Hamlet’s grief simply prohibits action. A range of much-explored 
intellectual and religious questions play a part in Hamlet’s delay 
in avenging his father, but it is certainly a play about arrested 
agency and one replete with questions about grief and action. 
I am going to argue that it is grief, and a particularly contra-
dictory, continually contested form of the early modern state of 
melancholy in this play,45 that both arrest Hamlet’s action and are 
the instigators of a dangerous, intellectual agency. Hamlet’s is a 
subversive, insightful grief – subversive first in the simple sense 
that Hamlet’s continued state of mourning visually subverts his 
uncle’s celebration of the marriage to Gertrude, and at a time 
when the state is at war and needs to present an illusion of unity. 
Hamlet begins the play in a state of mourning. Then the Ghost 
demands that Hamlet remember him as Exeter exhorts his 
fellow Lancastrians to remember Henry V: not through mourning 
but through vengeance, not through tears but through action, 
not through melancholy (‘mourn[ing] in black’) but through 
sanguinity (‘mourn[ing] […] in blood’, 1 Henry VI, 1.1.17). 
But his father’s demand precipitates Hamlet not into the anger-
against-slight that is the sense of grievance which leads to revenge. 
Instead he may be read as remaining in a state of melancholy 
which involves over-thinking, meditation upon the pointlessness 
of existence and suicide, and self-denigration. How may the stasis 
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of melancholy be said to subvert Claudius’ state? On one level it 
cannot, as of course it may be said to stop Hamlet killing Claudius 
until the very end of the play. But Hamlet’s state of insightful 
grief posits him continually against a political state that is 
‘moving on’, from marriage to marriage, and over little patches of 
conquerable land. Anger, as we have seen, produces motion; love, 
too, the concupiscable passion, produces a movement towards the 
lover – and a movement across nations for Helena and Cleopatra. 
Grief produces a subversive stasis.
Insightful grief cannot be equated precisely with melancholy, 
the early modern psychosomatic state that has given rise to much 
productive speculation about this play. That scholars differ so 
radically in their reading of Hamlet’s melancholy suggests that 
melancholy itself is at a semantic and cultural turning point in 
Hamlet. In The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England,46 
Douglas Trevor reads Hamlet as a humoral materialist, who makes 
reference to his own melancholic complexion, his melancholic 
disposition, his diseased wit. For Trevor, humoral melancholy is 
becoming a scholarly fashion as Shakespeare writes Hamlet. Mark 
Breitenberg centres part of his argument about anxious mascu-
linity in early modern drama on the notion that melancholy is the 
state against which the male gender is defined.47 David Schalkwyk, 
on the other hand, suggests that humoral theory is figured as 
residual and outmoded in Shakespeare’s late Elizabethan work.48 
These equally plausible but opposing arguments are unsurprising 
given that, in fact, Hamlet is figured as tussling with the theories 
of subjectivity available to an Elizabethan intellectual, and with 
the contradictions inherent in melancholy at this time – melan-
choly as a disease and a choice, the passions as excessive material 
presences in the body over which the reasoning self must try to 
exert control. It is Descartes who can be credited with the first 
systematic explanation of mind/body dualism (see p. xxxi), but 
I am arguing that a kind of dualism is struggling to emerge fifty 
years beforehand in late Elizabethan and early Jacobean drama, as it 
interrogates the binaries of reason and passion, responsibility and 
predestination, psychological agency and somatic helplessness. 
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These binaries become particularly blurred in Hamlet and its 
staging of melancholy. On the one hand, the passions are always 
somatic in early modern discourse, so that feelings associated with 
grief and sorrow – heaviness, emptiness, tearfulness – are caused 
by the various activities of excessive black bile in the body and, 
when these feelings have an external cause, such as bereavement, 
these somatic phenomena are bound to be produced. A man may 
be of a melancholic disposition, as Hamlet describes himself, and 
be particularly susceptible to the emotions of sorrow and fear, 
even when there is no external cause, as Hamlet fears may be the 
case with the Ghost he has seen (2.2.600–605). For such a man, 
the dominant humour of his disposition, black bile, is always in 
danger of becoming excessive and resulting in madness. Another 
may become overwhelmed by a particular trauma – the death 
of a dear friend or relative, also Hamlet’s case – or may become 
sick with melancholy by habit, again with danger to his health, as 
Burton suggests in the Anatomy, where he describes ‘Passions and 
Perturbations of the Mind: How they Cause Melancholy’:
Perturbations often offend the body, and are most frequent 
causes of melancholy, turning it out of the hinges of his 
health. […] Those which are light, easy, and more 
seldom, to our thinking, do us little harm, and are 
therefore contemned of us: yet if they be reiterated, as 
the rain (saith Austin) doth a stone, so do these perturbations 
penetrate the mind: and (as one observes) produce a habit of 
melancholy at the last, which having gotten the mastery in 
our souls, may well be called diseases.49
Burton also asserts that melancholy is a universal human condition, 
always and inevitably leading to some form of madness, because 
everyone is prey to the passions that can cause it:
For indeed who is not a fool, melancholy, mad? […] who 
is not brain-sick? Folly, melancholy, madness, are but one 
disease, Delirium is a common name to all. […]’twas an 
old Stoical paradox […] all fools are mad, though some 
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madder than others. And who is not a fool, who is free 
from melancholy? Who is not touched more or less in 
habit or disposition? […] for what is sickness, but […] 
‘A dissolution or perturbation of the bodily league, which 
health combines:’ and who is not sick, or ill-disposed? in 
whom doth not passion, anger, envy, discontent, fear and 
sorrow reign? Who labours not of this disease?50
Here, the passions are figured as both universally felt and always 
in danger of being in excess. Passion is sickness and we are all 
sick. Again, it is difficult for the modern reader to decide what was 
considered normative in terms of mental health here: how much 
grief is ‘normal’ grief, when does sorrow – one of the primary 
symptoms and external causes of melancholy for Burton – become 
habitual and then pathological? How much sorrow is too much? 
Perhaps it is unhelpful to apply modern scientific notions of the 
normative or healthy to early modern medical and philosophical 
discourses of the passions, since to do so is to tend to forget the 
religious premises on which some of the early modern notions of 
the passions are founded. As Gail Kern Paster has pointed out in 
her opening to Humoring the Body, for the early modern thinker, the 
only being ever to have felt any emotion in a way not contaminated 
with the potential for sickness and degeneration was Christ, whose 
passions ‘were like the shaking of pure Water in a cleane Vessell, 
which though it be thereby troubled, yet is it not fouled at all’, 
whereas man’s passion always ‘bringeth up mire and dirt’.51 The 
mere human subject is always fighting the excesses of his passions 
even where Christian thought permits him or her to have them, and 
the ultimate healthy state, in which the passions may be felt but are 
always moderated by reason, seems impossible to achieve. Sorrow is 
no exception here. For Burton it is one of the most obvious causes 
and symptoms of melancholy – although to call it a cause or a 
symptom involves the modern scholar in an ultimately futile attempt 
to separate cause from effect:
In this catalogue of passions, which so much torment 
the soul of man, and cause this malady […] the first 
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place in this irascible appetite, may justly be challenged 
by sorrow. An inseparable companion, ‘The mother 
and daughter of melancholy, her epitome, symptom, 
and chief cause:’ as Hippocrates hath it, they beget one 
another, and tread in a ring, for sorrow is both cause and 
symptom of this disease.52
Despite the somatic composition of melancholy, Burton’s list 
of remedies ‘Against sorrow for Death of Friends or otherwise’ 
are all philosophical and commonsensical rather than medical: 
to prevent oneself from being overwhelmed with grief at 
bereavement one needs to remind oneself that one has other 
friends and pleasures, that it is cruel to desire that someone who 
died in sickness should return from everlasting life to worldly 
pain, that death for the righteous is the ultimate peace and, most 
exhaustively, that there are others who have suffered too, probably 
worse than you have.53 The explicit link between sorrow and 
black bile was being loosened by the late seventeenth century, 
as Richard Baxter’s sermon on ‘the best Preservatives against 
Melancholy and Overmuch Sorrow’ indicates:
Such a black distinct humour called Melancholy which 
hath of old been accused, is rarely, if ever found in any, 
unless you will call either blood or excrementitious 
humours by that name, which are grown black by morti-
fication, for want of motion and spirits.54
While an interest in the physical causes and manifestations 
of sorrow is still clear here, the word melancholy is, it seems, 
beginning to be used, in the title of the sermon, as a word for 
what we might call an emotion, as separate from ‘a black distinct 
humour’. This is made yet clearer where Baxter differentiates 
between circumstantial and dispositional melancholy:
But sometimes persons that are found, are suddenly cast 
into Melancholy by a fright, or by the death of a friend, 
or by some great loss or cross, or some sad Tidings, even 
in an hour; which shews that it cometh not always from 
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any humour called Melancholy, or any foregoing Disease 
at all.55
An earlier and better-known (because linked to Hamlet) tract on 
Melancholy, such as Timothy Bright’s of 1586,56 concentrates 
on melancholy as a humoral imbalance which leads to irrational 
fears and sorrows. Bright does not dwell upon or exemplify 
bereavement or loss as a cause of melancholy as Burton does 
later: Bright’s melancholics are primarily so by disposition rather 
than by circumstance. He is anxious to differentiate between the 
somatic disease of melancholy and its effects on the one hand and, 
on the similar effects of sorrow and fear that might overwhelm 
someone stricken with conscience and fearful of God’s anger. For 
Bright, all who suffer the disease of melancholy do so because of 
humoral imbalance; external causes are either simply imaginary, 
or the melancholic’s sickness means he reacts to them in irrational 
and exaggerated ways. The conscience-stricken, on the other 
hand, feels as he does ‘upon cause’; it is quite reasonable that he 
should suffer because he feels his sinfulness; therefore he cannot 
be said to be melancholic:
this [consciousness of sin] is a sorrow and fear upon 
cause, & that the greatest cause that worketh misery unto 
man: the other [melancholy] contrarily a mere fancy & 
hath no ground of true and just object, but is only raised 
upon disorder of the humour in the fancy.57
Bright’s explanations of melancholy’s causes are far more limited 
in scope than Burton’s (and it is certainly a far shorter work). 
For Bright, physical disease is the primary cause of negative 
affect in the end; for Burton, causes range from devils to desire 
for revenge, from sleep disorders to sorrow, from self-love to 
too much studying, heredity to habit, bad diet to bereavement.58 
Of course, Burton shares with Bright an early modern sense 
of mind’s inextricable reciprocity with body and both’s porous 
openness to the outside world. But what I am more interested 
in here is that both share a faith in effortful cure by the inflicted 
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themselves, through reason and imagination. For Burton, melan-
choly is very much part of the human condition and is often 
caused by traumatic accidents and poor upbringing; his cures are 
often meditative and philosophical, the Anatomy reading as a kind 
of group therapy to be shared with all the Classical and Christian 
exemplars of those who have also suffered. Even Bright, who 
seems to be more wholly interested in the somatic, recommends 
alongside physic the contemplation of ‘examples of constancy and 
moderation’.59 
Douglas Trevor lists many of the references to humoural 
theory in Hamlet, and cites, as his example of Hamlet’s use of 
the term ‘complexion’, a term used to denote humoral type, the 
use of the word in the jokey exchange with the pretentious Osric:
hamlet
But yet methinks it is very sultry and hot for my 
complexion.
(5.2.99–100)
But Hamlet uses the word twice elsewhere: once in the conven-
tional humoral sense, in the first part of his remembered Pyrrhus 
speech, where Pyrrhus is described as blackened with the humoral 
madness of warlike violence, then smeared with the even more 
dreadful red of his enemy’s blood:
The rugged Pyrrhus, he whose sable arms,
Black as his purpose, did the night resemble
When he lay couched in the ominous horse,
Hath now this dread and black complexion smear’d
With heraldry more dismal.
(2.2.53–7)
Hamlet has also used it in a context that complicates this sense of 
‘complexion’ in the contorted second half of a speech to Horatio, 
in which Hamlet condemns his uncle’s revels. Hamlet explains 
how Claudius’ court’s drunken celebrations sully Denmark’s 
reputation, then compares it to a man whose virtues are oblit-
erated in the eyes of others by one fault:
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So, oft it chances in particular men
That for some vicious mole of nature in them,
As, in their birth, wherein they are not guilty,
(Since nature cannot choose his origin),
By the o’ergrowth of some complexion,
Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason,
Or by some habit that too much o’er-leavens
The form of plausive manners – that these men,
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect,
Being nature’s livery, or fortune’s star,
Their virtues else, be they as pure as grace,
As infinite as man may undergo,
Shall in the general censure take corruption
From that particular fault. The dram of evil
Doth all the noble substance often dout
To his own scandal.
(1.4.23–38)
Thus, the single faults so detrimental to the ‘noble substance’ of 
these putative men are defects of birth, of which they cannot be 
said to be guilty, or they are humoral imbalances – ‘the o’ergrowth 
of some complexion’ – or they are habitual. They are natural 
excesses or they are visited upon this man by the fates. The sense 
of the passage is repeatedly broken by qualifying clauses that 
give the impression of one attempting to convince himself. What 
Hamlet seems to be repeating is that something that is not the 
fault of a man may condemn him in the world’s eyes, subject him 
to ‘scandal’. He switches between nature and habit, nature and 
fate in deciding what might be to blame – but it is not the faulty 
agent himself. It is an odd choice of extended metaphor given the 
initial excesses he sets out to criticize. Claudius and his court are 
celebrating and drinking too much, and it is clear that Hamlet 
considers this no ‘vicious mole of nature’ but a conscious choice. 
Trevor is not quite right to suggest, then, that Hamlet’s ‘outlook’ 
is essentially materialist,60 based in humoral theory. Or at least, 
this is just one outlook Hamlet marshalls against the horrible 
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notion that he may be responsible for his own actions in a time 
so out of joint.
When Hamlet watches Fortinbras’ soldiers march across the 
stage to conquer a tiny patch of Poland, he witnesses the actions 
of a man who certainly never sits at the helm and weeps, but keeps 
his course, as Margaret encourages the ‘Great lords’ of 3 Henry 
VI to do. As we have seen, Hamlet is full of people keeping their 
course after the death of his father, in ways that Hamlet finds 
he cannot. The audience first see him witness Laertes getting 
permission to travel, while Hamlet is told that he should stay 
where he is. They first see Claudius announcing that the whole 
court are to ‘move on’, to use an appropriate current cliché, 
after the death of their late king, by accepting that Gertrude 
and he are married; he then orders ambassadors abroad and 
generally seems to get on with the business of ruling in a swift 
and efficient manner, as a number of critics have noted.61 In this 
second scene of Hamlet, everyone is either talking about moving, 
or actually moving on- and off-stage, leaving Hamlet as static 
and reluctant commentator. When Laertes’ father is killed by 
Hamlet, Laertes declares he would happily cut Hamlet’s throat 
‘i’th’church’ (4.7.126); Hamlet finds the murderer of his father 
praying and finds reason not to do so, poising with the dagger 
frozen above the murderer like Pyhrrus in the Player’s speech 
but without the eventual violent conclusion. I may seem to be 
returning here to Lawrence Olivier’s assertion that Hamlet is 
‘a tragedy about a man who could not make up his mind’.62 But 
Hamlet spends the play ‘making up’ his mind in another sense. 
He spends the play in a state of what I have called insightful grief, 
forging and producing a mind in dialogue with his audience, 
until he succumbs to the stock Protestant notion that there is a 
special providence in the fall of a sparrow and agrees to take part 
in Claudius’ play fight.63 This making up, or constructing, of his 
‘mind’ is posited against the kind of assertive agency it takes to be 
a revenge hero. Grief, always in danger of being ‘excessive grief, 
the enemy to the living’ (All’s Well, 1.155), produces a caesura in 
politically productive time; it produces insight rather than action, 
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stillness or directionless movement rather than clear trajectory. 
Interestingly, Jonathan Hope and Michael Witmore’s use of a 
software system set up to search text for linguistic constructions 
and tropes has tentatively concluded that Shakespeare’s early work 
is more concerned with human action, his later work with human 
experience of action and being acted upon – with what characters 
feel, then, rather than with what they do.64 This is certainly borne 
out by an examination of grief in the early histories and Hamlet, 
throughout which dramatic history, the expression of sorrow is 
anathema to action, so that in the earlier, ‘active’ plays, tears are 
repeatedly scorned by characters as they call for revenge, where 
in Hamlet, whose central character is called to revenge but cannot 
manage it, grief is central to his subjectivity, his language and his 
philosophical insights.
‘THERE’S MATTER IN THESE SIGHS, THESE PROFOUND 
HEAVES’: NICHOLAS HYTNER’S HAMLET AND THE 
POLITICS OF EMOTIONAL EXCESS65
A number of recent modern Hamlets have been far from physi-
cally inactive. David Tennant at the RSC leapt about the stage with 
boundless energy – but this seeming drivenness only emphasized 
his directionlessness: after swearing to the Ghost to take only 
one direction, Hamlet then fails to take it.66 Rory Kinnear in the 
National Theatre’s 2011 production, as we will see, emphasized 
the comic dimension of Hamlet’s ‘antic disposition’ (1.5.180) and 
the unproductive aimlessness of the expression of grief. Michael 
Sheen’s incarcerated Hamlet had the restless energy of paranoia: 
in the twentieth-century asylum setting at the Young Vic, it was 
hinted that Claudius, the director of the hospital, might not have 
been old Hamlet’s killer and that Hamlet had staged the whole 
play’s action, creeping about the asylum at night when he should 
have been still, stealing the coat of his dead father so as better to 
pretend to be the Ghost, emerging from behind Fortinbras’ mask 
at the end of the play.67 Dreamthinkspeak’s heavily cut Hamlet, 
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The Rest is Silence, on the other hand, set behind a quadrangle 
of perspex windows, with the audience standing in darkness at 
its centre peering into the world of the play, centred on a static 
and often silent Hamlet, many of whose lines were cut. The ‘To 
be or not to be’ soliloquy was spoken by his uncle, mother and 
friends who had sneaked into his room to read it in his diary and 
who, in the case of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, proceeded 
scornfully to read it aloud for their own amusement, jumbled to 
produce a comical range of meanings. Edward Hogg’s Hamlet sat 
silently watching much of the action and seemed also to watch the 
audience; his voice was thin and reedy and there was a blankness 
about him suggestive of a theatricalized autism. The question I 
want to ask in the following analysis of the National Theatre’s 
production is around what meaningful sense might be made of 
the early modern tensions between passion and its moderation, 
and between grief and action, when these tensions do not exist 
for the modern spectator in the urgent way they may have for 
early modern audiences. It is perhaps, partially, in the relationship 
Figure 8: Hamlet (Rory Kinnear) in Hamlet dir. Nicholas Hytner, National Theatre, 
2010 (© Geraint Lewis)
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between movement and stasis that early modern meanings can be 
opened up to a modern audience.
The National Theatre Hamlet of 2010, directed by the theatre’s 
Artistic Director Nicholas Hytner, was most notably distin-
guished by its setting in a modern surveillance state, in which 
the play’s conventions of dialogue and soliloquy are complicated 
by the constant presence of Claudius’ state surveillance team, his 
Switzers, as Claudius refers to his personal guard in 4.5 (97) and 
as the stage-manager names these figures in the prompt copy.68 
Movement is foregrounded in this Elsinore, because it is always 
watched and followed. This was a Hamlet of exceptionally clear 
directorial decisions, some of which – particularly the death of 
Ophelia, who is fairly certainly murdered by the Switzers – did 
not emerge from the text but were logical extensions of the state 
and society that the production generated from the play. It was a 
Hamlet in which everyone’s actions, relationships – and indeed 
passions – were policed most blatantly by the state. From the 
moment when Fransisco muttered that he was ‘sick at heart’ 
(1.1.9) after his watch and Barnado looked at him questioningly, as 
if somewhat disturbed, because one does not admit such things as 
a soldier in this Elsinore, we were clearly in a world where openly 
showing that one is unhappy could be politically dangerous. What 
this highlighted for this study was the emergence in this play 
of a subjectivity forged in the tensions between private passion 
and public expression, single subject and the needs of the state, 
tensions which again heighten questions around agency and 
responsibility within the holistic worldview in which the somatic 
passions take their place.
The state that dominated this production may be read as an 
explicitly Soviet or even contemporary Russian one, and one 
might argue that this rendered the production an easy critique of 
something of which many of its audiences were likely already to 
disapprove. The fact that, as several broadsheet reviewers and a 
large number of bloggers and less mainstream reviewers remarked, 
Patrick Malahide’s Claudius looked rather like Vladamir Putin,69 
contributed to this sense of specific historical setting: Hamlet 
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as the Russian leader’s fantasy of returning to Soviet-style state 
surveillance, perhaps. Indeed, Jami Rogers entitled her review for 
Internet Shakespeare Editions ‘Hamlet and Putin’, and suggests 
that ‘it was thought-provoking as a critique of the contemporary 
Russian regime’.70 Two years later, as two young women are 
imprisoned for a critique of Putin’s actual regime71 (an artistic 
intervention similarly daft in its visuals to this Hamlet’s smiley 
face campaign, of which more later), this narrow reading seems 
more plausible than it might have when I left the theatre after 
seeing the production. In conversation with Matt Wolf for a 
series of public interviews around the production, Rory Kinnear 
(Hamlet) makes reference only to a setting that might ‘veer 
towards a Soviet satellite state’.72 However, whether or not one 
read this Hamlet as ‘set’ in contemporary Russia or the old Soviet 
Union, the production took very seriously the question of how, 
in modern dress, one might portray a state with a leader who 
murders former leaders and pack future leaders off into exile. The 
answer was an excessively paranoid one which, as Peter Holland 
reminds us in his programme essay for this production, is how 
Shakespeare portrays Elsinore.73 What ultimately prevented the 
production from being simply a satire on contemporary Russia or 
the former Soviet Union, if it was that at all, was the care it took 
in exploring the politics of emotion: this state policed emotion as 
if it were always dangerously excessive, endeavouring to follow it 
and cut it off – quite explicitly in the case of Ophelia.
Kinnear and Hytner, in an interview for the production’s 
programme, are particularly concerned with Hamlet’s ‘authen-
ticity’: ‘human authenticity is one of the play’s chief concerns,’ 
asserts Hytner. ‘One of our jobs has been to find ways of making 
vivid Hamlet’s grapple with his own authenticity.’74 For the 
creators of this production, the fact that Hamlet finds himself 
surrounded by corruption, pretence and false friends leads him 
through a distraught quest for that which passeth show. However, 
I would argue that the production went beyond familiar binaries 
of honesty and social pretence, false show and authentic selfhood. 
What Kinnear made clear, through a performance of Hamlet’s 
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deepening ‘depression’, as he puts it,75 is Hamlet’s dawning reali-
zation that the expression of ‘that within’, however sincerely felt 
and self-authored, does not get him any closer to avenging his 
father but rather demonstrates the length the state will go to pry 
into and police that interiority.
Rory Kinnear’s Hamlet risked his life in this production by 
showing he was miserable in a court where everyone is obliged 
to pretend to be happy – and when they are not, drown their 
sorrows in champagne and whiskey: Claudius and Gertrude 
drank liberally from the moment the cameras started filming 
what became Claudius’ statement to the nation (1.2.1–25) It was 
a production which took the Ghost’s accusation of Claudius’ 
and Gertrude’s adultery in a modern sense (in the play this is 
open to interpretation, of course, due to the religious and legal 
ambiguities around marrying one’s dead spouse’s sibling). The 
Ghost emphasized the word ‘adulterate’ in describing Claudius 
as ‘that incestuous, that adulterate beast’ (1.5.42) and Hamlet 
reacted in renewed surprise and horror. In this production, old 
Hamlet’s son is clearly being told that the ‘falling off ’ (47) of 
the love between his mother and his father happened before the 
old King’s death. Thus Gertrude was already in conspiracy with 
Claudius before the play began, having hidden her illicit love for 
him when her husband was alive – and the love his mother had for 
his father has, for Hamlet, now been tainted with a falsehood yet 
worse than that demonstrated by her swift turn to Claudius after 
old Hamlet’s death. Significantly, in 1.2, the re-announcement of 
the new King and old Queen’s marriage was televised, complete 
with recording of a national anthem-like theme and cheering 
crowds, Claudius and Gertrude sitting before a large painting 
of old Hamlet draped in black, while the foreign policy issues 
with Norway and the organization of the ambassadors were 
kept from the viewing public, discussed when the broadcast was 
complete. This was a royal marriage which was supposed to lull 
and calm the nation at a time of encroaching war, chiming well 
with Claudius’ suggestion of measure and balance in his personal 
actions – he weighed delight and dole (1.2.13) – while Hamlet 
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figures the court as a place of excess. As soon as the broadcast 
was over, Gertrude took a tense swig from a glass of champagne. 
It was not suggested that she suspected her new husband of her 
former husband’s murder – her exclamation in the Closet scene 
‘As kill a king?’ (3.4.29) was as horrified as any Gertrude’s at this 
idea (though her revulsion to Claudius’ touch at the end of this 
scene suggests that she certainly believes Hamlet’s accusation by 
this point). What the scene set up was the state’s utilization of 
the personal to smooth the political, its use of that which reads as 
authentic emotion – love between the newly married – to soften 
and humanize the state in the eyes of the populace. This strong 
visual reminder of the public, state occasion of this speech fits 
particularly plausibly with the lines in which Claudius posits 
himself as a paradigm of the victory of reason over passionate 
excess of grief:
Yet so far hath discretion fought with nature
That we with wisest sorrow think on him
Together with remembrance of ourselves.
Therefore […].
(1.2.5–8)
The king’s ‘therefore’ leads to the redeclaration of his marriage, 
which Claudius presented almost as a sacrifice of his natural 
desire to mourn his brother for the good of the state.
This Elsinore policed emotion and affect relentlessly. ‘Switzers’ 
lurked behind every panel of the set, a consciously bland and 
sinisterly shifting series of grey walls. The state followed, most 
literally, romantic relationships, friendship, art, all modes of what 
we might call ‘self-expression’. When Ophelia was confronted 
by her father about her relationship with Hamlet in 1.3 and  was 
forbidden to consort further with him, Polonius thrust at her a 
file of photographs of the couple seen together, taken by these not 
particularly shadowy agents; she was clearly horrified at the breach 
of privacy. The agents sprang forth after Hamlet’s first soliloquy 
in 1.2, to hold Horatio and the men of the watch at the threshold 
until Hamlet approved their entry. These Switzers listened quite 
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blatantly to Hamlet’s request that the players play The Murder 
of Gonzago. The First Player appeared most unnerved by the 
request, as if this were potentially a subversive text in its own 
right; he appeared even more worried when Hamlet asked him to 
learn the newly inserted lines. 
Ophelia was, the audience was undoubtedly to assume, finally 
murdered by the surveillance Switzers, justifying the terror with 
which she responded to Polonius’ demand that they go to the King 
to tell of Hamlet’s crazed entrance to her closet (2.1.117–18). Her 
father murdered, the Switzers prevented her from mourning him: 
his body in a clinical white bag was wheeled across the stage and 
she was prevented from following it. Her madness is explicitly 
feared as subversive by Horatio (4.5.14–15) and in this production 
she was given the treatment that is planned for Hamlet when he 
is sent off to England. The production also made the rare choice 
of having Gertrude see the Ghost in her closet: Clare Higgins 
stepped towards him, treading distractedly on to the painting of 
Claudius that Hamlet had removed from the wall to compare it 
to his father’s portrait. Gertrude then denied seeing the Ghost, 
and later, though she had conspired with Hamlet in her promise 
not to reveal that he is only ‘mad in craft’ (3.4.190), colluded 
with her husband’s government in a delivery of the description 
of Ophelia’s drowning which implied that she at least suspected 
the murder.
Kinnear’s was, from the outset, an emotionally expressive 
Hamlet, frustratedly tearful at his mother’s rapid remarriage 
in the first soliloquy and very plausibly devastated to hear the 
Ghost’s tale of the murder. He was clearly angry and frustrated 
after the humiliation of being refused a return to Wittenburg, 
which request he presented to his uncle as an official paper; 
he directed ‘A little more than kin and less than kind’ (1.2.65) 
directly at his uncle rather than to the audience or as if muttering 
to himself – not by any means the first time this has been done in 
production but a rarer choice, one which made the relationship 
between uncle and nephew very obviously confrontational.76 In 
this Denmark, it also made Hamlet a very brave man – though it 
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also suggested a critique of censorship and surveillance as crassly 
unsubtle mechanisms of state control. It was as if the authorities 
knew they needed to police passions and relationships but could 
only do so through their usual technologies for the surveillance of 
exterior shows and actions.
Interestingly, Kinnear’s Hamlet reacted particularly furiously 
to Claudius’ suggestion that his persistent mourning of his father 
was ‘unmanly grief ’ (1.2.94) and stormed away from his uncle on 
this line. This may be read as contempt for the machismo under-
lying the suggestion that grief could be thus gendered – but to 
me it rather read as genuine offence at being called unmanly. This 
reading of the line suggested that Hamlet’s melancholy might 
be circumstantial rather than dispositional, primarily produced 
by his father’s death. Indeed, a number of critics commented 
on the ordinariness of this Hamlet77 and certainly he spoke his 
lines within a realist tradition of acting that produced an effect 
of distress at bereavement which audiences might recognize 
from their own experience. Kinnear tried new meanings via 
odd emphases (more than one reviewer commented on the 
delivery of ‘Soft you now, the fair Ophelia’ as ‘Soft! You – now! 
The Fair Ophelia’ (3.1.88–9) as if to say ‘and now you enter, the 
woman who is rejected me, just to cap the speech in which I’ve 
been contemplating suicide’). He had a cigarette in his hand 
through ‘To be or not to be’, producing an effect of spontaneous 
thought – though in fact he only smoked it before the line ‘Thus 
conscience doth make cowards of us all’ (83), a conventional 
enough point for an actor to move or change pace, as it marks a 
new thought or conclusion after the set of questions that precedes 
it. The smoking was not used to break up lines, so that I found 
no irritable complaints from reviewers about bad verse speaking. 
What his supposed ordinariness suggested was that in this surveil-
lance state, any kind of emotional expression is in excess of what is 
permissible, because potentially disruptive. It is only legitimated 
if it can be displayed, like Claudius’ and Gertrude’s marriage, 
as part of the state’s propaganda apparatus. Having that within 
which passeth show is highly subversive.
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Kinnear’s Hamlet did not give the impression of having been 
a melancholic outsider before the death of his father or even of 
having been an extraordinarily profound intellectual, one of the 
marks of the early modern melancholic. He is, like his father (a 
downbeat, vulnerable-seeming and very human Ghost played by 
James Laurenson), ‘a man, take him for all in all’ (1.2.187), devas-
tated by his father’s death, offended at being called unmanly and 
understanding, horribly suddenly, that he lives in a place where 
expressing ‘that within which passeth show’ is not regarded as 
legitimate. 
Particularly passionate was Kinnear’s delivery of the ‘O what a 
rogue and peasant slave am I’ soliloquy (2.2.550ff.). The exclama-
tions of ‘Bloody, bawdy villain!’ (582) burst from Hamlet in fury 
and distress, as he knelt on the floor and desperately struck at it, 
underlining the fact that Hamlet’s anger is impotent because it is 
conflated with his grief. My preferred interpretation of these lines 
has been that they are a desperate rehearsal of the stage revenge 
hero, a theatrical rant intended by Hamlet to force himself into 
the choleric state of the stage revenger who is, in action, as good 
as his word. Then ‘Why what an ass am I! This is most brave,’ 
(384) is the bathetic, often comic, self-reprimand at his poor and 
ineffectual performance. ‘Bravery’, after all, means showiness in 
early modern English. However, there was no sense of a conscious 
theatricality at this point in this production. Kinnear exclaimed 
with a seemingly spontaneous but impotent desperation: Hamlet 
proved here that he felt just as strongly as the Player in the latter’s 
acted passion over the death of Hecuba, but that this makes no 
difference whatsoever to the fact that he, Hamlet, is still not 
an effective agent in the revenge tragedy the Ghost of his dead 
father commanded him to set in motion. It is significant that the 
production used a Q2-based text so that the words ‘O vengeance!’ 
were cut from the end of Hamlet’s exclamations in this soliloquy. 
The Folio line may have been considered too archaically stagy 
for Kinnear’s interpretation of the role, too far evocative of the 
archetypal revenger, which even in Shakespeare’s lifetime was 
being parodied.78 But Kinnear’s delivery indicated that no matter 
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how much Hamlet feels and how powerfully he expresses it, 
‘expression’ of passion is how one makes up one’s mind in the 
sense in which I have used it above (p. 205) – the way in which 
one constructs one’s own subjectivity – whereas his father has 
demanded that he make up his mind, in the common, figurative 
sense, to action.
Hamlet now talks himself into one more prequel to the action 
of the revenge hero, the Players’ performance, which he sets up 
to assure himself that his ‘melancholy’ has not misled him as to 
the nature of the Ghost (2.2.600–605). This, more than in any 
other production I have seen, read as a temporary burst of action 
before Hamlet falls back into the contemplative and interrogatory 
inaction of the ‘To be or not to be’ soliloquy. Kinnear and Ruth 
Negga signalled a sincere love between Hamlet and Ophelia, 
once expressed through the tokens Ophelia was now returning. 
They were both in tears when Hamlet declared that he ‘did love 
[her] once’ and she replied that she believed it (3.1.115–16). His 
warning against himself as ‘proud, revengeful, ambitious’ (125) 
was spoken as a performance he felt obliged to give in order 
to break the bonds between them, a pompous and implausible 
joke. As in many productions, Kinnear staged the realization 
that Hamlet is being spied on on his line ‘where’s your father?’ 
(130–1), when he realized that the book Ophelia was holding was, 
in this production, bugged. After that, his disgust was palpable 
for the love he once believed sincere and his later innuendoes 
for Ophelia’s benefit at The Mousetrap, crude and cruel. She 
became yet another of the court saps for whom Hamlet has been 
performing his ludicrous acts of madness – his silly weeping 
noises under the duvet for the benefit of Polonius in 2.2, the 
spoilt-brat whine with which he delivers ‘I lack advancement’ 
(3.2.342) for Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Kinnear played 
madness as if Hamlet cannot quite believe anyone is falling 
for his charade. He played the rebellious iconoclastic artist 
producing The Mousetrap with similarly violent irony, giving out 
T-shirts with the iconic smiley face he has been posting up about 
Elsinore and which Gertrude and Ophelia dutifully donned for 
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the Players’ performance. He dropped his underpants, uttered 
obscenities (this Hamlet certainly put the ‘c*nt’ into ‘country 
matters’ (3.2.118)) and until the moment Claudius cried for 
lights, everyone patronizingly humoured the eccentric Prince. 
Hytner and Kinnear’s concern with subjective authenticity came 
to fruition here: Kinnear’s performance suggested that after 
Ophelia’s betrayal, Hamlet reread every expression of feeling he 
had received or witnessed in Elsinore as having an ulterior and 
inauthentic motive; his maniacal glee at the court performance 
suggested that he simply could not believe the stupidity of the 
conniving and calculating court – were they really permitting him 
to do all this?
However, once the Ghost’s authenticity was proven by 
Claudius’ horror as he looked down upon the dead body of the 
player king (and the effect was intensified by a doubling of the 
Player with the Ghost of old Hamlet), this Hamlet developed 
a kind of hardened pragmatism in action that seemed far 
from ‘authentic’. The audience had come to know a Hamlet 
who talks about how he feels and what he must do. When he 
actually acted, he ceased to be Hamlet-like. In his mother’s 
closet he played a blunt lack of concern at her distress, until 
the Ghost came to upbraid him; his dry, comical reaction to 
his mistaken killing of Polonius seemed similarly determined 
in its performance of indifference. His pragmatic pleasure at 
his plan to send Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to their deaths 
startled Horatio. He was clearly affected by the uncovering of 
Yorick’s skull, and here Kinnear movingly signalled Hamlet’s 
memories of an age before he knew of betrayal and corruption 
and could simply play with a friend he loved. But when he 
challenged Laertes over the strength of their love for Ophelia, 
the bitter sarcasm of ‘I’ll rant as well as thou’ (5.2.284) showed 
us a Hamlet for whom all declarations and deeds of love are 
meaningless show.
Hytner’s own reading of Hamlet’s ‘We defy augury’ speech to 
Horatio (5.2.218–23) is that here he suddenly and paradoxically 
reaches some profoundly spiritual conclusions about his – and 
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all of humankind’s – situation. Here he is in conversation with 
Kinnear during rehearsal:
Nick Hytner: The other thing which is immensely 
engrossing – and releasing – is that everything you 
think you know, is simultaneously contradicted….For 
example, I think we’re both pretty sure that, by the 
time Hamlet comes back after being rescued [he has 
experienced] something mysterious enough for him to be 
unable to explain it in a soliloquy. Famously, the solilo-
quies stop. When he tells Horatio ‘Let be’, he seems to be 
saying that he’s letting go, relinquishing control, that he 
has discovered a truth that is unavailable to explanation. 
And yet, when he knows he’s dying, not once but three 
times Hamlet tells Horatio that he must tell his story 
and tell it correctly. As he’s dying, the thing that appears 
to be filling his thoughts most is the need to control the 
story that gets told after his dead. Now that’s not letting 
be, not letting go. And yet, simultaneously, I believe he’s 
genuinely discovered that there is a peace which passeth 
all understanding. I think both are true.79
Of course, early modern Protestant theology very much coheres 
with the notion that peace is to be found in the ‘special providence 
in the fall of a sparrow’ (5.2.218–9) which Hamlet cites from St 
Matthew’s gospel. As John Curran reminds us, ‘Calvinism often 
drew upon this passage to emphasize that we must take solace 
in God’s steady and thorough control of the universe’; we must 
sprinkle Christian patience on our passions. Curran goes on to 
point out how the sparrow axiom comforts the Christian who 
must, of course, be of more importance to God than a mere 
sparrow.80 It is interesting that Hytner also quotes from the Bible 
when he describes the ‘peace’ that Hamlet has discovered. But 
I would argue that predestination is not a satisfactory answer to 
this play’s questions and it is significant that Hamlet speaks these 
lines so soon after telling Horatio about ‘how ill all’s here about 
my heart’ (5.2.211–12). I have argued elsewhere that these lines 
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may be more plausibly read as a relinquishing of life rather than a 
renewed understanding of it and the fact that ‘famously the solilo-
quies stop’, to quote Hytner again, speaks not so much of peace 
as of death-wish.81 The fact that in this production, Osric was 
clearly high up in the hierarchy of the surveillance state, wearily 
humouring Hamlet as the latter teased him over his hat, and that 
he later helped Laertes to his poisoned sword, points even more 
clearly to a reading of this speech in which letting be is equivalent 
to giving up. Hamlet has fallen into somebody else’s plot of active 
vengeance and relinquished his socially excessive, insightful grief, 
his self-construction, his making up of mind.
When Fortinbras claimed the Danish throne in this production, 
he did so in front of the television cameras that had broadcast 
Claudius’ reassuring statement to the nation in 1.2. Fortinbras 
saluted to camera as he instructed his men to ‘bid the soldiers 
shoot’ (5.2.410); his statement that Hamlet should be born ‘like 
a soldier to the stage’ and was likely to have ‘prov’d most royal’ 
(5.2.403, 405) rang even more hollowly than it often does in modern 
production. The audience was left not with the impression that 
Hamlet’s request to Horatio represented a reneging on the peace 
he has found in providence, but the sense that ‘the need to control 
the story that gets told after he’s dead’ will be a pressing one in a 
new state, which seemed as keen to erase the real Hamlet and his 
untidy, inactive, unsoldierly passions from history, as Claudius 
was to eliminate him from the court.
This was a production that placed a highly plausible, 
emotionally expressive Hamlet in a state that clearly disapproved 
of most forms of emotional expression. The ‘setting’ was poten-
tially problematic in that it gave rise to a possible reading as a 
Soviet-style state, an easy-to-read, repressive and distant ‘other’. 
But Kinnear played Hamlet as an ‘ordinary’ man with an intensity 
of grief that I think will have prevented too easy a dismissal of a 
state that might be complacently and negatively compared with 
‘our’ own. The spatial dramaturgy produced by the set, whose 
grey walls moved to enclose and reveal those who felt what 
they should not, successfully foregrounded the ways in which 
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the state of Denmark is constructed to suspect all emotional 
expression as in excess of its rigidly defined needs, thus producing 
emotional expression as ‘self ’ in opposition to state. This chimes 
interestingly with theories of early modern subjectivity that see 
interiority produced in historical moments of surveillance and 
religious interrogation. It also resonates with current concerns in 
the UK about literal surveillance on the one hand and, perhaps, 
state interventions into the happiness of its citizens on the other. 
We are at a point, in British culture, when we are once again 
struggling with questions of the value of emotional expression 
and self-control in explicitly political ways. To a degree, the 
emotions have been made a matter of personal psychology in 
popular self-help and therapeutic discourse. However, debates 
around the over-prescribing or otherwise of pharmaceuticals for 
depression and the UK goverment’s current interest in the state 
of the nation’s happiness are examples of emotion’s recent and 
explicit politicization.82 As Hytner and Kinnear state repeatedly, 
for them, Hamlet is about ‘authenticity’. If one redefines the 
term as meaning self-authorship, without attaching to it moral 
abstractions around sincerity and binaries of inner truth versus 
social falsehood, Kinnear’s Hamlet wrestles to produce a self in 
a place where the expression of self in grief is always regarded as 
excessive. Hamlet in its own period represents an intense struggle 
between the notion of the somatic passions as always in excess of 
the reason’s attempts to keep it within ‘natural’ boundaries, and 
the passions as individuating and differentiating factors in the 
construction of self. Hamlet distrusts his melancholy and cannot 
become the directional avenger of the older history plays. The 
National Theatre production politicized emotion in such a way 
as to revivify these conflicts and contradictions for an audience in 
the early twenty-first century.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION: EMOTIONAL AGENDAS
To bring together ideas about the passions and their perceived 
excesses that were circulating among the literate in early modern 
England with the plays that both recirculated, troubled and 
produced anew such ideas for a wider audience is a large enough 
endeavour for more than one book. To bring these ideas and 
plays into dialogue with discourses circulating about emotion 
and its perceived excesses today, particularly as they are recir-
culated, troubled and produced anew in contemporary theatre 
production, is a yet larger enterprise and one which inevitably 
remains unfinished with this Conclusion. I want to continue with 
this kind of comparative, transhistorical project, a project that is 
always historically contentious, as W. B. Worthen has so cogently 
explained.1 What one ‘discovers’ about historical plays from 
current performance is always, to a degree, imposed and invented 
by the present, particularly if an uncritical naivety about what 
‘works’ in the theatre now is brought to bear on what might have 
been performed and expressed 400 years ago. However, having 
begun to consider emotion and its excesses in the early modern 
period via recent production, I am optimistic that the kinds of 
comparison that arise from this book may productively alienate 
ideas of emotional excess in the study of both early modern and 
contemporary theatrical cultures, and provoke further thought 
about how emotion has been expressed, judged, disapproved or 
valorized, recently and historically.
I introduced this book by suggesting that the drama of the 
early modern period is a particularly rich theatrical site for the 
discussion of the ways in which our own society conceives of, 
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celebrates and regulates emotion. In the UK, we are living through 
a period where a range of authorities are particularly interested in 
the way we feel. A ‘Happiness Agenda’ has recently been drawn 
up by a government keen to find ways other than the economic 
to improve the lives of its citizens. The ideological underpin-
nings of this ‘agenda’ have been summed up by commentator 
Suzanne Moore, who makes the blunt assertion that, at a time 
of economic recession, ‘the happiness agenda is just a way of 
making huge social problems seem personal’. Moore continues, 
‘We do not have control over a globalised system that right now is 
in crisis, nor do we have full control over our own impulses, our 
own unfathomable psyches.’2 The early modern period, before 
the discovery or invention of the unconscious, before the formal 
theorization of social and economic systems, appeared to under-
stand this very well. The power of the passions, and the religious 
and socio-economic systems that attempted to regulate them, 
were staged starkly, excitingly, in tension and contradiction with 
each other in the early modern theatre. It was a theatre able to 
stage the passions, and debates about the passions, their place in 
society and the body, powerfully and explicitly, because certain 
modern assumptions about individual emotional expression and 
its social and psychological benefits had not yet been made. I hope 
that this book will provoke readers to consider ways in which 
400-year-old plays might productively estrange us from ourselves 
and our supposedly inalienable right to emotional expression.
I also hope that this book can be part of (yet) another recon-
sideration of what we call the period in which Shakespeare and 
his contemporaries produced theatre. I have used ‘early modern’ 
here, ‘hopelessly Whiggish’ though the term is to some,3 because 
it speaks to the mix of familiarity and strangeness of emotional 
expression that emerges in the plays of this period. A purpose-
built theatre as a capitalist enterprise may be reasonably described 
as an ‘early modern’ phenomenon, as may early capitalist modes 
of trade and exchange. The notion of an ‘early modern dramatic 
subjectivity’, a concern (or invention?) of late twentieth-century 
Cultural Materialist scholarship, is more clearly in danger of 
222 Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage
imposing postmodern constructions of the self onto pre-modern 
culture. It still seems a productive concept to me, however: 
though I have not cited Stephen Greenblatt and Catherine Belsey 
on the subject here, their conceptions of self-fashioning and of 
the theatrical construction of agency4 have inevitably informed 
this book as I have considered the ways in which the passions 
were shifting in the theatre and wider culture of this period, from 
dangerous and turbulent somatic forces to that which begins to 
define the individual in relation to his or her society. If the First 
Player had had the cause to act that Hamlet had, he would have 
obliterated the stage with his tears and un-selfed the audience: 
maddened them, confounded them, amazed them. But Hamlet 
is not going to do that, because his passions are not of the right 
kind for this sort of passionate action. He has a psychosomatic 
make-up which, in conjunction with the social ties and restric-
tions that limit him, the education which informs him and the 
violent incident that has just been revealed to him, make him 
feel – and therefore move, and act – differently from the stock 
revenge hero. How one expresses, controls and judges one’s own 
passions, and how one’s social environment controls and judges 
them, is at the root of the construction of the dramatic subject 
during this period. These building blocks of subjectivity are 
clearly conceived and staged in the work of early modern theatre. 
Their reproduction now can provoke current audiences, I think, 
to reconsider the building blocks of their own.
ANGER
Rereading Coriolanus for Chapter 1 of this project, I was startled 
to be reminded of Volumnia’s assertion that she had a brain that 
led her use of anger. This idea of the brain seems so modern, 
post-Cartesian, super-egoic. But the tension between personal 
feeling and social usage, between the somatic and the socially 
constructed, is both very much of the period and begins to 
generate the binaries of self and body, individual and social 
environment that are fully expressed in later periods. Caius 
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Martius’ assertion that to compromise and suppress his fury at 
the Tribunes and Citizens is to prevent him from being the man 
he is has, naturally, led some actors and directors to wonder what 
made him that man. Why so angry? The play, I believe, is less 
concerned with what we may think of as psychological answers to 
that question, than with how his anger might be used by Martius’ 
political community. Eventually, it can’t be. Martius does not 
have a brain that leads his use of anger on to self-governance and 
resultant political power. His choler is himself, yet it is finally 
self-obliterating. In early modern writings on anger, drawing on 
the classics, anger is described almost unremittingly negatively; in 
Coriolanus, the choleric warrior can only make use of his anger in 
battle, has a moment of remittance from it in weeping before his 
family, then rekindles it and challenges his enemies to kill him, 
which they do.
In British culture at the time of writing, anger has an oddly 
ambiguous cultural status. Educational agendas around ‘emotional 
literacy’ and children’s ‘emotional and behavioural difficulties’, 
psychological and legal concepts of ‘anger management’, all 
speak to a concern that anger’s excesses are very much in need of 
control. Yet some expression of anger, it is assumed in therapeutic 
and self-help discourses, is necessary for mental health. These 
figurings of anger largely assume it is a personal trait or problem. 
The early modern period assumes it is partly that – albeit 
‘personal’ to the whole body rather than to our modern psyche 
– but that it is also a socially constructed trait or problem. The 
productions I have outlined in closing Chapter One here seem 
particularly conscious of the notion that anger is a passion which 
moves people and bodies of people politically – something that 
is easy to forget in a society with a supposed ‘happiness agenda’. 
In order for Coriolanus to speak this notion of anger as political 
movement, it does not have to be progressive or reactionary, to 
side with the plebeians or the patricians. It rather has to stage 
the anger of all who contain and express that passion, in terms of 
concrete proxemics as well as inner feeling, political movement 
as well as personal trauma. I hope that this book’s somewhat 
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Brechtian agenda in this regard may renew debate about what 
a ‘political’ theatre might be if it is still interested in staging 
400-year-old plays.
LAUGHTER
As I have described in Chapter Two, London’s South Bank is 
currently the site of a wide spectrum of attitudes to the past – a 
spectrum from alien cruelty to humanist kind-ness is staged, as 
one takes a walk from London Bridge to Shakespeare’s Globe. My 
work on laughter here has renewed my interest in ‘humanism’, 
which was rather generally and ahistorically condemned as 
‘liberal humanism’ in my early university education, when post-
structuralist, post-humanist discourses were excitingly sweeping 
Arts and Humanities departments. I have been interested in the 
rehabilitation of humanism since reading Levinas on the ethics 
of recognition and otherness,5 and it has seemed to me that 
the early modern dramas featuring mad figures, which I have 
examined here, offer a particularly productive way of consid-
ering moments of humanity and recognition in the theatre. Carol 
Neely’s work on Distracted Subjects is a brilliant historicist and 
humanist rehabilitation of the purposes of the Bethlem hospital 
(see pp. 76–7), but it underestimates the power of the face-to-face 
encounter in the theatre to trouble monolithic meaning. What has 
surprised me about working on plays featuring the incarcerated 
mad, so disturbing and potentially distasteful to some of the 
theatre reviewers I have cited, is that they have had more to offer 
a ‘humanist’ agenda of recognition of the other than that the work 
of that supposed inventor of the human, Shakespeare, where he 
falsely imprisons Malvolio as a madman. Tim Crouch’s desire to 
retell Twelfth Night from the point of view of an abused and abject 
Malvolio led me to scholars who have related the performance 
history of Malvolio as a history of the abuse of the social outcast, 
from the mid-nineteenth century onward (see pp. 254–5n. 118). 
This, is a performance history that may allow an audience 
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member to congratulate herself on her kindly humanism, as she 
views poor Malvolio, battered and humiliated, and which allows 
her the frisson of theatrical shame, as Malvolio declares that he 
is to be revenged on the whole pack of us. However, in answer 
to Crouch’s repeated question of ‘Is that what you find funny?’, 
I should say that, while reconsidering Twelfth Night, my answer 
must be, for the most part, ‘Yes’: Shakespeare does permit us to 
laugh at the ‘good practice’6 of the gulling of Malvolio, the social 
climber. It is the dramatists who stage the incarcerated mad as 
theatrical turns who have the greater potential for shifting and 
disturbing our secure positions within communities of laughter. 
Ironically, then, given the predominance of Shakespeare in this 
book, I hope that the work on laughter here, its potentially cruel 
excesses and its power as an expression of recognition, may also 
begin to shift and disturb Shakespeare’s position as the most 
humane writer of comedy.
LOVE
My hopes for love having written Chapter Three may seem 
perverse. It is the early modern passion connected to versions 
of the female that have pertained, most disturbingly, across 400 
years. Ideas about unfathomable, seductive yet wayward and 
unreliable women, ideas about spendthrift women, ideas about 
women so desperate for a man that they would go anywhere, 
do anything, have emerged at every turn as I have considered 
the powerful passions of Cleopatra and Helena. I would like to 
see these two plays in production fully and uncompromisingly 
investigate love’s selfish yet self-obliterating excesses, even at the 
expense of demonstrating that ‘Shakespeare wrote strong women’ 
– though partially because I think that releasing ourselves from 
the duty of rehabilitating early modern misogyny in this regard 
may actually still produce strong women. What has interested me 
in considering love’ s excesses in these two plays has been love’s 
amorality, during a period which clearly did differentiate love 
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from ‘mere’ lust and had a powerful sense of the pure and selfless 
love that came from God. Production and reading since the early 
modern period has found problems in these plays – Antony and 
Cleopatra in feminist terms, All’s Well in distinctly moral ones 
– which they have attempted to erase; in the process, they have 
often reinscribed Cleopatra and Helena within the gendered and 
moral boundaries from which the readings and productions were 
attempting to release them. It will be clear to the reader that one 
of the productions I enjoyed most while researching this book has 
been Arpana’s Gujarati All’s Well; this was because it managed to 
stage love in the most unabashedly excessive way, as Heli shared 
her passion for Bharatram with her Globe audience. Its setting 
in late nineteenth-century India permitted a range of historical 
and social commentary around colonialism, patriarchy and ‘tradi-
tional’ cultural mores, while also permitting love to be both in 
excess of these cultural phenomena and finally reassimilated by 
them.
As with all of the early modern passions – but perhaps more 
surprisingly for modern audiences and readers – love is far from 
an assumed good in the writings about it circulating during this 
period. In contemporary critical terms, moreover, it is impos-
sible to release it from ideological constructions of gender and 
sexuality. But a love like Cleopatra’s, in its theatrical amorality, 
cares little for these things and manages to be both of and in 
excess of its historical and cultural moment. In addition to hoping 
that there might be more stagings of shameless, amoral love in the 
future to entice and disturb theatre audiences, I hope that there 
may be more writing on this passion in early modern drama that 
is less concerned with finding love on the right side of a sex/
spiritual transcendency binary than some recent work has been.
GRIEF
In considering grief and its relationship to melancholy in Chapter 
Four, I have returned to the sense of emotion as motion that 
emerged in the Introduction and in Chapter 1. Grief produces 
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stasis rather than action in the Henry VI plays, and this stasis 
acquires a political inflection in Richard III and Hamlet, as 
the mourning women disrupt Richard’s political trajectory and 
Hamlet refuses to cease his mourning for the sake of his uncle’s 
corrupted monarchy and, for most of the play, to become the 
simple avenging agent demanded by the ghost of his father. I 
have been drawn here to productions within mainstream British 
theatres which have been more clearly informed by the conven-
tions of theatrical realism than those that have interested me 
elsewhere. Roxana Silbert’s Richard III was a theatrically conscious 
production, with a clear performer/audience relationship – but 
the company were interested in a personal psychology for Richard 
as well as in his history as Vice and stage Machiavel. Nicholas 
Hytner’s Hamlet was set in a political world of modern surveil-
lance and was concerned with ideas of personal authenticity in 
the face of totalitarianism. 
Here, I am interested in the place of the stage within stage 
realism, the stage whose presence realism tends to erase. In this 
RSC Richard III, the psychology of damaged self-esteem drove 
Richard in his jovial but ultimately contemptuous relationship 
with the audience and underpinned a theatricality finally undone 
by the excesses of female grief, as the women refused to play 
to either of the production’s dominant theatrical conventions – 
open stage direct address or psychological realism – and lay on 
the ground. In the National’s Hamlet a continuously moving 
set, and set of surveillance officials, hemmed Hamlet in at every 
turn, foregrounding movement as the dominant mode of a state 
for which any expression of grief was in excess of its regulatory 
forces. This chapter is, I think, an example of renewed scholarly 
interest by Cultural Materialist performance critics in the ways 
in which theatrical realism produces meaning in Shakespeare.7 
‘Naturalistic’ acting – particularly, perhaps, the acting of sorrow 
and grief, with its production of the sobs, gasps and tears that 
indicate the spontaneous, somatic production of emotion – has, 
partially due to Brecht’s critique, become associated with a privi-
leging of personal psychology over political construction. These 
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productions have defied this binary and foregrounded the politics 
of potentially disruptive, subversive emotion. I hope this book 
can continue the work of politicizing emotion, in the study of 
historical theatrical culture and of our own.
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
 * All quotations are in modern spelling. Play quotations are from modern 
editions and I have rendered all other quotations into modern spelling, 
in order not to suggest that plays are somehow more accessible to the 
modern reader than other writings.
  1. There is a wide range of early modern writing criticizing, in terms 
both highly serious and lightly satirical, the pure stoical position on 
the passions, whereby one rejects all feeling as inconsequential to a life 
of virtue. See Richard Strier, The Unrepentant Renaissance (Chicago, 
2011), ch. 1, ‘Against the Rule of Reason’, in which he reads Erasmus’ 
In Praise of Folly as a genuine celebration of the ‘folly’ of human passion 
and a satire on stoicism (32–6) and 37–42, where he cites Luther and 
Calvin as supportive of a place for the passions in Christian life.
  See also, as other early modern examples, James Sandford’s The 
Mirror of Madness in which he satirizes the Stoic Zenocrates’ position 
on anger and the contorted excuses a Stoic might make for indulging his 
own fury (London, 1576); Levinas Lemnias’ The sanctuary of salvation, 
helmet of health, and mirror of modesty and good manners (London, 1592), 
in which even moderate levels of enjoyment are said to be ‘reprehended 
[…] of the ‘sour sad and unpleasant Stoic’ (142); William Fulbeck’s 
Direction or Preparative to the Study of the Law (London, 1600), which 
is particularly scathing of Stoic ‘sourness’, and which suggests that 
in seeking to overcome man’s nature, those of the Stoic philosophy 
‘become beasts’ (16); Joseph Hall’s poem on the succession of James I, 
The King’s Prophecy, which suggests that a passionate ‘Weeping Joy’ is 
the only appropriate response to the Queen’s death and the coming of 
the new King, which opens:
What Stoic could his steely breast contain
(If Zeno’s self, or who were made beside
Of tougher mold) from being torn in twain
With the cross Passions of this wondrous tide? (London, 1603)
 In Thomas Adams’ sermons on England’s Sickness (London, 1615) it is 
sinful to claim a Stoical immunity to the suffering imposed upon man by 
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God: ‘But when God sees that thou digestest his Physic as diet, and with 
a strange kind of indulgency, wilt neither grieve that thou hast offended, 
nor that thou art offended: God will strike home, and sharpen at once both 
his blow & thy sense. Now thou shalt feel; even thy seared heart shall bleed. 
In a word, the wicked may be senseless Stoics, they cannot be insensible 
stones. There is in all men an impossibility of impassibility’ (85).
  James I’s own Basilicon Doron in James I, Works (London, 1616) 
advises his son in a balance of feeling and self-regulation thus: ‘Keep 
true Constancy, not only in your kindness towards honest men; but 
being also invicti animi against all adversities: not with that Stoic insen-
sible stupidity, wherewith many in our days, pressing to wine honour, 
in imitating that ancient sect, by their inconstant behaviour in their own 
lives, belie their profession. But although ye are not a stock, not to feel 
calamities; yet let not the feeling of them, so over-rule and doazen your 
reason, as may stay you from taking and using the best resolution for 
remedy, that can be found out’ (178).
  2. A moving example of such advice comes from Ludvig Lavater’s The 
Book of Ruth Expounded in Twenty Eight Sermons (London, 1586), 
which explains that ‘Our saviour Christ himself wept often, therefore 
that Stoical senselessness is not approved of God. Yet as in other things 
so also in weeping their must be kept a mean, neither must we weep 
for every cause. For all kind of weeping cannot be excused. SENECA 
although he was a Stoic himself, yet he sayeth we may weep but not 
howl out. But this makes greatly to our comfort, that in this little book 
it is written down twice, that these poor women wept abundantly, for 
hereby we do gather, that God regardeth the tears even of them that be 
very poor’ (34).
  3. Thomas Playfere, The Mean in Mourning (London, 1595), 5–6.
  4. See Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London, 
1971, 174) for an explanation of this concept, whereby the social 
subject is created by the ideological call into being. While I do not 
hold Althusser’s somewhat disempowering position, whereby the social 
subject appears to have no agency whatsoever in the world and is 
entirely a construct of the various ideological apparatuses that inter-
pellate him or her into subjectivity, the idea of interpellation into 
emotional subjectivity usefully denaturalizes the notion of emotional 
expression and provokes us to consider what kinds of cultural historical 
moments value which emotions and why.
  5. Jonas Barish’s analysis of works such as Gosson’s Plays Confuted in Five 
Actions (London, 1582), Stubbes’ Anatomy of Abuses (London, 1595), 
and Prynne’s Histrio-mastix (London, 1633) still provides a useful 
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introduction: The Anti Theatrical Prejudice (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
CA, 1981), 82–96.
  6. For an account of the emergence of the concept of emotional intel-
ligence within the academic discipline of psychology and within 
self-help discourses, see the Introduction to Gerald Matthews, Moshe 
Zeidner and Richard D. Roberts, Emotional Intelligence: Science and 
Myth (Cambridge, MA, 2004), 1–21. The work that was largely 
responsible for the popularization of the concept was Daniel Goleman’s 
Emotional Intelligence (New York, 1995).
  7. A key work on the ambivalent status of the public theatre in early 
modern England is still Steven Mullaney’s The Place of the Stage: 
License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England (Chicago and London, 
1988).
  8. See Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of 
Sumptuary Law (Basingtoke, 1996).
  9. The Tudors television series, dir. Michael Hurst, Peace Arch 
Entertainment for Showtime (2007–10). This series was a highly 
colourful costume drama, based on the life and loves of Henry VIII.
 10. Ian Hislop’s Stiff Upper Lip: An Emotional History of Britain (BBC, 
2012). The first episode of this series offered some engaging examples 
of commentaries on English culture by European travellers such as 
Erasmus, who remarked on the English propensity for kissing visitors 
at every available opportunity; see Erasmus, Epistola 65, translated in 
Retrospective Review 5, 251.
 11. See above, n. 1.
 12. All references to the Oxford English Dictionary are to the 2000 online 
edition.
 13. In fact the current OED entry for emotion (3) is fascinatingly ambiv-
alent about the development of the word to its current usage. The whole 
definition of Emotion (3a) reads: ‘Originally: an agitation of mind; an 
excited mental state. Subsequently: any strong mental or instinctive 
feeling, as pleasure, grief, hope, fear etc., deriving esp. from one’s 
circumstances, mood or relationship with others.’ Its list of citations 
begins with the 1602 example I have quoted above, then ranges through 
ten more, ending with ‘1992 More 28 October – 64/2 Lust is a powerful 
emotion and can often be mistaken for love’. However, the historical 
moment where ‘original’ usage shifts to ‘subsequent’ is not pinpointed.
 14. See Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a 
Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge, 2003) for an analysis of how 
‘over time, affective psychologies became gradually less theological and 
more philosophical, and ultimately more “scientific”’ and how termi-
nology shifted correspondingly (20–5 and passim). See the Introduction 
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to Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson (eds), 
Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of 
Emotion (Philadelphia, 2004) for a useful summary and problemati-
zation of the historical usage of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ among other 
relevant terms (1–20, 2). For an account of challenges to universalist 
scientific approaches to the production and meaning of emotion, see 
Barbara H. Rosenwein, ‘Problems and Methods in the History of 
Emotions’, Passions in Context, an International Journal for the History 
of the Emotions 1 (2010). Available online at www.passionsincontext.de/
uploads/media/01_Rosenwein.pdf (accessed 1 April 2012).
 15. It is still a current enough tension for the novelist Ian McEwan wittily 
to summarize, for example. See Solar (London, 2011) 130–2.
 16. Michael C. Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 1999).
 17. Paster et al. (in Reading the Early Modern Passions), have pointed out 
that ‘we now tend to associate’ both the terms passion and affection 
‘with amorous or fond feelings’ (2). ‘Emotional excess’ could mean ‘an 
excess of emotion’ or ‘an excess which is emotional’, where ‘passionate 
excess’ may just mean ‘an excess which is passionate’ to the reader.
 18. Dixon, Passions, 35–6.
 19. See Konstantin Stanislavski ‘Emotion Memory’ in An Actor’s Work 
trans. Jean Benedetti (Abingdon and New York, 2008) 195–228. 
Affective Memory, as Lee Strasberg named it, became one of the most 
significant techniques for what came to be called The Method in the 
USA. Strasberg developed this technique, from Stanislavski’s practice, 
at the Actors’ Studio. Later in Stanislavski’s own career he developed 
the ‘Method of Physical Action’, a set of techniques created to aid the 
actor in producing plausible realist performance – including the perfor-
mance of emotion – via simple but rigorous physical tasks rather than 
the recollection of strong feeling. See e.g. ‘Creating the Physical Life 
of a Role’ in Creating a Role trans. Elizabeth Hapgood (London 1981) 
131–50.
 20. See e.g. Stanslavski, Creating a Role, ‘Creative Objectives’, 51–62; Jean 
Benedetti Stanislavski and the Actor (New York, 1998).
 21. Strier, The Unrepentant Renaissance (Chicago, 2011), 17–18, citing 
Michael Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 1996), 15–16.
 22. Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power 
(Basingstoke, 2004), ‘Introduction to the Second Edition’, l–li.
 23. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,Tendencies (Durham, NC, 1993), 1–20, 8.
 24. I refer here to Mark Breitenberg, Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern 
England (Cambridge, 1996), Ania Loomba, Gender, Race, Renaissance 
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Drama (Manchester, 1989), and Kenneth Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise 
(Chicago, 2001), respectively.
 25. In their paper ‘Language at Work: The Periods of Shakespeare’ at 
the International Shakespeare Congress (Stratford-upon-Avon, 2012), 
Jonathan Hope and Michael Witmore demonstrated the ways in which 
sophisticated electronic search engines might be used to study linguistic 
patterns in Shakespeare. In this case, they were demonstrating tools for 
exploring the development of Shakespeare’s language across period and 
through genre.
 26. Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574–1642 (3rd edn) 
(Cambridge, 1992), 215.
 27. See Christie Carson, ‘Democratizing the Audience?’, in Christie Carson 
and Farah Karim-Cooper (eds), Shakespeare’s Globe: A Theatrical 
Experiment (Cambridge, 2008), 115–126.
 28. Ben Jonson, ‘To the Memory of my Beloved, the Author, Mr William 
Shakespeare and What He Hath Left Us’, in William Shakespeare, Mr 
William Shakespeare’s Comedies, Histories and Tragedies (the First Folio) 
(London, 1623).
 29. For example, in Gary Taylor, Reinventing Shakespeare: A Cultural 
History from the Restoration to the Present (London, 1990); Michael 
D. Bristol, Big-Time Shakespeare (London, 1996); Barbara Hodgdon, 
The Shakespeare Trade: Performances and Appropriations (Philadelphia, 
1998); Graham Holderness, ‘Shakespeare-Land’, in Willy Maley and 
Margaret Tudeau-Clayton (eds), This England, That Shakespeare: New 
Angles on England and the Bard (Farnham and Burlington, VT, 2010).
 30. In attempting this dialogue across histories and theatres, I hope I have 
heeded the warnings contained in W. B. Worthen’s Shakespeare and the 
Force of Modern Performance (Cambridge, 2003), where he troubles any 
possibility of a directly reproductive relationship between historical 
play text and current – or any – performance.
 31. Gail Kern Paster, Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean 
Stage (Chicago and London, 2004).
 32. Christian M. Billing’s Masculinity, Corporality and the English Stage, 
1580–1635 has recently done significant work to challenge recent 
scholarly assumptions about the fluid, indeterminate nature of early 
modern concepts of gender (Farham, 2008).
 33. Dixon, Passions, 3.
 34. In René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, trans. anon. (London, 
1650).
 35. Though in terms of gender, women are repeatedly figured as unable 
to control their passions and thus as less reasonable, less human, than 
men.
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no doubt be of comfort to a bereaved person whose insensitive peers 
were telling them to ‘snap out of it’. Ultimately, though, it is up to the 
bereaved to decide when the length of their mourning is preventing 
them from becoming an economically productive citizen.
 33. For an account of the influences of Seneca on the mourning women in 
this play, see Harold Brookes, ‘Richard III, Unhistorical Amplifications: 
The Women’s Scenes and Seneca’, Modern Language Review 75 (1980), 
721–137; Robert S. Miola, Shakespeare and Classical Tragedy: The 
Influence of Seneca (Oxford, 1992), 74–82 (this section is a revision 
of Brookes’ findings); M.L. Stapleton, Fated Sky, The Femina Furens 
in Shakespeare (Newark, DL and London, 2000) (particularly for an 
account of Seneca’s influence on Shakespeare’s depiction of Margaret).
 34. For Paige Martin Reynolds, given that ‘early modern Protestantism 
demanded a decisive separation between [the living and the dead]’, 
drama after the English Reformation retains the efficacious perform-
ative function that praying for the dead once had. ‘Female memory and 
mourning in Richard III’, asserts Reynolds, ‘replace purgatory’ (19). 
The liminal position of Henry VI’s corpse, on its way to burial at Paul’s, 
Anne’s belief that her dead father’s wounds reopen in the presence of 
his murderer, based, for Reynolds, in Catholic-like superstition, and her 
address to the corpse, all ‘indicate a resistance to entirely abandoning 
superstition and a pre-Reformation understanding of the dead’ (22). 
After this scene, Reynolds reminds us that the audience never again sees 
any of the many bodies mourned by the women in the play: ‘That the 
play insists’ on this absence ‘reinforces the Protestant privileging of the 
soul over the body’ but the women always mourn in excess of religious 
hegemony and continue to ‘refuse to let them be forgotten’ (22). The 
women disappear from the play to be replaced by the ghosts of the 
dead who lead Richmond to hope for victory and Richard to ‘despair 
and die’ as his mother wishes, so that ‘insofar as they have borne the 
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burden of memory throughout the play, the women of Richard III bring 
about Richard’s downfall’. As has been argued about revenge tragedy, 
then, this reading of Richard III offers the play as a kind of therapeutic 
replacement for the sense of agency a mourner might have had when he 
or she was permitted to pray for dead loved ones in purgatory. Patricia 
Phillippy shares Reynolds’ conviction that Catholic mourning practices 
are being referenced in Anne’s formal lament of her father-in-law and 
addressed to his body: ‘The king’s ritualized funeral procession carries 
the trace of the Catholic practice in which the cortege made frequent 
stops at public crosses, shrines, and taverns’ and prayers for the dead 
were spoken (she also cites accounts of drunkenness and disorder at 
these assemblies) (131). Indeed, Reynolds’ article draws on Phillippy’s 
connection between Richard III’s lamenting women and Catholic 
practice ‘in which women took a prominent role’ (132). According 
to this reading, the kind of theatrical grief which calls upon the dead 
as though they were present on-stage is always in excess of the grief 
permitted by Protestant doctrine – and masculine power more broadly. 
Katharine Goodland, too, explores Richard III in terms of post-Refor-
mation grief and women’s mourning, in Female Mourning and Tragedy in 
Medieval and Renaissance English Drama: From the Raising of Lazarus to 
King Lear (Aldershot, 2005). See also Thomas Rist, Revenge Tragedy and 
the Drama of Commemoration (Aldershot, 2008). Tobias Doring usefully 
sums up a scholarly turn in the examination of this scene, whereby the 
women’s laments ‘have been described as paradigmatic of the ways in 
which female passions are principally articulated in excess of social 
relations’ (Doring, 55). See also Isabel Karremann, ‘Rites of Oblivion in 
Shakespeare’s History Plays’, Shakespeare Survey 63 (2010), 24–36.
 35. Richard III, dir. Roxana Silbert, Royal Shakespeare Company, (Swan 
Theatre, Stratford-upon-Avon, 2012).
 36. King Lear, dir. Rupert Goold, Liverpool Everyman, (Young Vic, 
London, 2009).
 37. As Donald G. Watson points out in Shakespeare’s Early History Plays 
(Basingstoke, 1990), ‘First, not everyone in the play is fooled, in fact 
very few are. Second, though Richard does dominate the play, often he 
must share the stage, and more than once he loses control of the scene 
[…] and at other times controls it through sheer power or threats rather 
than the subtleties of deception’ (102).
 38. Shakespeare’s source, Edward Hall, The Union of the Two Noble and 
Illustre Families of Lancaster and York (London, 1548), which incor-
porates Thomas More’s History of King Richard the Thirde (London, 
1513), makes this explicit: ‘there was no man there but knew that 
his arm was ever such sith the day of his birth’ and the deformity is 
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mentioned in 3 Henry VI (3.2.155–7), where Gloucester speaks of it 
occurring in his mother’s womb.
 39. For analyses of Richard III as Vice and Machiavel, see William E. 
Sheriff, ‘The Grotesque Comedy of Richard III’, Studies in the Literary 
Imagination 5.1 (1972), 51–64; Wolfgang G. Muller, ‘The Villain as 
Rhetorican in Shakeaspeare’s Richard III’, Anglia 102 (1984), 37–59; 
Ralph Berry, ‘Richard III: Bonding the Audience’, in Berry, Shakespeare 
and the Awareness of the Audience (London, 1985); Katharine Eisaman 
Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance (Chicago, IL, 
and London, 1995), 48–54; Robert Weimann and Douglas Bruster, 
Shakespeare and the Power of Performance (Cambridge, 2008), ch. 2, 
‘Performance, Game and Representation in Richard III’, 42–56.
 40. Roxana Silbert, conversations in rehearsal, March 2012.
 41. Silbert first developed ways of working with the Stanislavskian ‘Method 
of Physical Action’ in her time with Max Stafford-Clark at the Royal 
Court. Stafford-Clark writes a Forward in support of Bella Merlin’s 
Beyond Stanislavski: The Psycho-physical Approach to Actor Training 
(London, 2001). He uses the method of ‘actioning’ whereby actors 
attach a transitive verb to each of their lines, thereby deciding not 
what feelings are being expressed through the lines but what is being 
done with them. Merlin, in an education pack for students about 
Stafford-Clark’s methods, describes the technique thus: ‘Basically, 
with “actioning”, you pinpoint (very specifically through an active 
verb) what it is that you want to do to your on-stage partner. For 
example: “I excite you”, “I challenge you”, “I woo you”, “I belittle 
you”. (Merlin, in Maeve McKeown, ‘Max Stafford-Clark Education 
Work Pack’. Available at http://www.outofjoint.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2010/09/Max-Stafford-Clark-Workpack.pdf (accessed 11 
December 2012). In agreement with Stafford-Clark and Merlin, Silbert 
likes to avoid the lack of precision and physical energy that privileging 
emotion over action can produce. Her work produces emotion through 
action and recalls early definitions of emotion as motion (see pp. xxi–
xxiii). She has also suggested that insisting on an action for every line 
of every speech can lead to an energetic but sometimes overly aggressive 
style of performance (Interview with Roxana Silbert, 5 March 2012).
 42. Richard III, dir. Michael Bogdanov, English Shakespeare Company, 
The Pleasance (Edinburgh, 1998).
 43. In this production, Ratcliffe (Neal Barry) is not doubled as, but is, one 
of the murderers of Clarence; the impression given is that Richard has 
given away titles to those who have carried out his will and Ratcliffe is 
one of Richard’s cronies throughout the rest of the play, also playing the 
part of churchman for him in 3.7.
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 44. Silbert’s interest in an emerging psychology for Richard III through 
the play chimes significantly with Steven Mullaney’s analysis of the 
affect of conscience (and of audience pity) which he argues is produced 
in Richard’s last soliloquy, as he imagines that the actual ghosts that 
have cursed him in his sleep are the products of his conscience. 
Steven Mullaney, ‘Affective Technologies: Toward an Emotional Logic 
of the Elizabethan Stage’, in Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. 
Sullivan, Jr. (eds), Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern 
England (Basingstoke, 2007), 71–89, 85–7.
 45. As I have suggested by footnoting recent discussions of Richard III and 
mourning/purgatory (see n. 34), I am not primarily concerned here 
with tensions between Catholic and Protestant forms of mourning and 
how the public and private signify and are figured in opposing religious 
discourses. For an engaging account of these tensions see Kate Welch, 
‘Making Mourning Show: Hamlet and Affective Public-Making’, 
Performance Research 16.2 (2011), 74–82. Her idea of the theatre as a 
discursive space in which grief and mourning may be explored and 
evaluated is of interest here.
 46. Douglas Trevor, The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 2004).
 47. Mark Breitenberg, Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 1996).
 48. David Schalkwyk,, ‘Is Love an Emotion’, Symploke 18 (2011), 1–2, 
99–130.
 49. Burton, Anatomy, Vol. 1, 248.
 50. Burton, ‘Democritus Junior to the Reader’, Anatomy, Vol. 1, 25.
 51. Gail Kern Paster, Humoring, 1, citing Edward Reynolds, A Treatise on 
the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man (London, 1647).
 52. Burton, Anatomy, Vol. 1, 203.
 53. Burton, Anatomy, Vol. 2, 176–86.
 54. Richard Baxter, ‘What are the Best Preservatives against Melancholy and 
Overmuch Sorrow?’, in A Continuation of Morning-Exercise Questions 
and Tales of Conscience, Practically Resolved by Sundry Ministers, in 
October 1682 (London, 1683), 297.
 55. Baxter, ‘Melancholy’, 297.
 56. Timothy Bright, A Treatise of Melancholy (London, 1586).
 57. Bright, Melancholy, 188.
 58. As first, the sites of the disease of melancholy on the one hand and 
religious dread on the other – respectively the body and the mind – are 
very much in binary opposition here; in the case of religious dread, 
‘it first proceedeth from the mind’s apprehension’; in the case of 
melancholy, symptoms come ‘from the humour, which deluding the 
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organical actions, abuseth the mind’ (189). There is no medicinal cure 
for a stricken conscience, whereas melancholy can be cured by physic. 
It is important for Bright to make this distinction, because to believe 
that ‘the soul’s proper anguish’ (197) is curable is heretical: to have a 
distressed conscience is a proper part of the human condition and is 
‘according to the good pleasure of God’ (193), whereas melancholy 
is a degenerate somatic disease. He complicates the issue somewhat 
by admitting that the melancholic is particularly susceptible to such 
religious anguish. The mind seems to act as the portal for the soul 
in Bright’s account of the soul’s anguish, and the mind and body are 
inextricably connected in the rest of his treatise. However, here he 
is anxious to keep the soul untouched by the body: the soul can be 
anguished, sorrowful, fearful but it cannot be contaminated by the 
workings of black bile. Circumstantial causes of melancholy as are 
occasionally cited in Bright, broadly categorized as ‘such accidents 
as befall us in this life against our wills, and unlooked for’ (242), but 
these are rendered categorizable under Bright’s taxonomy of physical 
causes of disease by considering them all part of our ‘diet’: ‘Our diet 
consisteth not only (as it is commonly taken) in meat and drink: but 
in whatsoever exercises of mind or body: whether they be studies of 
the braine, or affections of the hart, or whether they be labours of the 
body, or exercises only’ (242–3). Thus Bright, as well as Burton, can 
cite too much study as ‘procuring’ or causing melancholy (Bright, 24, 
Burton vol 1, 302–27), and advise the melancholic to avoid it, so that the 
spirits may be freed up to thin the blood. However, the overwhelming 
sense one gets from Bright is that melancholy is a physical disease with 
physical causes that one should eschew in order to keep in good health, 
albeit what he regards as somatic would not be connected so directly 
with the body today.
 59. Bright, Melancholy, 242.
 60. Trevor, Poetics of Melancholy, 64.
 61. Kathleen O. Irace makes the point in her introduction to The First 
Quarto of Hamlet that ‘the opening 27 lines in Act 1, Scene 2 of Q2 and 
F […] are absent, undermining a possible first impression of the king 
as an efficient, gracious ruler’. Introduction, The First Quarto of Hamlet 
(Cambridge,1998), 12.
 62. An assertion offered by Olivier in voiceover at the opening of his 1948 
film. Hamlet, (film) dir. Lawrence Olivier (Two Cities, 1948).
 63. See 273n. 79.
 64. Jonathan Hope and Michael Witmore, ‘Language at Work: The Periods 
of Shakespeare’, paper given at the International Shakespeare Congress, 
Stratford-upon-Avon, 2012.
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 65. Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner (National Theatre, London, 2010).
 66. Hamlet, dir. Gregory Doran, Royal Shakespeare Company (Swan 
Theatre, Stratford-upon-Avon, 2008).
 67. Hamlet, dir. Ian Rickson (Young Vic, London, 2011).
 68. Held at the National Theatre Archive, London.
 69. See e.g. James Woodall, review of Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, 
8 October 2010. Available at http://www.theartsdesk.com/theatre/
hamlet-national-theatre (accessed 10 October 2011); Maggie Constable, 
http://www.thepublicreviews.com/national-theatre-hamlet-milton-
keynes-theatre/ (accessed 10 October 2011); Caroline McGinn, Time 
Out, 13 October 2010. Available at http://www.timeout.com/london/
theatre/event/81883/hamlet (accessed 10 October 2011).
 70. Jami Rogers, Review of Hamlet, dir. Hytner, Internet Shakespeare 
Editions, 3 October 2010. Available at http://isechronicle.uvic.ca/
index.php/Ham?cat=114 (accessed 11 October 2011).
 71. Two members of the Moscow punk rock band Pussy Riot, whose 
signature costume is a colourful balaclava, were imprisoned in 2012 
for performing an anti-clerical, anti-government song in an Orthodox 
church.
 72. Rory Kinnear, interview with Matt Wolf. Available at http://www.
nationaltheatre.org.uk/video/rory-kinnear-talks-about-playing-hamlet 
(accessed 1 December 2012).
 73. Peter Holland, Programme, Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, 2010.
 74. Nicholas Hytner, Programme, Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, 2010.
 75. Rory Kinnear, Programme, Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, 2010.
 76. Particularly direct was Christopher Eccelstone’s delivery of the line 
to Claudius in the West Yorkshire Playhouse production of 2002 (dir. 
Ian Brown). Both of these Hamlets gave the initial impression that no 
matter how clearly they expressed their resentment of their uncle’s 
marriage, Claudius had ways of recuperating the moment.
 77. See David Lister, review of Hamlet, dir. Hytner, Independent, 8 October 
2010; Charles Spenser, The Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2010; and, 
in a negative commentary on this Hamlet’s ‘ordinariness’, Charles 
Weinstein, Internet Shakespeare Editions, 2 February 2011. Available 
at http://isechronicle.uvic.ca/index.php/Ham (accessed 10 October 
2011).
 78. Famously, by Thomas Lodge in Wit’s Misery and the World’s Madness 
(London, 1596), where he describes ‘the ghost, which cried so miserably 
at the Theatre, “Hamlet, revenge!” ’ (signature H4).
 79. Nicholas Hytner, Programme, Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, 2010.
 80. John E. Curran, Jr., Hamlet, Protestantism, and the Mourning of 
Contingency: Not to Be (Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2006), 205.
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 81. Bridget Escolme, Talking to the Audience: Shakespeare, Performance 
Self (London, 2005), 73, 90–92; for an account of Hamlet’s fatalism 
as read by Walter Benjamin in his comments on Hamlet as Trauerspiel, 
see Hugh Grady, Shakespeare and Impure Aesthetics (Cambridge, 2009), 
‘Hamlet as Mourning Play’, 154–60, 156.
 82. See Conclusion (p. 221).
CONCLUSION: EMOTIONAL AGENDAS
  1. In Chapter 2 of W. B. Worthen, Shakespeare and the Force of Modern 
Performance (Cambridge, 2003), ‘Performing History’, 28–78.
  2. Suzanne Moore, ‘Despite its promises, this government can’t make you 
happy. In times of austerity, you are on your own.’ Available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/feb/08/government-
cannot-make-you-happy (accessed 18 December 2012).
  3. See Richard Strier, The Unrepentant Renaissance (2, n. 3); also, in 
Resistant Structures: Particularity, Radicalism and Renaissance Texts 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1995), Strier suggests that the term 
‘early modern’ flatters and idealizes our own moment: ‘the earlier 
period is seen to take its orientation from how it leads to “modern” 
culture’ (6, n.5). I take his point but hope I have managed to historicize 
what he may regard as a dangerously presentist position in this book 
about ‘modern’ performance of ‘early modern’ drama.
  4. In Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to 
Shakespeare (Chicago, IL, 1980), and Catherine Belsey, The Subject of 
Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London, 1985).
  5. Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other (1972), trans. Nidra Poller 
(Chicago, IL, 2003).
  6. This is, famously, how John Manningham describes the gulling of 
Malvolio, after a performance at court in 1602. John Manningham, 
The Diary of John Manningham of the Middle Temple (1602–3), ed. R.P. 
Sorlien (Hanover,1976), 48.
  7. At the time of writing, for example, an edition of Shakespeare Bulletin 
on ‘Naturalism and Early Modern Performance’ is in preparation (ed. 
Roberta Barker and Kim Solga, 2013).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY WORKS CITED
All original dates of publication of plays refer to dates of first 
production, where known. All plays by Shakespeare are from the 
Arden Shakespeare Complete Works, ed. Richard Proudfoot, David 
Scott Kastan and Ann Thompson (London and New York, 2011).
Adams, Thomas, England’s Sickness, Comparatively Conferred with Israel’s. 
Divided into Two Sermons (London, 1615).
Anon., Elegy on the Death of Richard Burbage (1619).
Anon., A Pleasant and Delightful Poem of Two Lovers: Philos and Licia 
(London 1624), repr. in Miller ed., Seven Minor Epics (Gainsville, 1967).
Bacon, Francis, ‘Of Love’ (1612), in Francis Bacon: A Selection of his Works, 
ed. Sidney Warhaft (New York, 1965).
Baxter, Richard, ‘What are the Best Preservatives against Melancholy and 
Overmuch Sorrow?’, in A Continuation of Morning-Exercise Questions and 
Tales of Conscience, Practically Resolved by Sundry Ministers, in October 
1682 (London, 1683).
Boccaccio, Giovanni, Amorous Fiammetta, trans. Bartholomew Young 
(London, 1587).
Bright, Timothy, A Treatise on Melancholy (London, 1586).
Burton, Robert, The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), Thomas C. Faulkner, 
Nicholas K. Kiessling and Rhonda L. Blair (eds) (Oxford, 1989).
Chamberlain, John, The Letters of John Chamberlain (1597 to 1626), ed. 
N. E. M. McClure (Philadelphia, PA, 1939).
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, Those Five Questions, which Marke Tully Cicero, 
Disputed in his Manor of Tusculanum, trans. John Dolman (London, 1561).
Coeffeteau, Nicholas, A Table of the Human Passions, trans. Edward 
Grimeston (London, 1621).
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, ‘Notes on Antony and Cleopatra’ in The Literary 
Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge 
(London, 1836).
276 Bibliography
Crouch, Tim, England (London, 2007).
—The Author (London, 2009).
—I Malvolio, in I, Shakespeare: Four of Shakespeare’s Better Known Plays 
Retold for Young Audiences by their Lesser-Known Characters (London, 
2011).
Dekker, Thomas and Thomas Middleton, The Honest Whore Parts I and 
II (1604–5), in Fredson Bowers (ed.), The Dramatic Works of Thomas 
Dekker, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 2009).
Dekker, Thomas and and John Webster, Northward Ho (1605), in Fredson 
Bowers ed., The Dramatic Works of Thomas Dekker, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 
2009).
Descartes, René, The Passions of the Soul, trans. anon. (London, 1650).
Erasmus, Desiderius, ‘Epistola 65’ (1499), translated in Retrospective Review 
5, ed. Henry Southern (London, 1822), 251.
Ferrand, James, Erotomania or A treatise Discoursing of the Essence, Causes, 
Symptoms, Prognostics, and Cure of Love, or Erotic Melancholy (London, 
1640).
Fletcher, John, The Pilgrim (c.1621), in Fredson Bowers ed., The Dramatic 
Works in the Beaumont and Fletcher Canon, vol. 6 (Cambridge, 1994).
Fulbecke, William, A Direction or Preparative to the Study of the Law 
(London, 1600).
Gosson, Philip, Plays Confuted in Five Actions, Proving They Are Not to be 
Suffered in a Christian Commonweal (London, 1582).
Hall, Edward, The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lancaster 
and York (London, 1548).
Hall, Joseph, The King’s Prophecy: or Weeping Joy Expressed in a Poem, to the 
Honor of England’s too Great Solemnities (London, 1603).
Harsnett, Samuel, Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures (London, 1603).
James I, Basilicon Doron, in James I, Works, (London, 1616).
Jonson, Ben, ‘To the Memory of my Beloved, the Author, Mr William 
Shakespeare and What He Hath Left Us’, in William Shakespeare, Mr 
William Shakespeare’s Comedies, Histories and Tragedies (First Folio) 
(London, 1623).
—The Devil is an Ass (1616) (Manchester, 1994).
Jordan, Thomas, ‘The Virtuous Wife’, in Pictures of Passions, Fancies 
and Affections, Poetically Deciphered in a Variety of Characters (London, 
1641).
Joubert, Laurent, Treatise on Laughter (Traité du Ris) (1579), trans. Gregory 
David de Rocher (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1980).
Kepler, Johannes, Optics: Paralimpomena to Witelo and Optical Part of 
Astronomy, trans. William H. Donahue (1604) (Santa Fe, NM, 2000).
Laurens, André du, A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight: of Melancholic 
 Bibliography 277
Diseases; of Rheums, and of Old Age, trans Richard Surphlet (London, 
1599).
Lavater, Ludvig, The Book of Ruth Expounded in Twenty Eight Sermons 
(London, 1586).
Lemnias, Levinas, The Sanctuary of Salvation, Helmet of Health, and Mirror 
of Modesty and Good Manners (London, 1592).
Lipsius, Justus, His First Book of Constancy, trans. John Stradling 
(London,1594).
Lodge, Thomas, Wit’s Misery and the World’s Madness (London, 1596).
Manningham, John, The Diary of John Manningham of the Middle Temple 
(1602–1603), ed. R.P. Sorlien (Hanover, 1976).
Marlowe, Dido, Queen of Carthage (c. 1586) (Manchester, 1974).
Middleton, Thomas and William Rowley, The Changeling (1622) (London, 2006).
Milton, John, Sampson Agonistes (1671) (Cambridge, 1912).
Montaigne, Michel de, ‘Of Anger and Choler’, in Essays, trans. John Florio 
(London, 1613).
Painter, William, The Palace of Pleasure (London, 1566).
Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, 1992).
Playfere, Thomas, The Mean in Mourning. A Sermon Preached at Saint 
Mary’s Spittle in London on Tuesday in Easter Week 1595 (London, 1596).
Plutarch, Lucius Mestrius, ‘Life of Caius Martius Coriolanus’, Lives of the 
Ancient Greeks and Romans, trans. Thomas North (1579), in Geoffrey 
Bullough, Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, 8 vols (London 
and New York, 1957–75), vol. 4, The Roman Plays.
—‘Life of Marcus Antonius’, Lives of the Ancient Greeks and Romans, trans. 
Thomas North, in Geoffrey Bullough, Narrative and Dramatic Sources 
of Shakespeare, 8 vols (London and New York, 1957–75), vol. 4, The 
Roman Plays.
—‘Of Meekness, or How a Man Should Refrain Choler’, in The Morals, 
trans. Philomen Holland (London, 1603).
Prynne, William, Histrio-mastix, The Players Scourge or Actors Tragedy 
(London, 1633).
Radford, Mavericke, Three Treatises Religiously Handled and Named According 
to the Several Subject of Each Treatise: The Mourning Weed. The Morning’s 
Joy. The King’s Rejoicing (London, 1603).
Reynolds, Edward, A Treatise on the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man 
(London, 1647).
Riche, Barnaby, Farewell to Military Profession (1581) (Ottawa, Canada, 1992).
Sandford, James, The Mirror of Madness (London, 1576).
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, ‘A Treatise of Anger’, in The Workes of Lucius 
Annaeus Seneca, Both Moral and Natural, trans. Thomas Lodge (London, 
1614).
278 Bibliography
Sidney, Philip, An Apology for Poetry (or The Defense of Poetry) (1595) 
(Manchester, 1965).
Shakespeare, William, All’s Well that Ends Well (c. 1602).
—Antony and Cleopatra (1608).
—As You Like it (1599).
—Coriolanus (1608).
—Hamlet (1601).
—Hamlet First Quarto (1603) (Cambridge, 1998).
—Henry VI Parts I, II and III (c. 1590; c. 1592–3).
—King Henry V (1599).
—Love’s Labours Lost (c. 1594).
—Richard II (1595).
—Richard III (c. 1593).
—Romeo and Juliet (c. 1594).
—The Taming of the Shrew (c. 1593).
—The Tempest (1610).
—Timon of Athens (c. 1607).
—Troilus and Cressida (c. 1601).
—Twelfth Night (1600).
Southwell, Robert, The Triumphs Over Death: Or, A Consolatory Epistle, for 
Afflicted Minds, in the Affects of Dying Friends (London, 1595).
Stubbes, Philip, Anatomy of Abuses (London, 1583).
Webster, John, The Duchess of Malfi (1614), Arden Early Modern Drama 
(London, 2009).
Webster, John, The White Devil (1612) (London, 2008).
Wright, Thomas, The Passions of the Mind in General (London, 1604). 
Reprint based on the 1604 edition, ed. Thomas O. Sloan (Urbana, 
Chicago, IL, London, 1971).
SECONDARY WORKS CITED
Alberti, Fay Bound, Matters of the Heart (Oxford, 2010).
Allderidge, Patricia, ‘Management and Mismanagement at Bedlam, 
1547–1633’, in Charles Webster ed., Health, Medicine and Mortality in 
the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge,1979), 141–64.
Allen Brown, Pamela, Better a Shrew than a Sheep: Women, Drama and the 
Culture of Jest in Early Modern England (London, Ithaca, NY, 2003).
Althusser Louis, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London, 1971).
Andrews, Jonathan ‘Bethlem Revisited: A History of Bethlem Hospital 
c.1643–1770’, Ph.D. Diss. (University of London, 1991).
 Bibliography 279
Andrews, Jonathan, Asa Briggs, Roy Porter, Penny Tucker and Keir 
Waddington, The History of Bedlam (London, 1997).
Barber, C. L., Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form and 
its Relation to Social Custom (Princeton, NJ, 2012).
Barish, Jonas, The Anti-Theatrical Prejudice (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 
1981).
Barton, Anne, Introduction to All’s Well that Ends Well, Riverside Shakespeare 
(New York, 1976), 499–503.
Bassett, Kate, ‘The Hotspur of Ancient Rome’, Review of Coriolanus, dir. 
Dominic Dromgoole, Shakespeare’s Globe Independent on Sunday, 14 
May 2006.
British Broadcasting Corporation, http://www.bbc.co.uk/health/emotional 
_health/bereavement/bereavement_helpourselves.shtml (accessed 1 
December 2012).
Becker, Lucinda M., Death and the Early Modern Englishwoman (Aldershot, 
2003).
Belsey, Catherine, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in 
Renaissance Drama (London, 1985).
Benedetti, Jean, Stanislavski and the Actor (New York, 1998).
Benedict, David, Review of The Changeling, Cheek by Jowl, Variety.
Com, 28 May 2006. Available at http://www.variety.com/review/
VE1117930662/?refCatId=33 (accessed 20 October 2010).
Bennett, Susan and Christie Carlson (eds), Shakespeare Beyond English 
(Cambridge, 2013).
Benson, Sean, ‘Perverse Fantasies?’, Papers on Language and Literature 45.3 
(summer 2009).
Berry, Ralph, Shakespeare and the Awareness of the Audience (London, 
1985).
Billing, Christian, Masculinity, Corporality and the English Stage 1580–1635 
(Farnham and Burlington, VT, 2008).
Billington, Michael, Review of Coriolanus, dir. Dominic Dromgoole, 
Shakespere’s Globe Guardian, 12 May 2006.
—Review of The Changeling, dir. Declan Donnellan, Cheek by Jowl and 
BITE: 2006, Barbican, Guardian, 16 May 2006.
—Review of All’s Well that Ends Well, dir. John Dove, Shakespeare’s Globe, 
Guardian, 6 May 2011.
—Review of The Changeling, dir. Joe Hill-Gibbons,Young Vic, Guardian, 
3 February 2012.
Bloom, Harold, Bloom’s Shakespeare through the Ages (New York, 2010).
Boas, Frederick S., Shakespeare and his Predecessors (London, 1896).
Bowers, Rick, Radical Comedy in Early Modern England (Aldershot, 
2008).
280 Bibliography
Brady, Angela, English Funerary Elegy in the Seventeenth Century (Basingstoke, 
2006).
Breitenberg, Mark, Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 1996).
Brennan, Claire, Review of Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Janet Suzman, 
Liverpool Playhouse, Observer, 17 October 2010.
Bristol, Michael D., Big-Time Shakespeare (London, 1996).
Brooke, Nicholas, ‘All’s Well that Ends Well ’, Shakespeare Survey 30 
(1977).
—Horrid Laughter in Jacobean Tragedy (London, 1979).
Brookes, Harold, ‘Richard III, Unhistorical Amplifications: The Women’s 
Scenes and Seneca’, Modern Language Review 75 (1980), 721–37.
Bullough, Geoffrey, Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, 8 vols 
(London and New York, 1957–75).
Cake, Jonathan, ‘Interview with Guillaume Winter’, in Delphine Lemmonier-
Texier and Guillaume Winter, Lectures de Coriolan de William Shakespeare 
(Rennes, 2006).
Calderwood, James Lee, Shakespeare and the Denial of Death (Amherst, MA, 
1987).
Carlin, Claire L. ed., Imagining Contagion in Early Modern Europe 
(Basingstoke, 2005).
Carnegie, David, ‘“Maluolio Within”: Performance Perspectives on the 
Dark House’, Shakespeare Quarterly 52.3 (Autumn 2001).
Carson, Christie, ‘Democratising the Audience’, in Christie Carson and 
Farah Karim-Cooper (eds), Shakespeare’s Globe: A Theatrical Experiment 
(Cambridge, 2008).
Carson, Christie and Farah Karim-Cooper (eds), Shakespeare’s Globe: A 
Theatrical Experiment (Cambridge, 2008).
Cavendish, Dominic, ‘Suzman Interview for Antony and Cleopatra’, Daily 
Telegraph, 28 September 2010.
Certeau, Michel de, ‘Walking in the City’, in Imre Szeman and Timothy 
Kaposy, Cultural Anthropology: an Anthology (Oxford, 2011).
Charnes, Linda, Notorious Identity: Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare 
(Cambridge, MA, 1993).
Charney, Maurice, Shakespeare on Love and Lust (New York, 2000).
Clapp, Susannah, Review of The Changeling, dir. Declan Donnellan, Cheek 
by Jowl and BITE: 2006, Barbican, Observer, 21 May 2006.
—Review of All’s Well that Ends Well, dir. John Dove, Shakespeare’s Globe, 
Guardian, Observer, 8 May 2011.
Classen, Albrecht ed., Laughter in the Middle Ages and Early Modern 
Times: Epistemology of a Fundamental Human Behavior, its Meaning and 
Consequences (Berlin, New York, 2010).
 Bibliography 281
Clink Museum, London, ‘Education’, http://www.clink.co.uk/Education.
html (accessed 6 June 2010).
Cohen, Ralph, ‘The Most Convenient Place: The Second Blackfriars 
Theater and its Appeal’, in Richard Dutton ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Early Modern Theatre (Oxford, 2009), 209–224.
Constable, Maggie, review of Hamlet, dir. Hytner, National Theatre, 2 
March 2011. Available at http://www.thepublicreviews.com/national-
theatre-hamlet-milton-keynes-theatre/ (accessed 10 October 2011).
Correll, Barbara, ‘Malvolio at Malfi: Managing Desire in Shakespeare and 
Webster’, Shakespeare Quarterly 58.1 (Spring 2007), 65–92.
Crouch, Tim, Interview for British Council Edinburgh Festival 2011 
Showcase. Available at http://edinburghshowcase.britishcouncil.org/
home/tim-crouch/ (accessed 24 November 2012).
Curran, John E. Jr., Hamlet, Protestantism, and the Mourning of Contingency: 
Not to Be (Aldershot, Burlington, VT, 2006).
Daalder, Joost, ‘Folly and Madness in The Changeling’, Essays in Criticism 
38.1 (January 1988).
—‘Madness in Parts 1 and 2 of The Honest Whore: A Case for Close 
Reading’, AUMLA 86 (November 1996), 63–79.
Darnton, Robert, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French 
Cultural History (New York, 1985).
Deats, Sarah Munson, Antony and Cleopatra: Routledge New Critical Essays 
(London and New York, 2005).
Dennis, Carl, ‘All’s Well that Ends Well and the Meaning of Agape’, 
Philological Quarterly 50.1 (January 1971), 75–84.
Devereaux, Simon and Paul Griffiths (eds), Penal Practice and Culture, 
1500–1900: Punishing the English (Basingstoke, 2004).
Dezecache, Guillaume and R.I.M. Dunbar, ‘Sharing the Joke: The Size 
of Natural Laughter Groups’. Available at www.grezes.ens.fr/reprints/
dezecache&dunbar2012.pdf (accessed 28 November 2012).
Dickson, Andrew, Review of All’s Well that Ends Well, dir. Sunil Shanbag, 
Arpana Theatre, Shakespeare’s Globe, Guardian, 1 June 2012.
Dixon, Thomas, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular 
Psychological Category (Cambridge, 2003).
Dollimore, Jonathan, Radical Tragedy, 3rd edn (Basingstoke, 2004).
Doring, Tobias, Performances of Mourning in Shakespearean Theatre and 
Early Modern Culture (Basingstoke, 2006).
Dufallo, Basil and Peggy McCracken (eds), Dead Lovers: Erotic Bonds and 
the Study of Premodern Europe (Ann Arbor, MI, 2006).
Dunbar, R.  I.  M., ‘Bridging the Bonding Gap: The Transition from 
Primates to Humans’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 367 
(July 2012), 1597, 1837–46.
282 Bibliography
Dustagheer, Sarah, ‘To see, and to bee seene […] and possesse the Stage, 
against the Play’: Blackfriars’ actor/audience interaction in the repertory 
of the Children of the Queen’s Revels and the King’s Men’, paper given 
at the ‘Jacobean Indoor Playing Symposium’ (London Shakespeare 
Centre, King’s College, London, 4 February 2012).
Dutton, Richard, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theatre 
(Oxford, 2009).
Dutton, Richard and Jean E. Howard (eds), A Companion to Shakespeare’s 
Works: The Comedies (Malden, MA and Oxford, 2003).
Ede, Laurie N., British Film Design: A History (London, 2010).
Ellis, David, Shakespeare’s Practical Jokes: An introduction to the Comic in his 
Work (Lewisburg, 2007).
Escolme, Bridget, Talking to the Audience: Shakespeare, Performance, Self 
(London, 2005).
—‘The Spatial Politics of Shakespeare’s Rome in the Contemporary 
Theatre’, Shakespeare Survey 60, 2007.
—‘Shakespeare, Rehearsal and and Site-Specific Performance’, Shakespeare 
Bulletin, special edition, ‘Rehearsing Shakespeare: Alternative Strategies 
in Process and Performance’, 30.4 (Winter 2012).
—‘Does Shakespeare Work Better Outside Britain?’ Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/19/shake-
speare-outside-britain-international (accessed 23 October 2012).
—‘Costume, Disguise and Self-Display’ in Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany 
Stern (eds) Shakespeare’s Theatre and the Effects of Performance 
(London, 2013) pp. 118-140 (136).
Fernie, Ewan, ‘Shakesperience 3: Helena’s Fantasies (Part Two)’. Available at 
http://bloggingshakespeare.com/shakespearience-3-helenas-fantasies-
part-two (accessed 1 December 2012).
Fetzer, Margret, ‘Violence as the ‘Dark Room’ of Comedy: Shakespeare’s 
Twelfth Night’, Deutsche Shakespeare-Gesellschaft 2006, ‘Staging Violence 
and Terror’. Available at http://shakespeare-gesellschaft.de/en/publica-
tions/seminar/ausgabe2006/fetzer.html (accessed 26 November 2006).
Findlay, Alison, Women in Shakespeare: A Dictionary (London, 2010).
Fisher, Philip, The Vehement Passions (Princeton, NJ, 2002).
Fisk, John, ‘Audiencing: A Cultural Studies Approach to Watching 
Television’, Poetics 21.4 (August 1992), 345–59.
Fitz, L.  T., ‘Egyptian Queens and Male Reviewers: Sexist Attitudies in 
Antony and Cleopatra Criticism’, Shakespeare Quarterly 28.3 (Summer 
1977), 375–97.
Floyd-Wilson, Mary and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr (eds), Environment and 
Embodiment in Early Modern England (Basingstoke, 2007).
Frelick, Nancy, ‘Contagions of Love: Textual Transmission’, in Claire L. 
 Bibliography 283
Carlin ed., Imagining Contagion in Early Modern Europe (Basingstoke, 
2005), 47–62.
Freshwater, Helen, Theatre and Audiences (Basingstoke, 2009).
Freud, Sigmund, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, trans. Shaun Whiteside, in 
On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia (London, 2005).
Gardner, Lyn, Review of Coriolanus, dir. Yukio Ninagawa, Guardian, 27 
April 2007.
—Review of Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Janet Suzman, Chichester Festival 
Theatre, 2012, Guardian, 16 September 2012.
Gaskill, Gayle, ‘Overhearing Malvolio for Pleasure or Pity: The Letter 
Scene and the Dark House Scene in Twelfth Night on Stage and 
Screen’, in Laury Magnus and Walter W. Cannon, Who Hears in 
Shakespeare? Auditory Worlds on Stage and Screen (Madison, NJ, 2012), 
119–217.
Gervais, Matthew and David Sloan Wilson, ‘The Evolutionary Functions of 
Laughter and Humor: A Synthetic Approach’, The Quarterly Review of 
Biology 80.4 (December 2005), 395–430.
Ghose, Indira, Shakespeare and Laughter, (Manchester, 2008).
—‘Licence to Laugh: Festive Laughter in Twelfth Night’, in Manfred 
Pfister ed., A History of English Laughter: Laughter from Beowulf to 
Beckett and Beyond, (Amsterdam and New York, 2002)
Gittings, Clare, Death, Burial and the Individual in Early Modern England 
(London and Sydney, 1984).
—‘Sacred and Secular: 1558–1660’ in Peter C. Jupp and Clare Gittings 
(eds), Death in England: An Illustrated History (Manchester, 1999), 
147–173.
Golden, Leon, ‘The Purgation Theory of Cartharsis’, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31.4 (Summer 1973), 473–9.
Goldstein, Donna M., Laughter Out of Place: Race, Class, Violence, and 
Sexuality in a Rio Shantytown (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2003).
Goldsworthy Adrian, Antony and Cleopatra (London, 2010).
Goleman, Daniel Emotional Intelligence (New York, 1995).
Goodland, Katharine, Female Mourning and Tragedy in Medieval and 
Renaissance English Drama: From the Raising of Lazarus to King Lear 
(Aldershot, 2005).
Grady, Hugh, Shakespeare and Impure Aesthetics (Cambridge, 2009).
Grant, Steve, Review of Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Adrian Noble, Royal 
Shakespeare Company, Plays and Players, November 1982. 
—Review of Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Peter Hall, Royal Shakespeare 
Company, Time Out, 15 April 1987.
Greenblatt, Stephen, Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare 
(Chicago, IL, 1980).
284 Bibliography
—‘A Man of Principle’, Review of Coriolanus (film), dir. Ralph Fiennes, New 
York Review of Books, 8 March 2012.
Gross, Daniel M., The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’  
to Modern Brain Science (Chicago, IL, 2006).
Gross, Kenneth, Shakespeare’s Noise (Chicago, IL, 2001).
Gurr, Andrew, The Shakespearean Stage 1574–1642 (3rd edn) (Cambridge, 
1992).
Hamer, M., Signs of Cleopatra: Reading an Icon Historically (Exeter, 2008).
Harris, Jonathan Gil, ‘“Narcissus in thy Face”: Roman Desire and the 
Difference it Fakes in Antony and Cleopatra’, Shakespeare Quarterly 45.4 
(Winter 1994), 408–25.
Hart, Christopher, Review of Coriolanus, dir. Dominic Dromgoole, 
Shakespeare’s Globe, Sunday Times, 14 May 2006.
Headlam Wells, Robin, Shakespeare on Masculinity (Cambridge and New 
York, 2000).
Hemming, Sarah, Review of All’s Well that Ends Well, dir. John Dove, 
Shakespeare’s Globe, Financial Times, 8 May 2011.
Hobgood, Allison P., ‘Twelfth Night’s “Notorious Abuse” of Malvolio: 
Shame, Humorality, and Early Modern Spectatorship’, Shakespeare 
Bulletin 24.3 (2006), 1–22.
Hodgdon, Barbara, The Shakespeare Trade: Performances and Appropriations 
(Philadelphia, PA, 1998).
Holderness, Graham, ‘Shakespeare-Land’, in Willy Maley and Margaret 
Tudeau-Clayton (eds), This England, That Shakespeare: New Angles on 
England and the Bard (Farnham and Burlington, VT, 2010).
Hope, Jonathan and Michael Witmore, ‘Language at Work: The Periods of 
Shakespeare’, paper given at the International Shakespeare Congress, 
Stratford-upon-Avon, 2012.
Hunt, Alan, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary 
Law (Basingtoke, 1996).
Hunter, G.  K., Introduction to All’s Well that Ends Well, Arden Second 
Series (London, 2006), xxxiii–xxxiv.
Hyland, Peter, Disguise on the Early Modern Stage (Farnham, 2011).
Ingram, Martin, ‘Shame and Pain: Themes and Variations in Tudor 
Punishments’, in Simon Devereaux and Paul Griffiths (eds), Penal Practice 
and Culture, 1500–1900: Punishing the English (Basingstoke, 2004).
Irace, Katherine, Introduction to The First Quarto of Hamlet 
(Cambridge,1998).
Jackson, Ken, Separate Theaters, Bethlem (‘Bedlam’) Hospital and the 
Shakespearean Stage (Newark, NJ, 2005).
Jenkins Logan, Thad, ‘Twelfth Night: The Limits of Festivity’, Studies in 
English Literature 1500–1900 22.2 (spring 1982).
 Bibliography 285
Johnson, Samuel, Notes to Shakespeare I, The Comedies: All’s Well that Ends 
Well (London, 1765).
Jones, G.  P., ‘A Burbage Ballad and John Payne Collier’, The Review of 
English Studies 40.159 (August 1989), 393–7.
Joyce, Justin A., ‘Fashion, Class, and Gender in Early Modern England: 
Staging Twelfth Night’, in Cynthia Kuhn and Cindy Carlson (eds), 
Styling Texts: Dress and Fashion in Literature (New York, 2007), 49–66.
Kapur, Sohailia, ‘Musical Theatre in India’. Available at http://shekharkapur.
com/blog/2011/05/musical-theatre-in-india-guest-column-by-sohaila-
kapur/ (accessed 1 December 2012).
Karremann, Isabel, ‘Rites of Oblivion in Shakespeare’s History Plays’, 
Shakespeare Survey 63 (2010), 24–36.
Kastan, David Scott, ‘All’s Well that Ends Well and the Limits of Comedy’, 
ELH 52.3 (autumn 1985), 575–589.
Kemper, Becky, ‘A Clown in the Dark House: Reclaiming the Humor in 
Malvolio’s Downfall‘, Journal of the Wooden O Symposium (2007), 42–50.
Khan Coppelia, Shakespeare’s Roman Plays: Warriors, Wounds and Women 
(London and New York, 1997).
Kirwan, Peter, ‘All’s Well that Ends Well: Arpana’, in Susan Bennett and 
Christie Carlson (eds), Shakespeare Beyond English (Cambridge, 2013).
Kitzes, Adam H., The Politcs of Melancholy from Spenser to Milton (New York 
and Abingdon, 2006).
Kottman, Paul A., ‘Defying the Stars: Tragic Love as the Struggle for 
Freedom in Romeo and Juliet’, Shakespeare Quarterly 63.1 (2012), 1–38.
Kuhn, Cynthia G. and Cindy Carlson, Styling Texts: Dress and Fashion in 
Literature (Youngstown, NY, 2007).
Langis, Unhae, ‘Coriolanus: Inordinate Passions and Powers in Personal and 
Political Governance’, Comparative Drama 44.1 (2010), 1–27.
Langley, Eric, Narcissism and Suicide in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries 
(Oxford, 2009).
Laroque, Francois, ‘Slaughter and Laughter: Cruel Comedy in Fin de Siècle 
Tudor Drama’, in Centre D’etudes Superieures de la Renaissance, Tudor 
Theatre: For Laughs? Round Tables on Tudor Theatre and Drama vol. 6 
(Berne, 2002), 161–75.
Lawrence, W.W., Shakespeare’s Problem Comedies (New York, 1931).
Legal Times, ‘BLT’, ‘In Twelfth Night Mock Trial, Malvolio Loses’. Available 
at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/04/in-twelfth-night-mock-
trial-malvolio-loses.html (accessed 26 November 2012).
Letzler Cole, Susan, The Absent One: Mourning Ritual, Tragedy and the 
Performance of Ambivalence (University Park and London, 1985).
Levinas, Emmanuel, Humanism of the Other (1972), trans. Nidra Poller 
(Chicago, IL, 2003).
286 Bibliography
Lister, David, Review of Hamlet, dir. Hytner, National Theatre, Olivier 
Theatre, London, 2010, Independent, 8 October 2010.
Lodwick, Keith, ‘The Film Work of Stage Designer Oliver Messel’, V&A 
Online Journal 1 (autumn 2008). Available at http://www.vam.ac.uk/
content/journals/research-journal/issue-01/the-film-work-of-stage-
designer-oliver-messel/ (accessed 4 December 2012).
London Dungeons, ‘Attractions’. Available at http://www.the-dungeons.
co.uk/london/en/attractions/index.htm (accessed 6 June 2010).
Loomba, Ania, Gender, Race, Renaissance Drama (Manchester, 1989).
Lopez, Jeremy, Theatrical Convention and Audience Response in Early Modern 
Drama (Cambridge and New York, 2003).
Loxton, Howard, British Theatre Guide, Review of Coriolanus, dir. Yukio 
Ninagawa. Available at http://www.britishtheatreguide.info/reviews/
coriolanusnina-rev (accessed 4 April 2011).
http://www.britishtheatreguide.info/reviews/coriolanusnina-rev (accessed 
20 November 2012).
McCallum, M.  W., Shakespeare’s Roman Plays and their Background 
(London, 1967).
McEwan, Ian, Solar (London, 2011).
McGinn, Caroline, Review of Hamlet, dir. Hytner, National Theatre, Olivier 
Theatre, London, Time Out, 13 October 2010. Available at http://
www.timeout.com/london/theatre/event/81883/hamlet (accessed 10 
October 2011).
McKeown, Maeve, ‘Max Stafford Clerk Education Work Pack’. Available 
at http://www.outofjoint.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Max- 
Stafford-Clark-Workpack.pdf (accessed 2.7.2013)
MacDonald, Michael, Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety and Healing in 
Seventeenth Century England (Cambridge, 1981).
Madeleine, Richard, Shakespeare in Production: Antony and Cleopatra 
(Cambridge,1998).
Magnus, Laury and Walter W. Cannon, Who Hears in Shakespeare? Auditory 
Worlds on Stage and Screen (Madison, WI, 2012).
Maley, Willy and Margaret Tudeau-Clayton (eds), This England, That 
Shakespeare: New Angles on England and the Bard (Farnham and 
Burlington, VT, 2010).
Mansfield, Katherine, The Journal of Katherine Mansfield, ed. J. M. Murray 
(New York, 1921).
Marijuán, Pedro C. and Jorge Navarro, ‘The Bonds of Laughter: A 
Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the Information Processes of Human 
Laughter’, Bioinformation and Systems Biology Group Instituto 
Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud. Available at http://arxiv.org/
abs/1010.5602 (accessed 27 November 2012).
 Bibliography 287
Marshall, Cynthia, ‘Shakespeare, Crossing the Rubicon’, Shakespeare Survey 
53 (2000), 73–88.
Matthews, Gerald, Moshe Zeidner and Richard D. Roberts, Emotional 
Intelligence: Science and Myth (Cambridge, MA, 2004).
Maus, Katharine Eisaman, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance 
(Chicago, IL, and London, 1995).
Menzer, Paul ed., Indoor Shakespeare: Essays on the Blackfriar’s Stage 
(Selinsgrove, 2006).
Merlin, Bella, Beyond Stanislavski: The Psycho-physical Approach to Actor 
Training (London, 2001).
Miles, Geoffrey, Shakespeare and the Constant Romans (Oxford,1996).
Miller, Alan S., ‘Ten Politically Incorrect Truths About Human Nature’, 
Psychology Today. Available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/
articles/200706/ten-politically-incorrect-truths-about-human-nature 
(accessed 12 December 2011).
Miller, Alan S. and Satoshi Kanazawa, Why Beautiful People Have More 
Daughters: From Dating, Shopping and Praying to Going to War and 
Becoming a Billionaire (London, 2007).
Miola, Robert S., Shakespeare and Classical Tragedy: The Influence of Seneca 
(Oxford, 1992).
Moss, Stephanie and Kaara L. Petersen, Disease, Diagnosis and Cure on the 
Early Modern Stage (Aldershot, 2004).
Moulton, Frederick, ‘Fat Knight, or What You Will: Unimitable Falstaff ’, in 
Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard (eds), A Companion to Shakespeare’s 
Works: The Comedies (Malden, MA and Oxford, 2003), 223–242.
Mullaney, Steven, The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in 
Renaissance England (Chicago, IL, and London, 1988).
—‘Affective Technologies: Toward an Emotional Logic of the Elizabethan 
Stage’, in Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr (eds), Evironment 
and Embodiment in Early Modern England (Basingstoke, 2007), 71–89.
Muller, Wolfgang G., ‘The Villain as Rhetorican in Shakeaspeare’s Richard 
III’, Anglia 102 (1984), 37–59.
Myhill, Nova, ‘Taking the Stage: Spectators as Spectacles in the Caroline 
Public Theaters’, in Nova Myhill and Jennifer Low, Imagining the 
Audience in Early Modern Drama, 1558–1642 (Basingstoke, 2011), 37–54.
Myhill, Nova and Jennifer Low, Imagining the Audience in Early Modern 
Drama, 1558–1642 (Basingstoke, 2011).
Nash, David and Anne Marie Kilday, Exploring Crime and Morality in 
Britain, 1600–1900 (Basingstoke, 2010).




Neely, Carol Thomas, ‘Hot Blood: Estranging Mediterranean Bodies in 
Early Modern Medical and Dramatic Texts’, in Stephanie Moss and 
Kaara L. Peterson (eds), Disease Diagnosis and Cure on the Early Modern 
Stage (Aldershot, 2004), 55–68.
—Distracted Subjects: Madness and Gender in Shakespeare and Early Modern 
Culture (Ithaca, NY, and London, 2004).
Neugebauer, Richard, ‘Medieval and Early Modern Theories of Mental 
Illness’, Archives of General Psychiatry 36.4 (1979), 477–83.
Nightingale, Benedict, Review of Coriolanus, dir. Dominic Dromgoole, 
Shakespeare’s Globe, London, 12 May 2006.
Ninagawa, Yukio, interviewed by Rachel Halliburton, Time Out, 16 April 2007. 
Available at http://www.timeout.com/london/theatre/features/2809/
Yukio_Ninagawa-interview.html (accessed 20 November 2012).
O’Donoghue, Edward, The Story of Bethlem Hospital (London, 1915).
Osmond, Susan, ‘“Her Infinite Variety”: Representations of Shakespeare’s 
Cleopatra in Fashion, Film and Theatre’, Film, Fashion and Consumption 
1.1 (February 2011), 55–79.
Panksepp, Jaak, ‘The Riddle of Laughter: Neural and Psychoevolutionary 
Underpinnings of Joy’, Current Directions in Psychological Science 19.6 
(December 2000).
Panksepp, J. and J. Burgdorf, ‘Laughing Rats? Playful Tickling Arouses 
High-frequency Ultrasonic Chirping in Young Rodents’, in S. Hameroff, 
D. Chalmers and A. Kazniak (eds), Towards a Science of Consciousness 
(Cambridge, MA, 1999).
Paster, Gail Kern, Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakesperean Stage 
(Chicago, IL and London, 2004).
Paster, Gail Kern, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson (eds), Reading 
the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion 
(Philadephia, PA, 2004).
Pender, Stephen, ‘Rhetoric, Grief and the Imagination in Early Modern 
England’, Philosophy and Rhetoric 43.1 (2010), 54–85.
Peter, John, Review of The Changeling, dir. Declan Donnellan, Cheek by Jowl 
and BITE: 2006, Barbican, Sunday Times 21 May 2006.
Petersen, Kaara L., ‘Performing Arts: Hysterical Disease, Exorcism, and 
Shakespeare’s Theatre’, in Stephanie Moss and Kaara L. Petersen, 
Disease, Diagnosis and Cure on the Early Modern Stage (Aldershot, 2004).
Pfister, Manfred ed., A History of English Laughter: Laughter from Beowulf to 
Beckett and Beyond (Amsterdam and New York, 2002).
Phillipy, Patricia, Women, Death and Literature in Post-Reformation England 
(Cambridge, 2002).
Pigman, G. W. III, Grief and the English Renaissance Elegy (Cambridge, 
1985).
 Bibliography 289
Porter, Roy, Mind Forg’d Manacles: A History of Madness in England from the 
Restoration to the Regency (London, 1990).
Proudfoot, Richard, ‘Peter Brook and Shakespeare’, in James Redmond ed., 
Themes In Drama 2: Drama and Mimesis (Cambridge, 1980).
Provine, Robert R., Laughter, A Scientific Investigation (London, 2004).
Redmond, James (ed.), Themes In Drama 2: Drama and Mimesis (Cambridge, 
1980).
Reed, Robert, Bedlam on the Jacobean Stage (London,1952).
Reynolds, Paige Martin, ‘Mourning and Memory in Richard III’, ANQ 
(2008), 19–25.
Rist, Thomas, Revenge Tragedy and the Drama of Commemoration (Aldershot, 
2008).
Rogers, Jami, Review of Hamlet, dir. Hytner, National Theatre, Internet 
Shakespeare Editions, 3 October 2010. Available at http://isechronicle.
uvic.ca/index.php/Ham?cat=114 (accessed 11 October 2011).
Rosenwein, Barbara H., ‘Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions’, 
Passions in Context, an International Journal for the History of the Emotions 
1 (2010) Available at www.passionsincontext.de/uploads/media/01_
Rosenwein.pdf (accessed 1 April 2012).
Royster, F. T., Becoming Cleopatra: The Shifting Image of an Icon (Basingstoke, 
2003).
Rublack, Ulinka, ‘Fluxes: The Early Modern Body and the Emotions’, 
History Workshop Journal 53 (2002), 1–16.
Rutter, Carol Chilllington, Enter the Body: Women and Representation on 
Shakespeare’s Stage (London, 2001).
Saito, Fumikazu, ‘Perception and Optics in the 16th Century: Some Features 
of Della Porta’s Theory of Vision’, Circumscribere 8 (2010), 28–35.
Saldago, Gamini, Eyewitnesses of Shakespeare: First Hand Accounts of 
Performance, 1590–1890 (London, 1975).
Schafer, E., ‘Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, the Male Gaze, and Madonna: 
Performance Dilemmas’, CTR 2.3 (2002), 7–16.
Schafer, Elizabeth, Commentary on William Shakespeare, The Taming of the 
Shrew, Shakespeare in Production series (Cambridge, 2002).
Schalkwyk, David, ‘Is Love an Emotion?: Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and 
Antony and Cleopatra’, Symploke 18.1–2 (2010), 99–130.
Schanze, Ernest, The Problem Plays of Shakespeare (Oxford, 2005).
Schiesari, Juliana, The Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis 
and the Symbolics of Loss (Ithaca, NY, 1992).
Schiff, Stacy, Cleopatra: A Life (New York, 2010).
Schoenfeldt, Michael, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 
1996).
—‘Give Sorrow Words: Emotional Loss and the Articulation of Temperament 
290 Bibliography
in Early Modern England’, in Basil Dufallo and Peggy McCracken (eds), 
Dead Lovers: Erotic Bonds and the Study of Premodern Europe (Ann Arbor, 
MI, 2006), 143–164.
Schwarz, Kathryn, ‘My Intents are Fix’d: Constant Will in All’s Well that 
Ends Well’, Shakespeare Quarterly 58.2 (Summer 2007), 200–229.
Scodel, Joshua, Excess and the Mean in Early Modern Literature (Princeton, 
NJ, 2002).
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, Tendencies (Durham, NC, 1993).
Shanbag, Sunil, Interview with Andrew Dickson. Available at http://
firstpageonlineuknews.co.uk/world-shakespeare-festival-around-the-
globe-in-37-plays-3707 (accessed 5 November 2012).
Shakespeare’s Globe, http://www.shakespearesglobe.com/theatre/on-stage 
(accessed 9 February 2012).
Sheriff, William E., ‘The Grotesque Comedy of Richard III’, Studies in the 
Literary Imagination 5.1 (1972), 51–64.
Sherman, Nancy, ‘Stoic Meditations and the Shaping of Character. The 
Case of Educating the Military’, in David Carr and John Haldane (eds), 
Spirituality, Philosophy and Education (London, 2003), 65–78.
Smith, Bruce, Shakespeare and Masculinity (Oxford, 2000).
Solga, Kim, Violence Against Women in Early Modern Performance. Invisible 
Acts (Basingstoke, 2009).
Spargo, R. Clifton, The Ethics of Mourning: Grief and Responsibility in 
Elegiac Literature (Baltimore, MD and London, 2004).
Spencer Kingsbury, Melina, ‘Kate’s Froward Humour: Historicizing Affect 
in “The Taming of the Shrew” ’, South Atlantic Modern Language 
Association 69, 1 (winter 2004), 61–84.
Spenser, Charles, Review of Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, National Theatre, 
Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2010.
—Review of All’s Well that Ends Well, dir. John Dove, Shakespeare’s Globe, 
Daily Telegraph, 9 May 2011.
Stapleton, M. L., Fated Sky, The Femina Furens in Shakespeare (Newark, DE 
and London, 2000).
Stanislavski, Konstantin, An Actor’s Work, trans. Jean Benedetti (Abingdon 
and New York, 2008).
—Creating a Role, trans. Elizabeth Hapgood (London 1981).
Steggle, Matthew, Laughing and Weeping in the Early Modern Theatre 
(Aldershot, 2007).
Stern, Tiffany, ‘Taking Part: Actors and Audiences on the Stage at 
Blackfriars’, in Paul Menzer ed., Indoor Shakespeare: Essays on the 
Blackfriar’s Stage (Selinsgrove, 2006), 35–53.
Strier, Richard, Resistant Structures: Particularity, Radicalism and Renaissance 
Texts (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1995).
 Bibliography 291
—The Unrepentant Renaissance (Chicago, IL, 2011)
Suzman, Janet, ‘A Word from the Director’, programme note to Antony and 
Cleopatra, Chichester Festival Theatre, 2012.
Svendsen, Zoe, ‘“A Mad Qualm Within this Hour”: The dramaturgical 
Challenges of Middleton and Rowley’s The Changeling (1622) in 
Modern Production’, paper given at ‘Confined Spaces: Considering 
Madness, Psychiatry, and Performance’, AHRC Network: Isolated Acts 
(Cambridge, 2012).
Tarlow, Sarah, Ritual, Belief and the Dead in Early Modern Britain and 
Ireland (Cambridge, 2010).
Taylor, Gary, Reinventing Shakespeare: A Cultural History from the Restoration 
to the Present (London, 1990).
Taylor, Millie, ‘Don’t Dream It, Be It: Exploring Signification, Empathy 
and Mimesis in Relation to The Rocky Horror Show’, Studies in Musical 
Theatre 1.1 (2007), 57–71.
Taylor, Paul, Review of Coriolanus, dir. Dominic Dromgoole, Shakespeare’s 
Globe, Independent, 11 May 2006.
—Review of All’s Well that Ends Well, dir. John Dove, Shakespeare’s Globe, 
Independent, 10 May 2011.
—Musical Theatre, Realism and Entertainment (Farnham, 2012).
—Review of Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Janet Suzman, Chichester Festival 
Theatre, Independent, 18 September 2012.
—Review of The Changeling, dir. Joe Hill-Gibbons, Young Vic, 3 February 
2012.
Tillyard, E. M. W., Shakespeare’s Problem Plays (London, 1951).
Torture Museum, Amsterdam, www.torturemuseum.com (accessed 27 
October 2012).
Torture Museum, ‘Tortura, Inquizione, Pena de Morte’. Available at http://
www.torturamuseum.com/this.html (accessed 9 February 2012).
Trevor, Douglas, The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 2004).
Ure, Peter, Shakespeare: The Problem Plays (London, 1961).
van Vugt, Mark, Charlie Hardy, Julie Stow and Robin Dunbar, ‘Laughter as 
Social Lubricant: A Biosocial Hypothesis about the Pro-social Functions 
of Laughter and Humor’. Available at www.professormarkvanvugt.com/
files/LaughterasSocialLubricant.pdf (accessed 20 November 2012).
Virtualtourist.com, http://www.virtualtourist.com/travel/Europe/Czech_ 
Republic/Hlavni_Mesto_Praha/Prague-400455/Things_To_
Do-Prague-Torture_Museum-BR-1.html (accessed 27 October 2012).
Watson, Donald G., Shakespeare’s Early History Plays (Basingstoke, 1990).
Webster, Charles ed., Health, Medicine and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century 
(Cambridge, 1979).
292 Bibliography
Weimann, Robert and Douglas Bruster, Shakespeare and the Power of 
Performance (Cambridge, 2008).
Weinstein, Charles, Review of Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, National 
Theatre, Olivier Theatre, London, 2010, Internet Shakespeare Editions 2 
February 2011. Available at http://isechronicle.uvic.ca/index.php/Ham 
(accessed 10 October 2011).
Welch, Kate, ‘Making Mourning Show: Hamlet and Affective Public-
Making’, Performance Research 16.2 (2011), 74–82.
Wells, Stanley, Shakespeare, Sex and Love (Oxford, 2010).
Wiles, David, The Shakespearean Clown (Cambridge, 1987).
Woodall, James, Review of Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, 8 October 2010. 
Available at http://www.theartsdesk.com/theatre/hamlet-national-
theatre (accessed 10 October 2011).
Woods, Penelope, ‘Globe Audiences: Spectatorship and Reconstruction at 
Shakespeare’s Globe’ (Ph.D. thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 
2011).
Worthen, W. B., Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance (Cambridge, 
2003).
Wren, Celia, ‘“As You Litigate It”’, American Theatre, 26.6 (July–August 
2009), 42–43.
Zeki, S. ‘The Neurobiology of Love’ (Federation of European Biochemical 
Societies, 2007).
Žižek, Slavov, ‘Signs of the New Invasion’, New Statesman, 12 December 
2011.
THEATRE PRODUCTIONS AND FILMS CITED
Crouch, Tim, I Malvolio, Unicorn Theatre (London, 2012).
de Mille, Cecil B., dir. Cleopatra (film), Paramount Pictures (1934).
Hislop, Ian, Ian Hislop’s Stiff Upper Lip: An Emotional History of Britain 
(television series) BBC (2012).
Hurst, Michael, dir. The Tudors (television series), Peace Arch Entertainment 
for Showtime (2007–10).
Mankiewicz, Joseph, dir. Cleopatra (film), 20th Century Fox (1963).
Middleton, Thomas and William Rowley, All’s Well That Ends Well, adapted 
by Mihir Bhuta, dir. Sunil Shanbag, Arpana Theatre, Shakespeare’s 
Globe, London 2012.
—Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Trevor Nunn, Royal Royal Shakespeare 
Company, Shakespeare Theatre, (Stratford-upon-Avon, 1972–1973).
—Antony and Cleopatra (television film), dir. Jon Scholfield, Incorporated 
Television Company (1974); based on the Royal Shakespeare Company 
production, dir. Trevor Nunn (Stratford-upon-Avon, 1972).
 Bibliography 293
—Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Peter Brook, Royal Shakespeare Company, 
Royal Shakespeare Theatre (Stratford-upon-Avon,1978).
—Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Adrian Noble, Royal Shakespeare Company, 
The Other Place (Stratford-upon-Avon, 1983).
—Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Peter Hall, Royal Shakespeare Company, Royal 
Shakespeare Theatre (Stratford-upon-Avon, 1987).
—Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Giles Block, Shakespeare’s Globe (London, 
1999).
—Antony and Cleopatra, dir. Janet Suzman, Chichester Festival Theatre 
(Chichester, 2012); first produced, with some of the same cast, for the 
Liverpool Playhouse (Liverpool, 2010).
—The Changeling, dir. Declan Donnellan, Cheek by Jowl and BITE: 2006, 
Barbican Theatre (London, 2006).
—The Changeling, dir. Joe Hill-Gibbons, Young Vic (London, 2011). 
Shakespeare, William, All’s Well That Ends Well, dir. John Dove, 
Shakespeare’s Globe, London 2011.
—Coriolanus, dir. Tim Supple, Chichester Festival Theatre and Renaissance 
Theatre Company (Chichester, 1992).
—Coriolanus, dir. Dominic Dromgoole, Shakespeare’s Globe (London, 2006).
—Coriolanus, dir. Yukio Ninagawa, The Ninagawa Company, Barbican 
Theatre (London, 2007).
—Coriolanus, dir. Ivo van Hove, in The Roman Tragedies (Romeinse Tragedies), 
Toneelgroep Amsterdam, Barbican Theatre (London, 2009).
—Coriolanus (film), dir. Ralph Fiennes, Icon Entertainment International 
and BBC Films (2011).
—and Bertolt Brecht, Coriolan/Us, dir. Mike Pearson and Mike Brookes, 
National Theatre Wales (RAF St Athan, Wales, 2012).
—Hamlet (film), dir. Lawrence Olivier, Two Cities (1948).
—Hamlet, dir. Ian Brown, West Yorkshire Playhouse (Leeds, 2002).
—Hamlet, dir. Greg Doran, Royal Shakespeare Company, Swan Theatre 
(Stratford-upon-Avon, 2008).
—Hamlet, dir. Nicholas Hytner, National Theatre, Olivier Theatre (London, 
2010).
—Hamlet, dir. Ian Rickson, Young Vic Theatre (London, 2011).
—The Rest is Silence (Hamlet), dir. Tristan Sharps, Dreamthinkspeak, 
Riverside Studios (London, 2012).
—Richard III, dir. Malachi Bogdanov, English Shakespeare Company, The 
Pleasance (Edinburgh, 1998).
—Richard III, dir. Roxana Silbert, Royal Shakespeare Company, Swan 
Theatre (Stratford-upon-Avon, 2012).
—The Taming of the Shrew, dir. Connall Morrison, Royal Shakespeare 
Company, Swan Theatre (Stratford-upon-Avon, 2008).
294 Bibliography
—The Taming of the Shrew, dir. Edward Hall, Propeller Theatre Company, 
Old Vic Theatre (London, 2008).
—Twelfth Night, Henry Irving, Manager, Lyceum Theatre (London, 
1884).
—Twelfth Night, dir. Bill Alexander, Royal Shakespeare Company, Royal 
Shakespeare Theatre (Stratford-upon-Avon,1987).
—Twelfth Night (film), dir. Trevor Nunn, BBC Films/Circus Films/Fine 
Line Features (1996).
Shakespeare Theatre Company, Malvolio’s Revenge, Shakespeare Theatre 
Company Mock Trial, Sidney Harman Hall (Washington, DC, 2009).
Shaw, George Bernard, Caesar and Cleopatra (film), dir. Gabriel Pascale, 
Gabriel Pascale Productions (1945).
Thomas, Gerald, Carry on Cleo (film), Pinewood Studios/Anglo-
Amalgamated (1964).
Webster, John, The Duchess of Malfi, dir. Gale Edwards, Royal Shakespeare 
Company, Royal Shakespeare Theatre (Stratford-upon-Avon, 2001).
—The Duchess of Malfi, dir. Phyllida Lloyd, National Theatre, Lyttleton 
Theatre (London, 2003).
—The Duchess of Malfi (Ten Thousand Several Doors), dir. Jane Collins and 
Peter Farley, Prodigal Theatre, Nightingale Theatre (Brighton, 2006).
—The Duchess of Malfi, dir. Jamie Lloyd, Old Vic Theatre (London, 2012).
INDEX
acting xxiv, 26, 36, 134–5, 137, 178, 
213, 227
in Antony and Cleopatra 156, 162–7
in Hamlet xiii–xv
Stanislavskian conventions of xxiv, 
193–4, 232n. 19, 270n. 21
Adams, Thomas 229–30n. 1
Adelman, Janet 242n. 84
Alexander, Bill 99
Althusser, Louis xvii, 230n. 4
Andrews, Jonathan 76, 248–9n. 55
anger xiv, xxxi–xxxiv, 1–53, 222–3
caused by emotional repression 22, 
26, 29–30, 43
caused by social slight 2, 13–15
healthy expression of 10, 15–18, 30
as the humour choler, see choler
as madness 16, 21 237n. 41
Montaigne on see Montaigne
need for suppression, control of 
xxxiii, 5, 10–13
Plutarch sources for Coriolanus’ 
anger 18–21, 23–4
as a political force 49, 51–2
Seneca on xxxiii 5, 11–12, 14–15, 
17, 37
use in war xxxiii 5, 37, 39, 41
anti-theatricality xvii, 61, 106, 230–1n. 
5, 245n. 17
Apatheia xiii, xx, xxxix, 5–6
Aquinas, Thomas xxii
Aristotle xxi, 2–3, 5, 12, 13, 60, 84, 178
Arpana Theatre 133–9, 226
audience/audiences xxvii, xxxiv, 
xxxv–xxxvi, 22, 30, 31–3, 45, 
47, 48–52, 55, 61–2, 63, 68, 69, 
77–8, 79–80, 88–9, 90–1, 93–7, 
102–10, 135–6, 137, 138, 178, 
181, 192, 193, 194–6, 205, 227
van Aschat, Gijs Scholten 4, 44
Austen, Jane: Pride and Prejudice 29, 
108
BBC adaptation of by Andrew 
Davies (dir. Joe Langton) 29
Aveling, Edward 253n. 113
Bacon, Francis 118
Barber, C. L. 98
Barbican Theatre, London 46, 47, 88
Barish, Jonas, 230–31n. 5
Barton, Anne 120
Bassett, Kate 239n. 66
Baxter, Richard 201–2
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 
29, 108, 267n. 32
Becker, Lucinda M. 174, 175
Beiner, G. 121
Bell, Robert H. 108
Bell Shakespeare Company 99
Bella, Merlin 270n. 41
Belsey, Catherine 222
Benedict, David 86–7
Benson, Sean 254n. 118
Bentley, Thomas 264n. 114
Bethlem Hospital, Bedlam 83, 224
visits to 75–7
Bhuta, Mihir 260n. 61
Billig, Michael 240n. 70
Billing, Christian 45, 233n. 32
Billington, Michael, 28, 86–8, 90, 121, 
239n. 66
Blackfriars (theatre) 80, 96
Bloom, Harold 121
Boas, Frederick S. 119–20
Boccaccio, Giovanni 123, 125, 128




Breyer, Stephen G. 110
Bright, Timothy 202–3, 271–2n. 58
Brome, Richard 97
Brook, Peter 145
Brooke, Nicholas 80–1, 249n. 58
Brookes, Mike xxxiii, 47, 48
Brown, Ian 273n. 76
Brown, Pamela Allen 245n. 22
Burbage, Richard 168, 177–8
Burgdorf, J. 64
Burton, Robert xxxvi, 124–5, 139, 
179–82, 199–203, 272n. 58
Butler, Gerard 39
Byatt, A. S. 29
Cake, Jonathan 21–2, 25–33, 35–6, 
51, 52
Callaghan, Dympna 116
Carnegie, David 99, 253n. 113
Cattrall, Kim 142, 147, 149–50, 151, 
152
de Certeau, Michel 47
Charnes, Linda 171
Charney, Maurice 117, 118, 167
Chastain, Jessica 40
Cheek by Jowl 86
Chichester Festival Theatre 142, 147, 
148
Chitty, Alison 145
Choler 7–9, 114, 152, 214, 223
in Coriolanus 1–53
see also anger
Cicero, Marcus Tullius 180–1
Clapp, Susannah 86, 87, 121
Classen, Albrecht 58
Clement, Paul 100
Clink Prison Museum, The 73, 74
Cockpit, the (theatre) 96
Coeffeteau, Nicholas 10, 12, 14–15, 
114–15, 139
Cohen, Ralph 96
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 155, 263–4n. 
104
Collier, John Payne 177
Collins, Jane 78, 81
Copeau, Jacques 99
Correll, Barbara 254n. 116








Cultural Materialism xxvi, xxx
Curran, John 217
Daalder, Joost 85–6, 250n. 79
Darnton, Robert 56
Dekker, Thomas 154
Honest Whore, The, Part 1 (with 
Thomas Middleton) xxxvi, 55, 
69, 76, 91–7




Descartes, René xxxii, 198
Dezecache, Guillaume 246n. 41
Dickson, Andrew 133, 134
Dixon, Thomas xx, xxi–xxii, 231–2n. 14
Dollimore, Jonathan xxvi
Donnellan, Declan 86, 87, 90
Doring, Tobias 179
Dreamthinkspeak 207–8
Dromgoole, Dominic 22, 30, 43
Duffell, Nick 239n. 68
Dunbar, R. I. M. 246n. 41
Duncan, Sandra 196
Dustagheer, Sarah 96
Ecclestone, Christopher, 273n. 76
Ede, Laurie N. 140
Emotion
definitions of xix–xiv
as motion xxi–xxiii, xxx, 35–6, 42, 
143, 179, 198, 223, 227
see also anger; choler; excess; grief; 
laughter; love; melancholy; 
passions; weeping
emotional intelligence xvii, 231n. 6
 Index 297
emotional literacy xvii, 223
English Shakespeare Company 194
Everett, Ruth 152
excess, excessive
anger 9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 32, 37, 52, 
144, 223, 237–8n. 41
Cleopatra, Cleopatra’s theatricality 
and passions as 139–42, 144, 
146, 154, 156–7, 165–6
female passions, women as 152, 
156–7, 166, 188, 189–90, 
196–7, 226, 227, 268–9n. 34
grief as (Chapter 4 passim) 127–8, 
170–72, 174–5, 186, 189–90, 
196–7, 205, 211, 213, 218, 227 
268–9n. 34
humoral 8–9, 113, 125, 182, 198, 
199, 182, 204
laughter as 54–9, 61, 68, 78, 102, 
108–9, 225
love as 111–12, 115, 118, 125–6, 
128, 130–2, 138–9, 152, 167, 
225–6
madness as 59, 69, 97, 110
male, masculine 131, 157
in the musical 137
passions, emotions as 113, 179, 198, 
199, 200, 209, 219
political/Cultural Materialist 
concept, ‘in excess of ’ 
xxvi–xxviii, 46–53, 57–8, 131, 
171, 190, 197, 213, 219, 230, 
226, 227, 268–9n. 34
Farley, Peter 81
Fernie, Ewan 129–30
Fetzer, Margret 254n. 118
Fiennes, Ralph xxxiii, 33–44
Flaneur Productions 48
Fletcher, John: The Pilgrim 95, 100–2
Firth, Colin 29
Fitz, L. T. 151
Fortune, The (theatre) 96
Freshwater, Helen xxxiv–xxxix
Freud, Sigmund 183
Fulbeck, William 229n. 1
Galen, Galenic see humours, humoral 
theory
theory of vision xxxvi, 124
Gardner, Lyn 6, 7, 147, 151
Gaskill, Gayle 99, 253n. 113
Gaulier, Philippe 136
Gervais, Matthew 65, 66
Ghose, Indira 62, 66, 67, 71, 245n. 19
Gittings, Claire 173
Globe Centre Australia, the 99
Globe, The 97 see also Shakespeare’s 
Globe
Golden, Leon 178–9
Goldstein, Donna M. 244n. 7
Goldsworthy, Adrian 149
Goodland, Katharine 269n. 34
Goold, Rupert 191
Grant, Steve 145
Greenblatt, Stephen 34, 36, 38, 40–1, 
222
grief xiv, xxxviii–xxxix, 168–219, 226–8
and gender 188
as grievance 173–7
increasing tolerance of 170
Seneca on 182, 230n. 2
see also excess, grief as; melancholy; 
mourning; weeping
Gross, Daniel M. 2–3, 13, 15
Hall, Joseph 229n. 1
happiness, happiness agenda xxxviii, 
219, 221, 223
Hardy, Charlie 246n. 41
Harris, Jonathan Gil 15
Harsnett, Samuel 247n. 45
Hart, Christopher 239n. 66
Hawthorne, Nigel 99






Hippocrates 10, 15, 115, 201
Hoare, Oliver 152
Hobgood, Allison 254–5n. 119
298 Index
Hogg, Edward 207




van Hove, Ivo xxxiii, 3–4, 23, 44–7
humours, humoral theory, xxi, xxxi, 
xxxii, xxv, xxxv, 7–9, 170–1, 
182, 199, 236n. 15, 201, 





Hytner, Nicholas 206, 207, 208–9, 
216–19, 227
Ian Hislop’s Stiff Upper Lip: An 
Emotional History of Britain, 
TV series xviii, 231n. 10
Ibsen, Henrik 119
Irving, Henry 99, 100, 253n. 112
Jackson, Ken 249n. 58, 251n. 96
Jacobs, Sally 145
James I, King 230n. 1
Johnson, Samuel 258n. 33
de Jongh, Nicholas 30
Jonson, Ben, xxix, 97
Devil is an Ass, The 96
Jordan, Thomas 153, 263n. 100
Joubert, Laurent 60–1, 64, 65–9, 70, 71, 
72, 79, 85, 95, 107
Joyce, Justin A. 256n. 129
Kanazawa, Satoshi 244n. 10
Kapur, Sohailia 137
Karasawa, Toshiaki 4, 5, 6
Kastan, David Scott 117–18, 132, 260n. 
59
Kemper, Becky 98–100, 102, 104, 109
Kepler, Johannes 124–5
Kettle, Martin 240n. 71
King’s Men, the 96, 249n. 66
Kinnear, Rory 206, 207, 209–10, 212–19
Kirkire, Swanand 137
Kirwan, Peter 133
Knowles, Beyoncé 251n. 89
Kottman, Paul A. 115
Langley, Eric, xxxv–xxxvi, 125
laughter xiv, xxxiv–xxxvi, 54–110, 
224–5
communities of laughter/laughers 
58, 61–3, 64, 67, 71, 93, 94, 
102, 106, 108
early modern philosophies of 58–62, 
66
at madness 57, 59, 66, 68–71, 75, 
79–82, 85, 86, 88, 91–5
problems of historical interpretation 
55-
recent scientific theories of 58, 64–7, 
246n. 41
as socially exclusive or inclusive 
62–8
du Laurens, André 124, 258–9n. 42
Laurenson, James 214
Lavater, Ludvig 230n. 2
Lawrence, W. W. 119, 120
Lecoq, Jaques 136
Leicester, Margaret 24, 28, 30
Leigh, Vivien 140
Lemnias, Levinas 229n. 1
Levinas, Emmanuel 224
Lipsius, Justius 181
Liverpool Everyman (theatre) 191
Liverpool Playhouse 147
Lodge, Thomas, xx
Logan, Thad Jenkins 254n. 118
London Dungeon, The 74–5
Lopez, Jeremy 68–9
love xiv, xxxvi–xxxviii, 225–6
as disease 114–15
and gender 111–12, 113, 119, 136, 
138–9, 158, 167
as madness xxxvi, 235n. 51
as opposed to lust, xxxvii, 111–12, 
115–19
as a somatic passion xxxvii, 114
and theories of vision 124–5
see also excess, excessive
 Index 299
Loxton, Howard 7
Lynch, Richard 48, 51
MacDonald, Michael 248n. 55
madness xiv, xxxv–xxxvi, 57–110
gendered 69, 71
see also Bethlem Hospital, Bedlam; 
laughter; passions
Malahide, Patrick 208
Maloney, Kevin 240n. 71
Mansfield, Katherine 258n. 33
Marcus, Leah 79
Marijuán, Pedro C. 246n. 41





melancholy 115, 124, 170, 171, 175, 
179–81, 197–204, 213, 219, 
226–7, 271–2n. 58
weakening of link between sorrow 
and melancholy 201–2




Changeling, The (with William 
Rowley) 54–5, 83–91
Honest Whore, The (with Thomas 
Dekker) xxxvi, 55, 69, 76, 
91–7
Miles, Geoffrey 235n. 11
Milller, S. 244n. 10
Milton, John 178
Montaigne, Michel de 12–13, 15–18
Moore, Suzanne 221
Morgan, Rhian 51
mourning xiv, 127, 169–76, 183, 186, 
188–91, 192, 194, 196, 197, 
212, 213, 227, 267–8n. 23, 
268–9n. 34, 271n. 45
Mullaney, Steven 154, 270n. 44
Myhill, Nova 96–7
Nakagoshi, Tsukasa, 7
National Theatre, London xxix, 81, 145, 
172, 206, 207, 208, 219
National Theatre Wales 47–8, 49
Navarro, Jorge 246n. 41
Neely, Carol Thomas 66, 69, 76–7, 92, 
104, 224
New Historicism xxvi




North, Thomas, 18, 23, 159
Nunn, Trevor 99
O’Donoghue, Edward 248n. 55
Old Vic, The 81
O’Neill, Johnjo 191, 194–5
Osmond, Suzanne 140, 146
Painter, William 125, 128
Panksepp, Jaak 64, 66, 67
Parekh, Mansi 134, 135, 137
Pascal, Gabriel 140
passion, passions
and Christian philosophy xiii, xxv, 
161, 169, 174, 179, 180, 182, 
186, 200, 217, 229n. 1
concupiscible xxii, xxiv
control, restraint, suppression of 
xiii–xv, xxii, xxv, xxxi–xxxiii, 
4–5, 8–9, 15–16, 24–5, 42–3, 
46, 52, 152, 160–1, 165–6, 180, 
198, 223
definition of xiv
and individuality, subjectivity xiv, 
xvi–xvii
irascible, xxii, xxiv, 201
as madness xiv, xxxv, 21, 87, 114, 
180, 199–200
moderation 169–74, 179, 182, 186, 
203, 207
as motion xxi–xxiii
as somatic xxv, xxxi–xxxiii, xxxvi–
xxxvii, 3, 7, 11, 13, 16, 33, 
133, 116, 117, 123–4, 143, 169, 
170–1, 175, 185, 187, 199, 201, 
300 Index
208, 219, 222, 227, 260n. 59, 
271–2n. 57
see also anger; choler; grief; love; 
melancholy; Montaigne; 
Plutarch; Seneca
Paster, Gail Kern xxv, xxxi, 153, 200, 
231–2n. 14, 232n. 17
Paul’s Children 96
Pearson, Mike xxxiii, 35, 47, 48
Pender, Stephen 179–80
Pennington, Michael 147, 150, 151
People’s Palace Projects 55
Peter, John 87
Petersen, Kaara L. 247n. 45
Phillippy, Patricia 186, 268–9n. 34
phlegm, phlegmatic 152, 153
Piercy, Ellie 122
Pigman, G. I., III 170
Plato 115, 181, 245n. 19
Playfere, Thomas, xiv, xvii, 170
Plutarch Lucius Mestrius xxxiii, 10–11, 
12, 15, 18–21, 23–5, 33, 38, 
139, 140, 147, 159, 161, 162, 
236n. 11
Porter, Roy 248n. 55
Prince’s Company, the 96
Prodigal Theatre 81–2




Provine, Robert R. 54, 58, 59
Puranik, Satchit 134
Puritanism and anti-theatricality xvii, 
61, 106, 230–1n. 5, 245n. 17
Queen Henrietta’s Men 96
Rackin, Phyllis, 264n. 105
Radford, Mavericke 170
Rains, Claude 140
Rancière, Jacques 242 n. 91
reason, reason in opposition to passion 
xiii, xiv, xxxi–xxxiii, xvii, xxxii
Redgrave, Vanessa 40
Redmond, Siobhan 194
Reed, Robert 248n. 55
Reynolds, Paige Martin 268n. 133
Riche, Barnaby 99, 253–4n. 111
Rogers, Jami 208
Rowley, John 48, 49
Rowley, William: The Changeling (with 
Thomas Middleton) xxxvi, 
54–5, 83–91
Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC) 
xvii, xxvi, xxxix, 81, 82, 99, 
145, 146, 150, 172, 191 193, 
206, 227
Royster, Francesca T. 264n. 105
RSC see Royal Shakespeare Company
Rylance, Mark 43, 164
Sandford, James 229n. 1
Sanguine, sanguinity 64–5, 152
Savran, David 250n. 59
Schalkwyk, David 112–14, 198
Schanzer, Ernest 152
Schiff, Stacy 149
Schoenfeldt, Michael xxi, xxv
Schwarz, Kathryn 128
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky xxvii
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus xxxii, xxxiii, 
5–6, 11–12, 14, 15, 17, 37, 182, 
189–90, 192, 230n. 2, 237–8n. 
41, 268n. 33
Sex and the City (TV series) 151
Shakespeare as cultural phenomenon, 
Shakespeare industry 
xxviii–xxxi
Shakespeare’s Globe (reconstruction of 
the Globe theatre, London) 
xxviii, xxxiii, 21, 22, 24, 25, 
27, 31, 32, 43, 44, 53, 73, 74, 
121, 131–2, 135–6, 164, 226
Shakespeare Theatre Company, 
Washington DC 100
Shakespeare, William
All’s Well that Ends Well xxxvii, 
111–12, 117–39, 166, 167
Antony and Cleopatra xxxvii–xxxviii, 
111–12, 131, 139–67
As You Like It 62–3
 Index 301
Coriolanus xxiii, xxxiii–xxxiv, xxxvii, 
1–53
Hamlet xiii–xvi, xvii, xxxix, xxxviii, 
xxxix, 10, 55, 70–1, 72, 83, 96, 
128, 156, 164, 165, 167, 172, 
173, 174, 175, 176–7, 179, 
181, 187
and grief, melancholy 197–219
Henry IV plays 128
Part 1 xxiii
Henry V 72
Henry VI triology 1 I72, 176, 184
Part 1 188, 197
Part 2 184
Part 3 176, 186–7, 205
King Lear 3, 8, 9, 36, 69, 72, 83, 100, 
117, 187, 191
Measure for Measure 56–7, 121, 132, 
264n. 114
Midsummer Night’s Dream, A 85
Much Ado About Nothing 188
Othello 54, 58–9
Richard II 169, 188
Richard III xxxviii, xxxix, 172, 176, 
184, 186, 188–97
Taming of the Shrew, The xxiii, 1, 
7–9, 167, 236n. 15
Troilus and Cressida 168–9, 171, 172, 
177, 178
Twelfth Night xxxvii, 68, 75, 78, 
97–103, 104, 105, 108–10, 113, 
224–5, 245 n. 19, 254n. 115n. 
117n. 118, 256n. 129
Two Gentlemen of Verona, The 72–3
Shanbag, Sunil 133, 135–6, 137, 260n. 
61
Shaw, George Bernard 119









Southwell, Robert 169, 186
Spenser, Charles 90, 121
Stafford-Clark, Max 270n. 41
Stahl, John 195
Stanislavski, Konstantin xxiv, 193, 232n. 
19, 270n. 41
Steggle, Matthew 80, 250n. 68
Stern, Tiffany 9
stocisim xiii, xviii, xxviii, 10, 182, 
199–200, 229–30nn. 1, 2, 
236n. 11
apatheia xiii, xv, xxxi
in Coriolanus 4–6, 13, 17, 20, 21
in Hamlet xiii
Stow, Julie 246n. 41




Sumptuary laws xviii, 231n. 8, 256n. 129
Supple, Tim 243n. 99
Suzman, Janet 142, 147–9, 150–2
Swetnam, Joseph 154, 166, 263n. 101
Tarlow, Sarah 173
Taylor, Millie 137, 260n. 59
Taylor, Paul 90–1, 121, 147, 151, 239n. 66
Tennant, David 206
Tillyard, E. M. W. 120, 121, 123
Toneelgroep, Amsterdam 4
Torture museums 74, 247–8n. 54
Trevor, Douglas 198, 203
Tudors, The (TV series) xviii
Twite, Christine, 234n. 43
Tyler, Gerald 48, 49
Universidade da Quebradas 55–6, 
244n. 3
University of Rio de Janeiro 55–6
Ure, Peter 119–20
Versweywald, Jan 45
Victorian and Albert Museum (V and A) 
The 140–1
Vora, Chirag 134
van Vught, Mark 246n. 41
302 Index
Walter, Harriet 146
Watson, Donald G. 269n. 37
Webster, John, xxxvi,
Duchess of Malfi, The 71, 77, 78–82, 
96
Northward Ho! (with Thomas 
Dekker) 95
White Devil, The 96, 252n. 99
weeping xiv, xvii, 170–1, 174, 176, 
184–7, 188
Wells, Stanley 115–16, 118
Whetstone, George: Promos and 
Cassandra 264n. 114
Williams, Olivia 87






Woods, Penelope 234nn. 42, 43
Worthen, W. B. 220
Wozniak, Jan 234n. 42
Wright, Thomas xxii, 13–14, 17, 113–14
Young, Bartholomew 123
Young Vic theatre 88, 191, 206
Zeki, S. 235n. 51
Žižek, Slavov 34, 41–2, 51
